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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Evolution of the Control and the Interoperability
The evolution of the industry through the years have made industrial processes intimately linked
to Information Technologies, from this union, it is of particularly interest the emergence of
Control Systems (CSs) as methods to manage and supervise the industrial processes. CSs present
many challenges from the point of view of cybersecurity and interoperability of the systems,
which are current hot topics of research. This thesis focuses on the analysis of the cybersecurity
and interoperability processes for the control systems of the industry. Of particular interest to
us is the analysis of the control systems of Critical Infrastructures (CIs). CIs are industrial
infrastructures which provide the most necessary services to society, so their continuous correct
operation is of paramount importance.
To contextualize our research, it is important to describe the current industrial frame and
trends, which shape the design and characteristics of the control systems and therefore our
investigation. The work of this thesis started in the frame of the third industrial revolution,
and has evolved through the appearance of a new paradigm in the recent years, adapting its
contents and characteristics to the newly evolving scenario. This industrial frame has been
introduced as the Industry 4.0, also called the fourth industrial revolution, which refers to an
industrial movement currently taking place, and which is guiding the industry towards adopting
certain new technologies and paradigms for their modernization. As it is possible to observe
in Figure 1.1, this industrial revolution has been preceded by three other industrial revolutions
in the history of mankind. The first one coincided with the introduction of water- and steam-
powered mechanical manufacturing facilities at the end of 18th century, which use was intensified
throughout the 19th century [9].
The second industrial revolution followed the introduction of electrically-powered mass produc-
tion based on the division of labour, around the 1870s. While the third industrial revolution,
or the “digital revolution” took place around the 1970s until recent years, when the industry
started using electronics and information technology to achieve further automation of manufac-
turing [10]. Finally, the fourth industrial revolution became publicly known in 2011 under the
name of “Industrie 4.0”, in order to improve the industrial processes and competitiveness of the
German industry as part of the 2020 strategy for Germany [10]. This new industrial framework
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envisioned a paradigm shift from the traditionally centralized processes to a decentralized ar-
chitecture. The first approach to tackle this objective is centered around three key components
and technologies, i.e., the Internet of Things (IoT), Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), and Smart
Factories [10].
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of the industry and control systems generations, adapted from [1] and [2]
A more elaborated concept included the following design principles: interconnection and interop-
erability, information transparency, decentralized decisions, and technical assistance [10]:
• In an environment where di↵erent machines, devices, sensors, and IoT “things” coexist
and need to interact, new challenges arise with respect to their interoperability and coop-
eration capabilities. Wireless communication technologies, standardized procedures and
protocols, compatible interfaces and processes, enabling technologies such as cloud com-
puting, are examples of technologies and guidelines suitable for achieving interoperability
and successful interconnection and cooperation in this new scenario.
• Since a key component of this new paradigm is the introduction of CPSs, it is possible for
the virtual world to access to information of the physical world. This characteristic gen-
erates a generation of context-aware systems, capable of analyzing their environment and
making decisions based on di↵erent sources of data. Therefore typical control information
can be aggregated to context information for interpretation in a transparent way.
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• Decentralization is key to this new industry paradigm, where the a✏uence of di↵erent types
of devices and systems (CPSs, IoT things) to the di↵erent networks of the industry build
a complex scenario for the interoperability and decision making, therefore intelligent and
autonomous decentralized decision-making procedures are of great importance in order to
accelerate and improve the problem solving in this environment, where local virtual and
physical-world information can provide enough data to make well informed decisions.
• There is a current migration of the functions of humans in the industry, they evolve from
machine operators towards strategic decision makers, system administrators and problem
solvers. With the increase on automation, and the inclusion of sophisticated automa-
tion intelligent processes which can tackle the complex processes of the industry, human
workers are now in charge of the maintenance and management of the industrial systems
and processes. Current control systems and monitoring infrastructures now can gather
relevant information about the behavior and dynamics of the industrial infrastructures,
complementing them with contextual information about the physical world provided by the
CPSs. This, therefore, results in e cient industrial procedures which are well structured in
order to provide important information for rapid problem solving and maintenance tasks.
We find, therefore, that control systems and monitoring processes are also key elements for the
correct operation of the industry. Together with the discussed technologies and principles, we
understand that one of the main challenges of the Industry 4.0 is adapting the control processes
traditionally used during the third industrial revolution, to this new scenario and paradigm. As
we can see in Figure 1.1, control systems have also evolved over the years, to accommodate to
the new arising needs of the industry. It is the focus of our interest to better understand the
characteristics and capabilities of these control systems, and the new requirements they need to
comply with in order to tackle the challenges the Industry 4.0 presents.
Thus, we position our research in this transition stage which represents the need to adapt the
existing systems (control systems in particular) to the newly appeared technologies and solutions.
Although in this tesis we discuss Industry 4.0, we do not claim an strict adherence to the actual
Industry 4.0 paradigm, since this framework emerged during the course of our work. However
we adapt our solutions and objectives to observe some of the new principles and characteristics
brought by this new industrial revolution and, for simplicity, hereafter we refer to our context
framework as Industry 4.0. To better understand and characterize our research, we will not
focus on the control systems of a generic industry, rather we will contextualize our research
on the control systems in charge of the Smart Grid (SG) [11], which can be viewed as the
intelligent version of the traditional electric grid, where the energy industry meets the Industry
4.0 paradigm. Therefore, in the remainder of this section, we analyze the control systems’
evolution through their generations, and identify the main challenges and characteristics they
need to provide in order to successfully operate in an Industry 4.0 context.
1.1.1 Control Infrastructures and Generations
To better understand control systems, we can define a CS as a system that performs the man-
agement and the regulation of behavior of other devices or systems. In particular, Industrial
Control Systems (ICSs) are a type of control system deployed to aid the operation of industrial
infrastructures such as electrical, water, oil, gas and data. Examples of such ICSs are Super-
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visory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and the Distributed Control Systems
(DCSs). ICSs are deployed in multiple types of industries, but when they serve as assistance to
infrastructures essential for the well being of the society, i.e., CIs, they are considered critical
infrastructures in themselves, and they are denominated Critical Control Systems (CCSs).
Since first introduced in the 1960s, CSs have evolved through three main generations, i.e.,
Monolithic, Distributed and Networked, until the present day. Figure 1.1 depicts in orange
the course of these generations, which start with the third industrial revolution. The main
characteristics of each generation can be outlined as follows [1, 12]:
• First Generation - Monolithic: were the first CS’s architectures designed, based on a
centralized control mainframe system. In this design, the control mainframe was usually
composed of two systems: one being the primary control unit, and the secondary one was in
standby in case the primary failed. They were in charge of performing the supervisory and
data acquisition tasks for the whole system, i.e., registering critical data and managing the
monitoring processes in the system. The field CS managing the industrial processes in the
CI was built using Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) connected to the central mainframe.
These RTUs and field equipment had constrained capabilities (e.g., 8-bit microprocessor
with 4-16 KB RAM), and implemented low data transmission rates for their communica-
tion with the mainframe (e.g., telephone, radio, automation protocols such as for instance
Modbus serial or IEC-101), which provided limited functionalities to the CI.
• Second Generation - Distributed : the second generation of CSs incorporated a set of
new technologies based on IP addresses which allowed the control processes to be dis-
tributed among di↵erent systems, e.g., Master Terminal Units (MTUs), control work-
stations, Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs) or dedicated servers (configuration server,
database server, applications server, historian). The implementation of distribution of
control processes improved the control tasks robustness, pushing the primary/standby
configuration of the monolithic mainframe to the background, where this configuration
remained for backup purposes only. In terms of communications with the field CS, the
networks evolved to the use of large Local-Area Networks (LANs), controlled by MTUs.
Additionally, RTUs technologies advanced to include faster microprocessors and bigger
memories, which enabled the remote devices to perform more advanced and autonomous
processes.
• Third Generation - Networked : the latest advances to CSs are presented in the third gen-
eration, which is present in most of today’s CIs. The networked generation breaks with
the isolation concept traditionally implemented in the CIs in the previous generations,
introducing network designs which use TCP/IP protocol (Transmission Control Proto-
col/Internet Protocol) to establish connections to the di↵erent segments or networks of
the CIs via the Internet. These connections made possible the implementation of real-time
monitoring processes and communications, multiple sessions, and interconnectivity. Tech-
nical advances in the field CSs provided new capabilities for the remote devices, especially
regarding communication among field devices, enabled by the TCP/IP networks. New
control protocols (e.g., Modbus/TCP [13], DNP3 [14], IEC104 [7]) and wireless technolo-
gies emerged for their use within critical systems, facilitating fast control and maintenance
tasks in the field networks and enabling remote operations within the CI. However, most of
these network protocols and systems lack basic security mechanisms, e.g., authentication
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and encryption mechanisms, which, together with the discontinuation of use of the isola-
tion paradigm, introduces new (and previously unknown in this context) vulnerabilities
within the CIs.
CCSs, as previously discussed, are critical systems which correct operation is of paramount
importance. The need of protecting and securing these systems are well recognized and covered
in multiple guidelines and recommendations issued by many countries around the globe, where
the di↵erent nations establish varied protection measures for their CIs. In Europe, the European
Commission provides guides with the COM(2011) 163 [15], the COM(2009) 149 [16] and the
guidelines towards Europe 2020 [17]. It is of particular importance the presence of the guides of
Situational Awareness (SA), and the guides for preparedness and response [6, 15].
Taking into account, on the one hand the aforementioned security and protection recommenda-
tions for CSs and the discussed security problems inherent to the networked generation of CSs,
and on the other hand the new challenges and the change of paradigm in the industrial sector
brought by the Industry 4.0, there arises the need to create a new architecture design for the
CSs capable of tackling this new scenario. This new architecture would constitute the Fourth
Generation of CSs, as we can see in Figure 1.1.
The main characteristics we envision for this new fourth generation of CSs in a setting of similar
characteristics to Industry 4.0 are the (i) security intrinsic to the design, (ii) decentralized con-
trol processes, and (iii) ensured interoperability among the heterogeneous components coexisting
in the scenario (see Figure 1.1). As we discussed in the previous section, the tendencies of the
new industrial revolution are to introduce advanced technologies and paradigms that need to
be accommodated to this new situation, and tackled from the control point of view. There-
fore, the inclusion of technologies such as the industrial IoT and CPSs within CCSs needs of
an infrastructure flexible enough to take advantage of these decentralized infrastructures, while
technologies such as the cloud can give support to the interoperability processes, which always
contemplates the security of the system from the point of view of design. It is therefore, a hot
research challenge to provide architectural designs which take all these aforementioned consider-
ations into account for building this new fourth generation of CSs, something we try to address
throughout this thesis.
1.1.2 Cyber-Physical Control Systems: Technologies and Protocols
Cyber-physical systems, as reviewed in Section 1.1, are collaborative systems composed of au-
tonomous and intelligent devices capable of managing data flows and operations, and monitoring
physical entities integrated as part of CIs. The interaction between cyber-physical devices is
carried out through large, heterogeneous and interconnected communication infrastructures.
Through these infrastructures, CSs can process and manage measurements and evidence pro-
duced in remote locations, as well as distribute and visualize control transactions. The interfaces
that lead these activities are generally control devices with the capacity to ensure the interme-
diation tasks between the acquisition world and the control world, such as gateways, servers or
RTUs. An RTU, typically working at 22MHz-200MHz with 256 bytes-64MB RAM, 8KB-32MB
flash memory and 16KB- 256KB EEPROM, serves as a data collector or a front-end to reach
remote substations equipped with sensors or actuators responsible for executing a specific action
in the field.
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Cyber-physical devices can be categorized according to their functional capacities: weak, heavy-
duty and powerful-duty [18]. We can describe these clases in the context of the SG, where within
the class weak, we identify extremely constrained devices but with su cient competences to run
simple operations, such as 4MHz, 1KB RAM and 4KB-16KB ROM (e.g., home-appliances,
sensors). Devices belonging to the heavy-duty category are relatively expensive devices (e.g.,
handled-devices, smartphones) that are able to execute any simple or complex critical action.
Their microprocessors are quite potent, working at around 13MHz-180MHz, 256KB-512KB
RAM and 4MB-32MB ROM, and within this category, we highlight the role of the RTUs,
smart meters (8-50MHz, 4KB-32KB RAM and 32-512KB flash memory) or industrial Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs). Industrial sensors usually present slightly greater capacities than
conventional ones, equipped with a 4MHz- 32MHz, 8KB-128KB RAM, 128KB-192KB ROM,
and with the ability to protect the observed infrastructure through their sensorial modules and
manage data streams. Finally, the powerful-duty class contains all those devices with significant
capacities to address any action or application, such as servers, proxies or gateways.
A particularization of CPSs are the Cyber-Physical Control Systems (CPCSs), which we can
define as those CPSs devoted to perform control tasks. It is possible to find a correspondence
of the CPCSs in Figure 1.1 with the CSs in their fourth generation. Given this consideration,
these control systems need to provide the three characteristics previously mentioned, i.e., secu-
rity, decentralization and interoperability. Regarding the functional capabilities of the CPCSs
in themselves, it is considered that they can be classified as the aforementioned CPSs (into
weak, heavy-duty and powerful-duty), however, since they need to enable the decentralization
capabilities necessary for an Industry 4.0 context (see Section 1.1), we consider that the CPCSs
need to be medium to powerful-duty devices, capable of running advanced software for control
tasks, interoperability and local decision making. Other CPS devices belonging to the IoT make
an important part of the Industry 4.0, but their control functions are reduced or assigned to the
more powerful (CPCS) devices.
In terms of security, the technological competences of current CPCSs consist of minimal pro-
tection services that traditional situational awareness systems demand, such as perception of
the environment observed, the comprehension of their meaning and their projection in the near
future, initially introduced by Endsley in [19]. However, SA solutions for critical control appli-
cations deployed on large distributions can become insu cient since local protection through
dynamic services should also be required to ensure one of the eight priority areas defined by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in [20].
This priority area, known as Wide-Area Situational Awareness (WASA), not only focuses on
monitoring critical components and their performance at all times, but also on automatically
anticipating, detecting and responding to unplanned faults, and if necessary to restore states
before major disruptions can arise. This also means that WASA strategies should be consolidated
in a methodological process that helps the underlying system extract, interpret and respond to
threatening situations, as proposed by Alcaraz and Lopez in [3]. But even so, this work neglects
the relevance of studying preventive and corrective measures taking into account the properties
of the context, the features of the underlying system and its technological capacities. Therefore,
additional work on the security of CPCSs is necessary in order to address the aforementioned
challenges for cybersecurity arising from the implementation of the characteristics of the Industry
4.0 paradigm [9]. In the next sections we further analyze the problem of security in this industrial
scenario, in particular applied to CSs due to the criticality of these systems.
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The last feature we need to review for CPCSs according to the characteristics we have elicited for
control systems in a similar framework to the Industry 4.0 (see Figure 1.1) is the interoperability.
Interoperability for CCSs is an open issue for research, which is currently the focus of intense
investigation. We devote next section to review the approaches and e↵orts for interoperability
in CSs that are present in the literature.
1.1.3 A Review on Interoperability
Interoperability is defined as the characteristic of a product or system to work and cooperate
with other products or systems without restrictions. This desirable feature enables large het-
erogeneous infrastructures to be able to operate correctly in a cooperative way. Hence, this is a
vital property for the operation of CCSs in CIs. Especially important is the interoperability for
the new generation of CSs as reviewed in Section 1.1, where the new industrial scenario evolving
towards the Industry 4.0 challenges the established procedures by introducing new technologies
within the CI, such as CPSs and industrial IoT devices, where they all need to work in a co-
operative e cient way, paying special attention to fulfilling the requirements and constraints of
operation of the critical systems [21].
Achieving interoperability in the context of critical systems is currently a trending problem
object of intense research by the scientific community and the institutions worldwide. From the
intensification of e↵orts to provide a more interoperable smart grid [6], and the establishment
a more interconnected health care system [22], to the need of achieving more interconnected
and interoperable first communications systems to protect CIs by first response teams [23],
the need to achieve interoperability of CSs is rapidly rising. Governments are also urging the
industry to take measures to protect their CIs through a strong investment in cybersecurity, and
coordination strategies, where interoperable systems are essential tools [24].
Since interoperability is a major concern for the Industry 4.0, where devices and technologies
such as the Industrial IoT need to achieve interoperability between devices and machines that
use di↵erent protocols and have di↵erent architectures, there have been created several working
groups gathering the e↵orts of the industry to tackle this problem [25]. Organizations such as
the Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC) or the Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) among
others are joining e↵orts to create an adequate industrial scenario where security and interop-
erability are considered from the design point of view, and allows these new technologies to be
correctly integrated and exploited. Examples of these are Industrial Internet Reference Archi-
tecture (IIRA) [25] and the Industrial Internet Security Framework (IISF) [26] which explore
interoperability and security platforms from the point of view of the industrial internet and the
industrial IoT. The IIC proposes a three-tier architecture pattern (edge, platform and enter-
prise) which combines the presence of a layered databus with a gateway-mediated connectivity
for the management of the interoperability and interconnection of the di↵erent actors in the
platform.
However, despite the increased e↵orts of the industry, governments and academia, still few
other solutions and approaches have been proposed, most of them focusing on the simulation
and modeling of interdependences, rather than tackling interoperability itself. In [27], C. Alcaraz
et al. propose a system that enables interoperability among the distributed systems belonging
to the SG. This approach is based on a context-aware policy enforcement system which uses
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the role-based access control model defined by the IEC/TS 62351-8 standard [28]. This interop-
erability infrastructure enables the connectivity of di↵erent technologies belonging to di↵erent
owners and manufacturers in three stages: authentication, authorization, interoperability. The
systems participating in the architecture are supposed to implement varied access and secu-
rity policies. Thus, the connectivity among these heterogeneous systems is achieved through a
network architecture based on a supernode containing a policy decision point. This system is
capable of taking interoperability and access decisions by means of an expert system capable of
denying or establishing connections using contextual information and authorization and access
information.
Another approach to interoperability is provided by the development of the European project
DIESIS [29], which analyze interoperability from a simulation point of view, through the con-
nection of three di↵erent CI simulators. The interoperability approach of this work is provided
through the use of ontologies, and a communication middleware for distributed simulations.
The system implements ontologies at three levels, i.e., federation, infrastructure domain, and
simulator, which formalize the conceptualization of CI domains. Additionally, the middleware
acts by allowing the propagation of e↵ects from domain to domain, a capability implemented
by rules that specify the way each two interconnected objects interact.
Further e↵orts on the DIESIS simulation are presented in [30], where the authors focus on the
implementation of a demonstrator for the approach of CI simulators interconnection. In this
paper, through a proof of concept, the authors aim to analyze the behavior of the previously
developed communication middleware when coupling heterogeneous simulation systems, using
various time and data models. The system also integrates the ontology-based knowledge based
system, and the simulations for the interoperability are performed arbitrarily using pair-wise or
group-wise coupling.
Other works related to the interoperability of critical systems come from the field of interdepen-
dencies modeling. Works such as [31, 32, 33] focus their study on the identification, modeling
and simulation of interdependencies existing in critical infrastructures. This area of knowledge
aims to understand the infrastructures existing between CIs and their implications in terms of
security. Also, outside critical systems, there are multiple active research e↵orts to tackle inter-
operability between information technology systems, where di↵erent platforms and services can
be used for this purpose, e.g., OSGi [34]. They are, however, di cult to apply to CIs due to the
special characteristics and constrains of these systems. Therefore, we find that interoperability
for CIs is a multidisciplinar area which presents high complexity due to vastness of the systems
considered, the complicated nature of their interdependences, and the varied nature of their
interconnections (physical, cybernetic, geographic, logical interdependencies).
1.2 Security Issues: Lessons Learned and Risks
Security issues, especially cyber-security ones, as we reviewed in Section 1.1.2, are a critical
point to address in current CSs, as well as an important characteristic to address in the design
of the new generations of CSs. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have now
become essential elements in our society since they o↵er significant improvements in e ciency,
cost reduction and enhancing quality of life. Mobile computing technologies, embedded systems,
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smart devices, wireless communication and the growth of the Internet are becoming the major
driving forces. These enable management of information from anywhere, at any time and any-
way, allowing an easier implementation and quicker operation of the great majority of today’s
competitors’ infrastructures and their services [35]. In fact, most of these physical facilities
are highly interconnected to other national (and international) systems through communication
systems, and managed through software-based systems, where the atomic data are not only the
integral elements of the infrastructure itself but are also needed between infrastructures in order
for them to function properly [1, 21].
Critical infrastructures are interconnections of a set of systems and assets, whether physical
or virtual [1], which are integral to the social, political, and economic life of a nation and its
citizens. Examples of these infrastructures can be water treatment systems, energy generation
and distribution systems, finance, borders, transportation, etc. In policy terms, the European
Union (EU) considers critical infrastructures to be “those physical and information technology
facilities, networks, services, and assets. the disruption or destruction of which has which, if
disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic
wellbeing of citizens or the e↵ective functioning of governments in the Member States” [36].
Similarly, the United States (US) government considers critical infrastructures as those “systems
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters” -
extract from Law 107-56, Section 1016, entitled critical infrastructure protection act of 2001
[37].
Any protection put into place to safeguard CIs should focus on preserving not only the physical
elements of the infrastructure but also and most importantly its virtual (cyber) elements, as a
disruption of these assets may trigger the same damage as the disruption of physical components,
putting the security and safety of these interconnected systems at risk. In order to guarantee
that CIs operate continuously, they are monitored by CSs to ensure the correct performance
of processes and operations. In the current industry, these control and monitoring operations
are performed by SCADA systems, which are composed of hybrid integral systems where a set
of control processes is widely distributed over large geographic locations, but any information
has to be centralized at a single point, the SCADA center. Remote substations comprise smart
collectors (field devices) capable of interpreting ingoing/outgoing tra c, of sending information
to the SCADA center or executing control actions in the field. These devices, widely known
as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) or RTUs, are connected to sensors in charge of
perceiving measurement values (e.g., pressure) or actuators to carry out an action.
Given these characteristics and the intrinsic criticality of the CSs, any physical or virtual disrup-
tion related to communication or control may have devastating consequences for the continuity
of services and business. Government and industry entities are already announcing the impor-
tance of addressing aspects of cyber-defense in their respective critical sectors, where control
systems are in the sights of potential attackers [38, 39].
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1.2.1 Cyber Stealth Attacks in Critical Infrastructures
One of the most dangerous threats that CIs face are cyber-attacks, where adversaries can re-
motely perform malicious acts that may have a disastrous impact on the infrastructures. This,
together with an increasing number of threats, faults and errors registered, have alerted institu-
tions worldwide [38, 39, 40]. There are annual reports published by the di↵erent governments
through specific organizations such as the European Union Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA) [41] and the Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-
CERT) [42, 43, 44], reflecting the current situation and the severity of potential threats. The
number of specific incidents apparently continues to grow, requiring a major e↵ort to establish
security and protection measures immediately.
ENISA’s work on managing incidents [41] in conjunction with the National Regulatory Author-
ities (NRAs) of the 28 EU member states was established in 2012 thanks to Article 13a of the
framework Directive (2009/140/EC) [45]. According to the two latest reports, the number of
incidents caused by natural disasters, human error, malicious actions, system faults and third
party faults, and registered in the di↵erent sectors has already reached significant numbers. The
majority of them targeted communication networks (51 in 2011 and 79 in 2012) based on fixed
telephony (e.g., VoIP over DSL, cable, etc.), fixed Internet (e.g., dial up, DSL, cable, etc.),
mobile telephony (e.g., UMTS, GSM), mobile Internet (e.g., UMTS, GSM). With very similar
goals, ICS-CERT via the Critical Infrastructure Information Act (the CII Act) of 2002 manages
incidents from owner organizations of CIs.
According to ICS-CERT, the number of incidents became more noticeable in 2010, the year
in which information technologies started to be well-known, in which active remote accesses
(e.g., Internet connections, connection to sub-networks, use of wireless technologies) also started
to be exploited. The power grid industry is leader in the number of detected incidents (18
in total), followed by nuclear, chemical and water management, which received between 8 and
15% of the threats. The majority of the incidents reported were related to SSH (Secure Shell),
brute-force attacks, scanning and spear-phishing (2 out of 3 attacks) in the power grid with
the aim being to acquire credentials or personal information. As we can appreciate, one of the
most dangerous threats that CIs face are cyber-attacks, where adversaries can remotely perform
malicious acts that may have a disastrous impact on the infrastructures [46]. This is especially
true when these cyber attacks target CIs and the adversaries’ objective is to remain unnoticed
while pursuing their goals, and so we face stealth attacks, a sophisticated and potentially very
dangerous type of cyber attack. Usually these attacks are launched by powerful adversaries
with the objective of extracting sensitive or reconnaissance information without being noticed,
to sometimes, afterwards, use this information to launch malicious attacks to cause disruptions
to CIs. Some examples of these attacks, perpetrated in 2010 are:
• CIKR Mariposa [47]. Mariposa was a botnet, performing operations of denial of service
attacks, e-mailing spam, personal information theft, modifications in the web-browser’s
searches, and other similar cyber-attacks.
• Stuxnet worm [48]. The first malware code designed specifically for engineering controllers
(i.e., PLCs/RTUs). The worm, with the ability to infect numerous network devices without
leaving evidence of the attack, was primarily focused on reaching and manipulating critical
sections of a particular PLC of Siemens. The origin of the infection was traced back to
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the unsuitable use of personal media devices (USB drivers).
In 2011, 197 reports of incidents were received; the water sector, topping the list with 81 in-
cidents. Many of the reported incidents were related to spear-phishing for illicitly obtaining
security credentials or unauthorized access to restricted systems, as well as other relevant at-
tacks such as:
• Night Dragon attack [49]. Attack reported by McAfee, which was based on a combination
of a set of potential threats (e.g., social engineering) and malware (e.g., Trojans) to breach
the security of corporate networks in charge of managing control systems.
• Nitro Attacks [50]. Sophisticated attack that involved several companies in the chemical
sector, primarily private companies involved in research, development, and manufacture
of chemicals and advanced materials. The attack aimed to collect confidential data, and
infected machines in the order of 27% in the USA, 20% in Bangladesh, 14% in United
Kingdom, 6% in Argentina, 4% in Singapore, 4% in China, Taiwan, Germany and Czech
Republic; 2% in Hong Kong, India, Netherlands and Finland; 1% in South Korea, France,
Russia, Japan, Sweden, Norway, and Canada.
• Duqu [51]. Virus considered to be a mutation of Stuxnet but without the ability to self-
replicate. Despite this feature, Duqu is able to reveal private information, configurations
and accesses and has a similar behavior to Flame, described below.
The number of incidents remained equally high in 2012 with 198 registered [43]. 41% of the
threats targeted the energy sector and its control systems, and the water sector witnessed the
second highest number of incidents with 15% of the threats. The report of 2012 also noted two
important aspects. On the one hand, systems connected to the Internet and protected through
weak or default credentials were those that most received the most common attacks on the
Internet; and on the other hand, more and more the water sector was becoming a specific target
for attackers. This report presented some specific examples, such as the case of the water utility
located in Springfield (Curran-Gardner public water district), which was attacked from an IP
address located in Russia without leaving any evidence of this intrusion in the SCADA system.
Other examples of cyber-attack are:
• Flame [52]. Worm originally designed to open back doors, infect and modify functions, in
addition to stealing confidential data, destroying information or recording conversations.
• Gauss [53]. Cyber-spionage toolkit designed to steal data from individuals in the Middle
East. It gathers passwords (banking credentials, browser cookies, etc.) working in a similar
way to Flame.
In 2013, ICS-CERT received roughly 200 incidents [44]. The highest percentage of incidents was
found to be in the energy sector (53%) followed by critical manufacturing (17%). The majority
of these incidents were related to cyber-attacks such as watering hole attacks (with the intention
of attacking those strategic points (e.g., servers, websites) that are frequently visited by targets),
SQL (Structured Query Language) injection, and spear-phishing attacks. In the first quarter of
2014, the ICS-CERT reported attacks mainly on the energy and water sectors, followed by the
transportation sector, where the main vulnerabilities targeted were weaknesses and flaws in the
design of the systems [54].
In the following years, the number of cyber attacks have slowly increased in number and sophis-
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tication, becoming a widespread threat to the world’s CIs. Of particular importance is the fact
that in December 2015, the ICS-CERT registered the first known cyber attack to have a physical
impact to the power grid, becoming the first documented cyber-physical attack against a CI [55].
This Ukraine power grid cyber attack made use of spear-phishing emails with the BlackEnergy
malware in order to control the SCADA system and switch o↵ substations and di↵erent control
devices (modems, RTUs, etc.), as well as to destroy information using the KillDisk malware
[56].
According to the ICS-CERT, in the next year, 2016, 290 incidents were reported, where the
critical manufacturing sector accounted for 63 incidents, the communications sector had 62
incidents and the energy sector had 59 incidents [55]. Spear phishing represented 26% of these
incidents and network scanning and probing accounted for 12%. According to ENISA [57],
the top threats for the last couple of years include malware and web based attacks. As we
can see this phenomenon is escalating, in mid 2017 the WannaCry ransomware attack was
launched, infecting more than 230,000 computers in 150 countries. This cyber attack used the
WanaCrypt0r ransomware which takes advantage of a Microsoft vulnerability (specifically the
CVE-2017-0143 (MS17-010) vulnerability in components of the SMBv1 service - port TCP 445)
[58] in order encrypt the user’s files, demanding payments in the cryptocurrency bitcoin to
decrypt them [59]. This attack a↵ected multiple types of infrastructures and companies such
as manufacturing companies, oil refineries, city infrastructure objects and electrical distribution
network facilities, being Telefonica (the biggest Spanish telecommunications company) and the
National Health Service (NHS) of England examples of a↵ected CIs.
Through this review of recent attacks, we can readily identify the real danger behind stealthy
adversaries, and the need to understand them better in order to prevent attacks and counteract
them, especially in critical contexts. The concept of stealth attacks was introduced for con-
ventional networks by M. Jakobsson et al. in 2003 [60]. They were described in the literature
as those attacks in which the cost and visibility of the attacker have to be minimized. Cyber
stealth attacks “allow a skilled but not very powerful attacker to target communication networks
in a way that makes it unlikely that he gets traced and caught” [60]. This type of adversary has
proliferated in recent years targeting critical systems, since the first known high-scale stealthy
attacks on CIs (Mariposa, Stuxnet).
These incidents showed the characteristics and sophisticated capabilities of these types of attacks,
and proved that it is possible to adapt stealthy techniques used for conventional networks to
threaten critical scenarios. However, besides these highly complex attacks, we understand that
it is also possible to take this same knowledge on stealth attacks from general-purpose networks
to implement stealthy cyber attacks on CIs in a less complex manner, but with potential, equally
harmful results. CIs, especially ICSs, have, over the years, added ICTs to their infrastructures,
but they have not incorporated su cient security mechanisms to protect them [1], so they have
inherited many threats and weaknesses from traditional networks. This lack of strong security
mechanisms opens the door to multiple types of cyber attacks against CIs, one of the most
powerful being stealthy attacks. Our work is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to
undertake the analysis of this kind of stealth attack in CIs.
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1.2.2 Cyber Attacks in Interconnected CPCSs
Both cyber attacks and cyber stealth attacks threatening CSs and CIs around the globe can be
directly applicable to CPCSs and in general to the infrastructures transitioning into the new
industrial paradigms. However, there are slight variations that can change the scenario of the
cyber attacks and cyber stealth attacks to the CPC systems. This is due to the changes in the
architectural design introduced by the new industrial models, where numerous and heterogeneous
new technologies and types of devices are included within control networks, changing the focus
of the CSs from a centralized perspective to a distributed one (see Section 1.1.1).
These changes introduced by the fourth generation of CSs (see Figure 1.1), have direct conse-
quences on the security of the CIs and on how the CCSs can handle threatening events such as
system faults and anomalies, and cyber attacks. On the one hand, this new paradigm brings
positive changes which highly improve the security and defense mechanisms of the system, i.e.,
the use of a decentralized paradigm, and the incorporation of security by design within the sys-
tem. On the other hand, characteristics such as the need for interoperability and the inclusion
of new technologies (e.g., CPCSs, industrial IoT, cloud computing) result in additional security
challenges that might inject new unknown security impacts and vulnerabilities within the critical
systems.
In a more elaborated way, we can discuss that the introduction of decentralization for CCSs
have a positive impact on the security and robustness of the system, given that distributed
autonomous decision-making processes help the system take control decisions and actions even
in the presence of threatening e↵ects a↵ecting a section of the network, the CSs can make use of
their decentralization to re-route control tasks and responsibilities to other actors in the system.
This characteristic can help palliate and rapidly mitigate the e↵ects of cyber attacks and cyber
stealth attacks (see Section 1.2.1).
Additionally, the inclusion of security within the CPCSs from a design point of view positively
reinforces the strength of the CS in the face of threats such as cyber (stealth) attacks. As
we previously discussed, traditional control systems up to the third generation did not usually
introduce security mechanisms by default. CSs lacked even the most basic security processes such
as authentication and encryption procedures. This is the case of widespread control protocols
such as Modbus [13], where its version Modbus/TCP does not provide the measures to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of the messages between master and slave devices [61]. In this
case, lack of authentication mechanisms and integrity checks introduce numerous vulnerabilities
within any system using this protocol.
In the third generation of CSs (see Figure 1.1), some providers add basic security services to some
segments of their CSs, however they still largely coexist with legacy equipment and protocols
unable to introduce security mechanisms. Therefore, the change of perspective introduced in
this fourth generation of CSs, where the (cyber) security takes a relevant position in the design
of the infrastructure, helps improve the security of the whole infrastructure and cope with
cyber (stealth) attacks. In terms of the used protocols, the fourth generation will prioritize and
encourage the usage of di↵erent and more secure control protocols, in order to align this CS
layer with the requirements and practices of the Industry 4.0 for cybersecurity.
However, as aforementioned, when proposing a new design model for the architecture of the CSs
in their fourth generation, it is necessary to consider that the introduction of new actors and
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technologies within critical systems might cause unforeseen impacts to the CI. To take advantage
of the new technologies o↵ered by the Industry 4.0 without introducing new vulnerabilities into
the critical setting, it is important to consider security by default. This way it is possible to
provide a robust architectural design which provides interoperability with these new solutions
and that can leverage all the positive characteristics provided by this new paradigm.
1.3 Goals of the Thesis
In the previous sections, we have given the initial motivation of this thesis, where we have
presented the new research challenges introduced by the new generation of control systems and
their architectural design. These newly arising problems are the driving factors that have shaped
the research agenda of this thesis. As discussed in Section 1.2, given the extensive presence of
multiple cyber threats targeting CIs, and specially their control systems, interoperability and
cybersecurity must be included among the key characteristics that shape the design of future
CSs. The achievement of these essential qualities can be accomplished by the preparation of
a propitious control scenario which facilitates the inclusion of the technologies brought by the
new industrial revolution within CIs. CPCSs, the cloud, IoT, and others, bring new operational
methods into scene, thus to build secure and e cient CCSs for this new generation, it is necessary
to take new methodologies and procedures into account.
We, therefore, aim to approach the construction of a secure interoperability platform for the
control of the CIs, shaped by the characteristics of the fourth generation of control systems, and
aligned with the Industry 4.0 by the consideration of its tendencies and the inclusion of several
technologies belonging to this paradigm. The inclusion of these technologies, while fulfilling the
purposes of security, decentralization and interoperability desired for the new generations of CSs,
introduce new challenges in this scenario. Our ultimate objective with this work is therefore to
contribute towards the resolution of these challenges, with the purpose of proposing a new solu-
tion approach for the architectural design of a control system architecture which contemplates
all the characteristics and needs that the newly identified scenario brings to light.
It is possible to particularize these research objectives, by dividing them into di↵erent research
targets. Since we intend to provide an architectural design for the fourth generation of CSs, it is
necessary to take into account the environment of application of our proposal. We address this
design goal in a setting dominated by the tendencies introduced by the new industrial revolution.
Within this context, we focus on the needs of the CSs of the smart grid. We therefore have to
clearly understand the scenario, analyzing the inherent characteristics, requirements and needs
of this new setting, as well as the threats that can arise within this system from a point of view
of cybersecurity.
Based on this preliminary research, it is therefore possible to determine the security mechanisms
and services that our architecture needs to incorporate from a point of view of design. It is our
aim to establish wide-area situational awareness within our design, therefore our e↵orts on the
security research are directed towards this principle. Given the special focus on security brought
by the fourth generation of control systems, and the criticality of the SG for society, carefully
considering the security services implemented by the architectural model is one of the key pillars
of our research.
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Once established the security services for our model, we aim to design an architecture for the
fourth generation of CSs. This model has a special focus on security and interoperability, also
contemplating and including some of the technologies, protocols and services newly arriving to
the industrial context, where they coexist and cooperate within the CI in order to provide the
necessary services for the control of the SG. This focus on security and interoperability brings to
scene an environment of interconnectivity and cooperation which highlights the interdependen-
cies between critical infrastructures, to contemplate this characteristic in our design, we address
the scenario of interoperability and cooperation among a federation of smart grid providers’
infrastructures, which shape the outcomes of our research in this area.
1.3.1 Direct Contributions
In light of the research objectives described in the previous section, we provide a list of the
main direct contributions of this thesis, which are closely related to the challenges and goals
previously identified:
• We review the advanced threats that menace the operation of critical systems, in particular
we focus on the cyber attacks and cyber stealth attacks that threaten the critical control
systems of critical infrastructures, such as the smart grid. Since anomalies and system
faults have been largely studied in the context of CIs, we focus our research on the analysis
and understanding of these newly arising attacks to critical systems, and the possible
mitigation and countermeasuring techniques that can help palliating their e↵ects.
• We examine and identify the special requirements that constraint the design and opera-
tion of a secure interoperability architecture for the CSs (particularly CPCSs) of the SG.
We focus on modeling the non-functional requirements that shape such infrastructure,
following the NFR methodology to leverage essential requirements, satisficing techniques
and metrics for our architectural model. We perform this process twice, firstly to extract
the model for the secure interoperability, and later, the model for the protection system’s
architecture.
• We study the services needed for the secure interoperability of the CSs of the SG. This
thorough review covers the security mechanisms from basic services to advanced proce-
dures capable of tackling sophisticated cyber threats menacing the control systems at any
level. Our analysis is divided into di↵erent areas, i.e., prevention, awareness and reaction,
and restoration, which contemplate a robust security model for the protection of critical
systems.
• We provide a designed architectural model for the secure interoperability and interconnec-
tion of the CPCSs of the SG. This scenario contemplates the interconnectivity scenario
where a federation of SG providers interact through the secure interoperability platform
in order to manage and control their infrastructures in a cooperative way. This platform
takes into account some of the inherent characteristics and new technologies and services
present in the new industrial scenario, which transits to the Industry 4.0 paradigm.
• We present a proof of concept of our architectural model, which helps validate the proposed
design for the secure interoperability platform through experimentations. We devise a set
of validation cases that test some of the main functionalities o↵ered by the designed secure
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interoperability system, providing insight about its performance, capabilities, and pending
issues for the future.
1.3.2 Outline of this Thesis
In this chapter, we have introduced the principal motivation and scenario of this thesis, we
present the new challenges arising from the newly arrived Industry 4.0 paradigm, which shapes a
new generation of control systems, capable of including modern technologies and services such as
the CPCSs, industrial IoT devices, cloud computing, etc. In order to better understand such an
scenario, we review the principal components introduced by this paradigm, i.e., interoperability,
security and distribution, and contrast them with the existing infrastructure designs’ capabilities
and issues. We determine that the goal of this thesis is to provide a new architectural model
for the fourth generation of control systems, capable of contemplating all the key characteristics
and components of the new paradigm.
Before proceeding with the design, we review the main issues and threats that menace current
infrastructure’s CSs and CPCSs, in Chapter 2 we review these advanced cyber threats in the form
of cyber stealth attacks, identifying, providing a taxonomy and classification of these attacks,
as well as describing the main countermeasures and preventive actions that can be taken to
mitigate their e↵ects within critical settings.
To address the design of our architectural model, we initiate it by performing a requirements
analysis. In Chapter 3, we identify the main requirements and constraints for CCSs. The focus
of this chapter is on non-functional requirements, thus we follow the NFR model framework
methodology and the goal question metric approach in order to identify the requirements, sat-
isficing techniques and metrics for the secure interoperability and protection solutions for CCSs
of the SG.
Chapter 4 is devoted to the analysis and identification of the main security services and char-
acteristics that are needed in order to establish comprehensive security mechanisms in our ar-
chitectural model design. This chapter focuses on the security for CSs, one of the three main
pillar characteristics of the fourth generation of CSs. We study security at di↵erent levels, from
the basic security services to the advanced and specific security services for the infrastructure.
A special consideration is given to the prevention, awareness and reaction mechanisms that
can be implemented in our design, and their key characteristics and applicability to the critical
scenario.
In Chapter 5, we provide our design approach to tackle the problem of secure interoperability
for the CPCSs of a federation of SG providers. In this section we review the key technologies
that make part of our design and the chief interoperability and security components needed to
implement this new type of CS for the Industry 4.0 paradigm.
In order to better understand the capabilities and characteristics of our architectural model, we
devote Chapter 6 to the validation and analysis of the behavior and performance of a prototype
version of our design. This prototype version is presented through a testbed which contains
some of the main functionalities devised for the architectural model in the previous section. To
perform the validation of the proposed system, we design a series of validation cases through
simulations and experimentations which aim to determine the performance and behavior of
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the prototype model, and provide insight about the capabilities of a large-scale, real-life secure
interoperability system based on our original design.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the contributions of this thesis and describes lines of future work
and open research problems.
1.4 Publications and funding
The work in this thesis has led to several publications in journals and international conferences.
Next, we provide a list of these contributions, organized by the type of publication:
Articles in ISI-JCR Journals
• L. Cazorla, C. Alcaraz and J. Lopez, “Cyber Stealth Attacks in Critical Information
Infrastructures”, In IEEE Systems Journal, issue 99, pp. 1-15, 2016. ISI JCR Impact
Factor 2016: 3.882.
• L. Cazorla, C. Alcaraz, and J. Lopez, “A Three-Stage Analysis of IDS for Critical Infras-
tructures”, In Computers & Security, vol. 55, issue November, Elsevier, pp. 235-250, 2015.
ISI JCR Impact Factor 2015: 1.64.
• L. Cazorla, C. Alcaraz, and J. Lopez, “Awareness and Reaction Strategies for Critical In-
frastructure Protection”, In Computers and Electrical Engineering, vol. 47, issue October,
Elsevier, pp. 299-317, 2015. ISI JCR Impact Factor 2015: 1.084.
International conference papers
• L. Cazorla, C. Alcaraz, and J. Lopez, “Towards Automatic Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion through Machine Learning”, In 8th International Conference on Critical Information
Infrastructures Security, vol. 8328, Springer International Publishing, pp. 197-203, 2013.
• C. Alcaraz, L. Cazorla, and G. Fernandez, “Context-Awareness using Anomaly-based De-
tectors for Smart Grid Domains”, In 9th International Conference on Risks and Security
of Internet and Systems , vol. 8924, Springer International Publishing, pp. 17-34, 2015.
Book chapter
• C. Alcaraz, L. Cazorla, and J. Lopez, “Cyber-Physical Systems for Wide-Area Situational
Awareness”, In Cyber-Physical Systems: Foundations, Principles and Applications, Else-
vier, In Press.
The work in this thesis has been funded by a FPI fellowship from the Junta de Andaluc´ıa through
the project FISICCO (P11-TIC-07223). In addition, parts of this work have received support
from the projects PISCIS (P10-TIC-06334), and FACIES (HOME/2011/CIPS/AG/4000002115).
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Chapter 2
Advanced Threats to the CPCS
Critical Infrastructures, especially their control systems, have increasingly become the target
of many and sophisticated cyber attacks over the years. As mentioned in Section 1.2, critical
systems are specially vulnerable to cyber attacks, and Computer Emergency Response Teams
(CERTs) around the globe confirm the intensification of the number of malicious cyber attacks
launched in order to cause disruptions to CIs (see Section 1.2.1 for more information). Especially
harmful and dangerous for the CIs are the cyber stealth attacks, introduced in Section 1.2.1,
which are capable of causing great damage to critical systems or sensitive data leaks without
the system administrators notice.
As discussed in the previous chapter (see Section 1.2), there are many types of cyber-attacks
targeting CIs with di↵erent objectives at mind. They vary in levels of sophistication, rang-
ing from simple physical system’s disruption to advanced large-scale cyber attacks such as the
Stuxnet worm [48] or the WannaCry ransomware attack [58] (see Section 1.2.1). There is much
literature reviewing cyber attacks, and many reports and discussions on large-scale cyber stealth
attacks. However, taking into account the new scenario for the CCSs we depict in Chapter 1
where the new industrial paradigm of Industry 4.0 emerges, and brings with it a new genera-
tion of CSs including many new concepts and technologies, we identify a di↵erent type of cyber
stealthy attack that has not been previously analyzed and discussed in the context of critical
systems.
These attacks are the cyber stealth attacks which employ methods and practices applied to
general-purpose networks, and which in the new generation of CSs, where CPCSs abound, they
represent a growing threat. These attacks target networks and devices in the control systems
which were previously nonexistent in critical networks, and which now (if unprotected) introduce
new vulnerabilities within critical systems. We, therefore, devote this chapter to analyze in depth
and understand the characteristics, scope and mitigation processes of the main cyber stealth
attacks belonging to this last discussed category. And, since these attacks can be launched
against multiple systems of the Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs) e.g., CPCSs, the
communications networks, etc. we use the term CI in general for the remainder of the chapter,
referring to all the critical systems and devices (CPCSs, industrial sensors, communication
networks, etc.) which are objective of these attacks.
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Figure 2.1: Stages of a stealth attack
2.1 Stages of a Stealth Attack
To better understand stealthy attacks, we begin our analysis by determining the process of the
attack itself. Stealth attacks, as in any kind of (cyber) attack, are composed of three main
stages or phases that have to be fulfilled so as to achieve the adversary’s objectives, namely:
(i) stealthiness of the communication, (ii) stealthiness of the execution, (iii) stealthiness of the
propagation. Figure 2.1 illustrates these stages, where each phase is based on the preceding
one. Every single attack is di↵erent in nature, and can comprise one or more of the three stages
mentioned, always following the established order: first the communication phase, then the
execution of the attack and lastly its propagation.
In the specific case of stealthy attacks, they follow these three phases, but the adversary remains
undetected while pursuing his objective. However, it is important to note that the success of a
stealth attack depends on the intention of the adversary, since his objective might be to achieve
only one or two of the stages; e.g., the attacker aims to scan the ports of a system unnoticed,
to determine which ones are open, and he does not care about being detected afterwards. In
this case, therefore, by succeeding in the first stage of development of the stealth attack, the
adversary fulfills his tasks.
Figure 2.1 represents an external cyber attacker, that transmits the attack to the CI, mainly
targeting the communication networks and the system’s critical nodes. This first phase of the
attack is the least intrusive stage of the attack, since sometimes the only aim of the adversary
is to achieve this phase undetected. In a second step, the adversary achieves the execution
of the attack within the CI itself, this execution could result in vast damage or compromised
information, since the adversary remains unnoticed while extracting information or damaging
the equipment. The last stage of the attack represented in the figure, is the propagation of the
attack to other nodes or to other connected infrastructures. The successful achievement of this
step reveals a highly sophisticated attack, launched by skilled adversaries, with good knowledge
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of the victim system.
However, the criticality of the attack depends on the intention of the adversary, i.e., it is not
the same to subtract information as to cause irreparable damage to the CIs. Additionally, as we
have mentioned, each attack achieves one or several of the aforementioned stages according to
the objectives of the adversary, i.e., in the case of industrial spies, they may only want to extract
information without being discovered, and without causing any harm to the CIs. In Section 2.3,
we provide a review of the stealth attacks against CIs, indicating the scope of each attack and
the intentions of the adversaries.
2.2 AICAn Taxonomy
In the current literature, there is a wide variety of attack taxonomies and studies on cyber-
security for both conventional and critical systems [3, 62, 63, 64]. However, it is important to
stress that the majority of these studies do not consider new ways to address recent security
problems. For example, Lipson showed in [65] a chronological study of threats carried out since
1980, and most of these threats are still present in modern information systems. This means
that the area of security remains open, where more attention needs to be paid by the scientific
community, and more specifically, when ICTs are being adopted in critical contexts.
To complement these studies on stealth attacks in critical scenarios, we extend the taxonomy
proposed in [3], based on the security properties Availability (A), Integrity (I) and Confidentiality
(C), AIC. To this end, we consider the attack taxonomies given by the ENISA in [66], F. Skopik et
al. in [67] and the security framework for ROLL (Routing Over Low Power and Lossy Networks)
specified by IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) in [68].
The motivation behind the extension of the taxonomy based on AIC is the fact that besides
being attacked, there are multiple types of anomalies appearing all the time within a critical
infrastructure, therefore it is necessary to include certain indicators of anomalies to study the
e↵ect they alone have, and when (stealth) attacks are present. In the critical infrastructures
field, it is, for example, necessary to discern between infrastructural anomalies and control
anomalies:
• Infrastructural Anomalies (InfAn), related to physical events (e.g., pressure, flow, radia-
tion) relative to the critical infrastructure itself and its components.
• Control Anomalies (CAn), corresponding to any unexpected alteration in the control of
critical systems caused by Hardware (HW) and Software (SW) faults, errors or intrusion.
• Intrusion anomalies (IntrAn), associated with those malicious actions within the physical
infrastructure or its control systems that cause unforeseen incidents.
• Combinations of the above. For example, an IntrAn can trigger a CAn, or vice-versa; or
an IntrAn can produce abnormal changes in the readings values causing an InfAn (e.g., a
stealth attack).
Given the importance of taking into account the anomalies when detecting intrusion or security
gaps, we therefore propose to include a new class within the taxonomy given in [3], denoted
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here as AICAn and depicted in Figure 2.2. This new taxonomy comprises the following threat
classes:
Most of the stealthy attacks base their strategies on conventional threats against the availability
(A), integrity (I) and confidentiality (C) of critical data, its hardware/software resources and
user’s information (credentials and roles) [3]. However, as mentioned above, adversaries can also
take advantage of existing vulnerabilities or anomalies to attack the critical system’s AIC. For
this reason, we propose a new taxonomy based on AIC plus anomalies, denominated here as
AICAn, where, for each category, we identify a subset of threats according to the their nature
and type:
• Availability: these threats aim to reduce, as much as possible, the accessibility and dis-
position of resources and information of the system, infringing upon some of the afore-
mentioned SCADA security requirements. These threats can be carried out through a
set of actions related to Denial of Service/Distributed Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS), or
physical attacks. Depending on the intentions of the attacker (exhaustion of assets, op-
erational disruption or reduction of functionalities), we identify two subcategories within
the availability property: Resource Availability (RA) and Information Availability (IA).
• Integrity: correspond to those vulnerabilities exploited to distort critical sections of a
node/object or its messages, such as an overflow or implementation attack. Availability
attacks may also have a repercussion on the integrity of a node and its assets, thereby
violating one of the essential security requirements of a SCADA system. We consider two
sub-types of integrity threats: Resource Integrity (RI), and Information Integrity (II).
Additionally, if an adversary is capable of manipulating security credentials and roles so
as to impersonate the users or the administrator of the system identities, a threat to the
User Integrity (UI) and Host-User Integrity (HUI) can arise.
• Confidentiality: concerns the adversary’s ability to eavesdrop or deliberately expose sen-
sitive information belonging to configurations or critical data, i.e., information on op-
erational control (commands, alarms or measurements) or information associated with
connectivity, routing tables, nodes location, existing vulnerabilities, etc. This allows the
adversary to carry out subsequent attacks [69], and thus we have to di↵erentiate between
Resource Confidentiality (RC) and Information Confidentiality (IC) in our analysis.
• Anomalies: an anomaly is defined as something that deviates from the standard or com-
mon. If the system presents a specific set of rules/patterns of behavior, an anomaly would
therefore be the introduction of new unknown patterns, or the breach of such rules/pat-
terns. As we have stated, it iso possible to identify three anomaly categories: Infrastruc-
tural Anomaly (InfAn), Control Anomaly (CAn), Intrusion Anomaly (IntrAn), and any
combination of them.
All of these threats, especially those related to availability, integrity, confidentiality and intrusion
anomalies, can be the origin of the distortion or corruption of assets, destruction of assets,
denial of service, information disclosure and eavesdropping [62]. To form the AICAn taxonomy,
however, we have to consider the possibility that unforeseen events (anomalies) can also become
potential threats, which may open up new security gaps that can be exploited through stealth
attacks; or that these events may stem from these attacks as well.
Stealth attacks, as described above, happen in a scenario where the objective of the adversary is
22
2.3. Classification of Cyber Stealth Attacks
AICAn
Availability Integrity Confidentiality Anomalies
Resource 
Availability (RA)
Information 
Availability (IA)
Resource 
Integrity (RI)
Information 
Integrity (II)
User Integrity (UI)
Host User 
Integrity (HUI)
Resource 
Confidentiality (RC)
Information 
Confidentiality (IC)
Infrastructural 
Anomalies (InfAn)
Control Anomalies 
(CAn)
Intrusion 
Anomalies (IntAn)
Combination
Figure 2.2: AICAn taxonomy
not only to successfully perform the attack, but also to do so with a minimal e↵ort, and in a way
that hides his existence and activities to the largest possible extent. It is therefore important
to identify the methods or weapons employed by the adversaries, which are closely related to
the AICAn taxonomy [60]. Firstly, impersonation, which attacks the integrity (I) of the system,
and consists in introducing packets with stated originators di↵erent from the real originators,
which can be performed by spoofing IP addresses or by using communication frequencies that
have been assigned to others. This is always supposing that the originator of the impersonation
is an honest party.
Secondly, the lies weapon threatens the integrity (I) of the system, where the attacker propagates
incorrect information, such as incorrect routing tables. Lastly, overloading, which threatens the
availability (A) of the system, is a technique that has been proposed as a possible technique to
mount DoS attacks, where the attacker injects invalid messages (message with violated integrity,
replayed message or junk message). Technically, overloading is di cult to implement as a stealth
attack, nevertheless, it can be quite e↵ective in controlling operations such as route discovery
or routing table update.
2.3 Classification of Cyber Stealth Attacks
Stealth attacks can be categorized according to several parameters. In our review of the liter-
ature, we find there are five types of stealth attacks depending on the objective of the adver-
sary: (i) disconnection and goodput reduction [60], (ii) active eavesdropping [60], (iii) scanning
and probing [70], (iv) covert and side channel exploitation [71, 72] [73], and (v) code injection
[74, 73].
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2.3.1 Disconnection and Goodput Reduction
In this first type of attack, the adversary wishes to disconnect the communications network
(a partition of the network or isolate particular nodes) of the CI, or degrade its operation (its
goodput). Here, the adversary does not need to control the nodes, but only needs to make them
inadvertently get involved in the attack by tricking them into modifying their behavior (e.g.,
modifying their routing tables incorrectly) to cause disruption. This attack implies a threat to
the availability and sometimes the integrity of the victim system, constituting a risk to the IA,
RA and RI according to the AICAn taxonomy; also, these threats indicate possible anomalies in
the infrastructure regarding confidentiality (CAn) and due to the intrusion itself (IntrAn). This
attack is especially applicable to CPSs deployed in the field and remote networks, as present in
the fourth industrial revolution.
An attacker may disconnect a victim in several ways, e.g, M. Jakobsson et al. [60] provide
di↵erent variations of the disconnection attack in wireless mobile networks, where the power
consumption of the devices is critical to their operation:
• Disconnection due to the unreachability of the nodes: the adversary disconnects the victim
nodes making the other nodes believe they are unreachable (attack against the IA, RA).
This attack has several variations, implementing di↵erent degrees of stealthiness by using
these methods:
– The adversary routes considerable amounts of tra c through the victim until it runs
out of power. This attack is based on the cost that sending messages has in terms of
the battery power consumed.
– The adversary attacks all the known neighbors of the victim node making their bat-
teries run out of energy. This causes disconnection as well, but it can be overcome
by moving into another neighborhood.
– The adversary routes tra c to the victim node and its neighbors, causing a portion of
the messages to be dropped due to insu cient bandwidth. This version of the attack
takes into account the response of a router trying to reach a node several times, and
then concluding that the node is disconnected.
• Removal of an entry in the routing table: here, the adversary disconnects a node removing
its entry in the routing tables of the network, making the victim node “disappear” (attack
against the IA, RA, RI). It is also possible that the attacker forges the route discovery
messages to convince the source node and other legitimate nodes that no route to the
victim can be found.
• Goodput reduction: the disconnection of one or more nodes usually implies a reduction of
the goodput of a network. The adversary can disconnect a large number of nodes, corrupt
a large enough number of routing tables to increase the de facto tra c through each node,
or degrade the power supplies of a large enough portion of the routers, virtually disabling
them. This constitutes attacks against the IA, RA and RI of the AICAn taxonomy.
Stealthy implementation of these procedures allows a low exposure of the adversary during the
attack. What we have previously discussed are stealth versions of the common DDoS attack [60].
Regarding stealth DoS, there are several ways of performing this type of attack, for example,
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M. Jakobsson et al. provided an overview on how it can be carried out against di↵erent types
of wireless networks in [60, 75].
2.3.2 Active Eavesdropping
This second type of stealth attack comprises the modification of the routing information of a
section of the communications network of the CI, in order to hijack tra c from and to selected
victim nodes [60]. Here the attacker can perform tra c analysis and selective filtering of packets
without the knowledge of the victim, to actively eavesdrop on him and modify his behavior, e.g.,
making nodes of the network “disappear” and detouring the network tra c through compro-
mised nodes. This attack usually threatens the confidentiality of the system (IC, RC), thus
we usually see the activation of the indicator CAn in the presence of eavesdropping attacks.
Sometimes it also introduces risks to the availability or integrity (IA, RI).
The simplest way to achieve this attack is to corrupt the routing tables of nodes on the path
between a victim and the sender/receiver. The attacker can remove correct routing table entries
and add incorrect ones in order to force rerouting [60]:
• For incoming tra c, i.e., packets going into the victim, the attacker forces all incoming
tra c to be sent through a node he has previously corrupted. To receive tra c only from
certain sources, the attacker can selectively tamper with the routing tables, allowing only
those entries that are useful to the attacker to remain correct.
• For outgoing tra c, i.e., packets sent from the victim to another node in the network, the
attacker modifies the routing tables of the victim and/or the routing tables of the nodes
close to the victim forcing tra c to be rerouted through a corrupted node.
To corrupt the routing tables of the network, the adversary can use the very tools of the routing
protocols. The attacker can propagate routing tables where the entries are modified; another
option is to make use of the route discovery process of the network to include new routes or report
route error, in order to tamper with the routing tables. This attack was especially introduced in
the context of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in the networked generation of CSs, and
it is becoming more and more dangerous in the 4th generation due to the massive presence of
remote and distributed networks which use wireless technologies and establish communications
through the Internet.
2.3.3 Scanning and Probing
Scanning is a method for discovering exploitable communication channels. It implies a previous
reconnaissance of the network or a particular host [70] of the CI. The objective of port scanning is
to determine which ports of the system are open, and through them obtain valuable information;
e.g., which services are running on the system that are available to the attacker, what services
of the Operating System (OS) are being used, parameters such as IP and MAC addresses,
topological information, etc. The idea is to probe as many listeners as possible, and keep track
of the ones that are receptive or useful to your particular need [76].
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These types of attacks are the least dangerous in terms of threats to the AICAn of the system,
therefore threatening the correct operation of the system, but they present a threat to the
confidentiality of the resources (RC) and they can serve as a precursor to more powerful and
disruptive attacks, thus they need to be always considered and monitored. C. Yin et al. [77]
state that the port-scan is at the beginning of the process of intrusion, and there are varied
techniques to scan the system, e.g., stealth scan, fragmentation scan, changes of scan order,
slow scan, randomizing inter-probe timing, scan with forged address or distributed scan. G.
Lyon states in [76] that several techniques have been developed over time for surveying the
protocols and ports on which a target machine is listening.
This threat is present in the networked generation of CSs and would increase its presence in
the 4th generation since the CSs tend to be distributed and therefore expose their interfaces to
the Internet. While there are many industrial protocols and systems that can be probed, the
necessary inclusion of remote operations for control tasks have made them especially vulnerable
to scanning and probing attacks coming from the Internet, being the most common attacks the
TCP-based ones.
During a normal TCP connection, the source initiates the connection by sending a SYN (syn-
chronize) packet to a port on the destination system. If a service is listening on that port, the
service responds with a SYN/ACK (synchronize/ acknowledgment) packet. The client initiating
the connection then responds with an ACK packet, and the connection is established. If the
destination host is not waiting for a connection on the specified port, it responds with an RST
(reset) packet. Most system logs do not log completed connections until the final ACK packet
is received from the source [78].
To scan the system, this standard behavior is modified in di↵erent ways. Here, we describe some
of these variations, in order of degree of stealthiness:
• TCP connect() scanning : the most basic form of TCP scanning, where the connect()
system call of the OS is used to open a connection to every interesting port on a machine.
If the port is listening, the connect() call will succeed; otherwise the port is unreachable.
This technique is fast and does not need any super user permissions, however, it is easily
detectable and filterable, since the target node will log the connection and error messages
when the adversary initiates the connection to the port service and immediately shuts it
down.
• TCP SYN scanning : sometimes referred to as half-open scanning, since the TCP connec-
tion is not fully opened. The attacker sends a SYN packet, as it would happen to open a
real connection, and waits for a response. The response can be a SYN/ACK packet if the
port is listening, or a RST packet if the port is not listening. When the adversary receives
a SYN/ACK packet, he sends a RST packet to tear down the connection. This attack
needs super user permissions to build the SYN packets. The advantage of this attack is
that systems do not usually log these kinds of attempts at communication; however, it is
easily detectable if the firewalls are configured to detect SYN packets targeting restricted
ports.
• TCP FIN scanning : increasing the level of stealthiness, the FIN (finalize) scanning tech-
nique [79] is based on the idea that closed ports respond to FIN packets with RST packets,
while open ports ignore them. The FIN scan’s stealth packets are unusual because they are
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sent to a device without first going through the normal TCP handshaking. Nevertheless,
there are some systems that are not vulnerable to this type of scan, because they respond
to a FIN packet with an RST packet regardless of the current state of the port.
• Christmas scan: this type of scanning technique sends a TCP packet to a remote device
with the SYN, FIN, ACK flags set. This is colloquially called a Christmas tree scan
because of the alternating bits turned on and o↵ in the flags byte (00101001), like the
lights of a Christmas tree. Similar to the FIN scan, a closed port responds to this packet
with an RST packet, and an open port ignores it.
• Null scan: the adversary creates a TCP packet with all the TCP flags o↵. This is a type of
packet that never occurs in the real world. As in the previous two situations, an open port
receiving this kind of packet ignores it, and a closed port responds with an RST packet.
These last three attacks are denominated stealth scan attacks [78], because they do not usually
generate a log entry on the scanned host, and they allow an attacker to determine which ports are
open on a target node, without being detected by the host OS. Many attacks in the literature use
stealth scans and probes as a first stage in reconnaissance to gain insight into the characteristics
of the system, to later trigger a more sophisticated and informed attack.
I. Dainotti et al. [80] provide a study on stealth scans carried out by botnets, in a coordinated
and distributed infrastructure, targeting critical voice communications infrastructures. This
scan attack is called sipscan and probes each target IP address with two packets: (1) an UDP
packet sent to the port 5060 carrying a session initiation protocol (SIP) header, and (2) a TCP
SYN packet that attempts to open a connection on port 80. This attack is usually the first step
in a more sophisticated attack, where the attacker sends malware that infects the nodes of the
network to make them act to profit the adversary.
2.3.4 Covert and Side Channel Exploitation
A side channel attack is very powerful in practice [81]. Here the adversary measures side channel
information and is able to recover very sensitive information about the functional behavior of a
system, without utilizing its dedicated interface [71]. Side channel attacks exploit the external
manifestations of the system, like processing time, power consumption and electromagnetic
emission to identify the internal computations [72]. This type of attack represents a threat to
the confidentiality of the resource (RC) and in the particular case of side channel attacks that
induce faults in the system, the anomalies indicators that are activated are InfAn, CAn and the
IntrAn.
The aim of side channel attacks is usually to identify a “leakage” or source of secret data
(side-channel analysis), where the attacker can use the results of this information to identify
weaknesses in the system. The di↵erent types of side channel attacks are: timing attacks, power
analysis attacks, electromagnetic analysis attacks, fault induction attacks, optical side channel
attacks, and tra c analysis [71]:
• Timing attack : the adversary analyzes the running time of the system in order to extract
knowledge about the type of computations and the parameters used. The main targets of
timing attacks are cryptographic systems.
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• Power analysis attack : here, the adversary measures the power consumption of the system
to extract knowledge about it. There are several types of power analysis attacks, mainly
targeting cryptosystems, which employ di↵erent methodologies and levels of sophistica-
tion to obtain the information; e.g., simple power analysis, di↵erential power analysis or
correlation power analysis.
• Electromagnetic analysis attack : this kind of attack implies the analysis of the electromag-
netic variations of a system by the adversary. There are several types of electromagnetic
attack which target very di↵erent kinds of systems; however, this kind of attack is most
often designed for constrained cryptosystems.
• Fault induction attacks: the induction of faults in the system can result in erroneous
operations that can shed some potentially valuable information about its operation.
• Optical side channel attacks: here the adversary is capable of retrieving information via
the light emission from the monitors and LEDs (light-emitting diode) of a system. There
are di↵erent kinds of displays and LEDs, and the information that can be extracted from
them is varied.
• Tra c analysis attacks: this kind of attack provides the adversary with information about
the topology of the network, through the analysis of the tra c flows.
A variation of a side channel attack is the use of covert channels [73], where there is a hidden
connection between the transmitter and the receiver, thus there is a chance to extract or send
valuable information through the channel without the system noticing. There are two types
of covert channels: (i) communicating extra information to a host, and (ii) hiding the fact
that the communication to a host exists [74]. Covert channels usually take advantage of places
where random data is naturally transmitted, thus the encrypted information can be transmitted
replacing this data. This technique is sometimes referred to as piggybacking [82], where the
messages are hidden within the regular messages of the network. There are many varied ways of
implementing covert channels, and the targets are multiple. However the commonality behind
this type of attack is its dangerousness and its potential to induce multiple threats within the
victim systems, targeting most AICAn variables. According to N. Tomar et al. in [73] the
following vulnerabilities that can favor covert channels:
• Virus and other malware: software such as viruses and Trojan horses can be introduced
inside the victim’s system, to perform activities such as capturing packets and injecting
scripts into the victim’s programs.
• Important resources: resources such as system files, disks, RAM, etc. are valuable to
attackers, and vulnerable due to their criticality in the normal operation of the system.
• Data sensitivity : within the system coexist data with di↵erent degrees of sensitivity. The
most sensitive data is the most interesting information to attackers, and thus the target
of covert channel exploitation.
• Vulnerable protocols: several protocols implemented by CIs that are not properly secured,
or they do not implement security mechanisms such as authentication (e.g., Modbus [13]).
To protect the systems against covert channels attacks, it is important to strengthen their
security.
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• Design robustness: covert channels take advantage of principally two vulnerabilities of the
system: design oversight, and weaknesses due to the system’s design. Design oversight-
derived vulnerabilities are unintentional and unforeseen, however weaknesses inherent in
the system’s characteristics are strong obstacles to the security of the system and provides
a way of access for covert channels.
• Packet headers: as seen in [74], covert channels can be embedded in TCP and IP header
fields, with very di↵erent objectives and functionalities.
• Super user permissions: an attacker can take advantage of an unintentional, careless or
default assignment of super user permissions to processes, to create a covert channel.
• Handshake trials: communication protocols usually have handshake procedures to start the
transmission of information. Some attackers use handshake trials to transfer information
in an unnoticed way.
• Public resources: resources that are shared in the network, such as printers or hard drive
disks, are vulnerable to attacks if they are not protected by security mechanisms.
• Authentication: as we have previously seen, some protocols and systems lack adequate
authentication mechanisms, such as Modbus, DNP3 or ICCP [13]. This adds multiple
vulnerabilities to the unprotected systems, among them, the use of covert channels by an
attacker.
Most of these attacks introduce, as we have described, a wide range of AICAn threats, e.g., the
attacks that exploit flaws or use malware are capable of threatening the availability (IA, RA)
and the integrity of the system (II, RI), as well as compromising the integrity of the user and the
host (UI, HUI); the confidentiality of the system can be also compromised (IC, RC), activating
the CAn and sometimes the IntrAn indicators.
2.3.5 Code Injection
A code injection-based attack consists in introducing or “injecting” a tainted or illegitimate code
within a computer program, in order to alter its outputs or change its course of execution [83],
and cause di↵erent e↵ects, e.g., compromise sensitive data, execute malware, etc. These attacks
target varied types of control SW in the CIs, and pose a threat to multiple variables of the
AICAn taxonomy, allowing the adversary to interfere with the AIC of the system, and insert
CAn and IntrAn anomalies.
Depending on the targeted system’s characteristics and the degree of stealthiness intended in
the attack, it can be performed using two main channels: system vulnerabilities, and malware
infection (i.e., infecting the system with malware, virus or Trojan horses). Injections exploiting
design vulnerabilities appear when system designers and developers make incorrect assumptions
about the use of the system’s services, e.g., (i) the input characters of a field will always be
the regular and required ones (e.g., no colons, numbers or quotation marks are expected); (ii)
the input of a field will never exceed a pre-determined size; (iii) the numeric values introduced
as inputs in a system will always stay between the upper and lower bounds expected; (iv) the
client supplied values cannot be modified by the adversary (e.g., cookies poisoning attack [84]);
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(v) it is safe to take pointers or array indexes from the requested input; (vi) the input will never
provide false information or fake values (e.g., the size of a file); etc. [85].
On the other hand, malware can also pose successful and potentially harmful threats when
implementing injection attacks (e.g., Stuxnet [48], Duqu [51], etc.). There are multiple types
of code injections, and several ways of classifying them. We have decided to categorize them
according to the target they are designed to inject, thus these attacks can be roughly summarized
into the following four categories:
• Database injection: are the injections performed by the adversary to corrupt the databases
of the system, or retrieve valuable information from it, without having the proper creden-
tials to access the system. Database injections compromise the AIC of the system (IA,
RA, II, RI, IC and RC) and activates the CAn and IntrAn indicators of anomalies. The
most well-known attacks in this category are the SQL-injection attacks [75].
• Command injection: also known as shell injection attacks [86], can occur when the the
system allows software to execute a command line. Therefore the attacker can make the
system execute commands or functions to carry out unwanted tasks. This type of attack
allows the attacker to threaten the AIC of the system (IA, RA, II, RI, IC and RC) and of
the user (UI, HUI), in addition to introducing the CAn and IntrAn anomalies.
• Website injection: is the set of attacks that take advantage of flaws existing within web-
sites, browsers or web applications that allow the adversary to introduce code and execute
unwanted actions in an otherwise trusted environment (threatens AICAn like the previous
attack). The most well-known attack within this category is cross-site scripting (XSS),
which occurs when the adversary exploits a flaw detected on a web server to inject some
code in the server, for his own use [87, 88]. Related attacks are the Cross-Site Request
Forgery (CSRF) [89], where the adversary forces the victim to execute unwanted actions
on a web application in which he is currently authenticated; or the Server-Side Includes
(SSI) Injection [90], where the attacker introduces scripts in HTML pages or executes
arbitrary codes remotely.
• OS injection: comprise those attacks that target the stack, heap, pointers or internal
variables determining the behavior of the system. Code injection at this level can make
the OS execute unwanted routines and procedures, inserted in the OS’s running processes
through the modification of the system variables to point to external code introduced by
the attacker [91]. They threaten the AICAn as does the previous attack.
In a critical context, these attacks can target di↵erent parts of the infrastructure, namely the
corporate networks, the SCADA center and the remote substations. The first are based on
local area networks connected to the SCADA to gain access to critical data streams on SCADA
servers, and are vulnerable to injections designed for conventional networks. The SCADA center
is in charge of constantly monitoring the infrastructures through distributed substations. The
remote substations are control sub-networks based on field devices (sensors, actuators) and
communication interfaces (PLCs, gateways, etc.) in charge of sending sensorial measurements to
the SCADA center. The SCADA center and the remote substations are vulnerable to injections
specifically designed to target industrial devices and protocols.
Code injection attacks usually tend to implement some degree of stealthiness, since the adversary
usually aims to retrieve valuable information from the system, or to force a desired (malicious)
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behavior without the end user being alerted. The actual level of stealthiness depends on the
objective of the attacker, and also on the way the injection is tailored to the targeted system.
According to Figure 2.1, it is possible to evaluate the degree of stealthiness of a given attack
(in the communication, execution and transmission phases) and assess the potential threats and
risks it poses.
2.3.6 Assessment of Stealthiness
We can di↵erentiate two main kinds of behaviors in cyber stealth attacks: the reconnaissance
based attacks and the attacks with disruptive or tampering objectives. These two main groups
di↵er in the threats they pose to the correct operation of the CIs in terms of the AICAn
taxonomy. Attacks with reconnaissance objectives, e.g., scanning and probing, or side channel
attacks, are characterized by an adversary who tries to gather as much information as possible
from the victim system, without being discovered in the communication phase (see Figure 2.1).
In the case of this type of adversary behavior, the properties of the AICAn that are a↵ected are
usually related to the confidentiality, specifically the confidentiality of the resources (RC). In
some of the cases, the attack is capable of retrieving certain information from the system, thus
the IC property of the AICAn is compromised.
Some of the reconnaissance attacks might cause disruptions in the victim system, when the
attacker intentionally induces faults to obtain information; in this case, the availability of the
system can be a↵ected, i.e., the IA and RA properties of the AICAn taxonomy; and the indicators
of anomalies InfAn, CAn and IntrAn could be activated. Let us take a simple example, the
TCP connect() scanning attack, where the attacker probes the ports of the system in search
of useful open ports. This attack does not cause any disruption to the victim system, however
the adversary is able to extract information about it, using just the communication phase of
the attack to his own benefit. The information discovered in the reconnaissance attacks can be
used by the adversary to launch more sophisticated attacks in a later step, using the knowledge
acquired in the reconnaissance. The level of stealthiness achieved by this first group of attacks
is determined by the stealthiness of its communication phase; i.e., whenever the adversary
implements the attack in such a way that the victim system’s warning mechanisms are not
triggered by the reconnaissance actions, the attack can be categorized as stealthy.
Our second category of attacks, those with disruptive or tampering objectives, are characterized
by an adversary who tries to achieve all the phases of the attack, i.e., communication, execution
and sometimes propagation, stealthily. These attacks are much more complex, requiring highly
skilled and informed attackers, capable of communicating with the system and executing the
attack and if desired, propagating it to infect other components or target systems. Due to the
possibilities they o↵er to the attacker, they are very dangerous to the victim system in terms of
AICAn, because they can potentially disrupt all the AIC properties of the system and trigger
all the di↵erent types of anomalies. The most representative attacks in this category are covert
channel attacks and code injections.
To evaluate the level of stealthiness of a given attack it is necessary to evaluate each phase of the
attack in order to determine if all of them are stealthy, and if the defensive mechanisms (e.g.,
Intrusion Detection System (IDS)) of the victim are not alerted by the attacker’s actions. As
an example, we consider a code injection attack where the adversary’s objective is to stealthily
31
Chapter 2. Advanced Threats to the CPCS
achieve the three phases of the attack. Firstly, in the communication phase of the attack, the
adversary can exploit vulnerabilities detected in the target system, or can make use of malware
(virus, Trojan horses, etc.).
Both methods open the door to performing code injection stealthily if the attacker specifically
designs the attack to avoid triggering the defense mechanisms of the victim system. There-
fore the injection attack is considered stealthy at the communication stage if the vulnerability
exploitation or the malware communication is stealthy. An example of this first phase is the
exploitation of the industrial communication protocols used in the CIs, e.g., the Modbus/TCP
protocol, commonly used in SCADA and DCS networks for process control, which do not provide
authentication of the source of a request. This provides an adversary with a chance to attempt
to gather information on the system being controlled and about the PLC [92].
In the second phase, the execution of the injected code (see Figure 2.1), the level of stealth-
iness achieved in this stage depends on the implementation of the attack and on the defense
mechanisms available in the targeted system. If the attack is designed to perform its tasks in a
way that avoids triggering any alarm, and the security mechanisms implemented are not finely
tuned to detect this kind of attack, the injection can be considered stealthy in its execution
stage. To illustrate this assessment in the context of CIP, we analyze the PLCs Modicon M340
from Schneider Electric, which has a disclosed vulnerability to CSRF attacks [93]. These devices
incorporate a web server interface that processes requests from clients about the underlying in-
frastructure. However, the web server does not implement security mechanisms to verify their
authenticity, thus an adversary could trick a client into sending an unintentional request to the
web server, which would be considered authentic [94].
The injected commands could be sent to the PLC through a specially crafted HTTP request,
for example, sending the victim a request embedded in an image <img src="http://plc-web-
server.com/?query string"/>, where the query string would request the server to perform
some malicious action that would be considered legitimate. The adversary could exploit this
vulnerability to remotely reset or alter the PLC’s configuration. Lastly, we can assess the stealth-
iness of the propagation stage of a code injection. Through the exploitation of vulnerabilities, the
attack could in some cases be successfully disseminated. However, through the use of malware
it is possible to stealthily communicate the injection attack to other victims, as we have seen
in the Stuxnet worm [48], or its variation Duqu [51], that were specifically designed to attack a
particular PLC manufactured by Siemens, and infect numerous network devices without leaving
evidence of the attack.
Therefore, we conclude that cyber attacks with disruptive or tampering objectives can be
stealthily carried out through the three phases illustrated in Figure 2.1. We also stress that
these types of attacks should be classified as very dangerous to ICSs, since the adversary could
launch a potentially harmful attack that executes malicious actions and propagates its e↵ects
without being noticed, threatening not only a CI, but spreading the threat to other dependent
or interconnected targets.
Table 2.1 summarizes the contents that have been reviewed in this section, providing a tentative
analysis of the threats that stealth attacks pose to CIs in relation to the AICAn taxonomy.
In this table, divided into targeted areas and threat categories, it is possible to observe that
attacks are closely related to one another, since attackers, irrespective of their modus operandi,
generally base their goals on the execution of a set of combined threats to the AIC of the
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system, as discussed previously. The AICAn analysis is based on the discussion, by a group of
experts, of the impact on AICAn by di↵erent implementations of each stealthy attack listed.
It is important to note that the assignment of likelihood in this table is determined by the
di↵erent implementations of each of the selected stealth attacks, and may vary if other examples
are taken into account. However, we believe this study shows an interesting overview on the
impact of stealth attacks on CIs from the point of view of AICAn. From Table 2.1 we can
conclude that most of the stealth cyber attacks focus on altering the integrity of the information
of the system, possibly inducing threats to the availability of resources and information, and
consequently causing control anomalies.
Additionally, some of the more sophisticated attacks expand their scope to also exploit the
system’s vulnerabilities in order to alter the integrity and confidentiality of the resources and
information, and introduce the possibility of impersonation (UI and HUI compromising), pro-
ducing CAn and IntrAn anomalies. From this table, we conclude that most of these attacks
focus on the exploitation of the vulnerabilities associated with control and also those vulner-
abilities intentionally produced by intruders. We also note that threats classified as covert
channel exploitation and code injection can become potentially harmful threats to CIs, since
they can compromise or degrade a wider range of security properties necessary for the good
operation of critical systems, endangering the availability, integrity and confidentiality of these
systems.
2.4 Countermeasures and Prevention Mechanisms Against
Stealth Attacks
Given the restrictive nature of stealth attacks where the adversary wants to carry out his actions
unnoticed, they must be very precise and tailored to the target system. Therefore, the defense
mechanisms and the countermeasures applied must always take into account the environment of
the system that is being protected. In this section we discuss measures that counteract stealth
attacks equivalent to those discussed in Section 2.3 in general-purpose networks, which are
applicable to critical settings with the adequate adaptations to fit the constrained environment
of CIs, e.g., protocol reinforcements, introduction of additional equipment within the network,
physical measures, etc. An extensive review of the literature provides two main lines of action
for the protection of CIs: avoidance mechanisms (passive protection) and detection and recovery
mechanisms (active protection). We devote this section to providing some ideas about how to
protect the systems or minimize the e↵ects of these stealthy attacks.
Avoidance mechanisms are put into place to prevent threats and reduce risks, while detection
and recovery provide early detection and warning against attacks, and help restore the system
to its original working state, palliating the e↵ect of anomalies or attacks. These protection
mechanisms are applied to counteract the weapons used to perform the attacks. The most
threatening of the weapons under consideration, i.e., the one with the least visibility and cost,
is the use of impersonation. The use of lies is a weapon with an inferior degree of stealthiness
than impersonation, however it is also threatening if the attacker uses it to propagate incorrect
information to corrupt the targeted system. Overloading has the lowest degree of stealthiness,
nevertheless a skilled adversary could make use of it to collapse a subsystem of a CI without
drawing the attention of the system administrators.
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In general terms, it is possible to employ di↵erent methods to counteract these weapons; the
main avoidance mechanisms that can be used are: cryptography, standardization and reputation
mechanisms. Apart from these, when addressing each di↵erent attack, it is possible to apply
specific countermeasures, either active or passive protection. The use of cryptographic authenti-
cation methods improves resistance against stealth attacks, since cryptographic authentication
is harder to forge than IP addresses, etc. It is also important to note that in the field of CIP,
the most-used protocols (e.g., Modbus [92]) still lack authentication mechanisms, something
that is advantageous to the attacker [75]. Additionally, the naturally scarce resources such as
bandwidth, storage, computation capabilities or power, provide the adversaries with targets to
easily bring down the operation of the network.
Nevertheless, the implementation of cryptography in constrained systems is challenging, thus
it is necessary to consider the use of lightweight cryptographic primitives for authentication,
e.g., symmetric cryptography or elliptic curve cryptography [81]. However, to only rely on
authentication is insu cient to thwart stealth attacks, since the corruption of legitimate nodes’
behaviors perverts the correct authentication processes [75]. Thus it is necessary to strengthen
the authentication process by applying recommended and standard procedures.
There are varied authentication and access control techniques, such as Discretionary Access
Control (DAC), where the access control is assigned according to pre-defined criteria, Mandatory
Access Control (MAC), where the access control is evaluated according to a set of policies,
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), where the access is granted according to the evaluation
of a set of attributes combined according to system policies, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
which uses roles and privileges to grant access to users, location-based authentication, where the
physical location of the user is combined with identity tokens to authorize access, and several
others [95, 96].
From all these methods, we find interesting the separation of the user identity from its priv-
ileges within the system, since it provides a more versatile and dynamic management. These
characteristics can be find in the RBAC model. What is more, the IEC/TS 62351-8 standard
[28] is especially focused on the security of remote control substations (for CIP), and underlines
the need to implement access control mechanisms using RBAC, which is directly recommended
for this environment. This standard, additionally recommends the usage of the Principle of the
Least Privilege, or principle of minimal privilege, which states that the sole entities able to gain
access to logical devices and modify their objects will be those (virtual and physical) entities
with the suitable permissions to operate in the field.
To address this, authentication must be based on the assignation of subjects-to-roles and roles-
to-rights, restricting the accesses to particular objects developed in substations (e.g., IEC-61850
objects [97]). This di culty is increased due to the knowledge uncertainty about the honesty
of the di↵erent hosts. However, several of the aforementioned problems can be palliated (even
solved) when deploying reputation mechanisms to protect the networks, so that even if the nodes
are compromised by adversaries, the reliability of the system can still be assured. The use of
reputation has various advantages, such as the use of collaborative methods, which provides
robustness to the design of the network and eliminates the connectivity dependencies between
nodes [75].
Cryptography and reputation measures are especially beneficial for goodput reduction attacks.
Although these two main countermeasures try to minimize and palliate all kinds of stealth attacks
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against the networks, they are particularly useful in the case of the disconnection attacks or the
active eavesdropping, where once detected, the tra c going through the corrupted nodes can be
averted or reduced [60].
Scanning and probing attacks are one of the most critical types of stealth attacks, since they
open the door to other more sophisticated and more informed attacks. Some countermeasures
against these attacks are provided by V. Marinova-Boncheva in the paper [70]. The author
proposes the use of stealth probes to detect any attacker that prolongs his procedures for a
long period of time, for example, checking for system vulnerabilities and open ports for a period
of two months. To this end, the stealth probes collect information from the system, checking
for methodical attacks that last an extended period of time, they sample a wide area and
discover correlating attacks. Basically this technique implies the use of mixed signature-based
and anomaly-based IDSs.
Another way to confront stealth scanning and probing is proposed by C. Yin et al. in [77], where
they suggest the use of honeypots to detect the attacks and alert the system’s administrators.
A honeypot is “an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use
of that resource”; it reacts like a normal machine, based on the type of OS it simulates, while
it is recording and transferring packets to scan detection mechanisms to learn the tactics and
tools used by the attackers and alert the administrators of illegal accesses to the network it is
protecting.
The countermeasures for side channel attacks are highly tailored to the type of exploitation and
the actual implementation of the attack. G. Joy Persial et al. provide certain guidelines to
counteract side channel attacks in their work in [71]:
• Timing attacks: this kind of attack can be prevented by hiding time variations or using
blinding techniques [98]. A simple form of hiding variations is to make the computations in
constant time. Another possibility is to always add certain computations to the execution
of the algorithms to mask the timings. Other variations include hiding the internal state
of the systems, so that the attacker is no longer able to simulate internal computations.
• Power analysis attack : the power consumption is reduced using masking and elimination
techniques. Masking “randomizes the signal values at the internal circuit nodes while still
producing the correct cipher text” [71]. It can be done at software level, adding random
masks to data subsequently encrypted, or at hardware level where the system adds random
mask bits to balance the degree of randomness of the resulting message.
• Electromagnetic analysis attack : this kind of attack can be prevented by covering the
system with a protective casing that hides or attenuates the electromagnetic radiations.
This case also prevents the attacker from accessing the individual physical components of
the system.
• Fault induction attack : can be prevented by checking the computations [98] or verifying
the signature of the sent messages to identify the failures. There are IDSs specifically
designed to identify core failures and hijacks and the correct operation of the systems [99]
[100].
• Optical side channel attack : to prevent the adversary from retrieving information from
display monitors and leds, once the device is ready to be deployed. These lighting signals
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used for debugging should be disabled, or masked.
• Tra c analysis attack : counteracting this type of attack is very di cult [71], since it
is necessary to encrypt the messages transmitted and mask the channel, to prevent the
adversary from analyzing the tra c. In their work in [101], J. Deng et al. provide di↵erent
countermeasures to prevent this attack, based on modifications of the routing schemes used
by the nodes of the network.
Existing countermeasures for covert channels are varied, and comprise the use of commercial
solutions such as antivirus and anti-malware SW, and restricting and strengthening the imple-
mentation of the network’s protocols and policies. Examples are [73]:
• Anti-malware: as we have previously seen, software such as viruses, worms and Trojan
horses can be introduced inside the victim’s system, to capture packets and inject scripts
into the victim’s programs. Updated anti-virus and anti-malware SW can generally detect
these behaviors.
• Resource monitoring : resources such as system files, disks, RAM, sockets, etc. are valuable
to attackers, and thus adversaries frequently target them. Monitoring these resources with
HIDS can provide insight into the system’s status and help detect the presence of covert
channels.
• Data sensitivity : information can be classified according to its level of sensitivity, thus
special security mechanisms can be put into place to di↵ering degrees to protect the data
according to its sensitivity.
• Secure protocols: to protect the systems against covert channels attacks, it is important to
strengthen the security of the network, thus implementing secure protocols, e.g., HTTPS
instead of HTTP, helps prevent such attacks and protects the transmission of sensitive
information.
• Design robustness: covert channels take advantage of design oversight vulnerabilities,and
weaknesses due to the system’s design. In the first case, these unintentional failures can be
corrected once discovered, removing the covert channel. In the second case, they cannot
be removed until the system is re-designed to eliminate the vulnerabilities. However, the
use of good practices, such as secure programming or process desegmentation, can make
the system more resilient against covert channels.
• Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS): such as Snort [102], monitor packet header
fields such as ACK, SYN, to detect patterns that can indicate (unmask) the presence of
covert channels.
• Super user permissions: super user permissions may be needed to execute software, but
it is necessary to carefully evaluate the processes granted with these permissions, to avoid
harmful routines that are able to damage the system.
• Handshake restrictions: handshake trials between systems can be a way used by a malicious
actor to fool tra c monitoring systems, thus a limitation on these trials should be put
into place.
• Public resources: the access to public resources such as printers or shared disks should
be restricted and limited to the known users of the network, and reinforced with au-
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thentication methods for preventing covert channels. For example, the use of RBAC,
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), Kerberos or simple Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) could help.
• Authentication: methods like passwords, captchas [103] or biometric mechanisms can help
protect the system against covert channels, as well as RBAC/ABAC, Kerberos or PKI.
Additionally, the IEC/TS 62351-8 [28] standard for security in substations recommends
the use of authentication mechanisms, and more particularly RBAC to reduce complexities
in the entire SCADA network.
Prevention methods for covert channels are not restricted to just these points. Since the covert
channels implemented for a system are highly tailored to its individual characteristics, each of
the targeted environments will provide new challenges to the adversary. Thus, new behaviors
will appear, and consequently, the targeted systems can be protected in di↵erent ways according
to each specific situation.
Regarding the countermeasures that can be put into place to prevent and fight code injection
attacks, in addition to the general measures that can be used (i.e., cryptography, standardiza-
tion and reputation), it is possible to take two di↵erent approaches: prevention and validation
mechanisms and monitoring tools (e.g., IDSs, antivirus, anti-malware SW).
To prevent code injection, it is important to secure the input and output handling, by intro-
ducing validation mechanisms, selective inclusion and exclusion procedures, standardized input
and text formatting and encoding, parametric variables, dissociation and modularization of
the procedures from the kernel of the system, good handling of super user credentials, isola-
tion of some critical procedures, hash validation of executable images, and similar mechanisms
[83, 104].
In order to detect the most sophisticated and stealthy injection attacks, it is important to deploy
intelligent and finely tuned IDSs, capable of adapting to new dynamics and learning new attacks
[105], beyond just relying on attack signatures and known events. These automatic and adaptive
capabilities provide the detection systems with tools to detect and prevent highly targeted and
complex stealth attacks [106, 107, 108].
Most of the countermeasures and preventive mechanisms discussed in this section can be cate-
gorized as avoidance mechanisms (passive protection), however, as cyber attacks against control
systems are becoming increasingly aggressive and sophisticated, it is necessary to put into place
active protection mechanisms, to address the continuous threats to the CIs [42, 15]. Thus, as
discussed and as a complementary measure to avoidance mechanisms, detection and recovery
mechanisms are the techniques put in place for early detection, prevention of and counteraction
to risks in order to restore the system to its original working state, and palliate the e↵ect of the
attacks or anomalies happening within the system.
Given this definition, we classify the active protection mechanisms into two main categories:
the methods that require the intervention of an operator, and the automatic methods. Within
the first class, we find the early warning systems, the IDS, and all the situational awareness
[3] mechanisms deployed to detect and alert the human operators of any attack or anomaly
happening within the system under surveillance. To the contrary, the automatic methods are
those tools deployed to provide an automatic response to the problems that arise, with little to
no supervision from the human operators.
39
Chapter 2. Advanced Threats to the CPCS
Currently there is little literature on the automatic or semi automatic response mechanisms,
since their application to CIs is complex and potentially dangerous, due to the criticality of the
environment. However, it is absolutely essential to start to deploy such techniques within CIs,
since faster counteractions would help prevent the e↵ect of attacks or anomalies from cascading
to other interconnected and interdependent CIs [15]. Solutions that can provide these automatic
functionalities are the Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs), SW that “has all the capabilities of
an intrusion detection system and can also attempt to stop possible incidents” [109].
The IPS is often integrated as an extension of the IDS, but it usually receives less attention
than IDS research due to the intrinsic complexity of developing the mechanisms that o↵er an
automated and correct response against certain events. However, the increased complexity
and speed of cyber-attacks in recent years shows the acute necessity for complex intelligent
dynamic response mechanisms [105]. These systems can perform a wide variety of actions, from
operations on files and re-routing, to automatic revocation of privileges for certain profiles of
the infrastructure. Thus, using this module, it is not necessary to alert the system’s human
operator/administrator to launch countermeasure actions, the system itself could select and
execute them in a semi-supervised or unsupervised way.
In Table 2.2, we summarize the analysis of the stealth attacks from the point of view of coun-
termeasures and protection, also reviewing the level of stealthiness of the attacks corresponding
to Figure 2.1. This evaluation takes into account their associated AICAn risks (see Table 2.1),
always considering the worst scenario possible; i.e., the maximum level of stealthiness that an
adversary can achieve using these techniques and approaches. Moreover, we provide an overview
of the most suitable countermeasures applicable to prevent or react against the stealth attacks,
outlined in the last column of this table. This set of tentative measures is a selection of proce-
dures that come from the context of general-purpose networks (trying to palliate or avoid stealth
attacks in these non-critical settings) and which can be applied to CIs with a few adaptations
to fit the specific needs of critical environments (industrial protocols, additional equipment,
etc.).
2.5 Summary
According to M. Jakobsson et al. [60], stealth attacks are better (i.e., more profitable) than
regular attacks, which require a higher amount of energy and leave the attacker more exposed
to detection. In the previous sections, we have identified five di↵erent types (main categories)
of stealth attacks, namely: (i) disconnection and goodput reduction, (ii) active eavesdropping,
(iii) scanning and probing, (iv) covert and side-channel exploitation, and (v) code injection
attacks. We have described their objectives and scope and using the AICAn taxonomy, we have
determined their potential threats to CIs.
This study therefore shows the danger inherent in attacks where the adversary tries to go
unnoticed, since the system can be threatened for long periods of time without being protected,
the actions against the infrastructure are varied and range from simple probing of the system
to extraction of sensitive information, or disruption to the correct operation of the CIs a↵ected.
Additionally, the adversaries are able to propagate their threats to other nodes or interdependent
CIs, thus creating cascading e↵ects through the interconnected infrastructures.
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Besides the vulnerabilities introduced in the scenario associated to the interest of the infras-
tructure to adversaries (sensitive data, potential of social disruption, etc.), the high complexity
of the environment and their interconnected nature increase exposure to potential attackers
and unintentional errors. According to NIST [110], a high number of interconnections present
increased opportunities for DoS attacks, introduction of malicious code or compromised HW.
Moreover, when dealing with a vast amount of nodes in the network, as happens in CIs, the
number of entry points and paths exploitable by and adversary increases.
Nevertheless, there are several methods that help prevent and counteract the attacks studied.
The main actions we find that currently are indicated to help in the case of stealth attacks are the
preventive mechanisms, such as reputation or cryptography. We find therefore that it is essential
to incorporate protection tools for control elements, governance, validation and testing of SW
and HW components, to prevent any perturbation to the system’s security properties. Moreover,
protection of communication channels (using for example cryptography, virtual private networks,
bump-in-the-wire, etc.) is also needed, since most of the cyber threats rely on attacks against
the confidentiality (information or configurations of resources), in order to learn about the
environment, conditions and elements of the victim system.
However, in the event of truly sophisticated stealth attacks, it is necessary to include a layer of
protection that provides reactive recovery mechanisms capable of launching automatic reactions
against an attack that is underway, to restore the normal operation of the system under attack,
as soon as possible. Within this category we find the IDS and IPS modules, capable of advanced
detection mechanisms, and in some cases, of launching some prevention actions and alerts to
the security profiles responsible for the nodes under attack. Currently, there is little research on
automatic and semi-automatic reaction systems, due to the inherent complexity of the modules,
which is vastly increased in the case of CIs, where any disturbance of their operation is of critical
relevance.
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Chapter 3
Analysis of Requirements of Secure
Interoperability in CPCS
Practically all our critical infrastructures are today under the supervision and are dependent
on other additional systems, the control systems, whose underlying infrastructures in turn, rely
heavily on the new information and communication technologies for control. Indeed, ICTs
have now become essential elements in our society because they o↵er significant benefits to
improve e ciency, cost reduction and enhance quality of life. In their evolution towards the
fourth generation of CSs (see Section 1.1.1), they are incorporating technologies such as mobile
computing, distributed systems, smart devices, IoT devices, wireless communication or cloud-
computing. These new concepts and technologies are becoming the major driving forces behind
the management of diverse information, allowing a quicker operation of the great majority of
today’s competitors’ infrastructures and their services.
In fact, most of these physical facilities are highly interconnected to other national (and in-
ternational) infrastructures through communication systems, and are managed through ICTs
[35]. This new way of monitoring makes the present control systems critical in themselves (as
discussed in Chapter 1), where the notion of criticality is intertwined with the nature of the
system and its sensitivity to adverse events caused by unforeseen faults or intentional threats.
This also means that CIs and their minimum services (e.g., water, energy or transport) are
also dependent on the e↵ectiveness of the ICTs integrated inside CSs in charge of collecting,
distributing and processing the correct functional performance of resources and the provision
of services. A particularization of CSs are the CPCSs (see the definition in Section 1.1.2), also
considered critical systems in themselves. In this section we will refer to CSs in general, and
refer to CPCSs when a particularization is needed.
Examples of CSs are DCSs or SCADA systems, both belonging to the category of ICSs [1]
(see Section 1.1.1). SCADA systems, in particular given their centralized nature are commonly
sensitive to a number of threatening factors: (deliberate/unintentional) faults and existing vul-
nerabilities related to access control, communication or control. All of them may imply not
only the degradation of the minimum monitoring services but also the neglect of other essen-
tial services for society, which could even result in the well-known cascading e↵ect between
infrastructures [31].
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The proof of this is found in annual reports published by di↵erent governments through specific
organizations such as ENISA [41] and the ICS-CERT [43, 54], respectively (see Section 1.2.1).
Both reflect the current situation and the severity of potential threats, where the number of
specific incidents apparently continues to grow. This requires an immense e↵ort to design
protection measures without infringing the five basic control principles defined in [21]: real-time
operational performance, dependability, survivability, sustainability and safety critical.
These five requirements are basic because they encompass a further set of important conditions,
such as availability, integrity, access to component, component lifetime, change management and
reliability, among others [111]. Many of these requirements are also included in the guidelines
published by the NIST in [112] for ICSs and for smart grids in [20], and even in the guidelines
published by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) through its NERC-
CIP cybersecurity series (002-009) [113] (for further information on the guidelines characteristics
see [21]).
On the other hand, we have so far identified three chief vulnerabilities in CSs: (i) weaknesses
in the configurations of the CIs (network configurations, security policies, defense mechanisms,
etc.); (ii) architectural design of the system; and (iii) errors in the development, which are
generally related to software and hardware elements. Many of these vulnerabilities come from
modernizing the TCP/IP-based technologies, increasing, on the one hand, the complexities of
the CS and, on the other hand, adding new vulnerabilities to the control.
Indeed, existing SCADA architectures, their devices and their protocols, have to adjust to the
new technological changes brought by the Industry 4.0 and the new generation of CSs to o↵er
network architectures which are distributed, secure and autonomous for data management in real
time, interoperability between systems and protocols (e.g., Modbus or DNP3 with ISA100.11a,
WirelessHART or ZigBee PRO) and scalability for the cooperation and collaboration with the
new control technologies. A clear example of this new change, as discussed in Chapter 1, is
found in the new electrical distribution generation, i.e, in the smart grid generation.
In the SG, CSs serve as the central edge of supervision and data acquisition from thousands to
millions of smart devices with direct connection to diverse networks: backhaul, Wide Area, Field
Area, Neighborhood Area, and Local Area Networks. In this context, backhaul and the Internet
are the chief sources that connect the di↵erent sub-domains with the rest of the networks, in-
cluding Advanced Metering Infrastructures that characterize the bidirectional interfaces between
the real world, and the acquisition and control world.
Through these interfaces it is possible to manage and interact with smart meters and utility
business systems, substituting the traditional one-way advanced meters. This technological
evolution also shows how CSs are becoming more complex at the di↵erent levels (functionally,
architecturally), and hence also require special care when adapting new technologies. In other
words, finding a perfect connection between systems and guaranteeing secure monitoring at all
times requires, for each adapted technology, a set of minimum requirements which should not
interfere with the basic control principles.
Given these considerations, this chapter aims to identify and analyze the main requirements that
cover the security of the control systems, particularly the CPCSs, and the ones that make possible
this interconnection and interaction of subsystems in order to provide correct interoperability
and interconnection among them, creating a secure interoperability infrastructure among control
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systems, in which di↵erent critical systems interact and cooperate in a secure and e cient way
to help the CIs perform is tasks and provide their critical services to the society.
Through this analysis, we aim to provide a guideline an analysis that contain the main re-
quirements these secure interoperability infrastructure has to comply with in order to ensure its
correct operation for the interconnection of critical control systems, as well as di↵erent meth-
ods to satisfy these requirements (in the form of sets of techniques) and a way to measure and
assess the fulfillment of the identified requirements and the performance of the suggested secure
interoperability architecture. Throughout this chapter we review the di↵erent requirements and
characteristics that constrain our scenario, to later analyze the possible techniques to help the
architecture comply with the requirements, and after that, we provide an example set of metrics
to help evaluate the correct operation of such system. We also make a particularization on IDS
systems deployed as components of the infrastructure for its protection.
3.1 The Special Requirements and Constraints of Critical Con-
trol Systems
As stated, CSs are systems that manage other critical systems (also known as “systems of
systems”). Specifically, ICSs are deployed to aid in the operation of industrial infrastructures,
the services of which are also essential to social and economic welfare. This feature means that
CSs can also be considered as critical control systems (CCSs, as discussed in Section 1.1.1),
where the correct operation of their control services against unforeseen and/or dynamic changes
is of paramount importance. In this section, we review the main characteristics and requirements
of CSs, as well as the constraints any system has to consider when dealing with these critical
systems. This analysis is the first step in our study, which sets the basis to better understand
the features needed to build a secure interoperability infrastructure for control systems as we
devised in Chapter 1.
3.1.1 CCS Requirements
CCS are complex systems, and this complexity is due to several factors: (i) ICSs are composed
of multiple networks with thousands of nodes in them; (ii) the heterogeneity of the network
is high, integrating multiple types of nodes and technologies, i.e., legacy equipment (e.g., old
RTUs and industrial sensors) using protocols such as Modbus/TCP [13] running alongside mod-
ern devices (e.g., cloud servers, wireless sensors, mobile devices, etc.) which use technologies
such as Bluetooth [114] or ISA100.11a [115]; (iii) ICS components and sub-systems have many
dependencies between them, and CCSs also have interdependencies with other CIs [31].
These factors make CCSs challenging systems to manage, moreover, they also make the ICSs
targets vulnerable to attacks [41]. In recent years, cyber attacks targeting CIs have increased
exponentially, as shown in the cases of Stuxnet [48], Duqu [51], the Nitro attacks [50], the
WannaCry ransomware attack [58] and others [39, 47] (see Section 1.2.1).
Due to their complexity, CCSs need to be analyzed in order to better understand their require-
ments, to provide them with adequate protection against the multiple threats they face because
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of their characteristics. In [21], the authors compile the requirements that a CCS must comply
with to achieve the right levels of security and performance. We describe them here, as these
requirements form the basis of our study:
• Real-time performance: CCSs have hard real-time constraints regarding communications,
execution processes and system upgrading, as none of them should cause delays in the
system. The communications’ response time is heavily constrained, sometimes tightened
to a maximum of one millisecond [1]. Additionally, naturally occurring faults in CIs,
or malicious activities can introduce delays in the system, something that needs to be
palliated and reduced as soon as possible.
• Dependability : is “the ability of a system to properly o↵er its services on time, avoiding
frequent and severe internal faults” [21], thus a control system must provide its service
despite fault occurring. Dependability comprises five attributes that absolutely have to be
observed: availability, reliability, maintainability, safety and security [21].
• Sustainability : as defined in [21], sustainability is “the ability of a system to meet the needs
of the present without compromising its ability to meet future needs”, i.e., the system must
continue to function like the day it was deployed despite any later updates, upgrades or
modification of its components (hardware and software).
• Survivability : is “the capability of a system to fulfill its mission and thus to face malicious,
deliberate or accidental faults in a timely manner” [21]. Survivability is composed of three
main elements: unsusceptibility, resilience and recoverability (defined below).
• Safety critical : this is safety related to critical environments; its implementation makes it
possible to prevent unplanned e↵ects that the failure of a critical system could inflict on
society. It also relates to the protection against faults cascading from critical infrastructure
to another, the so-called “cascading e↵ect” [21, 31].
These requirements are common to all critical environments. These scenarios are highly complex
and heterogeneous and, as we have mentioned, they combine multiple technologies and are
subject to many restrictions and constraints. This makes it di cult to use the same state-
of-the-art in ICTs as in regular, non-critical information systems. In Figure 3.1, we represent
the aforementioned CCS requirements, graphically. In this figure, not only do we consider the
hierarchies of the requirements and how they are composed, we also consider that all these
requirements have the same level of importance or criticality.
Sustainability Safety-critical Dependability
Real Time 
Performance Survivability
Figure 3.1: CCS requirements
The reason for the hierarchization of these requirements is purely semantic, according to the
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definition and concepts of safety, security and survivability engineering [116]. We understand
that if one of the requirements is not met, the CCS fails to perform its tasks and is incapable
of providing the required service. This failure to meet the CCS requirements causes failures in
the a↵ected CI which could also possibly cause a cascading e↵ect, a↵ecting those related and
interdependent infrastructures that rely on the service a↵ected.
3.1.2 CCS Constraints
SCADA systems are one of the main types of CCSs used for large, geographically-dispersed
distribution operations, such as electrical power grids, petroleum and gas pipelines, water or
waste-water systems [117]. The special characteristics of CCSs, particularly SCADA, as seen in
[21], result in special constraints that control HW and SW elements deployed within them have
to comply with. Fleury et al. [111] identify these constraints and classify them in 5 di↵erent
categories:
• Performance and availability : critical data must be available at all times, without delays
or jitter in data delivery, and it must be reliable and have high integrity [111]. In addition
to these constraints, any (cyber) security mechanism implemented must be fail-safe so that
the failures of such mechanisms do not result in the failure of the CI.
• Deployment and management : CCSs need to be highly stable with respect to failures before
they can be deployed because they govern physical systems with equipment deployed to last
decades. What is more, their operation cannot su↵er down-time for system maintenance
and upgrades in the way that is common to traditional ICT systems [111]. Thus, practices
such as SW patching are not trivial in CSs, since it is not practical (and sometimes
impossible) to take down CCSs to apply security patches [118].
• There are strong computation, space and storage constraints in CCSs because they were
adopted in the 1960s and although their architecture has evolved, legacy equipment, SW
and protocols are still working in today’s networks and need to be taken into account [1].
• A common constraint found in control systems is the strict application timing requirements,
some of which require a message delivery time of no more than 2 ms [99].
• The extra costs associated with security computations, i.e., the ones performed solely to
achieve a device’s security goals, do not scale well in critical environments, due to the
diversity of its many embedded systems [99].
These above-mentioned constraints define and restrict the capabilities of the CCSs, and hence
the security mechanisms applied to those systems, especially in the case of the secure inter-
operability architecture for the CSs of the SG discussed previously. Apart from the use of
di↵erent communication protocols and data types, tailored security solutions are particularly
critical wherever the resources are constrained and the security measures applied compete with
the control software to perform their tasks.
It is vital that the secure interoperability solutions implemented for CSs in the SG observe at any
time these identified requirements and constraints for the CCSs. Particularly, they must respect
the responsiveness aspect of the system, (e.g., a command from the controller to actuator should
be executed in real-time by the latter), and the timeliness of any related data being delivered
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within its designated time period, also meaning freshness of data, i.e., the data is only valid for
its assigned time period [117].
A particularization is the application of specific security and protection solutions for the CCSs,
in a way that is compatible with their requirements. A. Nicholson et al. [118] defend that
Anti-Virus, Firewalls, IDSs and Intrusion Prevention and Response Systems (IPRSs) solutions
found in general information technology networks are equally e↵ective when employed to protect
control networks, but they must be tailored to the types of data used in this environment. We
analyze the requirements and characteristics of the secure interoperability architecture in the
sections that follow, and later we particularize this study with the analysis in depth of the
application of detection and protection modules for CCSs.
3.2 NFR Model Framework
Since our work aims to study and assess the operation of a secure interoperability architecture,
rather than reflect specific behaviors, we create a model of the system based on non-functional
requirements. A Non-Functional Requirement (NFR) is defined as “a SW requirement that de-
scribes not what the SW will do, but how the SW will do it” [119]. Examples of these NFRs
are SW performance requirements, SW external interface requirements, and SW quality at-
tributes.
NFRs are di cult to test, therefore, they are usually evaluated subjectively [119]. It is our aim,
however, to develop our study further, translating these high-level requirements into quantitative
information with respect to the IDS solution and its suitability within the critical environment
where it will be deployed. To this end, we base our analysis on di↵erent frameworks and
guidelines to be able to model our scenario.
In this section, we gather the main NFRs in order to establish the basic requirements for the
secure interoperability of CCSs as a first stage of modeling our system. To this end, we use the
NFR Framework, as described in [119]. This framework is used to model qualitative process-
oriented goals, dividing them into non-functional requirements, satisficing techniques and claims.
Since our proposed model implies high-level non-functional requirements, instead of goals, we will
model softgoals, where a softgoal is defined as a goal with “no clear-cut definition and or criteria
as to whether it is satisfied or not, since NFRs are subjective, relative, and interdependent”
[119].
3.3 NFR Requirements for Interoperability
Following the NFR framework methodology, we address the identification of requirements that
allow us to design a CCSs which key components are the ones determined by the fourth gener-
ation of CSs, as described in Section 1.1.1, i.e., decentralization, security and interoperability.
Additionally, our new design model need to incorporate the key technologies brought into scene
by the new Industry 4.0 paradigm, e.g., CPSs, IoT devices, cloud computing, etc. Since we
need a framework of study, we center our analysis on the CSs of the smart grid, as discussed
in Chapter 1. Therefore, the analysis of these requirements aim to provide a frame of reference
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containing the main requirements that CSs, and particularly CPCSs, have to comply with in
order to be integrated within a secure interoperability platform where varied types of systems
and actors of the SG interact and operate collaboratively.
We picture a very heterogeneous scenario, where di↵erent energy providers, control centers,
network protocols, legacy and modern equipment have to coexist and cooperate in order to
provide their services without interruption and in a manner that observes and adheres to the
previously identified requirements and constraints for CCSs (see Section 3.1). We analyze the
softgoals for the CSs based on the requirements for the CCS previously identified in Section 3.1.1
(see Figure 3.1).
We provide a complete map of the requirements in Figure 3.2. However, for the sake of clarity,
we have divided the identified softgoals into two subgroups: the softgoals for the interoperability
architecture and critical systems, and the softgoals for the interoperability. The first set of
requirements (see Figure 3.3) reflects the softgoals we have identified which guide the design
and development of an interoperability architecture for critical systems, and the diagram takes
into account CIP softgoals and architecture softgoals.
The CIP softgoals are those that reflects the need of any CS deployed within the critical systems
of implementing certain characteristics in order to comply with the CCSs’ constraints and re-
quirements (see Section 3.1). The architecture softgoals describe those requirements that need
to be addressed in order to build a secure interoperability architecture. To better di↵erentiate
the two types of requirements, Figure 3.3 illustrates them with a color code, in yellow we find
the CIP softgoals, and in orange the architecture softgoals.
The second set of softgoals, the softgoals for interoperability (see Figure 3.4) is composed of a
mixture of requirements, addressing di↵erent needs of the secure interoperability architecture for
the CPCSs of the SG. Among these requirements we find: interoperability softgoals, virtualization
softgoals, cloud softgoals and industrial IoT softgoals. Also, in the figure we find CIP softgoals
and architecture softgoals, which are represented there and repeated from Figure 3.3 in order
to better understand the relations between the two di↵erent sets of requirements and how they
interact and depend from each other.
In order to better understand these identified softgoals and their repercussions in the design
of a secure interoperability architecture, we devote this section to describe and explain those
requirements that are representative of this scenario. We focus only on the requirements that
are especially interesting for the scenario of secure interoperability, leaving out the analysis of
those NFRs of general nature, that can be easily consulted in the literature, e.g., for security
engineering requirements definitions and clarifications, see [116].
When we observe the diagram in Figure 3.2 (also present in the subset Figures 3.3 and 3.4),
we can see that the five softgoals depicted at the top of the diagram are the ones described in
Section 3.1.1, corresponding to the basic requirements for the correct operation of the CCSs (in
color code yellow). If we focus on the first subset of requirements (corresponding to Figure 3.3),
we observe that below them, we find the rest of the CIP softgoals and the architecture softgoals
we have identified for the secure interoperability architecture, and that extend the study in [21].
The definitions for the most representative requirements in Figure 3.3 are presented next, where
we first describe the ones in the CIP softgoals set (code color yellow), i.e., Safety, Accountability,
(Un)Susceptibility, Awareness and Context Awareness.
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Figure 3.2: NFR requirements for interoperability, a global view
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Figure 3.3: Softgoals for the interoperability architecture and critical systems
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Figure 3.4: Softgoals for interoperability
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We define Safety from the point of view of reliability engineering as the “degree to which ac-
cidental harm is prevented, reduced and properly reacted to” [116]. A safety system has the
mechanisms to prevent, reduce and react to accidental harm that could a↵ect society in some
way. A safety critical system is a particularization of a safety system, where the environment or
the system itself is critical to social and economic welfare. Safety requirements in CIs must be
always be complied with, otherwise malfunctions in the infrastructures operation could a↵ect
society and even endanger human life [21]. Accountability is defined as the fact or condition of
being accountable [120], related to the responsibility to justify actions or decisions. In computer
science, this same term applies to the need to preserve records and traces of any actions and
decisions taken within the system for later analysis, consult or audit. This requirement is in line
with the main security services provided by an interoperability architecture, therefore, it is vital
that all CPCSs within this architecture have to comply with this softgoal.
(Un)Susceptibility is the state of being likely or liable to be influenced or harmed by a particular
thing [120]. Critical systems, specifically CCSs should not be susceptible to any fault or attack.
This is highly complex to achieve, since CSs are such complex and heterogeneous systems, and
what is more, in an interoperability scenario, they inherently have multiple vulnerabilities given
the multiple systems interconnected and interdependent that participate in the interoperability
infrastructure. In order to achieve the highest levels of unsusceptibility to threats, critical sys-
tems usually implement multiple security mechanisms for detection, prevention and protection
against threatening and malicious events occurring within the system.
Awareness is defined as the “knowledge or perception of a situation or fact” [120]. In the field
of computer security, awareness refers to these measures taken in order to reinforce the security
of the system by analyzing and monitoring its states and behavior. Context Awareness is an
extension of the previous softgoal, which refers to the ability of a computer system to analyze
and monitor its environment and the behavior of their surroundings, i.e., the context, in order
to rapidly detect problems that arise, and avoid any malfunctions derived from these events.
This requirement has a variation, Location Awareness which is applicable to mobile devices,
since they have to be aware of their context and also of their location, in order to implement
awareness mechanisms. We find that all kinds of awareness are vital for the correct operation of
the CPCSs in an interoperability environment. All these requirements contribute to the concept
of Situation Awareness (see Chapter 1) referring to the perception of environmental elements
to understand how they impact system’s dynamics and performance.
Additional to these requirements, Figure 3.3 represents a second set of softgoals, the ones re-
lated to our scenario’s architecture, which are represented with a color code orange. To better
understand them, we extract them and provide definitions for the most representative ones in
the definitions Table 3.1.
We continue our study by describing the main softgoals in the set of softgoals for interoperability
(see Figure 3.4). We therefore devote this part of the analysis to describe the most representative
softgoals belonging to the categories distinguished in the figure: interoperability (code color
green), virtualization (code color purple), industrial IoT (code color dark blue), and cloud (code
color light blue). It is interesting to note that interoperability itself can be considered a goal
to achieve in our system, being defined as “the ability of two or more systems or components
to exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged” [123]. Thus we
consider interoperable, a heterogeneous set of systems that are capable of exchanging useful
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Table 3.1: Architecture softgoals definitions table
Softgoal Definition
Heterogeneity
Management
the ability of a system to manage diversity. In computer sciences, a system able to manage het-
erogeneity is capable of interoperate with diversity in HW, SW, network protocols, etc. without its
performance being impacted by the presence of this degree of diversity. This ability of the system
to correctly operate in an heterogeneous environment is referred as heterogeneity coexistence.
Extensibility an extensible system “is able to support new control components such as new technologies, protocols,
HW and SW components, and security services” [21]. Scalability (he ability of a system, network,
or process to handle a growing amount of work in a capable manner or its ability to be enlarged to
accommodate that growth [121]) and extensibility tend to be mixed up and confused, however they
represent two very important challenges for complex heterogeneous systems like CCSs. Extensibility
is a maintenance and updating characteristic which is especially desirable in a CI, where the arrival
of SW applications and new technologies to CIs such as the IoT or WSNs, greatly increases the need
to incorporate new interoperable devices and protocols.
Maintainability,
serviceability
the capability of the system to be maintained over time in order to continuously improve it and keep
it free from defects and errors. Maintainability is influenced by three factors [116]: (1) correctability,
the ease with which minor defects can be corrected between major changes, while the system is still in
use; (2) extensibility, defined above; and (3) repairability, the ability of a damaged or failed system
to be restored to acceptable operating conditions, within a specified period of time (repair time)
[120]. Other softgoals directly linked with maintainability are: exchangeability, HW dependability,
and modularity, which are described above.
Recoverability the ability to recover quickly from a system failure or disaster, to the point and (if it is possible) to
the state of the system at which the failure occurred [116]. It is closely related to survivability, but
it alludes to the capabilities of the system or deployment.
Reliability “the degree to which a work product operates without failure under given conditions during a given
time period” [116]. It relates to the costs produced by hazards turning into incidents, and the level of
loss of revenue for the company or the customer. It di↵ers from safety, as safety deals with dangerous
hazards which could lead to severe accidents with an impact on society.
Performability the performance of a system, viewed from the point of view of dependability, i.e., the performance of
a system in the presence of faults over a specified period of time [122]. An interoperable architecture
for CCSs should have high performability in order to ensure the critical operations are performed in
a timely and secure manner, avoiding faults and incidents within the system.
Robustness “the degree to which an executable work product continues to function properly under abnormal
conditions or circumstances” [116]. Fault tolerance is one of its main sub-quality factors. Robustness,
from a usability point of view has four related criteria: recoverability (defined above), observability
(consistency and inferability of the internal states of a system from the external outputs), and task
conformance (support for the tasks established by design) and responsiveness, which is described
below.
Accessibility the degree to which the user interface enables users to perform their specified tasks [116]. In an
SG interoperability environment, accessibility also refers to non-human users, i.e., the accessibility
of services or network nodes by the CPCSs in the network enables the control systems to perform
their tasks. This softgoal is related to the availability of the system, a vital requirement for critical
infrastructures.
Fault
Tolerance
the system that is fault tolerant is capable of continuing its operation despite the occurrence of
failures; a desirable condition which guarantees the resilience or self-healing of the underlying CCS.
Reaction “the degree to which the system responds (e.g., recovers) after an accident or attack” [116]. Reaction
is related to recoverability, and restoration (returning a system to a former safe condition after the
occurrence of a failure). The reaction approach in a critical environment must ensure that any
essential services that may have been lost or degraded are targeted before the recovery of any non-
essential services [116].
Resilience the capability of a system to maintain a proper service in the face of faults, as well as being able to
return to normal operation as soon as possible. In terms of survivability, resilient is the antonym of
vulnerable. In the context of CPCSs, we refer to the resilience of the information (data resilience),
and the resilience of the control system (control resilience).
Monitoring the process of providing regular surveillance or systematic review of a system [120]. This softgoal
conveys the need of a critical system of continuous analysis and vigilance in search for unwanted and
possibly threatening events. Monitoring is directly linked to the awareness requirements for CPCSs.
Service
Assurance
the application in the system of policies and processes directed to ensure that the services o↵ered
meet predefined dependability and quality levels. Also, in combination with reliability properties
and related to safety critical requirements, the softgoal service continuity indicates the need for the
system to provide a continuous, stable operation.
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information with each other. In our work we search for the configuration and characteristics
needed in a secure and interoperable infrastructure for CCSs, therefore this can be considered
one of the pillar softgoals in our analysis. Interoperability of HW, SW, protocols is of vital
importance to build a CS belonging to the new generation of CSs (see Section 1.1.1).
When addressing the analysis of the sets of interoperability NFRs, we are firstly interested in the
Responsiveness of the system, which is the ability of a functional system to perform an assigned
task within the required time interval [124]. For our purpose, we will consider that a system
is responsive when it is capable of performing its functions in the required time intervals, with
no (or at least no significant) delays. Also, the system must have a good degree of Operational
Environment Compatibility, defined as “the degree to which a system functions correctly under
specified conditions of the physical environment(s) in which it is intended to operate” [116]. Any
component added to the system must be operationally compatible with the underlying system
in order to be deployed within a CCS, where machinery and environmental radiation and noise
might interfere with the operation of unprepared systems.
We consider Decentralization, the transfer of important functions or services to diverse nodes in
a network in order to distribute responsibilities and workload, and Distribution, a distributed
system is a model where the components belonging to a network communicate and coordinate
their actions in order to achieve a common goal, key softgoals in our analysis for a secure
and interoperable infrastructure. These properties build high availability [125], resilience and
robustness into a system. Interestingly, by achieving these softgoals we achieve a state in which
the components of the system work concurrently to achieve a goal, however the faults occurring
within one system do not a↵ect the others (they are independent).
Regarding security, se aim to achieve Autonomy of Security, which conveys the need that the
security system implemented in a critical interoperability environment is independent from the
control or influence of any other system in the infrastructure. This allow the security mechanisms
to function correctly regardless of any faults occurring in the control system, thus protecting
its integrity, confidentiality and availability. Additionally, we consider vital to implement In-
telligence within the system, referring to the presence of solutions capable of adapting to new
circumstances and acting more e ciently in the face of new system dynamics. This requirement
is linked to the threat intelligence softgoal, which refers to the intelligence in the face of threats,
i.e., acting e ciently and adaptively against any anomalous occurrence.
An interesting requirement in our scenario is Virtualizability, defined as the ability of a system
of being virtualized, or provided in a virtual manner. Virtualization in computer science refers
to the creation of a virtual version of something, e.g., computer software, computer hardware,
storing devices, or computer network resources [120]. Virtualized network functions, the inclu-
sion of cloud computing services, etc., are new resources and services that can be included in
the CPCS interoperability scenario with the help of virtualization. Virtualizability is related to
the Instantiability softgoal, which is defined as the ability to create an object (an instance) of a
specific class [120]. Virtual services can be instantiated on demand to respond to the requests
of each client.
Finally, when analyzing mobile systems within a control infrastructure, it is important that they
provide Local Contextual Information to the control system. This softgoal reflects the need of
the interoperability system, especially when dealing with mobile and wireless devices, to provide
accurate information about the context of the system in a periodic or frequent manner. This will
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allow the system to be aware of the health of the surrounding infrastructure and avoid or timely
react to any fault or threat to the system. This softgoal is directly linked to the awareness and
monitoring requirements.
Cloud NFRs, as well as some of the softgoals belonging to the di↵erent sets of NFRs described in
Figure 3.2 have not been described in this section, as we discussed earlier, this is due to the need
to focus our study on the most representative NFRs for the scenario of secure interoperability.
Definitions and specifications of these omitted softgoals can be found in the general literature
for software, security and reliability engineering, e.g., see [116], [126], [127].
3.4 NFR Satisficing Techniques for Interoperability
In Section 3.3 we identified the requirements that any interoperability platform should comply
with, taking into account both the requirements in critical systems and the ones that illustrate
the behavior of the communication architecture, the interoperability system, the industrial IoT
and the virtualized components within it. We represented them through the NFR Framework
softgoals, and now we need to go a step further in order to find specific ways to analyze whether
these softgoals can be satisfied, and to find determined techniques or tools to achieve the inter-
operability.
Since we are working with NFRs, we have to address their characteristics to carry out our
study. The problem is that these goals or properties lack a clear definition, as they are usually
based on abstract terms which is not very useful from a measurement perspective [128]. It is
therefore di cult to assess whether or not the NFRs have been satisfied, because there is no
clear-cut criteria for this evaluation. Our approach to tackle this problem is inspired by the Goal
Question Metric (GQM) approach [129]. The GQM approach is a goal-oriented methodology for
the identification of measurements in SW engineering. It is built upon the idea of decomposing
the problem into several goals, which are further refined by questions and metrics for answering
them. We follow this idea to continue our study on the interoperability softgoals for CIs, in
order to bind these abstract characteristics to specific practices.
Instead of refining our analysis in terms of questions at the operational level of the GQM, and
in line with the NFR Framework, we reflect on the operations taken for reaching the identi-
fied softgoals in terms of satisficing techniques. Thus, in this section, we aim to identify those
techniques that can be implemented by the system, capable of satisficing the established NFRs.
Table 3.2 presents the simplified matching of the satisficing techniques found for the interoper-
ability softgoals, directly linked to the requirements of the critical systems.
We provide this simplified matching between the NFRs for CIP and the satisficing techniques
for the architecture (See Figure 3.5) because we consider the requirements for CIP to be the
top requirements for the interoperability of a platform for critical systems, and all the NFRs are
below them.
Figure 3.5 (and hence Table 3.2) presents the di↵erent types of satisficing techniques identified
for the interoperability of CPCSs. In order to best comprehend the image, we have extracted
these di↵erent types of satisficing techniques into separate figures following the code of color
present in the general figure. Those techniques colored in yellow allow the protection of the
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Figure 3.5: Satisficing techniques for the interoperability architecture
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Table 3.2: Satisficing techniques for interoperability
CIP Requirements Techniques
Dependability
Real-Time
Performance
HW Optimization Resource Distribution
SW Optimization
HW Acceleration SW Upgrade
Exclusive Allocation of Resources Task Optimization
Power Conserving State Power Optimization
IoT SW Optimization Sensor Heartbeat
Negotiation Mechanisms Ontologies
Minimizing Resource Utilization Node Pairing
Dynamic Adjustment of Behavior
Use of good practices
Testing
Prioritization
Load Balancing
Survivability
Redundancy Parallel Operation
Reaction
Fault Remediation Replication
Replication Data Replication
Control Replication
Self-Healing Restoration
Self-Consciousness
Fault Detection Monitoring
Context Aware Data Analytics IDS
Context Awareness IPRS
Intelligence
Emergency Notification
Diversity
Authorization
Access Control Proxy Re-encryption
Principle of Least Privilege Delegation
Role-based Information Access Control
Authentication
Inter-Realm Authentication Identity Federation
Authentication Policies
Decentralization
Minimizing Resource Utilization IoT SW Optimization
Power Optimization Task Optimization
Power Conserving State Sensor Heartbeat
Negotiation Mechanisms Ontologies
Node Pairing Cloudlets
Dynamic Adjustment of Behavior
Logging
Encryption
Storage and Dissemination of Trust Information
Safety Critical
Decentralization
Minimizing Resource Utilization IoT SW Optimization
Power Optimization Task Optimization
Power Conserving State Sensor Heartbeat
Negotiation Mechanisms Ontologies
Dynamic Adjustment of Behavior
Replication Control Replication Data Replication
Distribution
Cloudlets Node Pairing
Geographical Distribution Resource Distribution
Redundancy Parallel Operation
Restoration
Prioritization
Isolation
Validation
Use of good practices
Sustainability
Standardization
Standard API Policy Management
Modularization Resource Assignment
Interface Standardization Interface Abstraction
Parallel Operation
Virtualization
Automatic Scaling Migration
Automatic Recreation Instantiation
Relocation Virtual Machine (VM)
Isolation Scaling
Distribution
Cloudlets Node Pairing
Geographical Distribution Resource Distribution
Validation
Testing
Use of good practices
Design for assurance 58
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critical control systems in general terms, it is also depicted in Figure 3.6.
Sustainability Safety-critical Dependability
Real Time 
Performance Survivability
Redundancy
Replication
Restoration ReactionIntelligence Self-healing
Self-
consciousness
Design for 
assurance
Data ReplicationControl Replication
Fault Detection
Fault 
Remediation
Context 
Awareness
Context Aware 
Data Analytics
Emergency 
Notification
Satisficing 
Techniques CIP
Monitoring
Figure 3.6: Satisficing techniques for the subjacent infrastructure
Satisficing techniques colored orange indicate the ones that provide architectural robustness and
integrity to the interoperability platform and the communication infrastructure; we extract these
techniques into Figure 3.7. In green, we show the techniques that enable the interoperability
itself, described also in Figure 3.8. Colored blue are the satisficing techniques that help the
integration of industrial IoT nodes within the infrastructure, which we can also see in Figure 3.9.
Purple represents the techniques related to the virtualization of services within the platform,
available in Figure 3.10.
To better understand the scope of the satisficing techniques, we provide a brief description of
some of them, focusing on the most important or representative ones for our scenario. The
first group of satisficing techniques described correspond to the ones in Figure 3.6, where we
find techniques interesting for a CIP scenario. Among them we have, for example, Design
for Assurance, which refers to provisioning evidence for compliance to governing rules, and
that the governing rules provide appropriate grounds for trustworthiness [130]. It is based on
assurance cases, which make easier the accountability and the evaluation of the compliance to
good practices and standards easier. Following good practices of design oriented for assurance
helps the resulting system to improve interoperability, given that this compliance to governing
rules often implies the application of guidelines and standards which helps the construction of
more compatible and reliable systems.
Another interesting technique is related to Restoration, referring to mechanisms capable of
returning a system to a former or original condition after the occurrence of a failure. Restoration
is central to the need for mitigation and recovery techniques. International organizations provide
guidelines to improve recovery capabilities in CIs [15, 131]. Also Intelligence generates solutions
capable of adapting to new circumstances and acting more e ciently against any anomalous
occurrence. Machine learning (ML) techniques can provide the system with the necessary
intelligence to perform automatic actions based on computed decisions taking into account
multiple sources of data and a high number of interdependencies and constraints. These tasks
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can be very complex and escape the possibilities of a human operator, hence Intelligence solutions
are very important for complex interconnected scenarios.
In a CIP environment, implementing Redundancy is of paramount importance. It is defined as
the inclusion of extra components that are not strictly necessary for the normal operation, in
case of failure. When the primary devices stop working due to a fault, the secondary components
are activated to maintain the normal operation of the system, while the primary ones are under
repair. Redundancy can be implemented by introducing exact copies of primary components in
the system, or using components of di↵erent natures as redundant ones in order to maximize
diversity. Related to this technique, we have Replication. Replication implies providing multiple
identical instances of the same system (or task), all of them running in parallel. Replication
benefits performance and availability (see Section 3.1.2), since replicated components help when
there are peaks of activity. The use of replication implies that all the replicated systems are
always running to balance their workload, in contrast to redundancy, where the additional com-
ponents are put in place to ensure the continuation of the operation even if a system is brought
down by a failure. Two forms of replication can be implemented: Control Replication, where
the SCADA processes are replicated, and Data Replication, where the important information is
stored in di↵erent separated systems.
Regarding the protection of the CPCSs, we can conform a group of techniques to ensure the
e↵ectiveness of the mechanisms put in place, such as Emergency Notification, which refers to the
capability of providing timely and descriptive alerts and notifications of the important events
occurring within the system architecture. These notifications must contain su cient information
to allow the human operators in charge of managing these alerts to take appropriate and rapid
actions to mitigate the threats and avoid cascading failures between failing interconnected sys-
tems. Also Reaction mechanisms, defined as “a response to some foregoing action or stimulus”
[120]. In this scenario, we define reaction as the capability of the system to react against anoma-
lous and/or malicious events, through the IPRS modules deployed across the interoperability
platform.
Self-Consciousness, which allows the system to continuously monitor itself and its internal states,
and Self-Healing (self-healing systems are able to detect a malfunction and to react to it, return-
ing to their normal status and operation) techniques also help build a secure interoperability
system, protecting the underlying CCS. Self-consciousness allows each component of the sys-
tem to provide early detection capabilities and build security into the platform, and self-healing
complements self-consciousness and restoration, providing the components of the platform to
be able to recover from anomalous dynamics, thus preventing cascading failures and supporting
the service continuity.
In line with the self-consciousness and self-healing techniques, we have the Fault Detection
and Fault Remediation satisficing techniques. The interoperability system must be aware of
its behaviors and internal states, thus being able to detect any fault occurring within it. In
order to avoid any damage occurring from these faults, it is important to take rapid action and
mitigate the errors in the system before it cascades and threatens the normal operation of the
system. Additionally, and related to the context awareness softgoal identified in Section 3.3, the
interoperability architecture have to implement a Context Awareness satisficing technique which
allows the system to analyze and monitor its environment and the behavior of their surroundings,
i.e., the context, in order to rapidly detect problems that arise, and avoid any malfunctions
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derived from these events. This technique is highly related to the previous techniques (i.e.,
self-consciousness, fault detection), and all together provide security through prevention to the
infrastructure.
In order to achieve a context aware environment, it is important to analyze the information
behavior of the system and its surroundings. This information comes in the form of raw Big
Data, thus, it is important for the system to be able to examine this information and extract
conclusions from the data, taking always into account the contextual information of the system.
The technique which helps us achieve this understanding of the contextual information is referred
to as Context Aware Data Analytics.
Sustainability Safety-critical Dependability
Real Time 
Performance Survivability
Self-
consciousness
SW 
Optimization
HW 
Optimization
Testing
Access Control
AuthenticationAuthorization
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Distribution
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Figure 3.7: Satisficing techniques for the communication infrastructure
Once understood the first set of satisficing techniques, we focus on a second set containing those
techniques which have an impact on the communication infrastructure (represented in orange
in Figure 3.5). To better understand their dependencies and relations, we have extracted them
to Figure 3.7, and we continue with our analysis by providing definitions for some of the more
representative ones for our scenario, e.g., the monitoring mechanisms. Monitoring provides
continuous analysis and vigilance of the surveilled system dynamics in order to detect and
understand possible threatening occurrences. This technique was described first as a softgoal in
Section 3.3, and as a satisficing technique in this section. There are a wide variety of monitoring
tools and solutions which allow to better understand the inner dynamics of the surveilled system,
as well as its environment. Examples of these tools are the IDS and IPRS solutions, which
provide protective and defensive mechanisms that, put in place in a CPCS network or host,
monitor the system and/or its environment in order to detect threatening events (IDS) and
provide countermeasure actions to mitigate their e↵ects (IPRS). The implementation of these
techniques are of high importance in an interconnected heterogeneous environment such as the
SG.
Within this second set of techniques we find two of them which are extremely important for
our scenario, i.e., Decentralization and Distribution mechanisms. Decentralization, previously
defined as a softgoal, consists on the implementation of methods that allow the transference and
distribution of functions over the di↵erent nodes of a network in order to balance the workload
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and avoid centralized authorities which are vulnerable to faults and attacks. Distribution refers
to the implementation of mechanisms to communicate and coordinate network nodes in order
for them to be able to perform concurrent cooperative tasks. Three types of distribution can be
implemented [125]: Resource Distribution or modularization, where the system is composed of
multiple distributed processing resources interconnected to form a single system with integrated
control and system transparency to users; Processing Distribution or parallelism, where the
systems cooperate to solve a common problem; and Control Distribution or autonomy, where
the system is configured to perform autonomous operations based on distributed symmetrical
control and message-passing communication protocols among resources or the system.
Also, we find that Delegation mechanisms can result of interest for this scenario. Delegation is
defined as the authorization to represent others, or do something as a representative [120]. In
the context of computer security, it refers to the process of allowing another user of process to
use other user’s credentials or permissions to perform a task. This technique is highly useful
in critical situations, where a system administrator with the proper credentials might not be
present at the time of the emergency, thus the permissions to mitigate the critical situation
should be delegated to other available operators. Complementing this technique we have the
principle of least privilege (as seen in Section 2.4), which conveys the need that in a computer
system, especially in a critical environment, each module, function or piece of information should
only be accessed by those actors in the system (users, processes) which have a legitimate purpose
for accessing or using it.
To aid delegation, we can implement a Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) mechanism, which is a
type of Public-Key Encryption that provides a “re-encryption” functionality allowing a proxy
to transform ciphertexts encrypted under a public key, into ciphertexts decryptable by another
key. To do so, the proxy must be in possession of a re-encryption key that makes this process
possible, while at the same time making it impossible for the proxy to learn any information
about the encrypted data [132].
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Figure 3.8: Satisficing techniques for interoperability
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The third set of satisficing techniques we have identified is related to the interoperability of
the systems within the platform. These satisficing techniques are depicted in color green in
Figure 3.5, and extracted for clarity and understandability in Figure 3.8. Here we can propose
some definitions for the most representative ones for our work, e.g., Prioritization, defined as
the establishment of priorities among processes in a system, to ensure that the most critical
ones always have available the assets they need to operate properly. In CCSs, critical tasks need
to be taken care of as soon as possible, this is made possible through the organization of tasks
according to their priority.
Another interesting technique in this set for our scenario is Diversity, which provides di↵erent
implementations of the same specification (HW or SW), and uses them as replicated systems
to cope with errors in a specific implementation. Diversity complements the techniques of
replication and redundancy. An additional mechanism to help the interoperability of our system
is Policy Management, which refers to the definition, management, update and report on the
status of system policies. This capability must be present in all CSs, where the policies are
defined by the organization to which the infrastructure belongs. Security policies, especially,
must be up to date and be well defined in order for the system to be secure and interoperable
with external modules and devices.
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Figure 3.9: Satisficing techniques for the industrial IoT
Following the next set of definitions in Figure 3.5, we now describe several satisficing techniques
proposed for the compliance of the Industrial IoT systems within the interoperability platform.
They are marked in blue in Figure 3.5, and extracted to Figure 3.9 for better comprehensibility.
Among them, we discuss three of them for our scenario, i.e., Sensor Heartbeat, Node Pairing,
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and Negotiation Mechanisms.
The good health and correct operation of WSNs, and networks of IoT devices in general, is
monitored through the emission of periodic signals of liveliness to other nodes in the network,
denominated “heartbeats”, where the device communicates its presence in the network, and
goes back to sleep. We, then, refer to the technique which achieves this monitoring as “sensor
heartbeat”. Node Pairing is the technique in charge of e↵ectively establishing a communication
between two nodes in a network, in order for them to exchange information. This process need to
be secured in order to avoid the flooding of false information through the network with malicious
purposes. And negotiation mechanisms are those procedures taken, usually by two nodes at a
time, in order to establish a communication between them. In this negotiations, the nodes agree
the usage of common means for the communication, e.g., the communication protocols, or the
security policies and mechanisms. This is usually done automatically, and the systems adjust
their behavior dynamically according to the parameters of the negotiation. This procedure also
needs to be secured, in order to avoid a malicious node to force insecure means of communication
to perform attacks to the system.
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Figure 3.10: Satisficing techniques for virtualization
The last set of satisficing techniques studied is the ones referred to the virtualization of services
and functions in the network. They are colored orange in Figure 3.5 and extracted for clarity
into Figure 3.10. These techniques are common in virtualization scenarios, we can find their
descriptions as well as interesting uses in the literature (see [126]).
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3.5 Metrics for Interoperability
In the previous sections, we have focused our e↵orts on the analysis of the di↵erent variables that
influence and constrain the construction of a secure decentralized interoperability architecture
for the CSs of the smart grid. We especially aim to better understand the requirements that
constrain the inclusion of interoperability mechanisms for the CPCSs of di↵erent domains of the
SG. In Section 3.1, we reviewed the special requirements and constraints that are present in any
critical scenario.
Following the NFR Framework [119], which allows us to model the softgoals of the system, in
Section 3.3 we provide a detailed analysis of the NFRs for the interoperability of the CPCSs
of the SG. Section 3.4 reviews those satisficing techniques that aim to provide means and tools
to fulfill the previously identified requirements, inspiring the materialization of the operational
level on the GQM approach [129]. Following this methodology, we now address the next level of
the GQM, the quantitative level. To this end, we create a theoretical interoperability scenario
for the CPCSs of the SG, where we consider the interactions of di↵erent key elements belonging
to the Industry 4.0 environment. These architectural components appear at di↵erent domains in
the infrastructure and have di↵erent scopes (see Figure 3.11) in a proposed (fourth generation)
CS for the SG:
Provider
Federation
Cloud
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Point
Subnetwork
Subnetwork
Subnetwork
Subnetwork
Subnetwork
Provider
Provider
Figure 3.11: Interoperability architecture for the CPCSs of the SG
• Access Point : the access points have the most reduced scope in the infrastructure, they
perform di↵erent interoperability functions at a local level, there are several access points
per subnetwork.
• Subnetwork : are the building units of the interoperability platform, each subnetwork per-
form di↵erent tasks for the control and interoperability of the SG. Each subnetwork belongs
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to one or more energy providers.
• Provider : the energy providers are the corporative actors of the infrastructure, the equip-
ment in each of their subnetworks are controlled by a provider or a collaboration of several
of them.
• Federation: a federation of energy providers is the entity that encompasses di↵erent en-
ergy providers which establish cooperation mechanisms among them. They may share
equipment and resources as part as the cooperation mechanisms.
• Cloud : is the global infrastructure that acts as means of cooperation and communication
between the shared resources and means of the federation of providers, the cloud can
perform multiple interoperability operations while maintaining a global perspective of the
interoperability of the infrastructure.
Once this scenario is set, we devote this section to the identification of interesting metrics which
help evaluate the operation of this theoretical interoperability architecture for the CPCSs of
the SG. Metrics, as denominated in the field of SW engineering, are quantitative measures of
the degree to which a system or process has a given property. For our purposes, we consider a
metric as an evaluation method for assessing the level of satisfaction of certain non-functional
properties in a quantitative or qualitative way, on the basis of evidence and contextual input,
like, for example, stakeholder’s criteria [128].
In our analysis, we provide examples of sets of metrics for evaluating some of the main NFRs
identified in Section 3.3, i.e., the main high-level sets of softgoals, which include di↵erent sets
of softgoals inheriting their properties (see Figures 3.3, and 3.4). In our analysis of metrics, we
connect sets of metrics and sets of softgoals as a variation of the GQM approach, because in
GQM a set of metrics is used to evaluate each operational question of the model.
We make, however, this high-level connection of sets of metrics and softgoals, in relation to the
satisficing techniques. Otherwise, following the in-depth GQM analysis, the extension of this
study would be too extensive to be included in this thesis. Our di↵erent sets of metrics are
mere suggestions and examples, we understand that we have not been exhaustive, however we
do refer to di↵erent standards and guides where it is possible to find extensive information and
di↵erent implementations and formulae expressing detailed metrics within these sets.
We divide our study into 10 di↵erent sets of metrics according to the main softgoal categories in
Section 3.3: maintainability, reliability and availability, performance, safety and dependability,
responsiveness, auditing, interoperability, virtualization, monitoring and restoration, and autho-
rization and delegation. In addition to the analysis and definitions of the metrics, in order
to provide certain level of validation to the identified sets of metrics, we incorporate to our
study a set of controls or informative references where it is possible to find guidelines and useful
information in how to apply and construe a given metric.
These controls will help determine the formulation of the metric, its scope in the secure inter-
operability infrastructure, and support its application and its usefulness in this environment
by covering the identified need for this measurement with references to its application in the
literature. Most of these controls come from prominent control frameworks, such as the NIST
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [131], and di↵erent representa-
tive standards and guidelines for the security and interoperability of the critical infrastructures,
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e.g., NISTIR 7628 [20], NIST SP800-82 [112], the NISCC Guide [133], IEC/TS 62351 series
[134], NERC-CIP [113], ISO/IEC 27002 [135], IEEE 2030 [11], NIST SP800-144 [127] or the
NFV Guides [126].
The NIST Framework [131] contemplates five high-level functions for cybersecurity analysis:
identify (ID), protect (PR), detect (DE), respond (RS) and recover (RC). Within the analysis
provided, this framework provides 6 di↵erent standards and guidelines for controls, i.e., CCS CSC
[136], COBIT 5 [137], ISA 62443-2-1:2009 [138], ISA 62443-3-3:2013 [139], ISO/IEC 27001:2013
[140] and NIST SP800-53 [141].
Taking into account the aforementioned proposed structure of analysis for the metrics, we provide
an overview of a first set of metrics in Table 3.3, which are related to the maintainability
requirements of the secure interoperability platform (see Section 3.3). In the table we can review
the scope of each metric in our scenario, the requirements to which the metrics are related, and
the set of controls which help define and apply them. Here we can highlight some examples of
them, providing a brief high-level description of the metrics, which can be adapted and specified
on a later refinement step of specification:
• Restoration Time: is the estimated time required for a system to be restored to its original
operation, in the case of failure. This metric has an important impact on availability, thus
the infrastructure should have support mechanisms put in place to reduce its time and
impact as much as possible.
• Repair Time: also “Mean Time To Repair” (MTTR1) is the average time required to
repair a system that has failed. MTTR1 has to be kept to a minimum in critical systems,
which implement redundancy and replication mechanisms to compensate the failure of a
single component.
• Recovery Time: also “Mean Time To Recovery” (MTTR2), refers to the average time a
given system will take to recover from a failure. Similar to MTTR1, it indicates the time
lapsed before the system returns to its normal operation. It has to be kept under a given
threshold, in order to avoid failures cascading to other dependent systems.
This set of metrics described above are, as we discussed, high-level metrics (we do not provide
concrete formulae, since they can be formulated in several ways according to the scenario of
application), however we find that these are a representative example of metrics useful for
analyzing the maintenance needs of a critical system. To better understand the metrics and
their application to this environment, it is possible to refer to the following standards and
guidelines: IEC/TS 62351-7 [142], NISTIR 7628 [20], NIST SP800-82 [112], NIST SP800-53 [141],
IEC/TS 62351 [134], NERC-CIP [113]. And the following categories of the NIST Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [131]: ID.AM, RC.RP, RC.IM, RC.CO, PR.IP-
7, PR.MA; corresponding to the following standards and guidelines: CCS CSC [136], COBIT
5 [137], ISA 62443-2-1 [138], ISA 62443-3-3 [139], ISO/IEC 27001 [140], and NIST SP800-53
[141].
The next set of metrics analyzed corresponds to the reliability and availability metrics, repre-
sented in Table 3.4. This set contains an example of interesting measurements that can be taken
in a secure interoperability platform for the CPCSs of the SG in order to analyze the fulfillment
of the reliability and availability requirements. We propose several definitions as examples for
these metrics:
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Table 3.3: Maintainability metrics
Metric
Scope
Requirements Controls
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Installation
SW Cost
• • • Maintainability, Modularity, Virtualiz-
ability
CCS CSC [136],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
IEC/TS 62351-7 [142],
NISTIR 7628 [20],
NIST SP800-82 [112],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
IEC/TS 62351 [134],
NERC-CIP [113]
Installation
HW Cost
• • • Scalability, Virtualizability, Opera-
tional Environment Compatibility,
Heterogeneity Management, Hetero-
geneity Coexistence
Obtaining
SW Cost
• • • Scalability, Virtualizability, Opera-
tional Environment Compatibility,
Heterogeneity Management, Hetero-
geneity Coexistence
Obtaining
HW Cost
• • • Scalability, Virtualizability, Opera-
tional Environment Compatibility,
Heterogeneity Management, Hetero-
geneity Coexistence, HW Dependabil-
ity
Maintenance
HW Cost
• • • Scalability, Virtualizability, Opera-
tional Environment Compatibility,
Heterogeneity Management, Hetero-
geneity Coexistence
Maintenance
SW Cost
• • • Scalability, Virtualizability, Opera-
tional Environment Compatibility,
Heterogeneity Management, Hetero-
geneity Coexistence
Planned
Maintenance
• • • Maintainability, Service Continuity,
Service Performance, Service Assur-
ance
Restoration
Time
• • • Stability, Resilience, Reliability
Repair Time • • • Maintainability, Restoration
Maintenance
Man-hours
• • • Maintainability, Restoration
Failures Over
Time
• • • Resilience, Fault Tolerance
Recovery
Time
• • • Recoverability
Upgrade
Events
• • • Heterogeneity Management, Extensi-
bility, Scalability, Service Continuity
Mean Down
Time
• • • Safety, Service Continuity
Mean Time
Between
Failures
• • • Safety, Service Continuity
Number of
Maintenance
Operations
per Month
• • • • Heterogeneity Management, Extensi-
bility, Scalability, Service Continuity,
HW Dependability
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Table 3.4: Reliability and availability metrics
Metric
Scope
Requirements Controls
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Diversity • • • • Heterogeneity Coexistence, Hetero-
geneity Management, Operational En-
vironment Comptatibility, Interface-
ability
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
CCS CSC [136],
IEEE 2030 [11],
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
NISTIR 7628 [20]
Replication • • • • • Safety Critical, Survivability
Uptime • • • Availability, Service Continuity
Downtime • • • Availability, Service Continuity
Availability • • • Availability, Service Assurance
Redundancy • • • • • Robustness, Resilience
• Diversity : measures the number of di↵erent implementations of the same specification,
the more diverse a system is, the more resilient to failures it is.
• Replication: measures the number of replicated systems that are present in the system. It
can also be applied to a component, in order to identify its level of replication, e.g., RAID
systems: level 0 to level 7.
• Uptime: is the measure of the time a system is working and available, representing the time
it can work non-stop and without maintenance. Examples are: the percentage of time the
system is running and number of hours uptime versus number of hours of outage/downtime.
• Redundancy : refers to the inclusion of extra components that are not strictly necessary for
the normal operation, in case of failure. This metric measures the number of redundant
components available in the system.
To better understand these definitions and the application scope of these metrics for the control
systems, the following guidelines provide insight about the definitions and applications of these
metrics: NISTIR 7628 [20], and the categories: PR.MA, PR.DS-5, PR.IP-8, PR.DS-3, PR.DS-4,
PR.IP-4, ID.BE-4 of the NIST Framework[131], corresponding to the standards and guidelines:
COBIT 5 [137], ISA 62443-2-1 [138], ISO/IEC 27001 [140], NIST SP800-53 [141], CCS CSC
[136], and ISA 62443-3-3 [139].
In Table 3.5 we find a set of metrics related to the performance of the control systems in a secure
interoperability platform. These metrics are high-level examples of the di↵erent formulated
metrics that can be applied to measure this variable. Performance metrics are common in the
literature, and their formulae can vary depending on the concrete scenario of application, here we
propose the following definitions for some of the most interesting metrics in our scenario:
• Performance per Watt : is the rate of computation that can be delivered for each watt of
energy consumed. A low ratio of performance per watt is an indicator of the suitability of
a component for the CPCSs.
• Relative E ciency : the relative e ciency of two procedures, known as the ratio of their
e ciencies is frequently calculated as the comparison made between a given procedure and
a notional “best possible” procedure.
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Table 3.5: Performance metrics
Metric
Scope
Requirements Controls
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Speed • Performance
IEC/TS 62351-3 [143],
IEC/TS 62351-4 [144],
IEC/TS 62351-5 [145],
IEC/TS 62351-6 [146],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
NIST SP800-82 [112],
NISTIR 7628 [20],
NIST SP800-53 [141]
Completion
Time
• • • Performance, Service Assurance, Reli-
ability
Service Time • • • Performance
Speed of
Crypto-
graphic
Algorithms
• • • Performance, Security
Performance
per Watt
• • Performance
Bandwidth • • • • • Performance
Mean Delay
of General
Tra c
• • • • • Performance
Channel Ca-
pacity
• • • • • Performance
Relative E -
ciency
• • • Performance
In order to better understand these definitions and the scope of application of the metrics, we
refer to the following standards and guidelines: IEC/TS 62351-3 [143], IEC/TS 62351-4 [144],
IEC/TS 62351-5 [145], IEC/TS 62351-6 [146], NIST SP800-82 [112], NISTIR 7628 [20], and NIST
SP800-53 [141]. And to the ID.AM-5 category of the NIST Framework [131], corresponding to
the standards: COBIT 5 [137], ISA 62443-2-1 [138], ISO/IEC 27001 [140], and NIST SP800-53
[141].
Table 3.6: Safety and dependability metrics
Metric
Scope
Requirements Controls
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Percent System Safety
Hazards
• • • • • Safety Critical
NISTIR 7628 [20],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141]
Mean Time to Unsafe Fail-
ure
• • • • • Robustness, Safety
Degree of Redundancy per
Access Point
• • • • Maintainability, Service
Continuity
Number of Network Do-
mains
• • • Decentralization
Safety Design Stability • • • • • Safety
Safety Integrity Level • • • • • Safety
Time to Countermeasure • • • Robustness, Resilience
Safety Requirements
Traceability
• • • • • Accountability
Number of Countries • • • Responsiveness, Trust, Ac-
cesibility
Table 3.6 presents a set of metrics related to the safety and dependability requirements of the
70
3.5. Metrics for Interoperability
CPCSs interoperability infrastructure. These metrics are high-level examples of the di↵erent
metrics that can be employed to analyze the fulfillment of these requirements in a real environ-
ment. We can highlight some of them and provide general definitions for them:
• Mean Time To Unsafe Failure (MTTUF): represents the average time that a system will
operate safely before the occurrence of a failure that produces an unsafe system state
[147]. MTTUF should be as high as possible, indicating that there are few probable
unsafe failures for the whole system, and thus a robust dependable system.
• Safety Integrity Level (SIL): metrics that are available at IEC 61508 [148] allow developing
systems observing the level of safety of the system. Solutions complying with the spec-
ifications of this standard will ensure that the SIL of the subsystem is adequate for the
CCS.
To better understand this set of metrics, it is possible to consult the NISTIR 7628 [20] guidelines,
and refer to the PR.IP-4 and ID.BE-4 categories of the NIST Framework [131], which correspond
to the standards: COBIT 5 [137], ISA 62443-2-1 [138], ISA 62443-3-3 [139], ISO/IEC 27001 [140]
and NIST SP800-53 [141].
Table 3.7: Responsiveness metrics
Metric
Scope
Requirements Controls
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Latency • • • Performance, Responsiveness
NISTIR 7628 [20],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141]
Response
Time
• • • Performance, Responsiveness, Avail-
ability, Virtualizability
Throughput • • • Performance, Heterogeneity Manage-
ment
Schedulability • • • Performance, Responsiveness, Avail-
ability, Virtualizability
Jitter • • • Performance, Responsiveness
The set of metrics represented in Table 3.7 correspond to the ones related to the responsiveness
of the system. Responsiveness is commonly addressed in the literature for network engineering.
Within this set, we can highlight a metric very significative for the CIP scenario, Response time,
which is defined as the time it takes to initially respond to a request for a service or to access
resources [116]. It is vital for the availability (data and control) of the system.
The responsiveness metrics are reflected in the NISTIR 7628 [20] guidelines, and can be observed
in the ID.AM-5 category of the NIST Framework [131], which refers to the following standards:
COBIT 5 [137], ISA 62443-2-1 [138], ISO/IEC 27001 [140] and NIST SP800-53 [141].
The next set of metrics, illustrated in Table 3.8, is related to the auditing of the system. Auditing
is vital for implementing accountability processes, and helps maintain a set of quality standards
highly important for the correct operation of the system. In a secure interoperability platform
for the CPCSs of the SG, it is important to implement and quantify these auditing mechanisms.
Metrics relevant to this process could include the Number of Auditors, Number of Audits per
Year, and Number of Logs per Minute. Controls and informative references for this set of
metrics can be found in the NISTIR 7628 [20] guide, and in the PR.PT-1 category of the NIST
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Table 3.8: Auditing metrics
Metric
Scope
Requirements Controls
A
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Number of External
Auditors
• • • Accountability
NISTIR 7628 [20],
CCS CSC [136],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141]
Number of External
Audits per Year
• • Accountability
Number of Internal
Audits per Year
• • • Accountability
Number of Logs per
Minute
• • • Accountability, Performance
Number of Internal
Auditors
• • Accountability
Framework [131], which is related to the standards and guidelines: CCS CSC [136], COBIT
5 [137], ISA 62443-2-1 [138], ISA 62443-3-3 [139], ISO/IEC 27001 [140], and NIST SP800-53
[141].
Table 3.9: Secure interoperability metrics
Metric
Scope
Requirements Controls
A
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Number of Subnet-
works
• • • Interoperability, Scalability,
Modularity, Maintainability,
Flexibility
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
ISO/IEC 27002 [135],
IEEE 2030 [11],
NISTIR 7628 [20],
NIST SP800-82 [112],
IEC/TS 62351 [134],
NERC-CIP [113],
NIST SP800-144 [127]
Time to Translation • Heterogeneity Management,
Responsiveness
Number of Protocols • • • • Heterogeneity Coexistence
Number of Di↵erent
Types of Subnetworks
• • Trust, Interoperability
Number of Security
Policies
• • • • Interoperability, Heterogeneity
Coexistence
Number of Nodes • • Distribution, Decentralization,
Scalability
Strength of Crypto-
graphic Mechanisms
• • • Security, Reliability
In in Table 3.9 we find a set of metrics measuring the secure interoperability of the system. The
proposed metrics examples are related to the characteristics of the di↵erent networks that coexist
within an interoperability scenario for the control systems of the SG. Within this set (which can
be expanded according to the application scenario) we can highlight two main metrics:
• Number of Subnetworks: measures the di↵erent types of subnetworks that coexist within a
system. These networks might have di↵erent types of communications protocols (measured
by the Number of Protocols metric), di↵erent security policies (measured by the metric
Number of Security Policies) and have di↵erent characteristics, e.g., being a cabled or
wireless kind of network (this can be measured by the metric Number of Di↵erent Types
of Subnetworks).
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• Time to Translation: in case of protocol conversion or message translation, this metric
indicates the time lapsed from the emission of the message until it has been translated (or
converted) to be sent to the destination using the destination’s protocol or language. This
metric is useful in an interoperability infrastructure, where multiple nodes communicate
among them using di↵erent protocols.
In order to better understand these definitions and to find concrete examples of metrics for
these categories, it is possible to consult the following standards and guidelines: ISO/IEC 27002
[135], IEEE 2030 [11], NISTIR 7628 [20], NIST SP800-82 [112], IEC/TS 62351 [134], NERC-
CIP [113], NIST SP800-144 [127]. And also refer to the categories: ID.GV-1 and PR.IP-5 of the
NIST Framework [131], which correspond to the standards and guidelines: COBIT 5 [137], ISA
62443-2-1 [138], ISO/IEC 27001 [140] and NIST SP800-53 [141].
Table 3.10: Virtualization metrics
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Configurations
Backup per
Minute
• • • Resilience, Service Continuity, Ac-
countability, Restoration, Safety Criti-
cal
CCS CSC [136],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
NFV Guides [126],
NIST SP800-82 [112],
NERC-CIP [113],
NIST SP800-144 [127]
Velocity of New
Service Deploy-
ment
• • Reaction, Observability, Awareness
Number of Vir-
tualized Access
Points
• • • Optimization, Virtualizability, Perfor-
mance, Dependability
Percentage of
Virtualization
• • • Heterogeneity Coexistence, Virtualiz-
ability, Dependability
Number of Ser-
vices in Public
Cloud
• • Isolation, Trust, Security
Number of Ser-
vices in Propri-
etary Cloud
• • Virtualizability, Dependability, Main-
tainability, Interoperability, Scalabil-
ity
An important set of metrics in the scenario at hand (see Figure 3.11) is the virtualization
metrics, which help understand the virtualization characteristics of the critical environment
we describe. While virtualization metrics are common for multiple information technologies
scenarios, measuring the flexibility and performance of the virtualized services is of upmost
importance in a critical environment. The metrics represented in Table 3.10 are examples of the
measurements it is possible to assess the virtualization of the system:
• Number of Configurations Backup per Minute: measures the number of backups of config-
uration files that are made per minute in the system. While this number can be reduced
in a small system, when referring to a complex network such as the SG CPCSs, this can be
a massive number of system backups. This metric indicates the complexity of the system
and the backup and maintenance mechanisms implemented for its protection, as well as
provides insight about the needs of backup management needed for the platform (e.g.,
dedicated servers with a broad bandwidth used for backups).
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• Velocity of New Service Deployment : measures the time lapse needed for a virtualized ser-
vice to be created and deployed within the system. This metric is related to the flexibility
and elasticity of a virtualization system.
• Number of Virtualized Access Points: refers to the number of access points which are
o↵ered in a virtual rather than physical form. This metric is related to the Percentage
of Virtualization metric, which indicates the number or percentage of virtualized services
o↵ered in a given network.
• Number of Services in Public Cloud : indicates the number of services that are deployed in
a public cloud, in contrast to the Number of Services in Proprietary Cloud metric, which
indicates the number of services available only in the private cloud. In a critical system,
given to the sensitivity of the data managed, it is usually preferred to employ proprietary
server infrastructures. However, less sensitive data can be transferred to the public cloud
for storage and global availability.
Controls and representative information regarding these metrics can be found in the following
standards and guidelines: the NFV Guides [126], NIST SP800-82 [112], NERC-CIP [113] and
NIST SP800-144 [127]. Also it is possible to find information in the ID.AM category of the
NIST Framework [131], corresponding to the standards and guidelines: CCS CSC [136], COBIT
5 [137], ISA 62443-2-1 [138], ISA 62443-3-3 [139], ISO/IEC 27001 [140] and NIST SP800-53
[141].
Table 3.11: Monitoring and restoration metrics
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Events per Minute
• • • • • Awareness, Accountability CCS CSC [136],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
IEC/TS 62351-7 [142],
NISTIR 7628 [20],
NIST SP800-82 [112],
IEC/TS 62351 [134],
NERC-CIP [113],
NISCC Guide [133]
Number of Coun-
termeasures
• • Reaction, Recoverability
Number of
Restoration Oper-
ations
• • Restoration, Recoverability
Number of Packets
Inspected per Sec-
ond
• • Monitoring
Number of Alarms
per Minute
• • • • • Monitoring, Accountability
In order to assess the protection mechanisms implemented within a secure interoperability ar-
chitecture, it is necessary to find metrics to measure the performance of the monitoring and
restoration procedures deployed within the system. This set of metrics, presented in Table 3.11,
constitutes an example of the di↵erent measurements that can be taken in order to evaluate the
operation and suitability of these protection mechanisms within the infrastructure of CPCSs for
the SG. We provide example definitions for some of them as follows:
• Number of Critical Events per Minute: measures the number of critical events occurring
in a system, this gives indication of the vulnerability of the system in the face of external
threats or system faults. In a critical environment, it is vital to maintain this number as
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low as possible, being maintenance and upgrade operations adequate to solve the arising
problems.
• Number of Packets Inspected per Second : measures the number of network packets that
can be processed and inspected by a monitoring system per second. Techniques such as
deep packet inspection helps the system to detect any abnormal behavior or event. A high
throughput is desirable in a critical network, avoiding delays for this procedure.
To better understand these metrics and to broaden the definitions and scope of the metrics, it
is possible to consult the following standards and guidelines: IEC/TS 62351-7 [142], NISTIR
7628 [20], NIST SP800-82 [112], IEC/TS 62351 [134], NERC-CIP [113] and NISCC Guide [133].
Additionally, these metrics are covered in the following categories of the NIST Framework:
RC.RP, RC.IM, RC.CO, RS.RP, RS.CO, RS.AN, RS.MI, RS.IM, DE.AE, DE.CM, DE.DP, [131].
Which correspond to the standards and guides: CCS CSC [136], COBIT 5 [137], ISO/IEC 27001
[140], NIST SP800-53 [141], ISA 62443-2-1 [138] and ISA 62443-3-3 [139].
This last set of metrics is dedicated to the evaluation of the mechanisms of authorization and
delegation implemented within the secure interoperability infrastructure of our scenario. These
mechanisms are critical for the correct operation of the system, given that they provide redun-
dancy and backup procedures for the access and authorization mechanisms of control of the
system. Table 3.12 present an example set of metrics to illustrate the main measurements that
is possible to make in order to evaluate the presence and performance of the authorization and
delegation mechanisms, we specially highlight two of them, which are of paramount importance
for a critical scenario:
• Time to new Authorization in Critical Context : introduces a variation on the Time to New
Authorization, measuring the time it takes for the system to produce a new authorization,
in the presence of a critical event occurring within the system. In a critical infrastructure,
the authorization and permissions must be prioritized, i.e., non-vital procedures must be
relegated to a second plane in the presence of a critical event, giving priority to those
procedures (e.g., authorization) which will allow the sta↵ to remedy the critical situation.
Therefore, all critical authorizations must be provided as fast as possible.
• Time to new Critical Authorization in Critical Context : is the variation of the previous
metric, Time to New Authorization in Critical Context, in the event that the profiles of
the system that usually (and are usually authorized to) tend the critical events are not
available, however a member of the sta↵ with other type of profile is present and available
to act to remedy the situation. In this scenario, the authorization system must issue a
critical authorization for the new user, as rapidly as possible, but also, complying with all
the security procedures of the infrastructure. This metric assesses the secure authorization
mechanisms put in place in the infrastructure for these purposes.
To better understand these authorization and delegation metrics, it is possible to consult the
controls in the NIST Framework: PR.AC and PR.AT [131]. Which refer to the standards and
guidelines: CCS CSC [136], COBIT 5 [137], ISA 62443-2-1 [138], ISA 62443-3-3 [139], ISO/IEC
27001 [140] and NIST SP800-53 [141]. It is also possible to find further information regarding
these metrics and their implementation in the following standards and guides: IEC/TS 62351-8
[28], NISTIR 7628 [20], NIST SP800-82 [112], IEC/TS 62351 [134], NERC-CIP [113] and NIST
SP800-144 [127].
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Table 3.12: Authorization and delegation metrics
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Time to New
Authentication
• • • Responsiveness, Service Perfor-
mance, Distribution, Decentraliza-
tion
CCS CSC [136],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
IEC/TS 62351-8 [28],
NISTIR 7628 [20],
NIST SP800-82 [112],
IEC/TS 62351 [134],
NERC-CIP [113],
NIST SP800-144 [127]
Number of
Users
• • • • Security
Time to New
Authorization
• • • Responsiveness, Service Perfor-
mance, Distribution, Decentraliza-
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Time to new
Authorization
in Critical
Context
• • • Responsiveness, Service Perfor-
mance, Distribution, Decentraliza-
tion, Performance, Safety Critical
Number of
Field Opera-
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• • • Mobility, Security
Number of
Roles for
Delegation
• • • Decentralization
Time to Dele-
gation
• • • • Responsiveness, Service Perfor-
mance, Distribution, Decentraliza-
tion, Performance, Safety Critical
Time to Re-
encryption
• Security, Performance
Time to new
Critical Au-
thorization
in Critical
Context
• • • • Responsiveness, Service Perfor-
mance, Distribution, Decentraliza-
tion, Performance, Safety Critical,
Mobility
Number of
Role Managers
• • Security
Number of
Roles in the
System
• • • Security
Number of
Accesses per
Minute
• • Service Performance, Performance,
Resilience, Scalability, Availability
Number of
Security Man-
agers
• • • • Security
Number of
Operations
Authorized per
Minute
• • • Security, Accountability, Perfor-
mance
76
3.6. Requirements for Protection Solutions Deployed within Critical Systems
Throughout this section, we have detailed the main sets of metrics corresponding to the main
requirements for the secure interoperability of CCSs for the SG previously identified in Sec-
tion 3.3, the above-mentioned metrics are high-level sets of examples of metrics that can be
further developed into concrete formulas for measurements within a given specific scenario for
evaluation. This study intends to provide an overview of the main measurements that is possible
to make in order to assess the fulfillment of the identified softgoals for our secure interoperability
infrastructure.
Since they are high-level sets of metrics, we have not performed any validation procedures,
instead, we provide a set of literature controls and significative references to important standards
and guidelines in which it is possible to find documentation related to the di↵erent aspects to
evaluate and assess (which can be translated as metrics) and their description and scope at each
of the di↵erent levels of application (i.e., general cybersecurity, network protocol protection level,
smart grid security level, etc.).
Further work can be done in the specification of the metrics to be employed within a determined
scenario of application, and validation of these resulting metrics can be possible through a formal
process of validation, or through an expert group interview process, such as the Delphi method
[149]. However, given the stage of definition and refinement of our scenario, this process remains
as future work.
3.6 Requirements for Protection Solutions Deployed within Crit-
ical Systems
Since CSs are considered critical assets with a great potential impact for the society, it is vital
to protect their correct operation and integrity [21]. As reviewed in Section 1.2, the protection
and establishment of security mechanisms for CSs from the design is one of the pillars and key
characteristics of the new generation of CSs for the Industry 4.0. In previous sections, we have
reviewed the requirements and techniques for the secure interoperability architecture design from
a holistic perspective. However, a deeper analysis is in order, since it is necessary to include in
our design advanced protection solutions to face the sophisticated menaces that threaten this
new environment (see Section 2.4), and where their compatibility and suitability to the new
protocols and needs has not been yet established.
Therefore, in this section we aim to analyze in detail these mechanisms that help protect the
correct operation of the CSs and CPCSs and help prevent threatening events of diverse nature
occurring within the infrastructure, and avoid the generation of cascading e↵ects of threats
through interdependent critical infrastructures. In order to do so, we extend the NFR study
performed in Section 3.3, analyzing in depth those softgoals specially related to the security and
protection of the CSs.
Traditional means of protection for CSs are usually based on the triad firewalls, Demilitarized
Zones (DMZs) and antivirus [1, 117]. However, in the new context of Industry 4.0, where
security has to be implemented by design, it is necessary to go a step further and deploy so-
phisticated awareness and protection mechanisms specifically designed and adapted to critical
contexts [16, 150]. These mechanisms can be applied to prevention, awareness, reaction and
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restoration procedures. In our work, we decide to focus on the area of monitoring and detec-
tion for prevention and awareness procedures, hence evaluating the technologies enabling these
characteristics for the CCSs of the SG. However, this analysis is easily extrapolated to other
modules for the rest of aforementioned procedures.
These awareness mechanisms focus of this work are the IDSs [1], a security layer (HW or SW),
designed to detect ongoing intrusive activities in computer systems and networks [151]. In
the context of CPCSs, IDSs are designed to monitor network or system activities for suspicious
behaviors and produce reports to a management station. The IDS is also used for other purposes,
such as identifying problems with security policies, documentation of threats and to dissuade
individuals from violating security policies [152].
Therefore, in this section, we look at those requirements that IDSs should consider since they
act as the main way of filtering and defense in CSs. We also explore the set of metrics that
help determine the compliance level of the requirements of the IDSs in relation to the five
control requirements. It is necessary to focus on detection technologies due to the current
problems in finding a suitable IDS capable of o↵ering su cient means to not only understand
any SCADA vulnerability and all SCADA tra c (i.e., property protocols), but also to guarantee
sustainability, coexistence and scalability when other types of TCP/IP protocols (e.g., 6LowPAN
for Internet of Things) have to be integrated within the system.
To the best of our knowledge, the current literature does not contain any extensive theoretical
study on identifying those IDS requirements that have to be considered when implementing
IDS solutions for ICSs. There are only specific-purpose approaches restricted to a set of factors
[117],1805, e.g., the type of observed protocol (e.g., the SCADA IDS defined within the SPARKS
European project can identify anomalies associated with IEC-61850 and IEC-60870-5 networks
[153]), the acquisition architecture (centralized, distributed), the level of scalability and detection
granularity, the type of response (passive, active), or the degree of interoperability.
In an e↵ort to deliver such point of view, we have modeled the requirements that any IDS
solution has to fulfill to be deployed within a CI. This model takes into account the need to
comply with the CCS requirements identified in [21], and the constraints of CCSs as described
in Section 3.1.2. These constraints on the CCS impose powerful restrictions on the IDS solution
which is deployed in the critical environment, then our model will help build a more secure
control system and satisfy its requirements, through the identification and compliance with the
identified requirements for the IDS.
In order to do so, we use the NFR model framework [119], as described in section 3.2, applying
it to the analysis of the IDS solution suitability for the critical environment where it will be
deployed. Building on Figure 3.1, which represents the requirements or softgoals for the a critical
control system, we have Figure 3.12, which illustrates two main areas. The top half contains
the CCS softgoals as identified in Figure 3.1, while the bottom half of the figure shows the IDS
softgoals, needed in a critical scenario.
In other words, Figure 3.12 shows the application of the NFR Framework to describe the non-
functional requirements or softgoals that the IDS needs to satisfy in order to comply with the
CCS requirements. All the requirements are organized hierarchically and connected with other
softgoals according to the definition and concepts of safety, security and survivability engineering
[116]. The identification of the softgoals is a first step towards modeling the requirements of a
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Figure 3.12: CCS and IDS softgoals
critical complex system. The next stage of our study is the definition of the NFR softgoals for
those IDS to be configured within a CCS.
3.6.1 NFR Requirements for Protection Systems
In this section, we define the concepts involved in the NFRs identified in the model, in order
to provide more information about the non-functional requirements selected for the IDS so
as to comply with the requirements of the CCS (see Figure 3.12). Most of the definitions are
already present in Section 3.3, however here we apply them to the context of protection systems.
These definitions determine the scope of the requirements and will be used as a reference to later
identify the techniques capable of satisfying the requirements. As we did in Section 3.3, to better
understand the softgoals, we extract them and provide definitions for the most representative
ones in the definitions Table 3.13.
Given the definitions presented in Table 3.13 and the representation of the softgoals illustrated in
Figure 3.12, we can better understand the scope and definitions of the NFRs identified for an IDS
for CPCSs. We have established and defined the characteristics present in a critical environment,
and those requirements and constraints that restrict the inclusion of new components within such
a scenario. In the next section, we will further develop our study in order to determine how to
comply with the NFRs defined in this section.
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Table 3.13: Requirements for protection systems definitions table
Softgoal Definition and Description
Responsiveness a responsive IDS will be capable of performing its functions in the required time intervals (responsive-
ness of the IDS), and without introducing further delays or overheads within the surveilled system
(responsiveness of the infrastructure).
Safety the safety and safety critical of the infrastructure must be observed at every moment by the security
and protection modules deployed within it. No mechanisms implemented by these additional modules
should introduce within the infrastructure variables capable of damaging the system or causing
malfunctions in it in any way.
Security this property is a primary requirement for defense and protection of control assets in critical systems,
since the securement of CCSs is vital to maintain the normal operation of CIs [16]. Its variables,
Availability, Integrity and Confidentiality, have to be continuously monitored in order for the system
to be able to perform its tasks correctly. The protection systems such as the IDS are vital to maintain
this security and awareness for protection.
Fault
Tolerance
the ability of the system, in this case, the IDS, of continuing its operation despite the occurrence of
failures or malicious attacks. Thus the infrastructure has to be fault tolerant, as well as its protection
system. This softgoal is related to Resilience and Recoverability NFRs, which additionally imply the
ability of the system to return to normal operation as soon as possible after a threatening event.
Scalability,
Extensibility
softgoals that are mainly referred to the control infrastructure. However, the protection mechanisms
put in place should also be scalable and extensible in order to be able to handle any growing amount
of work due to the increase of tra c or tasks needed to monitored due to changes in the surveilled
infrastructure behavior or configuration.
Maintainability and its related softgoals (see Section 3.3) are directly applicable to the IDS component, since this
module needs to be maintainable in order to be secure, correctly tuned to the surveilled system and
to provide up-to-date protection measures. Especially important are the Configurability and Acces-
sibility requirements for the IDS modules, which must be accessible to the system administrators to
receive updates and modifications.
(Un)Susceptibility unsusceptibility and tolerance against failures make the IDS system stable and avoid that a fault
occurring within the protection system influences in any way the surveilled infrastructure.
E ciency this requirement, together with the relative e ciency softgoal indicate the need for the IDS compo-
nent of being e cient and not introducing any overhead within the surveilled infrastructure. This is
especially important in the case of critical systems, since their availability requirements for control
and information are vital for the correct operation of the infrastructure.
Correctness this requirement, together with its main factors, namely: accuracy, currency and precision, are vital
for IDSs in order to guarantee reliability of data and operations. The correctness of the monitoring
procedures allow the system to e ciently perform its tasks, issuing a reduced number of accurate
alarms that inform the system administrators of the events threatening the correct operation of the
surveilled system.
Operational
Environment
Compatibility
the IDS must be operationally compatible in order to be deployed within a CPCS, where machinery
and environmental radiation and noise might interfere with the operation of unprepared systems.
Reliability vital that the protection systems put in place are reliable, since any failure occurring within them
can trigger a critical incident in the CPCS, causing great impact on the infrastructure and possibly
cascading to interdependent critical systems.
Performance and the related softgoals (see Section 3.3) are very important requirements for any module deployed
within a CPCS, especially those modules providing security and performance. The adequate opera-
tion of the protection mechanisms influences directly the performance and correct operation of the
surveilled infrastructure. The IDS components must adequately perform its tasks in the stipulated
time and without introducing delays in the system.
Robustness and its related requirements (see Section 3.3) for the IDS module have a direct impact on the security
and the robustness of the surveilled CPCS. Similarly to reliability, the protection modules must be
robust in order to avoid failures and threats to disturb the correct operation of the IDS. The occur-
rence of faults within the security component can impact the surveilled infrastructure in two di↵erent
ways: (i) a failure to notify a threat in the CPCS can produce a fault in the infrastructure, (ii) a
fault within the IDS might impact the correct operation of the surveilled infrastructure introducing
a threat in the system. Either of these possibilities must be avoided, by deploying robust, reliable
and fault tolerant protection mechanisms within the CPCS.
Software
Quality
a way to comply with the previous requirement, is to consider the SW quality of the IDS, where its
development is guided by good practices and guidelines [154], and resulting in a SW component that
complies with standards and security guidelines.
HW
Dependability
in the event the IDS is deployed on HW external to the surveilled infrastructure, it is necessary to
ensure its dependability, and the compliance with the constrains of the CCS infrastructure.
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3.6.2 NFR Satisficing Techniques for Protection Systems
In Section 3.6.1 we identified the requirements present in our scenario, taking into account both
the requirements in CCSs and the ones that constrain the deployment of an IDS solution within
a critical environment. The NFR Framework has provided us with tools to represent the NFRs,
or softgoals, present in this scenario. However, we now need to go a step further in order to
find specific ways to analyze whether these softgoals can be satisfied, and to find determined
techniques or tools to help the IDS achieve this compliance.
As previously discussed in Section 3.4, the problem of NFRs is that these goals lack a clear
definition, making di cult the assessment to determine if they have been satisfied. Thus, we
tackle this problem in a similar way that in Section 3.4, where we use the Goal Question Metric
(GQM) approach [129] to continue our study on the IDS softgoals for CIs, in order to bind these
abstract characteristics to specific practices.
Instead of refining our analysis in terms of questions at the operational level of the GQM, and
in line with the NFR Framework, we reflect on the operations taken for reaching the identified
softgoals in terms of satisficing techniques. Thus, in this section, we aim to identify those
techniques that can be implemented by the system (in our case, the IDS), capable of satisficing
the established NFRs. Table 3.14 presents the simplified matching of the satisficing techniques
found for the softgoals of the IDS, directly linked to the requirements of the CCS.
Table 3.14: Satisficing techniques
CCS Requirements Techniques
Dependability
Real-Time
Performance
SW Optimization HW Optimization
Desegmentation Prioritization
Load Balancing Testing
Use of good practices
Survivability
Redundancy Diversity
Replication Reaction
Restoration Intelligence
Self-Healing Self-Consciousness
Safety Critical
Isolation Redundancy
Replication Prioritization
Desegmentation Restoration
Use of good practices
Sustainability
Standardization Testing
Modularization Design for Assurance
Use of good practices
This simplified matching to the NFRs of the CCS can be done because the use of these satisficing
techniques for the IDS will, in turn, make the IDS comply with the requirements of the CCS.
To better understand the scope of the satisficing techniques, we provide a brief description
of the most representative ones for our scenario. It is important to note that most of the
satisficing techniques have been described and defined previously in Section 3.4, however, here
we provide definitions and clarifications for some of them according to the context of application
of protection systems for the CPCSs.
Firstly, we understand that additionally to the Prioritization of the tasks of the CPCS, the
protection mechanisms deployed within it must work accordingly and provide a prioritized set
of alarms and warnings that clearly indicate the system administrator which ones are the most
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critical ones in need of immediate attention in order to avoid further failures and cascading
e↵ects. Modularization mechanisms can be aligned with the previous technique to complement
it. Modularization is the design of a whole system as a set of di↵erent modules. It makes the
system versatile, providing the means for modifying the structure and functionality of the system
by adding or removing modules. A modularized system is also easier to maintain, given that the
complete functionality of the system is not compromised when a module needs modifications.
Another interesting approach is the application of Desegmentation, which implies uncoupling
the processes in a system, so that they are not interdependent. This technique builds robustness
into a system, as independent processes are less likely to spread a cascading e↵ect.
In line with the previous techniques, we have the satisficing techniques for the HW Optimization
of the system, and its Load Balancing. It is vital to consider when deploying new protection
HW within a critical environment, where legacy interfaces and protocols, and the physical
environment dynamics may condition the characteristics and configuration of the new equipment.
And in case of IDS modules, it is necessary to take into account the workload that the new
component would need to manage in order to provide it with adequate resources in order for it to
perform its tasks in an e cient manner, complying with the real-time performance requirements
of the underlying CPCS. Taking into account the optimization of the system, we can implement
Diversity measures. In the context of IDS, it is possible to provide diversity in the detection
engines of the module, i.e., the introduction of signature-based detection together with anomaly-
based detection (this concept will be further expanded in Chapter 4) helps the detection system
discover threatening dynamics in di↵erent ways, therefore the detection mechanisms would be
more complete and sophisticated.
To further preserve our system, the own protection system should implement safeguard mech-
anisms for itself, such as Self-Consciousness, which helps provide early detection capabilities,
even in the presence of sophisticated or stealthy attacks (see Chapter 2) against the IDS. Addi-
tionally, it should implement Restoration and Reaction mechanisms. An important task of the
protection modules correspond to the mitigation and recovery tasks, where restoration is vital.
These techniques are mainly implemented by the IPRSs and restoration modules. IPRSs are
specialized in reaction, and use the information o↵ered by the IDS to decide the best response
strategies. IPRSs for CPCSs are still subject to research, since automatic reaction in a critical
environment could introduce new risks into the system and cause cascading e↵ects.
Table 3.14 describes the simplified matching of the satisficing techniques to CCS requirements,
now we model how these techniques satisfice the IDS softgoals, which, in turn is related to the
CCS requirements. Figures 3.13 through 3.17 represent these relationships. We have divided
the satisficing techniques and IDS softgoals taking into account the CCS requirements they are
related to for the sake of clarity.
Figure 3.13 represents the relationship between the satisficing techniques and the NFRs related
to the survivability of the CCS. The satisficing techniques which help the system to comply with
these requirements are those that build resilience into the system, e.g., redundancy. Figure 3.14
presents the satisficing techniques linked to the real-time performance of the CCS. Some of the
corresponding softgoals are related to the e ciency, performance and availability of the system,
they try to optimize and balance the general performance of the system, to avoid peaks of demand
that the system cannot respond to, e.g., SW and HW optimization and load balancing.
In Figure 3.15 we represent those IDS requirements linked to the safety-critical of the CCS. IDS
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Figure 3.13: Survivability, softgoals and satisficing techniques
softgoals such as fault tolerance, safety or availability have a great impact on the safety-critical
of the surveilled infrastructure. Thus, techniques focused on improving the IDS’s safety and
correct operation have a good influence on the general safety of the system, e.g., redundancy,
replication, and development guided by good practices.
Figure 3.16 illustrates those IDS NFRs related to the sustainability of the CCS. Here, the
IDS should comply with requirements such as maintainability, interoperability or scalability.
Therefore the IDS should be designed in such a way as to make configuring and modifying its
functionality easy. It should also make repairs or updates of their SW components easier so as
to fix any problems of the system, as in modularized systems.
Finally, in Figure 3.17, we present those IDS satisficing techniques corresponding to the robust-
ness of CCSs. Techniques that help achieve robustness are based on the design and development
process of the IDS, especially the development guided by good practices. We can see in the
figures that most of the aforementioned requirements and satisficing techniques overlap in the
diagrams presented. This is due to the separation we previously introduced, to more clearly
visualize our study.
From this study, it is possible to identify the great need for standardization and good practices
when deploying new components within a critical scenario. These practices ensure that the
CCSs are not a↵ected by the addition of IDSs, and that new risks will not be introduced into
the system as a source of unpredictable events or faults.
Additionally, as mentioned, there is an identified need for the CI to be protected. Some of the
pillars that support this protection are the mitigation and response capabilities of the infras-
tructure [15, 131]. CPCSs are able to provide early detection and response to threats if their
IDSs are equipped with su ciently intelligent capabilities. The intelligence of the system will
determine its adaptability to new circumstances and dynamics, providing the CPCS with tools
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to react to unknown threatening events and restore the CI to its normal operation.
3.6.3 Metrics for Protection Systems
Throughout our approach, we have concentrated our e↵orts on studying the requirements present
in CCS which influence and constrain the deployment of an IDS within the infrastructure (see
Section 3.1). Once studied the NFRs and constraints of CCSs, we identified the requirements an
IDS solution has to comply with to be deployed in this environment (see Section 3.6) following the
NFR Framework [119]. In Section 3.6.2, we have outlined a set of satisficing techniques, inspiring
the materialization of the operational level on the GQM approach [129]. And following this
methodology, we now address the next level of the GQM, the quantitative level. This stage tries
to identify di↵erent metrics to evaluate the suitability of the IDS for critical environments.
It is important to note, that most metrics have been already defined in Section 3.5 in the
context of interoperability, or their definitions can be found in the general literature. However,
in this section we try to give examples of application for these high-level metrics to the context
of protection systems. Table 3.15 summarizes the di↵erent sets of metrics identified for this
section, as well as illustrates the di↵erent standards and guidelines that serve as controls of such
metrics for a further development and definition stage.
Reliability and Availability Metrics
In this subsection, we present metrics related to the reliability and availability of a system.
These metrics can help determine and quantify the availability and reliability parameters of
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Table 3.15: Metrics for protection systems
Metric Set Examples of Metrics Controls
Reliability and
Availability
Diversity, Replication, Uptime, Downtime,
Availability
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141]
CCS CSC [136],
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
NISTIR 7628 [20],
IEEE 2030 [11]
Performance Compression Ratio, Speedup, Service Time,
Instruction Path Length, Completion Time,
Channel Capacity, Performance per Watt, Rel-
ative E ciency, Bandwidth
IEC/TS 62351-3 [143],
IEC/TS 62351-4 [144],
IEC/TS 62351-5 [145],
IEC/TS 62351-6 [146],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138]
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
NIST SP800-82 [112],
NISTIR 7628 [20],
NIST SP800-53 [141]
Responsiveness Jitter, Latency, Response Time, Schedulabil-
ity, Throughput
NISTIR 7628 [20],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138]
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141]
Correctness Accuracy, Precision, Currency, Sensitivity,
Specificity
ISO 5725 Series [155],
ISO 11843 Series [156]
ISO 2854 [157],
Maintainability Planned Maintenance, Repair Time, HW
Costs, SW Costs, Restoration Time, Failures
Over Time, Maintenance Man-Hours, Upgrade
Events, Recovery Time, Mean Time Between
Failures, Mean Downtime
CCS CSC [136],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138],
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141]
IEC/TS 62351-7 [142],
NISTIR 7628 [20],
NIST SP800-82 [112],
NIST SP800-53 [141],
IEC/TS 62351 [134],
NERC-CIP [113]
Dependability
and Safety
Mean Time to Unsafe Failure, Reliability, Sta-
bility, Safety Design Stability, Safety Require-
ments Traceability, Safety Integrity Level, Per-
cent System Safety Hazards
IEC 61508 [148] ,
NISTIR 7628 [20],
COBIT 5 [137],
ISA 62443-2-1 [138]
ISA 62443-3-3 [139],
ISO/IEC 27001 [140],
NIST SP800-53 [141]
Security Number of Incidents, Number of Port Probes,
Successful vs. Unsuccessful Logons, Number
of Patches Applied
NISTIR 7564 [158] NIST SP 800-55 [159]
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given IDS solution. With these measurements, we try to provide quantifiable evidence for several
parameters of the system that can help determine whether or not the IDS is su ciently reliable
and available to be deployed within a CPCS. The main reliability and availability metrics we
have identified are: diversity, replication, uptime, downtime, and availability. Here we provide
examples of application of these metrics to the protection system for a CPCS:
• Diversity : examples are, number of platforms where the IDS can run, and number of
communication protocols the IDS can understand.
• Replication: examples are, in RAID systems: the level of redundancy, e.g., level 0 to
level 7. In general components, the percentage of replication, or the absolute number of
replicated instances of a component.
• Uptime: examples are, the percentage of time the system is running and number of hours
uptime versus number of hours of outage/downtime.
• Downtime: an example is the percentage of time the system is down, or the absolute
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number of hours the system is down per year.
• Availability : examples containing this concept can include the percentage time the system
is available in relation to the total amount of time the system has been running. There
are other metrics containing this concept related to maintainability, such as the mean time
between failures, which are discussed below.
Performance and Responsiveness Metrics
Metrics related to performance and responsiveness are also useful for assessing IDS within CCSs.
We have selected some of them as examples, describing the ones we think are representative of
our scenario: jitter, latency, response time, schedulability, throughput, compression ratio, speedup,
service time, instruction path length, completion time, channel capacity, performance per watt,
relative e ciency, and bandwidth. In this section, we provide definitions for those metrics that
were not considered in Section 3.5:
• Compression Ratio: refers to the reduction of the size of the data, performed by a com-
pression algorithm. It is usually defined as the ratio between the uncompressed size and
the compressed size.
• Speedup: speedup is the increase of performance (speed) of a parallel algorithm versus its
sequential version. In CCSs, it can be useful to measure the performance in the presence of
replication mechanisms, where identical instances of a component are running in parallel.
• Instruction Path Length: measures the number of machine code instructions required
to execute a section of a computer program, providing information about the relative
e ciency of a system. It helps assess the complexity versus the e ciency of the IDS
modules.
Correctness Metrics
This section discusses examples of the metrics we have identified related to the correctness and
reliability of a detection or prediction system. These metrics are especially important for the
protection mechanisms in CPCSs, since they help measure how good the IDS’ detection process
is into detecting the threatening events, and not confusing them with harmless system dynamics.
For further insight about the evaluation on the correctness of statistical or prediction methods
and the metrics that can be extracted from them it is possible to consider standards such as
ISO 5725 Series [155], ISO 11843 Series [156], and ISO 2854 [157].
• Accuracy : is “the degree of closeness of measurements of a quantity to that quantity’s
actual (true) value” [160]. In IDSs, accuracy has to do with the rate of False Positives
(FP) and False Negatives (FN) of the system, i.e., the IDS can only be considered accurate
when its rate of FP and FN is minimum or negligible.
• Precision: is a characteristic inherent to the measurement system, statistically it is defined
as the dispersion of quantitative data, regardless of its accuracy [116]. It is, therefore, the
degree to which repeated measurements, taken in unchanged conditions, show the same
results.
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• Currency : in terms of correctness, currency is defined as the degree to which data remain
current, i.e., not obsolete. It is also known as the freshness of the data [116].
In the same context of correctness, there are two specific metrics that are truly interesting in
the case of an IDS: sensitivity and specificity. They are statistical measures related to both the
accuracy and precision of a classification system, and are defined as follows [161]:
• Sensitivity : also “true positive rate” or “recall”, measures the proportion of actual positives
correctly identified as such. Sensitivity shows how good a test actually is by calculating
how often the test will correctly identify a positive.
• Specificity : measures the proportion of negatives that are correctly identified as such. This
measurement shows how accurate the test is with false positives, and can be considered as
the percentage of times a test will correctly identify a negative result.
Maintainability Metrics
This section presents those metrics related to maintainability. As we have discussed, those
metrics have a strong relationship with the set of metrics in charge of assessing the availability
of the system. In this set of metrics we find very specific metrics that are commonly used in
ICT systems, and which can be applied directly to CPCSs or CIs: planned maintenance, repair
time, HW costs, SW costs, restoration time, failures over time, maintenance man-hours, upgrade
events, recovery time, mean time between failures, and mean downtime.
All these metrics have been previously reviewed in Section 3.5, where di↵erent examples of
application are also provided. In order to further concretize the set of metrics, it is necessary to
provide a real scenario of application and evaluation. In Table 3.15 we can find examples of this
set of metrics, as well as the standards and guidelines that can help define the concrete formulae
and values for the final metrics.
Dependability and Safety Metrics
Dependability metrics and safety metrics are really representative of CPCSs. In this section
we present an example of some of these dependability and safety metrics that can be useful to
evaluate in CPCSs. In the field of safety, we have found metrics that are mostly based on statis-
tics that provide insight into the probable occurrence of certain events over time. Dependability
metrics have a strong link to those of survivability, mostly related to availability, maintainability,
etc. For a more comprehensive list of this type of metric, we refer the interested reader to the
IEC 61508 Standard [148].
The set of metrics we have selected as an example of this category is: mean time to unsafe failure,
reliability, stability, safety design stability, safety requirements traceability, safety integrity level,
and percent system safety hazards. Here we provide definitions for the new metric examples,
which have not been previously examined:
• Reliability : as a function of time, or survivor function Rptq, is the probability of a system
which does not fail in a determined time interval [147]. From Rptq it is possible to compute
the reliability of the whole system.
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• Stability : metrics, such as Mean Square Stability (MSS) [162], refer to the equilibrium
and stability properties of a system. Systems with high stability will su↵er less faults and
provide a better service.
Security Metrics
The last set of metrics we have identified are those metrics related to security. These metrics
are usually strongly linked to the specific context where the security is to be implemented. In
our study, they are distributed among the other sets of metrics. According to the NISTIR 7564
[158], the security metrics are based on two aspects: correctness and e↵ectiveness.
• Correctness: usually related to the process of the development of the system, and to the
compliance of its operation with the expected behavior. Standardization, quality assurance
or development guided by good practices are targeted to improve the correctness of the
system, and therefore to improve their security. Examples of these metrics are described
above.
• E↵ectiveness : measuring e↵ectiveness is usually based on the security-enforcing mecha-
nisms, determining how well they function and if the system shows signs of vulnerabilities.
The aforementioned metrics can help evaluate the e↵ectiveness of the system, and thus
help gain insight into the security of the system. Examples of these metrics are: number of
incidents, number of port probes, successful vs. unsuccessful logons and number of patches
applied.
3.7 Discussion
The main objective of this study is to provide a structured analysis which illustrates the steps
to follow to determine the requirements and constraints that challenge the creation of a secure
decentralized interoperability architecture for the control systems (especially the CPCSs) of the
SG, and the ways to satisfy and assess the fulfillment of these requirements through di↵erent
sets of techniques and security metrics. To this end, in this chapter, we devise a procedure
to follow in order to deeply understand the non-functional requirements of a complex system.
Once this procedure is shaped, we make use of it to analyze the characteristics and needs of
a secure interoperability platform for CCSs, and re-apply it to understand the features and
requirements any component added to this platform has to provide in order to be compatible
with this environment.
The analytical procedure we follow is based on the guidelines of two main methodologies, the
NFR Framework [119] and the GQM approach [129]. Based on these two methods, we divide
the process of analysis of the system into three stages: the analysis of requirements, the identi-
fication of satisficing techniques and the identification of representative metrics. We apply this
strategy to understand the characteristics and needs of a secure interoperability architecture for
CCSs.
The first stage has been developed in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, where the CCS requirements
and special constraints are identified in an iterative way. In Section 3.3 this analysis has been
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extended in order to discern the requirements a secure interoperability architecture would have
to comply with in order to provide adequate and robust services for the interconnection and
interoperability of critical control systems, especially considering the CPCSs of the SG. The
requirements have been analyzed following the NFR Framework guidelines [119].
These NFRs, in contrast to functional requirements, represent high-level characteristics and
information about the system under study. In SW engineering, the capture and definition of
requirements is an iterative process that is refined in each cycle. In our work, we have performed
several iterations to determine the NFRs that are most suitable for the secure interoperability
architecture of generic CSs (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4), stopping our analysis at this point. If this
process is continued, given a concrete set of interconnected CIs and the needed instances of the
di↵erent security tools to evaluate, a further cycle of refinement focused on this concrete scenario
would provide the final NFRs that define the specific needs of this particular interoperability
infrastructure.
Our analysis, however, stops before this last cycle of specialization, remaining purely theoretical,
since we would like for our study to remain as open and versatile as possible to be applied to
the di↵erent types of CIs in existence. Once the NFRs have been refined according to a given
concrete scenario, a validation process should be done to determine the completeness and validity
of the NFRs selected. However, as previously stated, due to their abstract nature, NFRs are
di cult to define and test, therefore, they are usually evaluated subjectively [119].
Validation of some NFRs can be done through theoretical approaches, e.g., network security
requirements can be evaluated from a game-theory point of view, in the form of a game between
attacker and defenders using the Nash Equilibria [163]. Or through an expert group inter-
view process (Delphi method [149], checklists [164]) to determine the adequacy of the selected
NFRs for the problem at hand, and to have access to feedback about the completeness of the
requirement set.
Since we consider that the final refinement cycle of NFRs should be done taking into account
the real characteristics of a CI, we provide our study as a guideline for future reference when
studying and analyzing the requirements and constraints of concrete critical scenarios. Thus
the final refinement cycle of the NFRs and, in consequence, the validation process of the set of
requirements selected remain as future work.
The second stage of our study provides insights into the way to comply with the identified
NFRs (see Section 3.4). We have outlined the satisficing techniques proposed to achieve and
satisfice the softgoals identified in the first stage of the study. We have therefore described
sets of techniques that help achieve certain goals for the secure interoperability infrastructure
at di↵erent levels: techniques allowing the protection of the critical control systems, techniques
that provide architectural robustness and integrity to the interoperability platform and the
communication infrastructure, techniques that enable the interoperability itself, techniques that
help the integration of industrial IoT nodes within the infrastructure, and techniques related to
the virtualization of services within the platform.
In an e↵ort to concretize the results of a study based on abstract characteristics (NFRs), we use
the GQM approach [129] to identify sets of metrics that could help analyze from a quantitative
point of view the selected set of requirements. The metrics we have identified for our study are
merely examples of important quantitative information that can be used to evaluate a critical
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system, and any component that we want to add to this system, especially to ensure that the
newly added sub-system will not introduce new risks and threats into the CI. This part of
our analysis is developed in Section 3.5, where we present an abstraction model of the secure
interoperability system, where the di↵erent metrics can be applied according to their scope and
area of application within the interoperability platform (see Figure 3.11).
We have separated our metrics into ten large sets of metrics for the sake of clarity, however,
they can overlap. On the other hand, these five large sets have been characterized from a high
abstraction level due to the scope of this research, which ends in a refinement cycle before the
concretization of the scenario. In practice, it is necessary to formalize the exercise by considering,
for example, the templates o↵ered by ISO 27004 [165] or NIST SP 800-55 [159]. Both standards
provide su cient guidance to compute, through more tangible calculation, the quantitative level
of a study resulting in concrete sets of well defined metrics. In this way, the refinement of the
metrics o↵ers the means to develop and use assessment measures to determine the e↵ectiveness
of an information system and its controls.
It is important to note, that any metric we want to apply to a given system (e.g., CIs, the cloud,
the IoT) has to be validated in order to learn whether these metrics are suitable for this system’s
evaluation, i.e., if it makes sense to use these measurements in this scenario, and whether or
not they are representative for what we want to validate. However, this part of the study
needs the refined final set of NFRs that takes into account the actual CIs for interoperability
and the concrete interoperability solutions that will be implemented, which compose the final
scenario of application. In our study, we have not included the validation stage of our proposed
metrics.
However, for each of the metrics, we have provide a high-level definition, indicated their scope
and the requirements they aim to assess, i.e., whether or not the matched requirements would
have been fulfilled in the concrete secure interoperability scenario. And in a later step, we have
provided a set of standards and related guidelines that would serve as controls or representative
references in order to provide useful information about the application, representativeness and
evaluation of these metrics in a specific context of application.
As previously discussed, it is possible to tackle the validation of the metrics using two methods:
through a formal process of validation, or through an expert group interview process, such as the
Delphi method [149]. In such a complex scenario, where numerous actors and interdependencies
are in place, we consider the most viable method of validation for these metrics is through the
expert group interview process, a task that additionally can result in very valuable feedback for
the world of academia and also for the CI’s management. A supplementary study which could
provide additional information in the validation process consists in testing the selected metrics
within other non-critical environments.
A particular case of application of our three-stage methodology of analysis, is the application of
this study to the determination of whether a protection solution module (e.g., an IDS solution)
is suitable for deployment within this new industrial environment (Industry 4.0) and the new
generation of CCSs accompanying it (see Section 1.1), as described in the case of study in
Section 3.6. As we previously discussed, we focus our analysis on IDS solutions, however, with
little modification, it is possible to extend this work in order to determine whether or not any
given security component or process is suitable for its deployment within a CI through this same
three-stage analysis or requirements, techniques and metrics.
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We follow our methodology and perform iterations of refinement to identify and analyze the
requirements, techniques and lastly metrics that help evaluate the suitability and characteristics
of detection and protection solutions deployed within the CS of a CI. It is also possible to
understand this study as a particularization and further iterations of study of protection solutions
deployed within our secure interoperability architecture scenario.
As it has been discussed previously, we have performed several iterations to determine the NFRs
that are most suitable for a generic IDS for CIs (see Figure 3.12), stopping our analysis at this
point. If this process is continued, given a concrete CI (e.g., smart grid) and an instance of
the IDS tool to evaluate, a further cycle of refinement focused on this concrete scenario would
provide the final NFRs that define the needs of this particular infrastructure and IDS.
The results of this experimentation would provide additional insight to the experts when re-
viewing the metrics for the given IDS within a CI. This information would provide the experts
an overview of, for example, the performance of the IDS in general networks, indicating whether
the IDS solution is a priori too costly for a critical setting or not. However, these experiments
are di cult to set, and of course, removing the IDS from a critical scenario would only be rel-
atively useful in terms of evaluating the metrics. This is because the requirements of the CI
could constrain the application of the IDS too much, which would perform perfectly in a general
environment. Thus, due to the need to refine and validate NFRs according to a determined
scenario, and the need of concretize the metrics as previous steps, this last stage of the study
also remains as future work.
Therefore, our analysis stops at a theoretical point, where the actual scenario (concrete CIs
and IDS solutions) have not yet been defined. This implies that our study is applicable to
di↵erent settings, but also that further refinement of the NFRs and metrics is needed to take
into account the particularities of each scenario. Moreover, since the refinement cycles are
not finished at this stage, the necessary validation procedures of NFRs and metrics have not
been performed in our study, they remain as future work. Validation of NFRs and metrics are
di cult, we believe a valid strategy would be the expert group interview processes, such as the
Delphi method, providing experts with the su cient insight into the concrete scenario through
simplified simulations. From our point of view, our three-stage analysis and the outcome of this
study as a model would help sustain the improvement of security and interoperability of CIs by
ensuring the introduction of e cient and compatible components within the CCSs.
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Services for the Secure
Interoperability in CPCS
This chapter is devoted to the study and analysis of the diverse security services and procedures
necessary for the correct operation of CIs transitioning to the Industry 4.0 paradigm as described
in Section 1.1. These security services constitute a key characteristic of the fourth generation
of CSs, and ensure the correct operation of the systems, the interoperability components and
avoid that threatening events occurring within this infrastructure cascade through the di↵erent
interrelated components of the system. In this chapter we provide an overview of the security
services for general CIs’ control systems, and later on, we focus our analysis on the scenario of
the SG, as an example of critical infrastructures transitioning to the Industry 4.0 paradigm and
including CPCSs in their control infrastructures (e.g. smart meters, WSNs, etc).
We divide the services for the secure interoperability of CPCSs in particular, and control systems
for CIs in general, into four di↵erent components (see Figure 4.1): the Basic Security Services,
the Prevention and Detection services, the Awareness and Reaction services, and the Restoration
services. These di↵erent modules or sets of services help introduce secure interoperability for
the CPCSs of CIs; in our analysis we particularize the CI’s scenario focusing on the smart grid
infrastructures (as decided in Chapter 1).
The first module or set refers to the basic security services that must be present at each level of
the interoperability infrastructure in order for it to be secure. The second module corresponds
to the di↵erent prevention and detection services that should be deployed in order to monitor
and control the status of the secure interoperability architecture in order to avoid and early
detect any threatening e↵ect within the critical systems.
The next module contains those security services focused on implementing awareness and reac-
tion mechanisms within the secure interoperability infrastructure, their aim is to continuously
analyze the status of the interoperability architecture and each of the CPCSs, in order to pro-
vide adequate, proportional and e↵ective protection and mitigation responses to the threatening
events occurring within the critical system. The last module or set of services contains those
restoration mechanisms that any critical system should implement, in order to make the se-
cure interoperability infrastructure capable of returning (restoring) to its normal operation after
an error or failure within the critical infrastructure. Figure 4.1 provides an abstraction of the
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di↵erent sets of services mentioned, which will be discussed in detail in the remainder of this
chapter.
Basic Security Services
Security Services
Prevention 
and 
Detection
Awareness 
and Reaction Restoration
Figure 4.1: Security services
4.1 Basic Security Services
In the context of smart grid and the CPCS networks, there are three main basic security ser-
vices (see Figure 4.1) that allow the standard and secure interoperation of these critical systems:
Authentication, Authorization and Accountability mechanisms. According to NIST, authentica-
tion is defined as “the process of verifying the claimed identity”, and can be applied to control
access to systems and networks [112]. Authorization is the process of granting the user access
privileges, determined by policy rules applied to the authenticated identity and other relevant
information, which can be enforced by access control mechanisms [112].
According to NISTIR 7628 [110], periodic audits and logging procedures of the SG CPCSs need
to be implemented for accountability purposes. These mechanisms help validate the security
processes deployed within the critical systems and determine their operation condition. The
implementation of accountability services imply the application of security controls to ensure the
compliance of the systems with the established security policy procedures. The accountability
service must be protected by the authentication and authorization services [11].
Standards such as the IEC/TS 62351 [134], the NIST SP800-82 [112], the NISTIR 7628 [110], the
NIST SP1108 [6] and the IEEE2030 [11] among others, gather the need for the critical systems,
specially the ones belonging to the SG, to implement these three basic security services. These
will reduce the risk of malicious or accidental cybersecurity events while, at the same time, allow
access to the system to the relevant stakeholders [6].
These basic security services can be performed either in a distributed or centralized approach.
If a distributed paradigm is used, every system performs these processes on their own, being re-
sponsible for storing the credentials (user accounts, roles, etc.), performing the identification and
authentication of the user, and maintaining logging information of the main system events. The
decentralized approach does not usually require additional infrastructure, however, it presents
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several problems regarding the scaling capability when the size of the system increases, and the
realization of credentials maintenance tasks [112].
Alternatively, the centralized implementation for the basic security services procedures is widely
used, since it can be easily scaled and used to manage large amount of users and accounts.
A centralized approach uses central authentication systems and protocols (e.g., Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Kerberos, etc.) to perform the authentication of the users
[112]. For authorization purposes, in both the distributed and centralized approaches, it is
possible to use role-based access control mechanisms, such as IEC/TS 62351-8 (RBAC) [28], or
ABAC [96].
However, besides the improved scalability provided by the centralized approach, numerous con-
cerns arise concerning the impact of a centralized system in a critical environment. The main
concerns and considerations are the following ones [112]:
• The centralized authentication system must be highly secured, since it becomes a highly
critical solution, and an interesting entry point for cyber attacks (see Chapter 2 for further
information).
• The centralized authentication and authorization system has a high availability require-
ment, since its failure may prevent administrators from authenticating to a system during
an emergency. Additional protection and robustness techniques (e.g., redundancy) need
to be implemented (see Chapter 3 for extended information).
• The networks that are used to perform the authentication and authentication tasks must
be reliable and secure to ensure authentication attempts are not hindered.
We therefore propose that a hybrid infrastructure that combines the characteristics of the cen-
tralized and decentralized security services would allow the proper application and use of the
basic security services, leveraging the good qualities of both approaches.
4.2 Prevention and Detection
Critical infrastructures around the globe provide the most necessary services to society, so their
continuous correct operation is of paramount importance. Control systems, such as the CPCSs,
perform the management and the regulation of behavior of the internal devices and systems
of these infrastructures. They are considered a fundamental component within CIs, having an
impact in the overall performance of other interconnected critical infrastructures [1]. Thus,
the protection of CIs and their control infrastructures is currently seen as an essential part of
national security in numerous countries around the world [150].
Recent reports, as reviewed in Chapter 1, show that security incidents and cyber-attacks against
control systems are increasing, and they are getting more aggressive and sophisticated. For this
reason, and as dictated by governments and institutions around the globe, the integrity and
availability of all these critical systems have to be protected against the numerous threats they
face every day [150, 112]. Approaches for CIP arise from several perspectives: preparedness
and prevention, detection and response, mitigation and recovery, international cooperation, etc.
[42, 112, 15, 16]. As a tool to respond to this need for protection, intrusion detection has been
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at the center of intense research in the last decade, due to the rapid increase of cyber-attacks
on computer systems.
Intrusion detection refers to a variety of techniques for detecting threats in the form of sys-
tem faults (anomalies) or malicious and unauthorized activities. A technique that focalizes this
detection e↵ort is the intrusion detection system [109]. IDS solutions have been proposed for
multiple environments, and they could result in very valuable protection tools for CS environ-
ments. However, their application to the protection of critical systems must comply with the
strict constraints of CSs [21]. Systems such as the one presented by N. Goldenberg and A. Wool
[166] or the one proposed by H. Hadeli et al. [167] are examples of IDSs especially designed to
be deployed in a critical environment.
However, when intrusive behavior is detected by the IDS in a critical scenario such as CPCSs,
it is desirable to take evasive and/or corrective response actions to prevent these attacks from
succeeding, and ensure the safety of the computing environment [15, 4]; such countermeasures
are referred to as intrusion response. Incidentally, as threats become more abundant and sophis-
ticated, and given the special characteristics of CIs, apart from detection mechanisms, new and
more powerful solutions have to be deployed in order to safeguard them and to avoid faults and
consequent cascading e↵ects. To fight this domino e↵ect, besides providing e cient detection
mechanisms, we need to focus on the response, mitigation and recovery needs of CIs.
Solutions that can provide these functionalities are the intrusion prevention systems, also called
Intrusion Response Systems (IRS) [4], IPRS, and Intrusion Detection, Prevention and Response
Systems (IDPRS) [168]. An IPS/IRS/IPRS/IDPRS is “software that has all the capabilities of
an intrusion detection system and can also attempt to stop possible incidents” [109]. In the
remainder of the text, we will refer to these systems as IDPRS, since we will use the term
Response System (RS) to denominate a specific element of the whole system. The IDPRS is
often integrated as an extension of the IDS, but it usually receives less attention than the IDS
research due to the intrinsic complexity of developing the mechanisms to o↵er an automated
and correct response to certain events.
Traditionally, and particularly in CPCSs, the response to a threat was manually triggered by the
system’s human administrator, and required a high degree of expertise. However, the increasing
complexity and speed of the cyber-attacks in recent years, and the intricate possible ramifications
of a system’s faults show the acute need for complex intelligent dynamic RS [4]. Therefore it has
become necessary to use sophisticated advanced techniques from autonomic computing, machine
learning, artificial intelligence and data mining to build intelligent and smart IDPRS. Together
with the deployment of IDS solutions in these contexts, automatic and intelligent response
mechanisms have to be put in place to help protect CIs and prevent cascading failures to other
interdependent infrastructures [169].
4.2.1 Monitoring and Detection
Within the prevention and detection set of security services represented in Figure 4.1, we find
that the main tool of mechanism used to provide these services is the IDS, the monitoring and
detection component of the IDPRS. IDSs have several possible mechanisms to provide detection,
which can influence the e ciency and applicability of the IDPRS’ reaction component; thus, it
is important to note the technique used for detection. According to the implementation of the
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IDS’ engine, there are three main methods of detection: anomaly-based detection, signature-based
detection and specifications-based detection:
• Anomaly-based detection: the IDS compares definitions of activity that is considered nor-
mal against observed events in order to identify significant deviations [170]. This method
has the advantage of being very e↵ective in identifying previously unknown threats. Its
main drawbacks are the generation of a large rate of false positives in dynamic environ-
ments, and the di culty that arises when analyzing the causes of a given alert [109].
• Signature-based detection: according to NIST, a signature is “a pattern that corresponds
to a known threat” [109]. A signature-based IDS analyzes the information it gathers from
the system under surveillance and compares it to signatures of known threats in order to
identify possible incidents [170]. Using this method, the system looks for already identified
and known attacks, thus this solution is very e↵ective in detecting known threats, but
rather ine↵ective in detecting previously unknown threats, threats disguised by the use of
evasion techniques, and many variants of known threats.
• Specifications-based detection: similarly to anomaly detection, specification-based systems
detect attacks as deviations from normal behavior. However, these approaches contain
specifications of the system under surveillance (usually manually developed models) that
capture legitimate behavior, instead of using previously seen behaviors as in the case of
anomaly detection. To develop the models, legitimate systems’ behaviors can be extracted
from security policies and protocol specifications [152]. According to NIST [109], there are
three main problems that arise when using stateful protocol analysis. First, the reliance
on vendor-developed universal profiles that specify the use of particular protocols ties the
IDS to a specific environment, since the implementation of the protocols may di↵er from
system to system. Second, this kind of system is highly resource-intensive because of the
complexity of the analysis and the overheads caused by the state tracking. And lastly,
these IDSs cannot detect attacks that do not violate the characteristics of acceptable
protocol behavior. In general terms, the type of detection engine used in the IDS depends
on the needs and characteristics of the surveilled systems, where their selection is guided
by parameters such as precision (low false alarm rate) or e ciency [170].
In a critical context, the parameters studied to select the adequacy of a given IDS for a con-
strained environment are di↵erent from the general networks’ IDS solutions. Here, character-
istics such as precision vary from the desire to obtain low false alarm rates (low rate of false
positives) to the need to achieve a low rate of false negatives (the true attacks are not missed
by the detection engine). It is also necessary to observe the techniques implemented (to avoid
resource-intensive algorithms) and the level of automation achieved by the IDS for CIP [169].
Therefore, the selection of the detection engine must be aligned with the needs and constraints
of the critical system under surveillance, and the type of environment where the system has to
perform its tasks.
In general, taking into account their aforementioned characteristics, specifications-based detec-
tion as well as signature-based detection will work better for environments where the dynamics
and behaviors are well-known [152]. Contrarily, anomaly-based detection can be recommended
when the IDS is placed in an environment that constantly faces unknown behaviors and dy-
namics [170]. In the literature, we find di↵erent types of IDS specifically designed for CIP
[152, 171, 172, 173], using and adapting di↵erent types of detection engines.
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4.2.2 Intelligence and Learning Techniques
Each of the aforementioned detection engines might implement di↵erent degrees or adaptability,
these capabilities are introduced by the selected Machine Learning, Data Mining or Statistical
techniques. Machine learning and data mining are sometimes considered as synonyms, since the
methods and techniques used overlap significantly. Machine learning focuses on learning from
data, i.e. it compiles all the disciplines that design and construct automatic systems capable
of learning from examples. Data mining is defined as the “extraction of implicit, previously
unknown, and potentially useful information from data” in a automatic or semi-automatic way
[174]. The main distinction, which makes some authors consider data mining as a sub-field of
machine learning, is that machine learning is based on the known properties of the training data
(prediction), and data mining focuses on leveraging unknown properties and patterns in the data
(discovery). In this study we will refer to these two concepts at the same level of importance,
since it is necessary to apply both approaches (discovery and prediction) in order to build a
secure automatic detection and prevention system for CSs, and we will use machine learning to
denominate all of them.
Learning techniques are varied, and they originate from very di↵erent fields of knowledge, such
as optimization, statistics, logic, etc. It is interesting to study these methods taking into account
characteristics like their knowledge scheme and the level of supervision of the training, since the
constraints they impose to the underlying system impacts the possibility of introducing them in
a critical context (for further information on these constraints see Chapter 3). In our analysis,
we identify three di↵erent ways to classify the intelligence techniques for the detection engines,
i.e., considering the Knowledge Scheme, according to the degree of Supervision applied to the
technique, and by the field of knowledge from which the technique comes.
The knowledge scheme indicates the level of knowledge that is feed to the system prior to the
training. If we take this scheme into account, it is possible to divide the learning techniques into
two di↵erent sets [170]:
• Prior knowledge-based systems: these systems, in order to function, are fed with the
knowledge and experience of an expert. For example, this knowledge can be transferred
to the system by designing and writing a set of rules.
• Prior knowledge free systems: this kind of system is based on the knowledge extracted
through an automatic (or semi-automatic) procedure of training. The advantage of this
method is that it is not necessary to have any knowledge of the system in advance.
It is also interesting to consider those solutions that can add the knowledge of an expert to
the model of the system obtained through training. We can denominate these solutions hybrid
knowledge-based systems, and we theorize that they would result of extreme interest in the
context of intrusion detection within critical systems, since their performance would be higher
in these complex scenarios.
The learning of a system consists on generalizing behaviors from unstructured data, and in-
ducting knowledge from examples. It is possible to di↵erentiate two main di↵erent schemes of
learning according to the level of supervision (by a human operator) involved in the learning
process: supervised and unsupervised learning [175].
• Supervised learning implies providing the system with certain knowledge about the vari-
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ables that it is desired that the automatic system learns, i.e. the operator provides exam-
ples (labeled training data) of anomalous and normal behaviors in order to “teach” the
learner the model of the behavior of the system.
• Unsupervised learning implies that no knowledge is provided to the system when training
it; the algorithms implied in the learning process handle the data and learn on their own.
Pure unsupervised learning is di cult to achieve in real life contexts, and the accuracy
of these methods are low. There is usually a step of supervised preprocessing of the data
before the training, and a step of supervised parameter tuning after the training, to adjust
the models obtained.
There are other schemes and procedures that the algorithms follow, for example the semi-
supervised learning approach, that combine labeled and unlabeled training data. However, we
will only focus in the main schemes of supervision: supervised and unsupervised learning, to
study which of them is better suited in the context of CPCS monitoring.
Taking into account the field of knowledge from which the di↵erent techniques for detection en-
gines originate, we can di↵erentiate three main categories, i.e., Data Mining-based monitoring,
Statistical and Statistical Learning-based monitoring, and other mixed techniques for monitor-
ing.
Data Mining-based Monitoring
• Classification-based techniques: these correspond to classifiers in charge of assigning data
instances to (normal or anomalous) classes [176]. Within this category, the decision trees
(e.g., ID3, C4.5) are the most representative structures which deal with mapping observa-
tions into conclusions using hierarchical rules under the assumption of divide and conquer.
This assumption consists of recursively breaking down a problem into sub-problems until
these become atomic units. There are two types of decision trees: classification and re-
gression trees, the results of which depend on the type of data managed and the desired
outputs of the models. These tree-like structures are capable of providing fast computa-
tions and decisions since each data instance (in the testing phase) is compared against a
precomputed model. Their advantages are the speed of classification and the comprehensi-
bility degree of their outputs to humans. Nonetheless, their shortcomings are the tolerance
to redundant or highly interdependent data, as well as, their reliance on predefined models
primarily based on labels [177, 178].
• Association Rule Learning-based techniques: unsupervised schemes which try to identify
the relationships between categorical variables, using strong rules and thresholds to prune.
As part of this classification, we highlight the Apriori algorithm and the FP-growth al-
gorithm. The former is an influential algorithm for mining frequent patterns, which tries
to find rules in large datasets to predict the occurrence of an item based on the occur-
rences of others. In fact, its main property is: “any subset of a frequent pattern must
be frequent”; and its pruning principle is “if there is a pattern which is infrequent, its
superset should not be generated”. Similarly, FP-growth has the same goals, but uses
a compact frequent-pattern tree (FP-tree) structure under the assumption of divide-and-
conquer. This assumption consists of finding frequent rules/patterns to decompose mining
tasks into smaller ones, the aim of which is to recursively delete all the data items that
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are not frequent; instead of generating candidates for each study. As mentioned, the tech-
nique itself has to make use of pruning approaches to reduce the sets of rules. Hence,
the e↵ectiveness of the learning process depends heavily on the parameters that configure
the pruning operations and their algorithms, and on the number of rules that have to be
launched, where the processing time may increase exponentially regarding the number of
attributes [178]. Nonetheless, the comprehensibility of the results is an advantage.
• Clustering-based techniques: these aim to classify data instances in clusters through an
unsupervised or semi-supervised method; i.e., no knowledge of threats, attacks or anoma-
lies are needed in advance during training. This feature helps the testing phase process
the evidence quickly, where the unsupervised models only compare the instances with a
small number of clusters. To do this, the technique needs an evaluation function (e.g., a
distance function, density, etc.) to compute the distances between data points, where each
instance is evaluated according to its entire cluster. Although there are several clustering
algorithms (e.g., hierarchical, centroid-based, distribution-based, density-based, etc.), the
most popular approach is the k-means. Clustering-based techniques are quite dependent
on the algorithm’s parameters, which consequently have associated computational costs,
which are mainly influenced by the type of dataset and the parameters selected [176, 179].
Most approaches follow a quadratic order, except those based on heuristics (e.g., k-means),
which take a linear complexity. In addition, the tolerance of the algorithms to di↵erent
constraints in the data are quite dependent on the configuration of the parameters selected
[176].
• Rule-based techniques: these focus on learning rules that interpret the normal behavior of
the system with the capability of multi-class and one-class settings. Their main strengths
are the accuracy, comprehensibility, handling of simple parameters and low complexity. In
contrast, they are weak in incremental learning, dependence on expert knowledge, tolerance
to noise and are unsuitable for anomaly detection. Within this class, we highlight the rule
learners (e.g., Ripper). These algorithms use rules from trained data to construct a rule-
based decision engine under the assumption divide-and-conquer by looking at one class
at a time and producing rules that match the class. This procedure, apparently simple,
requires exploring the whole dataset where their learners become slow and inaccurate with
low tolerance to missing irrelevant and redundant data. Nonetheless, they provide speedy
classifiers with comprehensible results, and allow easiness to manage system parameters.
Statistical and Statistical Learning-based Monitoring
This class defines those statistical techniques that compute statistical models to apply inter-
ference tests so as to verify whether or not a specific instance belongs to a statistical model.
Within these techniques, it is possible to find:
• Parametric and Nonparametric-based methods: these refer to inference engines with a
strong dependence on the data observed and which are composed of well-known statistical
models, such as Gaussian or histograms [176, 179]. These statistical models are in general
accurate and tolerant to noise and missing values. Additionally, the statistical analysis
provides additional information to the detection systems, such as the confidence interval
associated with the anomaly. However, depending on the dataset, these methods can be
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sensitive to subtle changes and the output results are di cult for humans to understand.
Moreover, depending on the dynamics of the problem, the e ciency of the model can be
reduced, and in some cases, these techniques can potentially have quadratic complexity if
dealing with large databases [176]. In contrast, the chief disadvantage here is that these
techniques assume that the production of the data follows a particular distribution, which
in real life scenarios is not true [176], consequently there are di culties in determining the
best distribution to fix such data. This category also includes the operational models, the
observations of which are evaluated according to counters, bounded by predefined (upper
and lower) thresholds. If these boundaries are not e ciently computed, the approach
itself can then hamper the dynamic detection of anomalous events. In general, operational
models may not be suitable for those dynamic scenarios that regularly change their normal
behavior [178].
• Time Series-based techniques: these, can be both non-parametric and parametric [180],
basically aim to provide behavior forecasting using times series, which are sequences of
data points, measured at successive and uniformly distributed time intervals. These meth-
ods are generally suitable for detecting those threats launched in series form with subtle
perturbations (e.g., stealth attacks), but its e↵ectiveness decays when there are drastic
changes [178]. There are several methods of time series analysis; one of the most useful
for detection are the smoothing techniques, which provide weighted data instances. The
smoothing mechanisms provide accurate observations and their approaches are tolerant
to insignificant changes and missing values, in addition they help optimize parameters.
Unfortunately, as in the case of the rest of the statistical methods, they tend to be di cult
to understand for humans and have great di culty handling parameters. The smoothing
techniques also produce weak models for medium or long-range forecasting, which heavily
rely on past history and on the smoothing factor to predict the future; the variant expo-
nential smoothing models, in particular, cannot easily forecast future events in the presence
of fluctuations in recent data [181].
• Markov Models: are mathematical representations with quantitative values that help pre-
dict the future behavior of a system according to the current evidence. There are many
types of Markov models, and all them have functionalities and features in common, such
as operations based on successive data and dependence on a state transition (probabilis-
tic) matrix to illustrate activity transactions without having knowledge of the problem
in hand. However, and unfortunately, the Markov models are highly complicated when
addressing complex situations with multiple dimensions, the complexity of which increases
when leaving the most simple (first order) Markov chains, in favor of more precise and
complicated models [182] (e.g., the Hidden Markov Models (HMMs)). In addition, abrupt
changes in the normal activity sequence within a system becomes unmanageable, so that
this feature may become undesirable in critical contexts [178].
• Bayesian Networks (BNs): these networks are composed of directed acyclic graphs, where
the nodes represent states that have associated probabilities, and parameters encoded in
tables. The BN first learns from structures of the (either unknown or known) networks,
and then computes the parameters of the model. This category can be well-applied in
intrusion detection models as powerful and versatile solutions, but may become computa-
tionally complex if the networks are unknown a priori [177], or present too many features
(large BNs). Despite its ideal accuracy, this technique is too expensive in terms of time
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and storage, and tends to be infeasible for constrained scenarios. An extension of BNs
are the Na¨ıve Bayes networks, where their digraphs only hold one parent for each node
and the probabilistic parameters of the network are calculated using conditional proba-
bilities. These types of probabilities in the form of a product can be transformed into a
sum through the use of logarithms, allowing the decision system to be computationally
e cient and fast [177]. Other benefits, given the simplification of the model, are the di-
minished computational overhead for training, understandability of their networks, and
the possibilities for handling parameters and introducing incremental learning. However,
a disadvantage of this model is that it is not as accurate as a BN due to the existing
independence between the child nodes, which imposes strong constraints on its behavior
[177].
• Instance-based Learners: are lazy-learners based on the similarity of properties among
instances of the same class [177], such as the K-Nearest neighbor (KNN). These approaches
are characterized by their speedy learning with respect to the number of attributes and the
number of instances present in the dataset. In addition, they are suitable for incremental
learning and their parameters can be modified with fairly easily. Despite these benefits,
these approaches are quite sensitive to the selection of the similarity function [179], do not
provide a deterministic way of choosing the parameter k, and require storage. The size of
the instance sets are also dependent on k whose value a↵ects the time required to classify
an instance; in addition to exhibiting an extensive testing phase in which their methods can
reach a low tolerance to noise and a low stability depending on the parameters adjusted.
Other Monitoring Techniques
• Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs): these, in the artificial intelligence field, can be ap-
plied for anomaly detection using a multi-class or one-class configuration for training and
learning. The models essentially consist of the computation of the sum of weighted inputs
to produce weighted outputs [177]. Thus, the performance of ANNs depends on three
main aspects: input and activation functions, network architecture and the weight of each
connection. ANNs are generally accurate and fast classifiers, capable of tolerating highly
interdependent data, whose learners can need of back propagation algorithms where the
output models may not be comprehensible to humans and produce over-fitted models.
These drawbacks make it di cult to ensure real-time in the operational processes since
most ANN approaches need extra processing-time.
• Support Vector Machines (SVMs): this method is a supervised learning model based on a
non-probabilistic binary linear classifier under a one-class configuration to recognize data
patterns or outliers in datasets [183]. Given that SVMs work with linear combination of
(data) points, the computational cost follows a quadratic order and the number of vectors
selected is usually small. Thus, the complexity of an SVM is not a↵ected by the number of
features in the training data so SVMs are suitable for addressing large numbers of features.
The main weaknesses found is that most real-world problems involve inseparable data for
which no hyperplane exists that successfully separates the positive from negative instances
in the training set; and in optimization problems, the presence of local minimums and
maximums a↵ects the accuracy and speed. Even so, SVMs are, in general terms, accurate
and fast classifiers, and tolerant to irrelevant and redundant data. However, the method
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itself usually presents problems with the speed of learning, the comprehensibility and the
ability to handle the model and incrementally learn [177].
• Fuzzy Logic and Genetic Algorithms: Fuzzy logic consists of simple rule-based structures
that define reasoning [178]. The approaches are in general simple, flexible and fast in the
processing of rules and in the determination of anomalies, in which their approaches are
able to establish the normality boundaries and manage large databases. The technique is
also able to model complex systems and situations without requiring precision or complete
databases; however, its conclusions may not reflect the confidence degree of a problem.
Regarding genetic algorithms, these deal with optimization and search heuristics where
their implementations can require a large number of iterations to reduce a problem, and
according to a fitness function. This also means that the detection rate depends on the
accuracy of this function, where the approach itself has proven be unable to detect unknown
or new threats, as well as, multi-interactive attacks [184].
• Knowledge Detection-based techniques consist of progressively acquiring knowledge about
specific attacks or vulnerabilities, guaranteeing accuracy of the technique with a low false
positive rate, and flexibility and scalability for adding new knowledge. The result is a
system potentially capable of ensuring resilience against threats, but this security also
depends on the update frequency of this knowledge and the degree of granularity to specify
the threat patterns. According to M. Gyanchandani et al. in [178], there are a few types of
knowledge detection-based approaches, such as state transition, expert systems and Petri
nets. State transactions aim to define threat models through state transaction diagrams
illustrating the activity sequences and operandi mode; similarly, Petri nets represents state
transactions using directed bipartite graphs to show events and conditions. Conversely,
expert systems are composed of intelligence engines based on simple rules which define
di↵erent models capable of reasoning about the provided knowledge like a human expert.
Expert system models can be provided with varied knowledge; e.g., di↵erent types of
threats or vulnerabilities, or even conditions given by the security policies.
• Information and Spectral Theory. Both theories are based on statistical approaches. Par-
ticularly, the information-based techniques focus on analyzing the data itself and its order
to observe whether there are irregularities (related to meaning, features or properties)
within it [176]. Through concepts of entropy, their approaches are in general e cient, but
this feature depends on the size of the dataset to be compared; and they are also tolerant
to insignificant changes in the data and redundancy [185]. As for spectral theory meth-
ods, these work with approximations of the data (or signals) to observe whether there are
di↵erences, more visible in other dimensions of the data. Spectral analysis is an approach
fairly linked to time series analysis and the characteristics of the communication chan-
nels. It performs dimensionality reduction to handle high dimensional data; however, its
e ciency varies according to the mathematical method used to translate the model into
other dimensions, e.g., Fourier, and these techniques usually have a high computational
complexity [176].
Artificial intelligence and machine learning are vast fields of knowledge, and there are many other
methods available than the explained ones. Some of them have di↵erent properties and they
are classified in a broader field known as computational intelligence, but we have restricted this
study to the methods and techniques better suited for the constrained scenario of the intrusion
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detection within CIs. However, in this critical context, the need for automation cannot overcome
the need for accurate methods with good performance. Studies, such as the one performed
by Sadoddin and Ghorbani [186], defend that supervised machine learning techniques have
better general performance for real-life problems than the unsupervised ones. Considering this,
we develop a more detailed study centered in the advantages and disadvantages of supervised
machine learning techniques.
In the view of the information provided in this section, it is possible to discern methods that
are better suited for intrusion detection in critical scenarios. Taking into account parameters
such as the accuracy of the systems and the general performance of the models, we understand
that lazy learners and Bayesian networks are di cult to implement successfully in a constrained
environment. Whenever it is necessary to evaluate the correctness of a model, or it is necessary
to add a certain degree of expert knowledge, ANNs and SVM are the more restrictive methods.
Thus, we understand that the methods that are better suited for detection in CSs are the ones
based on logics, such as the decision trees and the rule learners. Decision trees have well-balanced
characteristics for this specific context, while rule learners have several drawbacks (e.g. accuracy)
that can be easily overcome (e.g. implementing boosting algorithms), but they provide several
capabilities (performance, comprehensibility, and easiness for introducing rules by experts), that
are vital and really interesting in this critical context.
4.2.3 Automation
Automation is defined as the introduction of automatic equipment or processes within a system,
to assist or replace human operators, mostly when the tasks involved are intensive in computa-
tions or the working conditions are extreme. In the CIP context, it is important to emphasize
that CIs are composed of subsystems that are usually deployed in distant and isolated locations,
where the automation of the tasks is of paramount importance. The objective of introducing
machine learning methods in the scenario of intrusion detection for CIP is complying with the
proven need [3] [187] of making certain processes automatic, and therefore assisting the human
operators in these complex tasks. The idea is that systems based on these automatic methods
will be capable of performing automatically, and will serve as powerful tools of reaction, pro-
viding methods of prevention of cascading failures, other than only detection of anomalies and
intrusions.
In this section, we have explored the needs of detection automation in a critical scenario, and
we have divided them into levels of automation. With the definition of these levels, we have
designed a methodology to determine the degree of automation of a protection system, that it
will also serve as a guide for designing future automatic detection and protection solutions that
comply with the needs of automation of CIs without violating the control requirements and
constraints identified in Chapter 3.
Levels of Automation
In the context of monitoring critical systems using machine learning techniques, the concept
of automation can be split into four di↵erent dimensions or levels: the automation of the data
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collection and feeding, the automation of the learning process and the automation of the de-
tection process. In several contexts [109], it is also vital to talk about the automation of the
reaction process, whenever the detection system is capable of launching prevention mechanisms
automatically as the first response against a detected threat or anomaly. Thus, we define these
five levels of automation as follows:
• Automation of the data collection: the collection of the raw data is a process that is inher-
ently automatic, since it involves capturing and recording vast amounts of data involving
measurements, logs, etc. for later processing and training.
• Automation of the data feeding : comprises all the procedures directed to preprocess, nor-
malize and prepare the raw data in order to feed the inputs of the system. This process
is di cult, costly and the majority of the real-life systems require a heavy preprocessing
of the data that is performed manually or semi-manually. It is vital to provide automatic
mechanisms with the object to adapt the functioning of machine learning-based system to
face the real-life problems.
• Automation of the learning process: the learning process comprises several steps: training,
tuning and validation. The training of the system is usually automatic, but the process
of tuning and validation normally needs the supervision of an operator in order to set the
system to a correct functioning for a context. Despite the general beliefs, the automation
of the learning process has little implications regarding the supervision of the system, it
is complex both for supervised and unsupervised methods, since they require following
the above-mentioned steps. However, learning is performed before the deployment of the
system, thus this kind of automation has less impact in the performance of the system.
• Automation of the detection process: the automation of the detection process is vital for
the performance of the system, and it is usually referred to a deployed system that has
to provide its services in real time. The need to tune the model in a later stage of the
deployment of the system can impact negatively the performance of the system. In this
case, the need of automation is vital, and the tuning of the models should be at least
semi-automatic.
• Automation of the reaction process: after detecting any anomaly or intrusion, the system
must take appropriate actions to avoid the problem to escalate. This reaction process can
be divided into two categories, according to the nature of the reaction of the system: passive
reaction processes and active reaction processes. Passive responses are typical from current
IDS, and include actions such as raising alarms or logging o↵ the system [187]; active
responses are those implemented to react against the anomaly or the intrusion in order
to avoid the system failure. In CIP, monitoring systems have traditionally implemented
passive reaction processes based on sending warnings to the operators and making available
the information for them to fix the system (this is observed through the review of the
literature regarding the automation of the available solutions, and will be discussed in the
following sections). These solutions are mostly semi-automatic and highly dependent on
the presence and accuracy of the operators. This dimension of the automation needs the
focus of the scientific community, in order to provide the IDS solutions with sophisticated
automatic measures of defense. This way, there would be first response mechanisms to
prevent failures to cascade through the critical systems in a rapid way [3].
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Figure 4.2: The needs of online automation of a critical IDS system
Figure 4.2 shows the levels of automation of an IDS. For the sake of clarity it is represented as
a line, but each step is a cycle itself, and the improvement of the process of learning and the
detection and reaction capabilities can only be made through refinement iterations. The main
focus of the figure is in the levels of detection and reaction, that show the need of online (and
possibly real-time) automation. There exist advanced systems that continuously refine their
models after they are online.
Discussion
Besides the great need for automatic intrusion detection and reaction in CIs, and the possibility
to achieve it through ML, it is necessary to consider that machine learning techniques are
complex, and in practice, they pose certain di culties whenever we try to apply them to real-
world problems. Kotsiantis et al. in [177] provide an example of the process of applying machine
learning techniques to a real-life problem where it is possible to appreciate that the process
of generation automatic and well-tuned models of a system is composed of multiple steps of
refinement to tune the learners. Despite general beliefs, the process of unsupervised learning
is not much simpler than the supervised learning, since the final model has to go through very
similar refinement cycles.
However, as we can see in Figure 4.2, the most significant need of online automation lays in
the processes of detection and reaction. These two processes will provide the protection to
the surveilled system, and once they are online, their posterior refinements are minimal. The
processes of preprocessing and learning are usually performed o✏ine, thus the costly proce-
dures of applying machine learning techniques do not interfere with the e cient execution of
the solutions, and they benefit from models that leverage complex knowledge of the surveilled
system.
We believe that the introduction of machine learning techniques in critical context IDS would
provide numerous benefits in two ways: in terms of immediate automatic reaction to threats and
in terms of understanding and leveraging knowledge about complex interdependent systems that
is beyond the expert knowledge.
Concerning the mechanisms that provide immediate automatic reaction to threats, the advan-
tages are clear, since these systems could automatically face rapidly the numerous threats that
put CIs in risk continuously. They could remove the need of displacing an operator to fix the
problem, especially when the threatened systems are specially vulnerable, being isolated or with-
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standing extreme conditions (e.g. remote subnetworks deployed in the field). Nonetheless, the
disadvantages of automating critical decisions are great in this critical context, where human life
could be at stake. However, building su ciently intelligent automatic systems, with enough se-
curity and supervision mechanisms could provide safe solutions that deal with the real necessity
of automating reaction measures for critical scenarios.
A substantial advantage of introducing machine learning techniques in the context of CSs is
that these techniques (especially the techniques based on logics, due to their higher degree of
comprehensibility of the generated models) are especially designed to discover the model of the
(surveilled) system, and its internal complex functioning. Such tool results of incomparable
power to researchers that try to model the complicated and interdependent relations and dy-
namics of CSs, outputting automatically-learned models of the systems that goes beyond the
knowledge of an expert.
4.2.4 Review of the State of the Art: Approaches, Techniques and Automa-
tion for Detection solutions
Artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques can be applied to a variety of systems
that provide protection for critical systems, mainly IDS solutions [171] [107], and few other
components such as firewalls [188]. We have surveyed the literature in the search of solutions
that provide specific IDS solutions for CIP, reviewing the characteristics and the degree of
automation of each solution. For each of these systems, we analyze the levels of automation
provided according to the classification provided in Section 4.2.3.
Table 4.1: Review of several systems according to the automation and knowledge dimensions.
System Method
Prior
Knowledge
Automation
Technique
Data
Collection
Preprocessing Learning Detection Reaction
[171] Sup. Free Auto No Auto Auto Passive
Statistics, ML
and Rules
[187] Sup. Required N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Rules
[172] Sup. Free Auto No Auto Auto Passive Statistics
[189] Unsup. Mixed Auto No Auto Auto N/A Pattern Discovery
[173] Sup. Required N/A N/A N/A Auto Passive Rules
[99] Sup. Required Auto N/A N/A Auto Passive Rules, statistics
[107] Unsup. Free Auto Auto Auto Auto N/A
Statistics, ML
and Rules
[190] Sup. Required N/A N/A N/A Auto Passive Rules, ML
[152] N/A Required N/A N/A N/A Auto Passive Specifications
[191] Unsup. Free Auto No Auto Auto Passive Clustering
We have summarized our analysis in Table 4.1, where we can distinguish three di↵erent di-
mensions, namely: prior-knowledge scheme, supervision and automation, that categorize the
reviewed systems according to the classification established in this section.
Du¨ssel et al. [171] present a payload-based anomaly-based network IDS for CIs, capable of
monitoring the tra c in real time. The IDS makes use of di↵erent techniques, the system
extracts the information in the form of vectors, calculates the distance measures of similarity and
compares them to a previously learned model of normality, indicating the presence or absence of
an anomaly by raising alarms. Roosta et al. [187] introduce an anomaly-based IDS for wireless
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process control systems. The IDS presented is theoretical, where the detection is based on
expert-designed policy rules. Yang et al. present and IDS based on pattern matching, capable
of detecting anomalies by analyzing the deviation from normal behavior. For this purpose they
use autoassociative kernel regression models and a sequential probability ration test to discern
an attack from the normal behavior. MELISSA [189] is a semantic-level IDS based on FP-
Trees [174] that looks for undesirable user actions by processing logs in the SCADA control
center. Carcano et al. [173] propose a state-based IDS that use rules to detect complex attack
scenarios based on chains of illicit network packets. Autoscopy [99] is an IDS capable of detecting
malware that tries to “hijack” pointers and routines of the system; first it learns the behavior
of the system and during its operation, it uses statistics to discern anomalous behaviors and
raise alarms. D’Antonio et al. present an IDS [107] that implements a rule learner to classify
values into normal and attack data, it has a flow monitor component that extract statistical
relations between di↵erent sessions to refine the learned model. Cheung et al. [190] propose
a three-layer IDS that is based on models and patterns of the system designed by an expert.
One of the layers implement a Bayesian learning module to detect changes in the availability of
the surveilled system. Lin et al. [152] propose a specification-based IDS, that uses the formal
specification of the system under surveillance to verify the correct use of the network packets.
Raciti et al. present an IDS for SGs [191] based on clustering techniques, for detecting anomalies
in the cyber and the physical levels.
In Table 4.1 we can observe the techniques and schemes used for the development of these
IDS solutions, and the levels of automation implemented. It is interesting to observe, that
the methods based on rules (pure transcriptions of the expert’s knowledge) do not require
data collection methods, since they do not undergo the training process for leveraging the
knowledge. Regarding the automation of the reaction processes, we can see that current systems
implement only passive methods of reaction. They are mainly based on raising warnings to
the operators, and they have to manually perform the inspections, repairs of the systems and
help in crisis situations (e.g. voltage peaks in pylons, high pressures in dams, etc.). The
main disadvantage of the absence of automation in such systems is that help might arrive too
late, and the failures of the system may cascade to other dependent systems, including other
interdependent infrastructures, causing all kinds of havoc. Therefore we find it vital that e↵ective
measures are taken, in order to avoid the possible social and economical harm derived from a
cascading failure. These measures must be automatic active reaction processes, maybe based on
machine learning techniques, that are capable of providing e↵ective countermeasures in the face
of any kind of anomaly or attack. Next section is devoted to discuss these response mechanisms,
the varied possible implementations and their suitability for CIP.
4.3 Awareness and Reaction
To understand the IDPRS, it is important to also understand the nature of the event they
attempt to detect, the environment where they operate, the di↵erent kinds of processes that
can be triggered to protect the surveilled system, and the possible types of solutions that can
be launched. In order to provide safe IDPRS solutions to protect critical systems, we need to
identify those desirable features, and most importantly, the characteristics that constrain the
application and deployment of response solutions in critical contexts such as CIs.
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Protection mechanisms put into place to safeguard CIs must be tailored to their environment,
taking into account its constraints in order to ensure the correct operation of the system as
a whole. IDPRS solutions, similarly to IDS, are designed to monitor and protect hosts (host-
based architecture), or networks (network-based architecture) [109]. A host-based IDPRS must
be tailored to the node where the solution is running, it must operate within the constraints
imposed by the host, and therefore it should be well integrated with its environment. Network
IDPRS solutions monitor the tra c of communication networks, and can be deployed in radically
di↵erent contexts.
Generally, the internal networks of CIs and their control systems can be divided into three
main types: corporate networks, the SCADA center and remote substations [112]. The first are
the business local area networks connected to a SCADA to gain access to critical data streams
on SCADA servers (e.g., historical data, alarms, etc.). Corporate networks are general-purpose
complex infrastructures where the nodes of the network (e.g., servers, gateways, SCADA centers)
have moderate to high computational capabilities and the constraints of these networks are
minimal. SCADA centers are in charge of constantly monitoring the controlled infrastructures,
using their communication networks to reach remote substations.
The nodes connected to SCADA centers are usually powerful, e.g., SCADA servers, gateways
and some powerful RTUs in the main remote substations. However, the protocols they use are
proprietary and restricted, thus the IDPRS solutions deployed in this environment could use
powerful computational resources, but they have to be designed for the specific communications
protocols. Remote substations constitute those control networks based on field devices (e.g.,
sensors, actuators) and communication interfaces (e.g., RTU, gateways, base stations) capable of
transmitting commands from the central system to field devices deployed close to the controlled
infrastructures, and sending sensorial measurements to the SCADA center.
In these remote networks, most of the nodes (sensors, base stations) have constrained compu-
tational power; moreover, the protocols used in the communication of their nodes are usually
proprietary, or adapted to low-power devices. Thus the IDPRS solutions deployed in this con-
text should have lightweight procedures, and they must be tailored to the specific protocols and
restricted nodes of the networks. Summarizing, these are the requirements posed by the physical
structures and components of CIs, however in our study we have to also determine the desirable
features and characteristics for the IDPRS solutions that are needed in CIP.
Our research takes as its basis the methodological framework for situational awareness given
in [3], which is based on two execution phases and a set of protection services, among them:
detection, alerting and response. We expand the proposed methodology (see Figure 4.3), to
describe the di↵erent methods and phases for detection and response in a critical context. The
aim of our study is to analyze the features and components available for prevention and response
in general-purpose networks.
To identify the characteristics that are useful for the protection of CIs, and the factors that limit
the application of RS to constrained critical systems, we need a methodological framework for
IDPRS solutions for CIP. In our study, we follow the situational awareness framework in [3], and
consider the taxonomies for general-purpose IDPRS solutions proposed by N. Stakhanova et al.
[4] and A. Shameli-Sendi et al. [5]. They constitute the basis we use and adapt to analyze the
IDPRS solutions that better fit CIP. The framework and taxonomy we consider for our analysis
is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Situational awareness for critical contexts, adapted from [3]
Figure 4.4 is divided into three main modules, corresponding to the three key components or
operational characteristics provided by the IDPRS: the detection module, the system’s automa-
tion degree and the response system. These modules characterize the resulting IDPRS and the
capabilities of detection, automation and response that this system will have, thus determining
the degree of protection this system provides to CIs. In this section we describe the features of
each element and study their advantages and disadvantages for critical systems.
4.3.1 Module 1: Detection
This module corresponds to the IDS component of the IDPRS, depicted in Figure 4.4, as pre-
viously described in detail in Section 4.2.1. As aforementioned, this component servers the
vital purpose of providing detection mechanisms to feed the awareness and reaction system
with valuable information about the event that threatens the system. The nature of the data
provided would depend on the type of IDS method of detection, i.e., anomaly-based detection,
signature-based detection or specifications-based detection (see Section 4.2.1).
In the case of an anomaly-based IDS, the system will provide alerts based on the deviation of the
system of its known normal behavior. This will provide mainly statistic data in need for further
analysis, in order to determine if the deviation of the norm is truly an abnormal behavior or
simply a change on the dynamics of the surveilled system. In the case of both signature-based
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Figure 4.4: Methodological framework, containing a taxonomy of IDPRS, adapted from [4] and
[5]
and specifications-based detection, it is easy to extract and analyze the detected events, since
the matches against rules or specifications reveal which ones have been violated and provide
exact information about the threat.
4.3.2 Module 2: Automation
A methodology to study the levels of automation of a given IDS solution for CIP is described in
Section 4.2.3. From this methodology we identify that the fifth level of automation corresponds
to the automation of the response mechanism implemented by the IDS. Since the IDPRS solu-
tions provide an extension of the functionalities present in the IDS, it is necessary to determine
the degree of automation they provide (according to the methodological framework for CIs given
in [3]), in order to determine the automatic capabilities they implement. According to the level
of automation, the RS are capable of providing di↵erent types of triggered responses [4].
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Degree of Automation
Currently, research is mainly focused on providing manual or semi-manual reaction mechanisms,
due to the di culties that arise when trying to apply correct automatic responses against deter-
mined events. IDPRSs implement these responses at di↵erent levels, which can be subdivided
and categorized into the following types (see Figure 4.4) [4]:
• Notification systems : reaction systems based on notifications principally generate alarms
when threatening events are detected. They basically provide information about the oc-
currence, and the system administrator is the responsible for selecting the appropriate
response. The majority of the existing IDS solutions provide this kind of mechanism [169].
It is important to note that this approach is not designed to prevent attacks or return the
system to a safe state. The major disadvantage of this approach is the delay between the
potentially harmful event and the human response [4].
• Manual response systems: manual response is a step ahead of the notification systems,
with respect to automation. The system has a preconfigured set of actions that the ad-
ministrator launches whenever a problem arises, and based on the characteristics of the
event reported [5]. This process is not completely automated, however the countermea-
sures are configured in the system beforehand and the response of the operator is faster
than in the previous scenario.
• Automatic response systems: are designed to be fully automated, thus (unlike the two
methods mentioned above) human intervention is not required, and consequently there is
no delay between the detection of the event and the response. However, due to the great
di culty in providing a high level of automation in the response mechanisms, the existing
systems that provide automated response are very limited [4]. The main problem of this
approach is the possibility that an inappropriate response is executed when a problem
arises; it is also di cult to ensure that an automatic response is able to neutralize a
problem [5].
Triggered Response
Those IDPRS that implement automatic reaction can be further categorized into two di↵erent
classes, taking into account the type of their triggered response. This reaction determines the
whole structure of the reaction system, and its intrinsic complexity. Accordingly, there are two
di↵erent types of solutions: the active response mechanisms, and the passive response methods
(see Figure 4.4):
• Passive response: the systems that present passive responses do not attempt to minimize
the damage caused by the potentially harmful event or prevent a repeat in the future. The
main objective is to notify the authority (e.g., the human operator, the SCADA center)
and provide information about the occurrence [4].
• Active response: active systems try to locate the source of the detected event and provide
active response actions to minimize the damage derived from the occurrence. The vast
majority of the IDS solutions available only provide passive response, whilst the active
reaction mechanisms are very limited at present [4].
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Currently, most CIs are not equipped with active RS. However, the need for dynamic incident
management and response systems capable of sending alerts for anomalies caused by malfunc-
tions or intrusive presence are widely defended by the scientific and governmental communities
[15, 35]. Most of the current IDS and IDPRS present in critical contexts implement passive
response mechanisms [171, 173], therefore, we focus our analysis on the characteristics, func-
tionalities and constraints of the automatic response systems.
4.3.3 Module 3: Response System
The third module of an IDPRS is the response system (see Figure 4.4), which is the component
capable of selecting proper countermeasures to a given threat. This element is fed by the IDS
component with insight about the threat, and has a determined degree of automation depending
on the implementation of the system. The decisions taken to select the reactive measures
against the threats can be made using various forms of computation. For example, they can be
predefined or modified depending on the environment, they can be calculated autonomously or
in a cooperative way. Also, the response can be applied in a reactive way or before the threat
reaches the maximum.
Thus, there are multiple forms of implementing the IDPRS and the varied characteristics they
can add. Specifically, our methodological framework considers the following features: response
cost model, risk assessment method, ability to adjust, cooperation ability, response selection
method, response execution method and time of response. These are the main features we evalu-
ate in the di↵erent IDPRS solutions, there are other di↵erent variables that could be included in
the study, such as the applying location and the response lifetime [192]. However, to determine
the best solutions for CIP, we focus on the first.
Response Cost Model
Each threat (attack or fault) to a system entails a cost; likewise, each response (automatic or
manual) to a threat has an impact on the system. Generally, the best responses are those that
cost less, and it is always necessary that the cost of the selected response is less than the cost
of the fault or attack. There are diverse forms of calculating the e↵ects of the response actions,
most of them belonging to the field of risk assessment [193]. There are three main ways of
providing the automated IDPRS with the models for calculating the cost of a response in a
particular situation: the static cost model, the static evaluated cost model, and the dynamic
evaluated cost model.
• Static cost model : where the response cost is assigned statically using the opinion of an
expert. This value has to be set for each response and it is usually preconfigured in the
system [5].
• Static evaluated cost model : the cost is calculated and assigned statically to each response.
Here, the evaluation mechanism usually computes the positive e↵ects of the response
(based on their consequences for the availability, confidentiality and integrity variables and
performance metrics), and the negative impacts (in terms of availability and performance).
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The combination of the two kinds of e↵ects comprises the cost assigned to the response.
The majority of cost models use the static evaluated cost model [5].
• Dynamic evaluated cost model : the system dynamically calculates the cost of the response
based on the dependencies between the resources and the actors in the system [5]. The re-
sulting cost-sensitive model is usually very accurate, and improves the performance of the
IDPRS by allowing it to select appropriate responses that take into account the interde-
pendencies of the system, its critical processes and the Quality of Service (QoS). However,
due to its increased complexity, the majority of the IDPRS available implement static cost
or static evaluated cost models.
In a critical context where the dynamics are well-known and the patterns of behavior are suf-
ficiently static and predictable, IDPRS solutions that implement static cost models are a good
option. Thanks to this static context, the range of possible threats and risks is limited to a
restricted known set, and the possible countermeasure actions are equally limited. Therefore
the simpler static methods perform well in these environments. However, whenever the behav-
ior of the system has more complex dynamics, it is necessary to apply more sophisticated cost
models. Especially if computationally powerful resources are available, the dynamic evaluated
cost model is highly recommended, since the costs are calculated taking into account the critical
processes and the multiple interdependencies existing between CIs.
Risk Assessment (Attack Cost)
Attacks or anomalies have a negative impact on the system, and through the calculation of
the cost of these events, we can help the response system determine the best course of action
for protection in a particular scenario. The assessment of these costs can be done statically or
dynamically :
• Static: consists of assigning a static value to each resource of the system [5]. This type of
risk assessment has a useful basic performance, and the procedures for its application are
described in many existing standards (e.g., NIST [194], ISO 27005 [195]). However, static
risk assessment does not provide the versatility and advantages of dynamic risk assessment
for a dynamic context.
• Dynamic: the assessment of risk dynamically provides a real time process for evaluating of
risk indices in the system [5]. The model is dynamically created by propagating the impact
of the security variables through service dependency models [196], attack graphs [197], or
general models based on metrics [5, 198]. Online risk assessment, although computationally
complex, minimizes the costs of the threats and response events in the system, and allows
the IDPRS to work, taking into account the context (state) of the system [199].
According to our study of the literature, a fully-fledged dynamic risk assessment component is
present in few IDPRS existing solutions [192] (described further on in Section 4.3.4). However,
given its importance in determining the best possible action responses for an RS, this component
should be addressed for the IDPRS, if only in its simpler forms. Static risk assessment mecha-
nisms such as the one proposed in [193] by A. Ca´rdenas et al., provide risk metrics such as the
average loss or the variance of the losses. In [193], an heuristic is proposed to minimize risk by
estimating the potential losses, to identify the high priority equipment (sensors) and to invest
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resources in protecting them. This kind of risk assessment evaluation component is especially
well suited to constrained, low-computational power sub-systems, such as the field networks in
CIs.
More sophisticated approaches include dynamic risk assessment components which perform their
evaluation of the risk level using di↵erent techniques. Y. Haimes et al. [200] study risk from
di↵erent perspectives, and at di↵erent levels (e.g., physical risk, logical and information risk) to
create models of risk. The Network Security Risk Model (NSRM) [201] is capable of assessing
the risk of cyber attacks on process control networks using models. They show the di↵erent
attack scenarios, and enable studying the progressions and consequences of the di↵erent attacks
modeled and the risk levels introduced by the selected response strategies.
Also based on modeling, the risk-aware framework proposed in [202] contains an online compo-
nent which measures the likelihood of success of an ongoing threat or attack, and the cumulative
impacts (cost) of the threat and the response. These measures help the RS determine the need
for activation or deactivation of the system’s policies as countermeasures. Specifically, this
framework is proposed for complex infrastructures and systems, with multiple interdependen-
cies and constraints present in their normal operation. Another risk-aware RS is presented in
[203], where the authors propose a framework for risk assessment in the smart grid.
R. Habash et al. identify metrics and factors evaluating the level of risk in this environment, and
the level of risk remaining after applying countermeasures to tackle the threat. In their paper,
A. Shameli-Sendi et al. [199] present ARITO, a response system using accurate risk impact
tolerance. This RS contains a risk assessment component that measures the risk impact in real
time. This system is also capable of providing feedback mechanisms for the countermeasures
applied by the RS, provided by the calculations of the response goodness, which helps indicate
the new risk level after applying the selected responses. After the risk evaluation, the system
can decide whether to activate a response or not, and the strength of the response, according to
the network risk level and the risk impact of each countermeasure.
Thus, given the di↵erent types of solutions at hand, we firmly believe that an IDPRS solution
deployed within a critical infrastructure should have a risk assessment component. In order to
determine the best response to anomalous situations, it is necessary to provide the RS with
mechanisms to evaluate the costs of both the threat and the response actions occurring within
the system. This feature is essential to apply accurate countermeasures to the threat, while
avoiding causing havoc and widespread operative disruption due to a mistakenly applied re-
sponse. Ideally, risk assessment should implement dynamic procedures, however, as we have
discussed, in constrained areas of the network, it is possible to implement static well-adjusted
procedures.
Ability to Adjust
The capability of a response system to adjust to new situations and scenarios is a desirable
characteristic that supports its robustness and continuity. However, its implementation is costly
in terms of computational complexity and di culty of design, and in some cases deemed unnec-
essary. Thus we can find in the literature two positions regarding the adjustability of the RS:
adaptive solutions and static solutions.
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• Adaptive: the adaptability of the response is “an ability of the system to dynamically adjust
the response selection to the changing environment” during the occurrence of a potentially
harmful event [4]. The adaptive model usually adjusts its actions based on response history
[5], and it can be in the form of: (i) the adjustment of the system’s resources devoted to
intrusion response; e.g., activation of additional IDS; or (ii) the consideration of the success
or failure of the previously used responses.
• Static (non-adaptive): the non-adaptive models provide a static response selection pro-
cedure, which remains the same throughout the lifetime of the IDPRS software. There
is no mechanism for tracing the behavior of the applied responses, and the support to
the system is manual (they can be periodically upgraded by the system’s administrator).
Although static, this kind of response model is simple and easy to maintain [4], so in some
cases it is preferred by the administrators.
When deploying an IDPRS in a critical context, the ability of the system to adjust to its
environment is in some cases very important. Since there are di↵erent types of networks within
CIs, each of them having di↵erent environmental characteristics, the adjustability of a IDPRS is
critical in these sections of the network where continuous changes happen, with frequent updates
of the networks’ nodes and continuously changing dynamics (e.g., in the corporate networks of
CIs). However, other sections of the networks usually have very static patterns of behavior,
and the need for an adaptive IDPRS there is not critical. This is the case, for example, in
the networks that connect the SCADA with the RTU (or destination gateway), and in the
communication networks between RTUs (or gateways) and sensors/actuators.
Cooperation Ability
Response systems can be designed in such a way that they perform their tasks autonomously,
being capable of monitoring localized areas of the surveilled system or the holistic behaviors of
the system. Conversely, they can be implemented cooperatively, which allows multiple IDPRS
to communicate with each other and collaborate at di↵erent levels.
• Autonomous : the autonomous IDPRS solutions handle events independently, without com-
munication with other components, at the level the threats are detected [4]. These solutions
are usually aware of just a restricted part of the context of the system, thus the responses
they can provide are generally localized.
• Cooperative: it refers to the set of RSs that combine e↵orts to respond to an intrusion.
They can consist of several autonomous systems, capable of detecting and responding
to intrusions locally, but with a final response strategy determined and applied globally.
Sometimes, the IDPRS systems are directly built to operate cooperatively, which makes
them perform better in terms of response speed and contained damage volume. Nonethe-
less, they are also more complex and require strong coordination and communication
between their components [4].
Complex networks, where there are complicated dynamics and interconnected dependent sys-
tems, benefit from cooperative IDPRS solutions. It is possible to deploy multiple autonomous
IDPRS modules for protection at di↵erent levels in the varied networks of CIs. However, co-
operative detection systems could be able to correlate di↵erent events (occurring at di↵erent
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levels or locations of the infrastructure) to provide behavior forecasting and improve the overall
performance of the IDPRS (proactive protection). Nevertheless, it is not always cost-e↵ective to
increase the complexity of the security mechanisms, since they can diminish the e ciency of the
operation of the infrastructure. Thus in constrained environments (e.g., remote substations),
autonomous lightweight IDPRS are the recommended option.
Response Selection Method
Once the detection system has provided information about the threat that is placing the system
at risk, and the costs have been calculated, the response mechanisms must determine the best
actions to carry out to counteract the threat. The IDPRS is capable of making such decisions
by associating the threat alerts with a determined set of actions. This association can be done
in three di↵erent ways, with increasing degrees of complexity: static mapping, dynamic mapping
and cost-sensitive mapping.
• Static mapping : here, each alert is mapped to a predefined response [5]. This procedure
provides a model that is easy to build and maintain, however, it also makes the system
predictable and thus vulnerable to intrusions (in particular, DoS attacks). Moreover, static
mapping systems have an inherent inability to consider the current state of the whole
system, therefore the actions triggered represent an isolated e↵ort to mitigate a problem,
without considering the current condition and impact of the response on the system. The
application of this technique for large systems is infeasible and prone to errors, since the
number of threat scenarios needed to be analyzed and the constant changes in system
policies make this process extremely complex [4].
• Dynamic mapping : these RSs are more sophisticated than static mapping systems, since
their response selection considers certain attack metrics (e.g., confidence, criticality, fre-
quency) and network policies [204]. Each alert is associated with a set of response actions
and when a potentially harmful event occurs, the system chooses, in real time, the best
response action from the corresponding set, taking into account the characteristics of the
particular threat [4]. This approach provides a fine-grained control over the automatic
response of the system through adjustments to the metrics. However, its main drawback
is that the RS does not learn lessons from one situation to the next; thus its intelligence
level remains constant (i.e., it does not change) until the next system upgrade [5, 205].
• Cost-sensitive mapping : these RSs attempt to balance the cost of the damage caused by
the harmful event and the cost of the response [4]. The optimal response is determined
through the cost-sensitive model of the IDPRS, which includes cost and risk factors related
to the event, and to each response [206]. Traditionally, cost-sensitive approaches use an
o✏ine risk assessment procedure, where the cost and risk factors are calculated in advance
and the values are static. In some cases, this mechanism is completely manual, and it is
the system administrator’s task to update these values over time [4].
To improve the static procedures and lower the burden on the system’s operators, online risk
assessment components have been proposed to measure the cost of attacks, faults and automated
responses [5]. Therefore, whenever the equipment capabilities allow it, it would be preferable to
use the most sophisticated response selection techniques for the RS. Cost-sensitive or dynamic
mapping would assist the operators in making the best decisions for incident response. However,
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this advantage comes with the price of complexity and computational cost: it is necessary to
analyze a vast number of factors (intrusion cause and e↵ect, identification of optimal response,
state of the system, maintainability) and to completely understand the problems addressed to
provide optimal responses [4].
Additionally, it is necessary to adjust the measures of accuracy and adequacy of a response to the
selection method implemented by the IDPRS. The maintainability of the system also increases
whenever automatic sophisticated techniques are used for response selection. Furthermore, in
ICS, the application of incorrect countermeasure actions can be devastating to the operation
of the surveilled system, and can cause fatal errors to cascade throughout the infrastructure,
and into other dependent interconnected CIs. Therefore, the response selection process must be
supervised by the system’s operator and the RS must adjust its functionality to the constraints
of its environment.
In a critical context it is thus desirable to have an IDPRS well integrated with its environment.
Within ICS, there are sectors with heavy-duty equipment and powerful computational capabil-
ities, such as the SCADA center or the main remote substations (based on gateways as main
interfaces), able to run IDPRS solutions that provide the most sophisticated response selection
methods (i.e., cost-sensitive mapping). Also, the ICS contains sectors with constrained resources,
where the equipment is not capable of performing high-complexity computations, e.g., in the
field networks, where there are mainly lightweight sensors with low computational power.
In this case, it is also interesting to protect the system through IDS and IDPRS solutions, but
these solutions have to be tailored to a constrained scenario. Thus, lightweight IDSs (like the
one presented in [99]) and IDPRS can be deployed, where the methods used to perform their
tasks consume fewer resources, e.g., providing an IDPRS with static mapping techniques for
response selection. Then, by deploying the IDPRS that best suits each part of the system, it is
possible to protect the infrastructure without the need to modify or add equipment to execute
these tasks.
Response Execution
When the response system has selected the most suitable actions to counteract the threat, there
are two ways of executing them: in a burst, or using retroactive feedback.
• Burst : this mode of execution does not take into account any mechanism to measure
the risk once the selected response (or set of responses) is applied. This means that all
the countermeasures are always applied, disregarding the possibility that a subset of the
actions could be enough to mitigate the threat. This is the response execution mode
usually present in the literature, its main weakness being the performance cost [5].
• Retroactive: in the retroactive execution, there is a feedback mechanism that measures
the response e↵ect taking into account the results of applying the most recent set of
countermeasure actions. This measurement helps the system to make decisions before
applying the next set of actions [5]. This kind of system was first presented by C. Mu et
al. in [207], where the authors indicate several ways to implement the retroactive approach:
– Selection window: each response has a static risk threshold associated with it, and
to run the countermeasure it is necessary to consider the current risk index of the
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system. If its value is higher than the static threshold of the action, the next response
can be activated. With a selection window, the most e↵ective countermeasures are
selected to repel intrusions.
– Independent responses: this method involves measuring the risks associated with
the countermeasure applied in order to make a decision about the application of the
next one. Since responses are evaluated independently taking into account their cost
impact, this step-by-step execution mechanism is more conservative than the previous
approach, and more suitable to be applied in critical contexts.
– Grouped responses: when calculating the risk of a single response does not provide
enough information to make the decision about running the next one, it is interesting
to build groups of countermeasures. The decision to run the next round of responses
is based on the general risk of the system. Once a group of countermeasures have
been applied, the risk needs to be re-calculated. The challenge of this method is to
determine how many responses in a round are considered enough to neutralize an
attack.
ICSs are complex and delicate systems, thus when an undesired event happens, it is necessary
to palliate its e↵ects as soon as possible and in the least harmful way possible. Two approaches
have been proposed: the burst response execution, which applies the countermeasures in bulk, as
a whole, and the retroactive response execution. Although it is possible to find both types of RSs
in the literature, the latter provides the advantage of stopping the process of responding to the
event to evaluate the e↵ects of the countermeasures already applied. Since, in a given situation,
a subset of the countermeasures selected to palliate the anomalous state could be enough to
restore the system to a normal operation, retroactivity capabilities are desirable.
Moreover, in a critical environment, executing countermeasure actions in a burst without evalu-
ating their impact on the system could bring it to a critical state. Thus, automatic non-evaluated
responses must not be executed in CIs without the supervision of a human operator. The rea-
son behind this is the criticality of any action performed within CIs, since any mistaken activity
(automatic or manual) can disrupt the operation of the system with unknown and potentially
devastating consequences. Therefore, in this context it is better to execute countermeasures
retroactively. However, these feedback mechanisms, as is the case with all adaptive approaches,
face some challenges that make their use di cult, e.g., measuring the success of the most recently
applied response or handling multiple threatening events.
There are several ways to provide feedback to the RS, ranging from simple static system’s met-
rics, to a more dynamic approach such as including a risk assessment component. As suggested
in Section 4.3.3, risk assessment can help determine the costs of the responses, to provide the
desired feedback to the IDPRS. Here, in order to make the IDPRS more precise, risk assess-
ment should be conducted dynamically (online). As we discussed previously, there are systems
in the literature capable of tackling risk assessment in di↵erent scenarios, varying from gen-
eral purpose environments [193, 199, 200] to complex cyber-physical infrastructures such as the
telecommunications industry or the smart grid [202, 203].
However, since these online dynamic mechanisms make the IDPRS costlier in terms of the
system’s resources [5], they can be included in areas of the network with su cient computation
capabilities. In constrained areas of the network, it is possible to use simpler methods than
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[193] to determine the suitability of the countermeasures for a determined situation. This can
help computationally constrained devices to include RS with retroactive, although rudimentary,
response execution capabilities.
Therefore, in a critical context, the unsupervised automated response execution of countermea-
sures in a burst should not be applied. Instead, supervised response execution, or retroactive
execution mechanisms should be put in place to prevent the application of countermeasures that
exceed the risk cost of the threat. It is therefore necessary, to delicately execute the responses,
maintaining a control of the risk associated with the automatic procedures of the IDPRS. In
this case, running and assessing the responses independently, or in small related groups can
deliver adequate automatic responses, while minimizing the risks and costs of the automatic
reaction.
Time of Response
It is possible to classify IDPRS solutions into proactive and reactive systems, taking into account
the time instant when the IDPRS launches the response actions, with reference to whether the
threat (e.g., an attack) has been already been confirmed or not.
• Proactive (preemptive): proactive RSs foresee the incoming (potentially harmful) event and
launch the response actions to help control the threat before it has a↵ected the resource.
This prediction is complicated to make and usually relies on probability measures and
analysis of the system’s behavior. Proactive solutions require the detection and response
mechanisms to be tightly coupled, so the countermeasures can be triggered as soon as the
event has been identified [4]. However, and although early response is highly desirable,
it is di cult to guarantee the correctness of the triggered response action [208]; thus the
proactivity of the system has to be balanced with the correctness of the responses provided.
• Reactive (delayed): in these RSs, the reaction is delayed until the threat has been confirmed
[4]. The threat can be confirmed using confidence metrics in the IDS or by the matching of
the event’s trace with an existing signature in the IDS. Clear distinction exists between the
proactive mechanisms (calling them incident prevention systems) and the delayed IDPRS
(calling them intrusion handling/response systems) [209]. The proactive response usually
includes actions to restore the system state to its normal operation [4].
Reactive systems, because they are less complex compared to proactive mechanisms, are widely
used in IDPRS solutions [5]. These RSs do not trigger any countermeasure actions until the
threat has been detected. The problem with reactive solutions compared to preemptive sys-
tems is that, generally, the delayed response leaves the event “unattended” for a longer period,
consequently allowing more damage to occur, and setting a greater burden on the recovery
mechanisms and the system administrators. While this might not cause too much trouble in
general networks, a delayed response is not suitable for critical systems [4].
N. Anuar et al. [168] detail the disadvantages of a reactive RS, defending the di culty to return
an a↵ected system to its normal operation, while having to consider that the system remains in
an unsafe state in the time window until the response actions are applied. However, deploying
a proactive RS in a critical environment is challenging, since false positively detected threats
might trigger countermeasure actions from the IDPRS and bring the system to an unstable
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state. To prevent this problem and benefit from the advantages of a proactive IDPRS, it is
necessary to finely tune the detection engine to make sure the rate of false positives is as low as
possible.
Additionally, critical systems should not implement entirely automatic response systems, with-
out human supervision, to avoid executing mistaken actions. Therefore, semi-supervised or
supervised proactive IDPRS solutions are recommended in this environment. Of course, it is
not always possible to deploy sophisticated and computationally costly solutions in several areas
of CIs, due to their constrained nature. However, there are simple techniques, such as statistics
or rule-based detection, which allows implementing lightweight preemptive systems. They are
capable of detecting certain patterns and behaviors that deviate from the standard operation and
which precede a threat, and launching adequate responses, even in a constrained environment
such as the field sensor networks.
Thus, sophisticated proactive IDPRS can be applied to ICS in a context where the nodes have
su cient computational power, e.g., to the SCADA center, or to the networks that connect the
SCADA center with the main remote substations. There, network dynamics are simple and the
nodes are powerful. Another area of ICS that could make use of proactive solutions are the
corporate networks, where there are complex dynamics and behaviors, but the resources are
su ciently powerful to apply behavior-based forecasting. Finally, as mentioned, sectors of ICS
where the equipment has constrained capabilities (e.g., field sensor networks) can benefit from
simpler, lightweight proactive RS solutions.
4.3.4 Review of the State of the Art: Approaches, Techniques and Tools for
IDPRS solutions
A review of the literature shows the di↵erent approaches taken to build IDPRS solutions through
the recent years. This analysis is based on the methodological framework and protection meth-
ods described in Section 4.3 and focuses on non-commercial general-purpose academic IDPRS
solutions. There is a line of commercial tools that provide several interesting solutions regarding
IDPRS mechanisms, however, the features implemented by these solutions have a proprietary
nature which restricts their study to the characteristics publicized by the provider of these tools.
N. Anuar et al. present a study based on Gartner’s report on network IDPRS in their paper
[168]. They analyze the level of response applied in commercial and research products, looking
at IDS and IDRPS technologies, as well as Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
products (tools for real-time analysis and management of security alerts within a system and its
network). Therefore commercial solutions are not included in our study, as we cannot identify
the essential features needed for the protection of the CIs.
One of the first IDPRS systems found in the literature is DC&A (Damage Control and Assess-
ment), defined by E. Fisch [209] in 1996. This system implements a dynamic mapping technique,
specifically designed for intrusion control and assessment, with two main components: (i) a dam-
age control processor to reduce and control the damage done by an intruder, while the intrusion
is still in progress, and (ii) a damage assessment processor that determines the harm done to the
system to subsequently help the recovery processes. This system selects the response actions
using an index, the suspicion level of each user’s activity and applies the responses assigned to
the suspicion level. If this index increases, di↵erent responses are selected. When the intruder
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leaves the system, the damage assessment processor determines the actions needed to revert the
state of the system to a safe and healthy state.
The Cooperating Security Manager system (CSM), proposed by G. White et al. [210], is a dy-
namic mapping IDRPS that selects its response strategies based on IDS confidence information
about the intrusive behaviors, and severity metrics associated with the attack. Although not
originally designed to be proactive, CSM can be configured to counteract intrusions proactively.
This IDPRS is a distributed collaborative solution equipped with autonomous response mecha-
nisms. CSM allows hosts to share information and detect intrusive user activity in a cooperative
way, but the response actions are decided and launched by each host locally [4]. One of the main
drawbacks of this model is that it is not capable of learning from attack to attack [5].
Another cooperative model is EMERALD (Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous
Live Disturbances), proposed by P. Porras and P. Neumann in [205]. EMERALD is a distributed
framework for network intrusion detection and prevention based on the insertion of di↵erent
layers of monitors in the network. The component in charge of response is the resolver, which
analyzes attack reports and coordinates the reaction e↵orts. There are several resolvers, each of
them responsible for the local strategy of reaction, but able to communicate with the resolvers
of the other layers, making the response selection a global procedure. As in CMS, the strategy
of reaction is based on security metrics and confidence values.
In the 2000s, one of the first IDPRS to be published was the BMSL-based (Behavioral Monitoring
Specification Language), by T. Bowen et al. [211]. This system has a static mapping response
selection mechanism, which bases its operation in pre-specified countermeasure actions. BMSL
describes the system’s behavior using a finite state machine automaton, which autonomously
assigns a countermeasure to each path. Another solution from 2000, the SoSMART system, by
S. Mnsman and P. Flesher [212], is an agent-based IDPRS with a statically mapped response
selection procedure. The incident cases are designed by the user and mapped to the appropriate
countermeasures. Additionally, the system uses case-base reasoning as an adaptation mechanism
in charge of determining if the current solution corresponds to intrusive behavior.
Another autonomous IDPRS is the PH system, designed by A. Somayaji and S. Forrest [213].
PH is based on a behavioral profile of the system composed of sequences of system calls. The
calls that deviate from the normal behavior are considered anomalous and can therefore be
marked to be counteracted. The system only implements two simple kinds of response actions:
suspending the suspicious processes or aborting them permanently. As do the majority of
IDPRS, PH implements a delayed response mechanism, i.e., it waits until the intrusion has been
confirmed.
W. Lee et al. propose a cost-sensitive IDPRS [214] based on three cost factors: (i) operational
cost, the cost of processing and analyzing data for detecting intrusions; (ii) damage cost, the
amount of damage that can be caused by an attack when the IDS is ine↵ective; and (iii) re-
sponse cost, the cost of applying the response when the attack has been detected. These factors
combined present the total cost of the intrusion, and they help the system select the appropriate
countermeasure in every case. One of the most complex dynamic mapping approaches of this
decade is the Adaptive, Agent-based Intrusion Response System (AAIRS) based on an agent
architecture [204].
AAIRS is a an agent-based complex system, where multiple IDSs monitor a host and generate
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alarms. These agents operate at the di↵erent layers of the response process. Firstly, the intrusion
alarms are processed by the master analysis agent, which calculates the confidence level based on
pre-set decision tables and classifies the attack as new or ongoing. The system then passes this
information to the analysis agent, which provides an action plan based on a seven-dimensions
response taxonomy: degree of suspicion, attack time, attacker type, attack type, attack implica-
tions, response goal, and policy constraints. Lastly, the tactics agent decomposes the response
plan into particular actions and activates the appropriate components of the response toolkit.
It is capable of adapting its responses to each situation using the IDS’ confidence metrics, which
indicate the number of false positive alarms against the correct number of intrusions generated
by each IDS. Similarly, the success metrics indicate the response actions that were successful in
the past. A drawback to AAIRS is that it requires the intervention of the system administrator
after each incident.
In 2001, S. M. Lewandowski et al. presented another cooperative RS, Survivable Autonomic
Response Architecture (SARA) in [215]. It is composed of several components that function as:
sensors (gathering of information), detectors (analysis of sensor data), arbitrators (selection of
adequate response actions), and responders (implementation of response). SARA’s components
are arranged to provide the highest possible levels of detection and prevention. For example,
each host can have an arbitrator to provide intrusion response while the selection response comes
from a global (cooperative) strategy.
The Cooperative Intrusion Traceback and Response Architecture (CITRA), presented by D.
Schnackenberg et al. in [216], is another cooperative agent-based system. CITRA uses a neigh-
borhood structure to propagate the intrusion information until it reaches a centralized authority
called the discovery coordinator, which determines the optimal response to the intrusion. The
discovery coordinator centralizes the global response, however, the local CITRA agents are in
charge of delivering the local response actions. CITRA’s framework is composed of network-
based IDS, security management systems and network components (e.g., routers). Their aim is
to detect the intrusion, trace it back to the source and coordinate the suitable reactions. Two
factors guide the response mechanism: the certainty (likelihood of the event being an actual
intrusion) and the severity of the intrusion (potential damage to the system). Once these two
parameters, which define the characteristics of the event, have been determined, the response
action is chosen from a pre-determined set.
Also in 2001, X. Wang et al. [217] presented TBAIR, the Tracing Based Active Intrusion
Response system, a dynamic-mapping non-adaptive IDPRS capable of tracing the intrusion
back to the source host to dynamically select a proper response to mitigate its e↵ects; e.g., by
blocking the intruder remotely or isolating the a↵ected hosts. The model proposed by T. Toth
and C. Kruegel [206] is capable of considering the cost and benefits of the countermeasures. It
implements a network RS capable of modeling dependencies between the services and resources
of the system, in the form of a tree. This model can reveal priorities in targets and helps evaluate
the impact of the response strategy on the system. Likewise, the algorithm for response selection
can take into account the assigned static penalty cost of having a resource unavailable, so it can
indicate the impact that the response strategy has on the system. Considering this model,
the algorithm chooses to apply the set of actions that has the least negative impact on the
system.
S. Tanachaiwiwat et al. [218] present a cost-sensitive, static IDPRS. The system is non-adaptive
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given the di culty of calculating the e↵ectiveness of a given countermeasure. The IDPRS is
based on the e ciency of the IDS, the alarm frequency per week (indicating the number of
alarms triggered per attack) and the potential damage cost. These variables serve to identify
the best reaction strategy from a predefined list of responses. Similar to [206], the system pro-
posed in [196] presents a cost-sensitive, dynamic RS capable of modeling dependencies between
the services of the system to identify the impact of the di↵erent countermeasures. This sys-
tem implements a delayed model, which suspends any action until after the threat has been
confirmed.
The IDPRS uses host IDS and provides two ways of classifying the resources of the system:
a resource hierarchy or a system map. The resource hierarchy is a directed graph, where its
nodes are specific system resources and the graph edges represent dependencies between them.
Each node is associated with a set of reactions to restore its working state when attacked.
The response is selected using: (i) the reaction cost, corresponding to the sum of the resources
a↵ected by the response; (ii) the reaction benefit, through the sum of nodes previously a↵ected
and restored to a working state; and (iii) the cost of the threatened resource. When there are
alerts about nodes that have not previously considered, the system adds them dynamically to
the map/hierarchy.
In 2005, B. Foo et al. presented ADEPTS, an adaptive and proactive RS, in [219]. ADEPTS
uses Intrusion Graphs (I-Graph) to model intrusions, which identify attack targets, the possible
spread of the intrusion, and those nodes where it is possible to apply successful responses. The
RS maps the alarms provided by the IDS against the I-Graph and selects the countermeasures
taking into account their calculated e↵ectiveness, their potential to cause disruption and the
level of confidence of the system being intruded. ADEPTS uses feedback mechanisms coming
from the a↵ected nodes, where parameters such as the confidence level of the attack and previous
similar experiences help in estimating the success or failure of the applied response. As opposed
to AAIRS [204], this system is capable of automatically updating the response e↵ectiveness
metric.
FLIPS, Feedback Learning Intrusion Prevention System [220], is another proactive IDPRS,
which emulates the applications in a restricted environment before their execution. Thanks to
this previous emulation, the system can recognize code injection attacks with only a few bytes of
data, and prevent the system from executing their malicious code. M. Papadaki and S. Furnell
present a cost-sensitive RS capable of evaluating the static and dynamic context of an attack
in [221] using a database of their characteristics (e.g., target, applications, vulnerabilities).
It also takes into account the characteristics of the responses available (e.g., counter-e↵ects,
stopping power, transparency, e ciency, and confidence level) to propose di↵erent kinds of
countermeasures according to the attack, and it is capable of adapting the response to changes
in the environment.
Similar to FLIPS [220] and ADEPTS [219], N. Stakhanova et al. propose in [222] another
proactive, cost-sensitive IDPRS designed to detect anomalous behaviors in terms of system calls.
The IDS tries to match the sequences of system calls with sets of normal and abnormal patterns
to determine whether there is an attack or not. If the IDS finds no signature (pattern) matches,
a machine learning engine is used to discern whether the behavior is normal or anomalous.
Since this system is proactive, the reactions are triggered before the attack is completed. To
operate in advance, the IDPRS has to have a predetermined mapping between system resources,
124
4.3. Awareness and Reaction
countermeasures and intrusion patterns. When a sequence of system calls matches an abnormal
pattern, the RS chooses the proper reactions available that have the least negative e↵ect. The
e↵ectiveness of the response is measured and its value is considered for future events.
K. Haslum et al. presented the Distributed Intrusion Prediction and Prevention System (DIPS)
in [198], a cost-sensitive, real time IDPRS with prediction and risk assessment modules based on
fuzzy models. Fuzzy logic is used to automatically estimate and infer risk, taking over this task
from the security and risk experts. DIPS implements a hidden Markov model to represent the
interaction between the attacker and the system’s network. Also in 2007, M. Jahnke et al. [197]
proposed a cost-sensitive IDPRS that uses graph-based mechanisms for risk assessment. Graphs
model the e↵ect of attacks in the resources, and the e↵ects of the countermeasures in terms of
availability. This system expands on the idea of T. Toth and C. Kruegel [206], using directed
graphs to model dependencies between the resources, and to calculate di↵erences between system
states.
One of the few early adaptive solutions is presented by C. Strasburg et al. in [223]. The authors
propose a structured methodology to evaluate the cost of a countermeasure based on three
parameters: (i) operational cost: the cost of preparing and developing responses; (ii) impact
of the reaction on the system: which measures the negative e↵ect of the response action on
the system; and (iii) response goodness: based on the number of possible intrusions that the
countermeasure can cope with, and also the number of resources that can be protected by the
countermeasure. The total response cost is a combination of these parameters.
C. Mu and Y. Li propose IDAM&IRS (Intrusion Detection Alert Management and Intrusion
Response System) in [207], which includes an RS based on hierarchical task networks. Each
countermeasure of the RS has an associated static risk threshold calculated using its ratio of
positive and negative e↵ects. The reaction is chosen using a response selection window that
shows the most e↵ective countermeasures. IDAM&IRS triggers a response when its value is
higher than its static impact risk index. The action is selected according to the goal of the RS:
analyzing, capturing or masking the attack, maximizing the system’s confidentiality or integrity,
recovering from the attack, or sustaining service. Each goal has its own sequence of responses
according to the risks they imply, e.g., weak responses earlier in time, and strong responses
later.
W. Kanoun et al. presented in [202] a risk-aware framework composed of an online model and
its architecture, which allows activating or deactivating response policies. They focus on the
need of having deactivation mechanisms which allow the RS to stop applying responses when
it calculates that the impact of the reaction surpasses an su cient threshold. This proactive
model bases its decisions on parameters such as the likelihood of the success of an on-going
threat and the accumulative impact of the threat and the response. Also in 2010, N. Kheir et
al. [224] proposed a proactive solution based on dependency graphs. This IDPRS extends the
propagation process developed in [197], by integrating the evaluation of the impact of an attack
on the security variables Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). Each resource in the
dependency graph has an associated CIA vector, where the variables are updated by active
monitoring estimation mechanisms or by extrapolation. The dependencies in the graph can be
structural or functional.
In 2013, S. Wang et al. presented in [225] a middleware RS, with the aim of providing cost-
benefit security hardening. The authors’ approach is the use of attack-graph models together
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with Hidden Markov Models to explore the probabilistic relation between system observations
and states. With this probabilistic insight, the IDPRS runs heuristic searching algorithms for
cost-benefit analysis, to determine the best security hardening measures available for the defense
of the system. Also in 2013, A. Shameli-Sendi and M. Dagenais published in [199] a cyber-attack
RS using Accurate Risk Impact Tolerance (ARITO) (see Section 4.3.3). The main component of
ARITO is the online risk assessment module, which evaluates in real-time the risk impact. This
model also provides a feedback mechanism for retroactive response execution, it measures the
goodness of the applied countermeasure, and indicates the new risk level after the application
of the selected action(s).
M. Zaghdoud and M. Al-Kahtani describe in [226] an RS based on contextual fuzzy cognitive
maps and ontology-based knowledge representation. This IDRPS has three layers, the first layer
uses ontologies to recognize the intrusions in the system. The second layer uses fuzzy cogni-
tive maps to determine the context of the e↵ect of the intrusion on the target system and to
diagnose it. In the third layer, there are response agents that select the suitable remedies avail-
able and react in a passive (alerting the system administrator) or active (applying determined
countermeasures) way.
In 2014, S.A. Zonouz et al. presented in [227] a game theory-based IDPRS, where the RS and
the adversaries are modeled as opponents in a two-player stochastic game. Its cost-sensitive
response selection method uses attack-response tree structures, which, solving partially observ-
able competitive Markov decision processes, derive the optimal reactions in each case. The RS
tries always to minimize the mathematical costs, while maximizing the benefit of the reactions
applied. B. Fessi et al. specify in [228] a genetic algorithm-based IDPRS, fed by a double-IDS
cooperative schema (network and host IDS). This RS uses a weighted linear combination model
to standardize the multiple attribute alternatives prior to the decision analysis. The genetic algo-
rithms are used to determine the appropriate countermeasures with the help of a decision model,
which takes into account the financial cost, reputation loss, and processing resources.
After our thorough review of the literature, we find that all of the aforementioned solutions,
which implement active reaction mechanisms, have been developed for general purpose net-
works. It is possible to identify automatic IDS solutions with notification systems capable of
sophisticated alerting processes [173]; but, they rely heavily on the presence of human operators
to confirm or perform the countermeasure actions needed. Therefore, we can state that (to the
best of our knowledge) in the public domain there are still no specific IDPRS solutions for the
field of CIP which are capable of implementing active and automated response solutions.
Additionally, there are other solutions (manual response systems) for CIP that provide passive
countermeasures in the form of notifications to the operators and they are capable of automat-
ically performing harmless actions such as logging of data records for forensic analysis, such as
the reputation-based early warning system proposed in [229]. However, and as we have stated,
active IDPRS solutions are widely needed for the critical infrastructure protection [15]. Thus,
it is necessary to employ more e↵ort in developing balanced solutions for automated response
in critical contexts.
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4.3.5 Analysis of Solutions and Countermeasures
In the previous section, we have described some of the di↵erent IDPRS solutions existing in
the literature and their evolution from their first appearance in the 90’s to the present day.
This section is dedicated to analyzing and assessing these solutions, evaluating the di↵erent
methods used regarding intrusion response and prevention against potentially harmful events
occurring in CIs. Taking into account the methodological framework and the taxonomy provided
in Section 4.3, the IDPRS are categorized according to the characteristics of the current solutions,
and they are presented in Table 4.2.
The systems are chronologically ordered, and the fields of the taxonomy that do not apply to
a specific solution are left blank. In Table 4.2, it is possible to appreciate that the majority of
the existing solutions implement reactive mechanisms, executing the response actions without
stopping (in a burst). We can also observe the trend over the years to move from static solutions
with respect to the calculation of the costs of the intrusion and the response, to more dynamic,
even cost-sensitive ones. In recent years, we have seen several attempts to provide adaptive
solutions, which help adjust to the specific situation of the system.
The review of the state of the art in the previous section covers solutions from diverse fields of
knowledge and application. In this section, we also evaluate these solutions according to their
possible application in the field of CIP. In order to do so, it is important to analyze the most
common intrusion responses, and provide a simple taxonomy to study which kinds of solutions
better fit in a critical scenario. Table 4.3, originally based on the study available in [4] and
later extended for our purposes, provides an overview of the main types of responses that are
found in the literature (note that this table focuses mainly on academic work, therefore it is not
exhaustive).
In Table 4.3, and according to our IDPRS taxonomy (see Figure 4.4), we divide the possible
countermeasures that an IDPRS can provide into: passive and active responses. In the first
place, it is important to consider passive reactions, which are the most abundant solutions in
the literature and they are usually included in the normal operation of some IDS solutions [4]. We
classify passive solutions into three categories, namely: administrator notification, prevention
measures and others. The first category corresponds to those systems whose mission is to
log the system’s information and state, and also alert the system’s administrator or human
operators to control the situation. As we have mentioned, notifications to administrators are
the most common operations implemented in deployed IDS/IDPRS systems for CIP. Prevention
measures are mechanisms that are sometimes present in protected systems. In our study, we
have distinguished 6 main types of preventive mechanisms:
• Cryptography: using cryptography for data encryption is an e↵ective approach to prevent
attackers from understanding captured data [230]. Bus and memory encryption increases
the di culty of successfully attacking a device [231]. It is also possible to support the OS
security by providing secure execution of cryptographic primitives as OS services [232].
There are other mechanisms such as link-layer encryption and authentication, multi-path
routing, identity verification, bidirectional link verification, and authenticated broadcast
that can help protect networks against intrusions and attacks [233].
• Security Policies: are the definitions of the measures taken by the organizations to provide
security to their entity. Usually they address constraints, restrictions and rules imposed
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on the systems and on their operators/users. Since each organization is free to define or
adopt the security policies to be implemented, there are many variants of them. Security
policies for CIs are called CIP policies, and they follow governmental guidelines [150].
IDPRS solutions, following these guidelines, can identify violations in the security policies
of the surveilled system [109].
• Monitoring: the monitoring system par excellence is the IDS, which supervises the local
(host or network) system’s operations and state [230]. IDS solutions for CIP implement
di↵erent degrees of automation using varied types of detection engines, e.g., P. Du¨ssel
et al. [171] present anomaly-based network IDS, capable of analyzing the tra c in real
time; A. Carcano et al. [173] propose a state-based IDS using rules to detect complex
attack scenarios; H. Lin et al. [152] have designed a specification-based IDS, relying on
the formal specification of the system under surveillance to verify the correct use of the
network packets.
• Protective/defensive infrastructure: consists of devices or system configurations designed
as prevention mechanisms, capable of performing protection tasks. Following the National
Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) good practices guidelines [133], this
line of defense can include firewalls, Demilitarized Zones (DMZ) and proxies. Firewalls,
are software or hardware security systems that control the incoming and outgoing network
tra c based on specific rule sets [234]. The DMZ are physical or logical subnetworks that
also provide services to an external untrusted network, allowing only the access from the
outside to the DMZ nodes, but not to other nodes of the internal system [109] (e.g., to gain
access to historical servers). Proxies represent intermediary interfaces capable of helping
their clients to make indirect network connections to other network services, and filtering
incoming requests [234]. These measures are usually present in current CIs at several
di↵erent levels of the infrastructures, and highly appreciable in SCADA architectures.
• Low-level preventive mechanisms: are physical measures or procedures implemented at
the lower layers of the communication systems to prevent intrusions. Examples of such
measures are directional antennas in wireless devices or synchronized clocks [230, 235],
which limit the possibilities of tra c interference and disruptions by restricting the access
to the communication channels. These measures do not impose any overheads to the
protected infrastructures, thus they are highly recommendable mechanisms to add to CIs.
• Session/communication measures: are techniques that add security at the session or com-
munications level, e.g., packet leashes or cookies. A leash is the information added inside
a packet to restrict its transmission distance [235]. Cookies are small pieces of data sent
from a website and stored in the user’s web browser to remember stateful information
[84]. These measures are frequent in general-purpose networks, however, they might not
be present in CIs’ industrial protocols. Nevertheless, they can be implemented in sections
of the CIs’ networks that use general-purpose communication protocols, e.g., the corporate
networks.
Lastly, in Table 4.3 we provide also another category to contain a broader range of passive
response methods that are not directly related to the categories mentioned above. Examples
are the activation of additional IDS, logging mechanisms, and intrusion analysis tools, backups
of tampered files, tracing connections to their source, etc. It is important to note that we
have reflected in Table 4.3 only a sample of the many possible countermeasures applicable to
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critical infrastructures, always taking into account the need to observe the constraints of CIs
and the specific context where the response actions are applied. Concerning the active reaction
mechanisms, we can divide them into two groups [4]: host-based and network-based response
actions.
Host-based responses refer to those local procedures which perform operations to modify pa-
rameters or processes that run within the a↵ected nodes; e.g., operations on files (restore,
delete files), operations on user accounts (restrict activities, disable accounts), operations on
processes and services (shutdown, restart, disable, abort, delay actions), and also trust mech-
anisms. Trust-based mechanisms such as the use of reputation, credit-based trust or token-
based trust have gained relevance in the protection of information in communication networks
[233, 235]. Network-based response, conversely, corresponds to those activities performed in
the communications network and that a↵ect communication’s services and parameters. Here
we can di↵erentiate responses such as disabling or blocking network operations [234], isolating
segments of the network [235], modifying routing parameters [233] or setting up deceiver devices
[236].
Currently, IDS/IDPRS solutions designed specifically for CIP implement some of the passive
methods present in Table 4.3, such as the generation of reports and logs for later forensic analysis
[229], security policies [152, 190], the presence of defensive infrastructure [229], etc. However,
some CIs still lack important passive prevention mechanisms; for example, systems based on the
Modbus/TCP protocol [190], which is commonly used in SCADA and DCS networks for process
control, lack authentication of the source of a request. This gives a chance for an adversary to
attempt to gather information on the industrial system and the network in general [190]. Active
reaction solutions, consequently, are rarely applied to critical systems.
The reason for the absence of active reaction mechanisms is twofold. In the first place, CIs
need stable well-behaved environments to perform their functions and it is critical that this
restriction is always observed, since any change in this scenario could have a big impact on
the correct operation of the infrastructures and cause disruptions in the critical services they
provide. Thus any active reaction mechanism must not (directly or indirectly) cause disruptions
in the normal operation of CIs. Secondly, the legacy systems and proprietary protocols and
components traditionally present in CIs [1] make the development of new security mechanisms
very di cult for the research community, therefore there is little research into this topic.
However, and despite these di culties, it is necessary to develop and deploy active response
solutions in CIs, thus we have selected some of the possible countermeasure mechanisms that
come from IDPRS solutions for general-purpose networks, which can be adapted to protect
critical systems (see Table 4.3). We divide the responses into: host-based response, where the
response system applies the security measures to the host system, such as modifications to the
user accounts and permissions and trust mechanisms; and network-based response, focused on
network operations, e.g., the installation of deceiver devices (honeypots, honeypets, etc.), active
routing techniques, etc.
4.3.6 Discussion
In the previous sections, based on a thorough study of the literature, we have designed a frame-
work to integrate IDPRS solutions in critical contexts such as the control networks of CIs. As
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seen in Figure 4.4, our methodological framework is composed of three main modules, each of
them corresponding to the main requirements needed to be addressed in this type of networks:
detection, automation and response. The detection module provides the system with insight
about the behavior of the system and sends alerts in the case of occurring threats or anomalies.
These processes can be performed by an IDS and, optionally, an alert management component
[229].
The automation module (see Section 4.3.2) compiles the di↵erent levels of automation that can
be present in an IDPRS solution [169]. The level of automation selected for the infrastructure
will determine the components integrated in the third module, the RS. And, in the event that
the ICS or CPCS implements active response mechanisms, the methodological framework in its
RS module categorizes the di↵erent characteristics that it can implement. This third module of
our framework is adapted from the work of N. Stakhanova et al. [4] and A. Shameli-Sendi et al.
[5].
The approaches of both N. Stakhanova et al. [4] and A. Shameli-Sendi et al. [5] present
taxonomies of RS designed for general-purpose networks. It has been our task to carefully
analyze these sub-components and properties in order to establish whether or not they can
be used in a critical environment. From Section 4.3.3 to Section 4.3.3 we have presented our
assessment and made recommendations on their use according to the characteristics of the
networks where the di↵erent RSs can be deployed. We have therefore studied the general-
purpose RS components present in these taxonomies, contrasted them with the literature on
ICS protection systems, examined their constraints and scopes, and reflected in our framework
the di↵erent possibilities for integrating IDPRS solutions in critical environments.
The methodological framework, together with our assessment and recommendations, integrates
the most important components that should be included when designing a IDPRS solution for
CSs. The main objective of this framework is to create a framework focused on preparedness
and response, to guide the design and development of IDPRS for critical infrastructures. Some
of the components are not present in current ICS-dedicated IDPRS, however they can help
address the challenges of prevention and protection set by the institutions around the globe
[42, 112, 15, 16, 36].
Once the di↵erent components that can be present in the RS have been analyzed, we examine the
possible countermeasures that the system can implement. In order to do this, we have reviewed
the academic literature in search of di↵erent types of protective mechanisms. We did not restrict
our search to ICS-related protection, but rather to di↵erent types of networks, and we have tried
to assess whether these measures can help protect critical environments. We discuss some of
the academic non-proprietary methods of protection, providing examples of response actions in
Table 4.3. We have divided them into passive and active solutions.
Passive methods, such as security policies, cryptographic mechanisms, etc., are put in place to
prevent malicious attacks and anomalies within the system, addressing the need to enhance the
preparedness and prevention in CIs, one of the five pillars of CIP identified by the European Net-
work and Information Security Agency (ENISA) [112, 15, 16]. Active methods, such as dynamic
routing techniques, are those deployed to address the need for more e cient early warning and
response capabilities in the CIs, corresponding to the second pillar of CIP identified by ENISA,
detection and response [16]. Therefore, and given these analyses on IDPRS constraints and
countermeasure actions, it is possible to reach several conclusions and recommendations about
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the inclusion of IDPRS solutions in critical contexts:
• An IDPRS solution deployed in a critical context should implement both passive and active
defense mechanisms, to be able to protect the surveilled infrastructure by providing early
detection and reaction measures, but avoid any interference with its correct and normal
operation. Most CIs are equipped with some type of IDPRS solution that mainly provides
passive protection, however, both institutions [42, 112, 15, 16] and researchers [3, 237]
report the need to have active response solutions in order to provide early detection and
prevention mechanisms.
• Our review of the existing systems in the literature show that, to the best of our knowledge,
in the public domain there are currently no specific IDPRS solutions that implement auto-
matic active response mechanisms for the protection of CIs. However, through the revision
of more recent literature on IDPRS solutions for general-purpose networks, and through
the analysis of the countermeasures taxonomy, it is possible to evaluate the advantages
and disadvantages of the di↵erent implementations of their components, and determine
the capabilities that they o↵er, and constraints they pose for CIs.
• Whenever the resources of the infrastructure are su ciently powerful to allow the necessary
computations, the decisions taken by the RS should be balanced, taking into account the
costs of the anomalies and the costs of the response actions applied in each case. According
to N. Stakhanova et al. [4], the ideal cost model should be evaluated dynamically. Due to
a better accuracy achieved using dynamic evaluated cost models, the performance of the
IDPRS increases and is able to select the optimal responses to threats, taking into account
the interdependencies and criticality of the a↵ected components of the system.
• It is generally better to provide proactive responses instead of delayed mechanisms, since
the last need to wait until the intrusion or the anomaly is finally confirmed to trigger
the reaction. In the case of a cyber attack, this postponement of the response gives
the adversary time to start and maybe complete malicious actions, and the system is
susceptible to deteriorating fast and unleashing harmful cascading e↵ects. In the case
of an anomaly, the continuation of the normal operation of the system in the presence
of faults may make the errors cascade through the interdependent systems before the
countermeasures take place. Contrarily, proactive mechanisms could detect changes in the
dynamics of the system earlier and send an alert or try to correct them from an early stage.
However, proactive responses for CIP must always be evaluated (taking into account costs
and risks of the countermeasures) and preferably supervised by human operators.
• The response selection method implemented by the IDPRS is also important, as we con-
sider that dynamic mapping and cost-sensitive mapping methods provide higher benefits
to the IDPRS than the static mapping-based solutions. Dynamic mapping systems take
into account metrics and policies to select adequate countermeasures, while cost-sensitive
mapping systems consider the costs of the attack and the response to make better choices
in the selection of the reaction triggered. Thus, these two mechanisms are more likely to
perform better than a static selection procedure, and make the IDPRS more e↵ective and
safe for CIP.
• Risk assessment methods can help assess the costs and implications of the attacks and
anomalies occurring within the system. An IDPRS including a risk assessment component
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can determine the impact of a given threat, but also the impact of the countermeasure
actions that are applied to palliate the problem. This module can introduce feedback
mechanisms into the RS, in order to execute the countermeasures gradually, preventing
the responses applied from generating undesired e↵ects. According to our analysis, and if
the system has su cient capabilities, it is better to provide the IDPRS with a dynamic
online risk assessment component, since it will provide real time evaluation of the system’s
risk status.
• Our taxonomy of response actions (see Table 4.3), provides a general vision of the main
passive and active protection mechanisms for critical contexts that can be implemented in
an IDPRS. However, it is di cult to provide insight about which of the techniques perform
better on a generic critical scenario, particularly as the active reaction mechanisms are
usually not present in such scenarios. Nevertheless, we provide a categorization of the
di↵erent techniques taking into account their nature and where are they applied, which
will allow a further study of their applicability within CIs.
In light of these facts, it is possible to identify the needs that current detection and prediction
solutions have in the context of critical systems. As we have said, according to the institutions
around the globe [42, 112, 15, 16], it is necessary to tackle the issues of preparedness and
prevention, and detection and response for the protection of the critical infrastructures. One
of the technologies that help protect ICSs are the IDPRS solutions, since these tools serve
as elements of detection and preparedness, and when implementing e↵ective RSs, they act as
prevention and response components.
Thus, we believe that further research is needed in order to develop e cient and cost-e↵ective ID-
PRS solutions capable of automatic active reactions for CIP. Through the literature on general-
purpose IDPRS, it is possible to examine the components and features usually present in these
systems and determine the ones that have the best fit for critical contexts. Through the analysis
of the internal IDPRS features and components we gain insight about their capabilities and
requirements (computational complexity, QoS demands, etc.), thereby identifying the ones that
would behave better in a constrained environment.
Firstly, we find that there is a great need to include dynamic adaptive online evaluation of costs
in the IDPRS for ICS. There have been approaches addressing this topic for general-purpose
networks [199, 227, 228], however in the field of CIP, there are few systems that implement
such mechanisms. It would be especially useful to channel this evaluation of costs through a
risk assessment component in charge of determining the impact of threats and responses in ICS
[203]. Additionally, these feedback mechanisms would positively a↵ect the capability of IDPRS
to implement retroactive response execution procedures.
Few of the general-purpose RSs in the literature implement retroactive execution, something
which would be very useful, particularly in critical contexts. As discussed above, critical envi-
ronments are very sensitive to changes in dynamics and configurations, thus the countermeasures
must be applied most carefully. Retroactive feedback mechanisms would therefore be especially
useful in this context, because they would allow the system to always measure the risk levels and
evaluate the system’s state before launching the responses. Therefore, research e↵orts should
be put in place in order to develop e↵ective risk and cost evaluation mechanisms capable of
performing correctly in a critical environment.
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In the same vein, it is important to consider improving proactive RSs. These systems should
be capable of detecting subtle changes in the behavior patterns of the system, and detect and
identify threatening dynamics for the ICS early on. Once these early detection mechanisms have
been deployed and tuned to the system, they can trigger actions from the RS capable of stopping
attacks and palliate system anomalies in order to avoid errors and threats to cascade through
the infrastructure to other interdependent systems. The analysis and prevention of cascading
(domino) e↵ects is currently a very active area of research in the field of CIP, much e↵ort is
being made to tackle this problem [238, 239, 240].
It is our belief that systems such as IDPRS which provide the main characteristics mentioned
above would be highly useful in critical contexts. Capabilities such as dynamic online risk and
cost evaluation would make the control systems su ciently trustworthy for ICS operators to
transfer some of their functions and supervision tasks to the automated management of the
infrastructure. Note that most critical countermeasures should be always supervised by human
operators, however, in the event of a semi-supervised control system implementing automatic
countermeasure responses, the IDPRS could always report its cost and risk analysis to the
operator to determine the best actions to take. It is our aim that this study will therefore be
useful as a guide to future design and development of IDPRS solutions specifically created to
protect CIs.
4.4 Restoration
Recovery mechanisms comprise all those actions related to resilience and fault-tolerance that
help the underlying system to return its natural state and operating configuration [241, 242].
Replication-based techniques are one of the most popular fault-tolerance techniques by replicat-
ing functionalities and adding redundancy within the system. At this point, it is important the
type of data consistency (linearizability, sequential and casual) and the replication mode, active
or passive. The passive replication aims to activate the backup systems only when needed, in
which primary devices are the only ones that can manage replicas. In contrast, an active replica-
tion consists in constantly replicating evidence and configurations of the primary entity so as to
preserve assets (e.g., data, links) and maintain updated the backup elements at all times.
Although the active mode is also characterized by individually managing evidence in multicast
mode, favoring the response, the redundancy management tends to increase complexities. For
example, when replicas need to be compared to identify Byzantine faults, a voting process in
distributed networks is normally required to manage consensus according to events detected.
Process Level Redundancy (PLR) is another example of active replication. It is in charge of
detecting transient faults, which are less severe than Byzantines but hard to diagnose. For the
detection, their algorithms demand software-centric approaches for the detection of transient
faults, resources to reduce overhead and redundant processes to schedule the processes across
all assets of the system.
Rollback is another well-known recovery approach. It includes a checkpoint-based rollback with
dependency on storage points containing current information, and a log-based rollback (also
known as message logging protocol) composed of checkpoints and a record of non-deterministic
events. Within the checkpoint class, it is possible to find coordinated and uncoordinated ap-
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proaches. The former centers on synchronizing checkpoints to restrict the rollback propagation,
but hampering the recovery time and their functionality in critical contexts. Uncoordinated
checkpoints, to the contrary, aim to individually execute checkpoints to later combine them
with a message logging protocol, thereby guaranteeing a complete picture of the execution of
a process. According to Treaster in [241], there are three main log-based techniques: pes-
simistic/synchronous, optimistic/asynchronous and causal. Pessimistic logging techniques con-
sist in registering each message received by an entity to subsequently be re-sent, and only if
necessary, during the rollback stages; whereas optimistic protocols focus on registering events
to a volatile memory to later (but periodically) store them in disk. Although this last protocol
can simplify storage complexities, since it avoids for each received event the writing in disk,
the recovery process can become much more complex whether the logs have not been stored
properly over time. Finally, causal protocols log non-deterministic events in a casual manner,
but they add the problems of the optimistic protocols in which events temporarily registered
may be lost unexpectedly.
Table 4.4: Classification and characteristics of the restoration techniques
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Replication-
based
Active
In general x 4 ˚ 4 4 4 4 4 4
Voting x 4 ˚ 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
PLR 4 ˚ 4 4 x x 4 x 4
Passive 4 ˚ 4 x 4 x 4
Rollback-
based
Checkpoints
Coordinated x 4 ˚ 4 x 4 4
Uncoordinated x 4 ˚ x x 4
Replication x 4 ˚ 4 4 4 4 4
Message
logging
Pessimistic x 4 ˚ 4 4 4
Optimistic x 4 ˚ x x x 4
Casual x 4 ˚ 4 x x x 4
Fusion-based x 4 ˚ 4 x 4
As the checkpoints are in general terms costly, experts [243, 244] recommend applying heteroge-
neous replication-based checkpoints to enhance performance and guarantee tamper-resistance to
faults. But their implementation can bring about complexities in the recovery processes due to
redundancy; a characteristic that has also been considered by the fusion-based techniques. These
techniques address the problem by relying on fewer backup devices as fusion points, instead of
actively configuring replication-based approaches in all the devices. Nonetheless, this character-
istic also tends to increase implementation costs and complexities for recovery by maintaining
updated the fusion points.
Table 4.4 encompasses all the aforementioned properties, which are also sustained by Bansal et
al. in [242]. These authors stress that the performance of each approach (denoted with ˚ in
Table 4.4) depends on a set of factors. For example, replication-based schemes vary according
to the number of replicas produced within the system (the performance decreases as number of
replicas increases); checkpoints and rollback depend on the frequency and size of the checkpoints;
fusion-based on the rate of faults (low rate of faults improves the recovery); and PRL on the
136
4.5. Context-Awareness and Situational Awareness in CPCS
set of faults. If in addition, the approaches are equipped to incorporate multiple fault detectors,
the level of reliability, accuracy and adaptation can become quite noteworthy, thereby favoring
their use for cyber-physical contexts.
4.5 Context-Awareness and Situational Awareness in CPCS
In the previous sections we have reviewed the main approaches and characteristics of the pro-
tection solutions for critical infrastructures, and their control systems in particular. We have
reviewed the basic security services, as well as the advanced solutions for protection which in-
clude prevention and detection, awareness and reaction, and restoration mechanisms. We now
study the applicability of these solutions to our SG scenario (see Section 1.1). Smart grid systems
contain seven chief domains: control systems, energy (production, transmission and distribu-
tion) substations, providers, market and end-users. In this context, the operational tasks related
to monitoring, supervision and data acquisition become fundamental to the correct use of the
power grid. This also means that any anomaly in the system, computational overheads or a
misunderstanding of the situation can trigger a (slight or serious) change in the control of the
entire grid, and therefore cause an undesirable or contrary e↵ect in its stability.
Since the correct operation of the control systems of the SG is highly important for the integrity
and general operation and performance of the entire grid, we focus on the analysis of applicability
of the aforementioned context and situation awareness strategies, techniques and practices for the
CPCSs of the SG, in the frame of the Industry 4.0. The strong focus of our analysis is centered
on the prevention and detection mechanisms (see Section 4.2), since as we have previously
mentioned, CIs do not usually implement awareness and reaction mechanisms yet, therefore, we
can only speculate about the applicability of these mechanisms in our scenario.
We therefore explore in this section those approaches that can be found in the current literature,
so as to evaluate their functionalities and applicability in the context of SGs, paying particular
attention to those conditions that entail a degradation in control. These conditions are related
to a set of requirements associated with the monitoring and security of the entire SG (see
Chapter 3), and the natural conditions of the communication infrastructures. The result of this
investigation gathering all the knowledge presented in previous sections, is a guideline to which
approaches are most suitable for each section of the grid control systems.
4.5.1 General Architecture and Technologies
In order to better understand the context and situational awareness mechanisms better suited
for the protection of CPCSs within the SG infrastructure, we need to comprehend the communi-
cation infrastructures and technologies that comprise the control infrastructure of a smart grid
[245]. This was partially introduced in Section 1.1.2, however in this section we expand this
knowledge with the particular characteristics of the SG.
The central architecture of the SG control systems corresponds to a decentralized control network
capable of remotely communicating with the rest of the sub-domains of the SG, e.g., substations.
At this point, smart meters, gateways, remote terminal units, sensors and a set of control
objects interact with each other through large and small communication infrastructures such
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as backhaul, Wide Area, Field Area, Neighborhood Area, and Local Area Networks (WANs,
FANs, NANs and LANs, respectively). All these infrastructures base their communications on
wired and wireless systems such as mobile cellular technology, satellite, WiMAX, power line
communications, microwaves systems, optical fiber, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WSNs, Ethernet, and so
on. These infrastructures are in charge of distributing monitored evidence (e.g., commands,
measurements or alarms) occurring at any point of the SG system, where backhaul and the
Internet are the chief infrastructures that connect the di↵erent sub-domains with the rest of
the networks, including Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMIs). An AMI is a bidirectional
interface with the capability to manage and interact with smart meters and utility business
systems, thus substituting the traditional one-way advanced meters.
This interconnection map primarily focuses on the secure monitoring of services and the e↵ec-
tiveness of energy production according to the real demand. These services mainly addresses the
means of notifying electricity pricing at any time and provide the end-users with customizable
services to e ciently manage energy consumption. Continuing with the topic of monitoring
services, the control transactions between the control system and substations are led by com-
munication interfaces (e.g., RTUs, gateways, servers, etc.) which serve as intermediary nodes
between the remote substation and the Master Terminal Units (MTUs) of the central system.
An RTU is a device working at „ 22MHz-200MHz with 256 bytes-64MB RAM, 8KB-32MB flash
memory and 16KB-256KB EEPROM. These hardware and software capabilities are enough to
compute data streams, operate mathematical formulations and identify those sensors or actu-
ators in charge of executing a specific action in the field. These interfaces are also able to
establish connections with other substations, allowing an inter-RTU communication with the
ability to ensure store-and-forward using one of the two existing communication modes, serial
(e.g., IEC-101) or TCP/IP (e.g., Modbus/TCP).
Control objects can be classified according to the type of micro-controller (weak, normal, and
heavy-duty), the type of radio transceiver (wideband and narrowband radios) and the type
of communication (synchronous/asynchronous) [18]. Within the category weak, we find those
limited devices such as home-appliances and sensors with extremely constrained capabilities
such as „ 4MHz, 1KB RAM and 4KB-16KB ROM, but with su cient capacity to execute
simple applications. Conversely, those classed as normal are those nodes that are able to com-
ply with any kind of collaborative network. A node belonging to this category usually has a
micro-controller of „ 4MHz-8MHz, 4KB-16KB RAM and 48KB- 256KB ROM. Finally nodes
belonging to the heavy-duty category are expensive devices (e.g., handled devices) that are able
to execute any simple or complex critical application. Their microprocessors are quite powerful
working at around 13MHz-180MHz, 256KB-512KB RAM and 4MB-32MB ROM. With respect
to transceivers, most of the sensory devices follow the IEEE-802.15.4 standard working with
wideband radios (e.g., CC2420) at frequencies of 2.4GHz with certain demand restrictions in
power. The narrowband radio-based transceivers (e.g., CC1000/C1020), to the contrary, work
at lower frequencies and are more susceptible to noise, but they have less power consumption
and faster wake up times.
Within the heavy-duty class, we highlight the industrial WSNs which are normally deployed
close to critical systems (e.g., generators, transformers, pylons, etc.). Their capabilities are
slightly greater than the conventional ones equipped with a „ 4MHz-32MHz micro-processor,
8KB-128KB RAM, 128KB-192KB ROM, and specific sensors to measure physical events as-
sociated with the industrial context such as temperature, voltage load, etc. They have the
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possibility to be directly linked to energy suppliers or industrial equipment in order to maximize
their lifetime with self-capacity for processing and transmitting measurements to a base station
(e.g., a gateway or an RTU). With similar features, smart meters can become heavy-duty devices
working at „ 8-50MHz, 4KB-32KB RAM and 32-512KB flash memory. An electrical meter is a
device capable of logging the consumption values in synchronous and frequent intervals, sending
this information back to the control utility for monitoring and billing purposes. Depending on
the type of network, the communication can also vary [245]. For example, in power generation,
transmission and distribution substations the communication can depend on specific or property
protocols such as IEC-61850, Modbus, Zigbee, WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, and so on. Many
of these o↵er technical solutions for customizing and optimizing the conditions of the applica-
tion context in order to improve its quality of service, or avoid, for example, industrial noise,
interferences or obstacles.
4.5.2 Context and Situation Awareness Approaches
Given that the great majority of the control objects (e.g., sensors, smart meters, etc.) are dis-
tributed over large-scale distributions where the control generally relies on only a few (or perhaps
none) human operators in the field, topics related to dynamic and reliable context-awareness
solutions should therefore be considered. Specifically, we explore a set of existing anomaly-based
techniques as a support to these solutions. But as the number of techniques is significant within
the current literature, we also particularize and stress here the main requirements and conditions
described in Chapter 3 for the protection solutions (see Section 3.6), to ensure a better defense
of the critical systems contained within a smart grid.
The concept of context was introduced by A. Dey in [246] as “any information that can be used
to characterize the situation of an entity”, where entity can be a person, place or object. This
characterization is widely used by dynamic context-aware computing systems to detect, prevent
and alert to unforeseen changes in the normal behavior of the system being observed [3]. An
example of these detection systems are the IDSs, the configurations of which should respect the
intrinsic requirements of the control (see Section 3.1) not to perturb the normal behavior of the
entire grid. These requirements are as follows:
• Performance ([R1]) is part of the control of a SG. This includes the availability in-real time
of assets and data from anywhere, at any time and in anyway; in addition to ensuring a fast
supervision, data acquisition and response, avoiding communication and computational
delays as much as possible.
• Reliability and integrity in the control ([R2]). Any change in the system can cause serious
deviations in the power production and distribution, putting the stability of the power
grid at risk.
• Resilience ([R3]) to address anomalies or unexpected incidents, which might also come from
intrusive actions. Likewise, aspects related to security ([R4]) at the di↵erent levels of the
communication and architecture must therefore also be considered as primary requirements
for resilience.
Working within these requirements, the IDSs need to ensure a set of conditions to guarantee a
fast, integral and reliable monitoring of evidence. That is to say, detectors need to show their
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potential to quickly find pattern sequences that prove the existence of a deviation within a set
of data instances; i.e.:
• Low computational complexity through optimized algorithms and handling of parameters,
in addition to guaranteeing a speedy classification, learning and comprehensibility of the
data instances. In this way, it is possible to meet the operational requirement ([R1]).
• Reliability through accurate detection with a low false positive/negative rate, compre-
hensibility of the results obtained, easiness to handle parameters, and tolerance to highly
interdependent data, noise, missing values or redundancy. The idea is to o↵er the best
way of understanding a situation so as to act accordingly ([R2]).
• Capacities for incremental learning to update the knowledge of the system with new (dis-
crete/continuous) values, states, threat patterns or parameters. This will permit the un-
derlying infrastructures to provide an updated protection layer for survivability (security
and resilience against future threats, [R3, R4]).
• Ability to control drastic or persisting changes in the normal behavior of the system, as
these deviations can mean the proximity or existence of intrusive actions, a↵ecting [R3,
R4].
Taking into account the general architecture and technologies present in this SG scenario (see
Section 4.5.1), the subset of essential requirements for the protection systems we consider in
this section, and the di↵erent methods and techniques for detection studied in Section 4.2.1,
we can better understand the approaches and solutions applicable for achieving a context and
situational awareness status in the SG control networks, their function, and application area, as
summarized in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Protection approaches applied in smart grid environments
Technique Ref. Application Application area
ANNs [247] Fault diagnosis Substations
Decision Trees
[248] Intrusion detection Control and substations
[249] Fault detection Substations
BNs [250] Intrusion detection HANs
Na¨ıve Bayes [251] Islanding detection Power systems
SVMs
[252] Fault detection and classification Transmission lines
[253] Intrusion detection HANs, NANs, WANs
Rules [254] Intrusion detection WANs, NANs and HANs
Statistical
[255]
False-data injection detection
(Markov graph-based)
Control and substations
[256]
Load/Price Forecasting,
Demand (time series)
HANs, Control and substations
Fuzzy logic
[257] Diagnosis and maintenance Substations
[258] Optimization for power storage Microgrid networks
Petri Nets [259] Fault diagnosis Distribution substations
Examples of combined solutions
ANNs and Rules [260] Fault diagnosis Control and substations
BNs on an
Expert System
[261] Fault diagnosis Substations (distribution feeder)
Fuzzy logic and
Decision Trees
[262] Islanding detection Substations
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4.5.3 Suitability of Detection Approaches for Smart Grid Domains
In this section, we analyze the suitability of the context and situational awareness techniques
previously described to be applied in di↵erent particular areas of the SG. To do this, we compare
the functional benefits of each of the schemes reviewed in Section 4.2.1, compared to the control
and security requirements and conditions, and the characteristics of the communication systems
(dimension, tra c and capabilities of the network devices). To illustrate this analysis, Table 4.6
provides a summary containing the di↵erent variables considered for the study.
Utilities: Control Centres and Corporate Networks
Control and corporate networks of a smart grid may range from large distributions with poten-
tially thousands of nodes (e.g., servers) with connections to backhauls, WANs or NANs, to small
and local networks. Depending on the type of domain and utility, they may have di↵erent kinds
of protocols and topologies to connect di↵erent networks (e.g., control and AMI, providers and
AMI). However, this interconnection mode and its relation to public networks, like the Internet,
forces us to consider heavy-duty IDSs that help detect potential (anonymous, unknown, concur-
rent or stealthy) threats, and thereby comply with the minimum security requirements [R3, R4].
As part of this information belongs to users or the business itself, and the other part corresponds
with control transactions for the protection and stability of the entire power grid, topics related
to reliability of the data itself [R2] should also be considered. Therefore, and observing Table
4.6, the most suitable techniques for this section of the grid could be:
• Knowledge-based methods: the dynamic features of the knowledge-based approaches, such
as expert systems, make them be one of the most attractive approaches to be applied
in complex and dynamic contexts. However, this protection will highly depend on the
degree of granularity of their knowledge and the frequency to with which this knowledge
is updated; two conditions that should be well-specified in the security policies.
• Statistics: statistical-based techniques, as described in Section 4.2.1 are powerful methods
that can be adapted to di↵erent scenarios, from simple to complex and dynamic contexts,
and serve as anomaly-detection engines in multiple IDSs in the literature [176, 179]. Sta-
tistical methods could be useful for detection at any level of a communication network
because of their great accuracy (except the operational models) despite being computa-
tionally complex. Note that Markov models may also be considered due to their inher-
ent characteristics, but their transaction matrices should be well-fixed to control drastic
changes. Specifically, HMMs are useful tools for detecting hidden dynamics and extract-
ing knowledge when there are gaps in the information received. Thus in the presence of
encrypted tra c, their use would be useful to detect certain hidden evidence ([R3, R4]).
As mentioned, there are other methods that could equally be applicable to theses types of
networks, e.g., rule learners, SVMs, Markov models or clustering techniques. However they could
be more di cult to adapt to the scenario, or present more challenges and inconveniences than
benefits due to their inherent characteristics. For example, these methods tend to produce over-
fitting, a characteristic that makes them inappropriate when the environment is continuously
adapting new dynamics and new constraints (e.g., frequent upgrades and maintenances). As for
the detection modes, the use of a signature-based IDS seems to be a good option since utility
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networks might apply existing and complex databases with diverse types of signatures defining
threat patterns or known undesirable dynamics related to the network. The main problem found
in this detection mode is the need to keep the threat databases up-to-date.
Substations: Production, Transmission and Distribution
The communication between the control centre and the remote nodes (i.e., RTU/gateway) is done
through MTU, where the data tra c between the MTU-RTU /gateway is generally regular and
standardized, and operational performance ([R1 ]), reliability in the control transactions ([R2 ])
and security ([R3, R4 ]) are all required. As mentioned in Section 4.5.1, RTUs are powerful
enough to be able to execute a set of operations or instructions, as well as, advanced algorithms
such as machine learning ones. Their hardware capacities also allows them to run specialized
detection techniques capable of detecting sophisticated threats in an environment that has a
regular behavior with a monotonous activity (note that this consideration is dependent on the
security policies). Assuming that the communications are configured to be synchronous with
regular tra c, the most suitable techniques for this section of the grid would be those related to
knowledge. However, and as described above, the implementation of knowledge-based systems
also depends on the functional features of the interfaces and the maintenance of these intelligent
systems. As an alternative, it is also possible to choose those approaches that do not infringe,
at least, [R1, R2 ] to ensure control at all times, such as:
• Rule-based techniques: this method is characterized by its simplicity ([R1]) and accuracy
([R2]), which should not degrade the main conditions for control. For the e↵ectiveness
of the approach and its use for protection, it is necessary to specify in detail, the rules,
exposing all the possible threat scenarios that can arise in the connectivities between the
MTU and the substations.
• Support vector machines: this method is powerful and well-suited to dealing with large
numbers of features. SVMs are accurate ([R2]) and they have low complexity models
([R1]) [177]. However they present problems in the speed of the learning process, a handi-
cap that makes SVMs di cult to implement in networks with constrained resources, and
particularly in the presence of dynamic scenarios. Nevertheless, this can be easily over-
come in networks with su ciently powerful nodes (e.g., gateways) deployed in rather static
scenarios, where the set of representative training instances is small.
• Statistics: optimized parametric or non-parametric solutions can become e↵ective ap-
proaches for these sections of the SG, but without considering those related to operational
models, since these do not guarantee the fulfillment with [R2].
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In addition, the detection methods that have problems in addressing over-fitting do not have as
big an impact as the corporate networks, because the stability and periodicity of the scenario
makes the classification instances very similar to the training datasets. However, signature-based
IDSs configured inside RTUs can become complex since these IDSs requires big databases with
known threat patterns to be kept, forcing the RTU to depend on external databases. However,
specification-based IDS could be a good candidate since legitimate specifications of the interfaces
are well known, and sometimes limited in terms of specification, favoring the definition of threat
patterns according to the technical characteristics of the devices. This criteria is also applicable
for constrained devices such as sensors or smart meters [250].
Another important part of a substation is the communication between RTU/gateways working
in ISA100.11a/ WirelessHART (or coordinators in ZigBee) and the industrial sensor nodes.
These sensors are heavy-duty devices with restrictions on executing complex operations and
algorithms, and these generally maintain a regular and static tra c where their functions consist
of constantly monitoring an object or an infrastructure, and sending this information to the
gateway. Assuming that the communications are completely synchronous, our goal is now to
find those lightweight solutions that ensure, at least, [R1, R2] ; and in this way, do not degrade
the operational activities in the field, such as:
• Rule-based techniques: this method, described above, is a simple approach that can be
computed by constrained devices, but its e↵ectiveness will depend on how the rules and
threat scenarios are defined.
• Support vector machines: SVM methods, as we discussed, have good qualities to be used
as detection engines for the IDSs deployed in constrained networks (favoring [R1, R2]).
But to apply the method, it is necessary that these networks need to ensure regular and
static tra c patterns to avoid triggering the learning processes with frequency.
• Optimized statistic-based solutions: as mentioned, these can also become quite e↵ective
for [R1, R2], since their approaches present a moderate complexity and a high e ciency.
However, the feasibility also depends on the optimization degree to avoid overhead costs.
The communication between industrial sensors is thoroughly analyzed in the next section because
home appliances and smart meters present similar behaviors.
Neighborhood and House Areas: Metering and Control
The type of data managed in the hierarchical communications (NANs) between data aggregation
point and metering devices (smart meters) and its relation to the end-users, makes the topics
related to security and privacy prevail over questions of control; but this control must exist as
well. Depending on the characteristics of the interfaces and assuming a constant communica-
tion, knowledge-based approaches can be good candidates to ensure [R3, R4 ] together with those
related to the statistics (e.g., smoothing approaches). As regards HAN networks, the commu-
nication between embedded devices ((weak, normal or heavy-duty) sensors, smart meters and
home appliances) becomes the most predominant infrastructure for the constant monitoring
1¯ means that the property complies with [R1] ; ˚ with [R2] ; and ˝ with [R3, R4].
2‚ states the benefits for the network device but with ‘dependence’ on the functional features of the approach
(e.g., data structure, abilities to control noise, changes, etc.) regarding the hardware or software constraints.
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and reporting of consumption evidence to smart meters. Their e ciency, however, depends on
the type of energy consumption of these activities (many of these devices are very dependent
on batteries), software and hardware capabilities, and even, on the type of configuration of
their networks, overwhelmingly ad-hoc in nature. Therefore, the selection of techniques should
primarily be focused on complying with [R1 ], such as:
• Decision trees, Fuzzy logic, rule-based techniques: these three approaches are in general fast
and e cient learners and classifiers ([R1]); a set of functional features for those application
scenarios built on strong restrictions and constrained devices [249]. Nonetheless, we could
also consider the operational models for their simplicity, but always keeping in mind the
need to define appropriate normality thresholds.
• Optimized statistic and clustering techniques: a well-configured simple approaches could
result in a lightweight detection tool ([R1]). In the case of clustering, this solution would
be more valid and useful in a scenario where the patterns of behavior su↵er few variations,
and the learning and testing mechanisms are seldom triggered.
On the other hand, ad-hoc networks could be used by human operators for local control, ac-
quisition and management of controllers, sensors, actuators, smart meters and other related
devices for control. In this regard, the control establishes a collaborative environment where
human operators can directly operate in the field or in populated areas (e.g., to locally check
neighborhood areas, status values of energy charging spots) without going through the control
centre; thereby facilitating the execution of actions in real-time and the mobility within the area.
This collaboration is generally based on very diverse kinds of technologies (e.g., PDA, cellular
devices) with similar capacities to the technical specifications defined for the heavy-duty devices
in Section 4.5.1, and hence, they can adopt similar approaches to those described for sensors.
But due to their relativity to control ([R2, R3, R4 ]), their lightweight IDS solutions should also
consider supplementary mechanisms, such as secure aggregation and reputation methods, to pro-
vide extra layer of protection and improve the detection procedures in the face of sophisticated
threats. At this point, we also conclude that methods with costly training processes are less
appropriate for dynamic networks regardless of the computational power of their nodes. This is
because the constant changes and new dynamics constantly appearing in those networks make
the IDSs trigger the learning mechanisms more frequently, and in this case they are computa-
tionally costly. However, in networks with regular and constant tra c, the training procedures
are triggered only a few times, thus the use of these methods does not produce overhead excess
in the system
4.5.4 Adequacy of Awareness Mechanisms of Prevention, Response and
Restoration in the CPCSs of the SG
In order to assess the applicability of each of the aforementioned methods for CPCSs, it is
necessary to take into account their computational features and the sensitive nature of the
application context. Control systems generally demand [21]: operational performance, reliability
and integrity, resilience and security, and safety-critical (for extended information see Chapter 3).
But ensuring these requirements implies considering the complexities and characteristics of the
di↵erent approaches, summarized in Tables 4.4 and 4.7, and their suitability to be supported by
the di↵erent cyber-physical devices.
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For the case of prevention, it is necessary to take into account parameters related to the com-
plexity, the accuracy and the general performance of the models, without discarding that super-
vised techniques have better general performance for real-life problems than the unsupervised
ones [186]. Under these conditions, we also observe that solutions such as BNs are di cult to
implement successfully in a complex constrained environment, since their computational cost
and complexity of implementation increases with the complexity of the system being modeled.
Whenever it is necessary to evaluate the correctness of a model, or it is necessary to add a cer-
tain degree of expert knowledge, ANNs and SVMs are the more restrictive methods; e.g., SVMs
have low complexity models but with problems in the speed of the learning process, which add
implementation overheads. Thus, we understand that the methods that are better suited for
detection and prevention in constrained scenarios are the ones based on logic, such as decision
trees, optimized rule learners and fuzzy logic, and on simplified computation models such as
operational or rule-based models. Concretely, decision trees have well-balanced characteristics
for this specific context, while rule learners have several drawbacks (e.g., accuracy) that can be
easily overcome (e.g., implementing boosting algorithms), but they provide several capabilities
(performance, comprehensibility, and easiness for introducing rules by experts), that are vital
and really interesting in critical contexts.
Knowledge-based systems and rule-based, optimized SVNs and statistical methods are contrarily
suitable to be integrated inside heavy-duty devices because of their accuracy capacities. Depend-
ing on the regularity of the tra c, the application context and its capacity for changes, optimized
parametric or non-parametric solutions, with exception to the operational models, can become
e↵ective approaches since their approaches present a moderate complexity and a high e ciency
for detection. Similarly, powerful-duty devices can also adapt the knowledge-based schemes and
statistics methods due to their ability to autonomously detect slight or abrupt anomalies with
a high accuracy. For example, hidden Markov models are potential tools for detecting hidden
dynamics and extracting knowledge when there may exist obfuscation in the tra c received.
Nonetheless, many sophisticated ML-based solutions can be applicable for powerful-duty envi-
ronments, however, some of them (e.g., SVN, rule learners, ANNs, etc.) have costly training
processes that can result less appropriate for dynamic networks with irregular tra c. In fact,
the occurrence of frequent asynchronous disturbances in these types of dynamic scenarios may
also make the IDSs trigger its learning mechanisms repeatedly, increasing the computational
overhead in the underlying systems.
These restrictions can be translated to the IRSs, since the applicability of given countermea-
sures heavily depends on the characteristics of the environment where the response is launched.
Currently, IRSs designed specifically for critical systems, implement some of the response mech-
anisms mentioned in Section 4.3, particularly passive methods, as indicated in Section 4.2.4.
However, most systems still lack important passive prevention mechanisms (e.g., authentication
of the source of a request), mainly due to the use of legacy equipment, the proprietary protocols
and components traditionally present in these environments [21]. Nevertheless, as observed in
Table 4.7, most passive and preventive mechanisms are easy to implement (e.g., logging, security
policies) and introduce little overheads in the system (it is important to note that Table 4.7 con-
tains a subset of the response actions identified in Table 4.3 in Section 4.3.5, especially analyzed
for CPCSs’ protection). Thus, they are e↵ective and adequate to be applied in CPCSs regard-
less of the computational power of the environment, but are especially indicated for constrained
contexts (e.g., home-appliances, sensors). Active reaction solutions, however, are rarely present
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Table 4.7: Classification and characteristics of the response mechanisms
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Generate System Logs 4 4 ˚ 4 4 4
Generate Alarm 4 4 4 4 4 4
Generate Report 4 4 4 4 4 4
Prevention
Measures
Cryptography ˚ ˚ 4 4
Security Policies 4 4 4 4 4
Monitoring 4 ˚ 4 4 4
Protective/Defensive Infrastructure 4 4 4 4 4 4
Low-Level Preventive Mechanisms 4 4 4 ˚ 4 4
Session/Communication Measures 4 4 4
Active
Host -
Based
Response
Operations on Files 4 ˚
Operations on User Accounts 4 ˚
Operations on Processes and Services ˚ 4
Trust Mechanisms ˚ 4 ˚
Network
- Based
Response
Disable / Block Operations 4 4
Isolation Actions 4 4 4
Routing 4 4 4 4
Deceiver Devices 4 4 4 ˚
4: the technique fulfills the property. ˚: some implementations of the technique can fulfill the property.
in these scenarios, since they usually entail the introduction of more sophisticated mechanisms,
therefore making a higher use of computational resources and equipment. Methods that modify
the behavior of the system or the network (operations on files, re-routing techniques, etc.) are
only adequate for sections of the CPCSs containing powerful equipment (RTUs, servers) capable
of devoting su cient computational power to the IRS. Additionally, other methods that require
extra HW or need to run powerful intelligent algorithms (e.g., deceiver devices, intelligent moni-
toring and response) are only applicable to powerful-duty environments of the CPCS, since they
need to perform complex operations with high requirements on computational power.
Regarding restoration, it is possible to note from Table 4.4 that the vast majority of techniques
present significant computational and spatial complexity since their approaches require a high
rate of redundancy. Logging events in an optimistic or casual manner, specification of multicast
protocols and configuration of hybrid networks, in which the handling of replicas and check-
points could be concentrated on some heavy-duty or powerful-duty nodes, could, for example,
resolve the implicit overheads of the models built on constrained environments. Also external
storage systems (e.g., cloud computing, external memory) can support the data storage and
the restoration phases in those nodes classified as weak. In less restrictive and distributed sce-
narios, where the rate of redundancy can become higher, more complex reparation mechanisms
can be adapted (e.g., rollback based on checkpoints and replication, message logging based on
pessimistic protocols, voting, etc.). However, the provision of lightweight and dynamic fault
tolerance systems composed of adaptive models in these types of application contexts is still
required. At this point, responsiveness, adaptability, accuracy and performance of the models
are fundamental criteria to consider when developing methods, without forgetting the need to
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Table 4.8: Adapting WASA techniques to cyber-physical environments
Weak Heavy-duty Powerful-duty
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Passive replication
Message logging
(optimistic, casual)
Active replication
Checkpoint replication-based
Message logging
(pessimistic, optimistic)
Active replication
Checkpoint replication-based
Message logging
(pessimistic, optimistic)
launch optimized strategies that give satisfactory average-time, with linear approximations as
stated in [263].
Table 4.8 summarizes the analysis performed in this section, where we determine that it is
still necessary to continue exploring new strategies that help simplify the implicit overheads in
awareness and response tasks, providing more dynamic lightweight solutions where the rate of
redundancy reaches minimum values, and the degree of accuracy and responsiveness reach high
values. These goals should be part of future work where experts in the field of CIP should
join e↵orts to foster the concept of WASA in all the sections that compose a CI, without
degrading the existing cyber-physical interdependencies and guaranteeing a suitable tradeo↵
between operational performance and protection [21].
4.6 Summary
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the security services necessary to provide a secure
interoperability infrastructure for the CPCSs of the smart grid. We have first discussed the
basic security services which must be implemented at each level of any critical CS in order
to operate securely, i.e., authentication, authorization, and accountability mechanisms. These
services should be implemented and used at any time by the actors in the infrastructure. Once
this basic security layer is put into place, it is possible to analyze further advanced security
services at three di↵erent levels (see Figure 4.1), namely prevention and detection, awareness
and reaction, and restoration.
The first of these advanced security services focuses on the early detection and prevention
of threatening events within the infrastructure. These services should be located at di↵erent
sections of the control infrastructure, and also monitor the operation of the interoperability
infrastructure itself in order to detect any possible dangerous dynamics in the systems and
launch mitigation mechanisms in order to avoid cascading faults through the interconnected
critical systems. As stated in these sections, the main tools that provide these capabilities
are the IDS solutions. We defend the provision of intelligent automated monitoring solutions,
capable of learning and adapting to the di↵erent dynamics of the surveilled system, whenever
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the subjacent infrastructure allows the deployment of advanced security mechanisms. It is
always necessary that the deployed detection and prevention solution observes and complies
with the requirements and constraints of the surveilled infrastructure, and its control system
(see Chapter 3).
A second approach to the security advanced services, is the inclusion of awareness and reaction
mechanisms in the infrastructure. These mechanisms help establish and maintain a state of
situational awareness and monitored operation of the infrastructure (the surveilled CI, the CPCS
and the interoperability infrastructure), which allows the early management of the di↵erent
occurring events in the system, in a measured, intelligent and automated way. There are varied
possible implementations of these intelligence and automation capabilities, however, we defend
the need to provide proactive, intelligent reaction solutions that help prevent threats within the
infrastructure at the earliest moment possible, to avoid any damage to the delicate operation of
the critical systems.
The third step in the inclusion of advanced security services for the interoperability of CPCSs in
the SG is the provision of restoration solutions for the infrastructure. These restoration mecha-
nisms are launched whenever a threatening event has caused an impact within the infrastructure
(e.g., it has produced a fault in a system, degraded the performance of a subnetwork, etc.) and
it is necessary to recover the system, and return its operational characteristics to the correct
regular ones. There are varied techniques to implement restoration measures, however they
usually imply the introduction of redundancy and backup elements within the infrastructure, in
order to be able to perform the recovery tasks. Restoration must be present at every level in
the architecture of a critical system, since any malfunction in the system should be remedied
immediately.
Once described the main security services we believe important for the operation of a secure
interoperability infrastructure of CPCSs in the SG, we have devoted the last sections of this
chapter to the analysis of these di↵erent techniques and measures in the context of cyber-physical
systems, and the implementation of awareness mechanisms within the CPCSs at each of the
levels of the SG infrastructure. This concrete study analyzes specific techniques and technologies
applicable to di↵erent domains of the SG, i.e., utilities, substations, and NaNs, studying at each
case the characteristics and specific requirements of these subdomains, and the adequacy of
the techniques for each of them. This last step brings the general study on abstract security
services for the control systems to the concrete scenario of the CPCSs for the SG, providing
insight about the better suited techniques and methods to protect the infrastructure. As in the
previous sections, we defend the inclusion of intelligent automated mechanisms which make the
surveillance system capable of achieving early detection, prevention and protection.
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Chapter 5
Design of interoperable and Secure
CPC Systems
This chapter is devoted to the design of a secure interoperability architecture according to the
requirements and recommendations reviewed in the previous chapters. We base our design on the
requirements, recommendations and techniques discussed in Chapter 3. The security practices
and guidelines follow the standards and recommendations of secure practices por interoperability
analyzed in Chapter 4. With these guidances in mind, we propose an architectural solution
for the secure interoperability of CSs, particularly the CPCSs of the SG, in the framework of
Industry 4.0 and in line with the new generation of CSs that accompanies this new industrial
paradigm.
We firstly aim to describe the problem and application scenario where we focus our analysis, in an
e↵ort to bring to light the objectives of the proposed design. To better understand our model,
we provide a brief description of the main technologies and guidelines applied. Sections 5.3
and 5.4 are devoted to detail the components and functionalities included in the design, while in
Section 5.5 we provide an analysis of the operation of our proposed system’s model, where we can
understand, through a detailed description and examples, the capabilities of the infrastructure
proposed.
5.1 Definition of the Application Scenario and Objectives of the
Design
In this thesis, we aim to provide a solution to the problem of interoperability among critical
complex control systems for the SG, belonging to di↵erent areas and di↵erent SG providers.
This is a di cult task given the high complexity of the control networks due to the vast amount
of nodes present and the high level of heterogeneity in these networks, where di↵erent industrial
protocols, legacy and new equipment, devices from di↵erent manufacturers, coexist in these
network and need to interact and work in a precise and finely tuned manner in order to ensure
the service availability and continuity in the infrastructure.
We therefore try to tackle this problem by proposing a design for the secure interoperability
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architecture for the CSs of the SG, framed in a transitional state towards the Industry 4.0
paradigm as described in Chapter 1, and considering the key characteristics of the new gen-
eration of control systems accompanying it, i.e., decentralization, security and interoperability.
Additionally, we need to consider the requirements and guidelines for secure interoperability pre-
viously identified in Chapter 3. These requirements can be categorized into 6 groups (i.e., CIP
softgoals, industrial IoT softgoals, architecture softgoals, interoperability softgoals, cloud softgoals
and virtualization softgoals), containing di↵erent kinds of NFRs each. From these groups of re-
quirements, it is possible to extract some information about the main desired characteristics
that our interoperability platform should have, in order to be compatible and operate well in
the context of CPCSs for the smart grid:
• Decentralization: is one of the pillar characteristics shaping the fourth generation of CSs.
As stated in Section 3.4, decentralization allows the transference and distribution of func-
tions over the di↵erent nodes of a network, this characteristic is highly useful in the control
and balance of the workload in the interoperability infrastructure, avoiding centralized au-
thorities subjects to threats. Decentralization can be achieved by making available to the
infrastructure’s devices di↵erent access points, where legitimate actors in the interoperabil-
ity platform can always be authenticated and authorized to perform their duties, regardless
of their scope, provider or constraints. This improves the availability and survivability of
the interoperability infrastructure, and of the CIs interconnected through the platform.
• Security : security is one of the vital requirements for the correct operation of any CI
(see Chapter 3), and one of the key requirements and characteristics that describe the
new generation of CSs. This requirement is especially important when considering an
interoperability scenario for di↵erent CIs. Given the high complexity and criticality of
such infrastructure, it is necessary to provide strong security mechanisms that protect
the dynamics occurring within the CIs, their control networks, and the interoperability
infrastructure that enables their interconnection and cooperation.
• Interoperability : itself, is the third identified characteristic or requirement for the CSs in
their fourth generation (see Section 1.1.1). Additionally, this requirement is key in the
design of the architectural model we aim to propose, which is highly focused on providing
interoperability and connectivity means for the di↵erent CPCSs coexisting in the infras-
tructure, in order to allow these systems to perform their tasks in a cooperative way.
• Survivability and dependability : these requirements need to be especially considered within
any critical system. Survivability and dependability are key requirements identified for the
CCSs of the CIs (see Section 3.1). They need to be considered with high priority whenever
designing our secure interoperability platform for the CPCSs of the SG, given that they
grant the CI will continue its operation even in the presence of system faults. Our secure
interoperability architecture must, therefore, inherit these characteristics from the CCSs
and ensure they are always observed and contemplated in the design of additional services
or infrastructures.
• Performance: the performance of the critical systems is not only an important NFR to
take into account in the design processes (see Section 3.3), but an essential constraint that
need to be observed and enforced at all times when dealing with CIs (see Section 3.1.2). As
reviewed, critical systems need to provide real-time performance, thus these characteristics
need to be transmitted to the interoperability infrastructure used for the communications
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and interoperability of CPCSs.
• Maintainability : maintainability is one of the requirements that descend from the depend-
ability softgoal of the CCSs (see Section 3.1). This requirement conveys the need for the
infrastructure to be continuously maintained in order to keep it free of errors, something
that is vital in a critical context, since any error or fault within the system can cause service
interruptions or cascade through the infrastructure a↵ecting other interdependent systems.
These cascading failures and service outages need to be avoided and kept to a minimum
in order to ensure the availability and service continuity provided by the CI. This main-
tainability characteristic need to be inherited by the secure interoperability architecture,
since it must maintain the same standards needed by the interconnected infrastructures
in order to grant the correct operation of the whole system.
• IoT capabilities: within an interoperability architecture for the CPCSs of the SG, it is
necessary to contemplate the presence of industrial sensors and IoT devices to adjust to
the scenarios framed by the Industry 4.0 paradigm, where di↵erent types of sensors, CPSs
and “things” automatically interact and cooperate to perform tasks within an industrial
scenario. When translating this paradigm to our scenario, where we attempt to design a
platform for the secure interoperability of CPCSs for the SG industry, it is necessary to
consider a scenario where CPSs, cloud systems, IoT devices and other technologies interact
and cooperate in a fluent way.
• Cloud capabilities: the use of cloud computing technologies in the scenario of CIP pro-
vides helpful tools to support control operations in critical constrained scenarios [264]. As
discussed in Section 3.3, the use of cloud computing introduces within the interoperability
architecture a high degree of flexibility, allowing the infrastructure to include virtualization
techniques, it also enables distribution and redundancy, and it improves interoperability
and accountability procedures. Since this technology belongs to the Industry 4.0 paradigm,
it is especially interesting to consider it within our scenario. Another interesting technol-
ogy to consider is the use of Fog computing capabilities, this new paradigm is an extension
or variation of cloud computing, oriented to the improvement of the cloud characteristics
in order to meet the demands of a more exigent scenario. Fog computing will be discussed
in depth in the following sections.
• Virtualization capabilities: virtualized services are enabled in the interoperability platform
thanks to the introduction of cloud and fog computing technologies within our scenario.
Virtualized services and network functions allow the system to introduce functionalities
within the interoperability infrastructure without the need to add extra dedicated and
costly HW to the infrastructure. These new services and functions are placed within the
cloud and fog services of the interoperability infrastructure, introducing a new degree of
flexibility and desirable characteristics within our scenario (e.g, portability of services,
migration, etc.) as well as resulting in a reduction of costs on HW for the infrastructure
(see Section 3.3).
Therefore, taking into account this set of important characteristics for the secure interoperability
platform, we can provide a first approach to the design of our architecture. A first draft of an
interoperability architecture combining the discussed characteristics is provided in Figure 3.11
in Section 3.5, where we address the main requirements and satisficing techniques for interoper-
ability in order to analyze their applicability to a real scenario through security metrics.
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Figure 5.1: Secure interoperability conceptual infrastructure for the smart grid
This abstraction provided in Figure 3.11 can be concretized using the satisficing techniques for
security recommended in Section 3.4, together with the identified set of characteristics identified
in this section in order to produce a first model of the interoperability infrastructure. Another
important contribution to our design comes from the discussion in Chapter 4 on the services
that aid the secure interoperability in CPCSs, where we find the studied services can be catego-
rized into four sets: basic security, monitoring and awareness,response and restoration, each of
them are studied in depth in the previous chapter. Therefore, taking into account the security
recommendations gathered from Chapters 3 and 4, we provide a first draft of the conceptual
model for the secure interoperability architecture for the CPCSs of the SG in Figure 5.1.
In Figure 5.1, we can observe a model for a distributed interoperability architecture based on the
concept of cloud and fog computing, where the CPCSs and IoT devices present in the SG infras-
tructures can communicate and interact with other systems belonging to other areas of influence
through these technologies. It is important to note that the interoperability platform provides
the basic and advanced security services discussed in Chapter 4, where we observe the presence of
monitoring and awareness services, together with response and restoration mechanisms. These
security services are present at di↵erent sections of the interoperability infrastructure, support-
ing the main requirements for the critical systems mentioned above (i.e., security, survivability,
dependability, performance, maintainability).
Other considerations
In the design of our secure interoperability architecture, we therefore contemplate the require-
ments and recommendations for interoperability reviewed in Chapter 3, together with the secu-
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rity services for the secure interoperability studied in Chapter 4. However, it is necessary to go a
step further and consider the threat model faced by the interoperability infrastructure. To take
this into account, we refer to the analysis of threats to the CPCSs developed in Chapter 2. As dis-
cussed, CIs are subject to many threats, from unexpected faults occurrences within the system,
to sophisticated attacks targeting specific devices or subsystems in the infrastructures.
Chapter 2 discusses the threats caused by sophisticated stealthy attacks, and Section 4.5 pro-
vides a brief overview on system anomalies and situational awareness. Therefore, taking into
account this consideration on the threat model, we can give further shape to the design of
the secure interoperability infrastructure for the CPCSs of the SG. Additionally, it is neces-
sary to consider the di↵erent standards, protocols and guidelines that will be interacting within
the interoperability platform in order to implement into this infrastructure design their main
characteristics.
The main protocols for the communications networks that can be integrated within the secure
interoperability architecture (see Sections 3.5 and 4.1) are industrial protocols such as Modbus
[13] (or Modbus/TCP [265]), IEC-60870-5-101 [266], IEC-60870-5-104 [7], IEC 61850 [97], DNP3
[14]; wireless industrial protocols such as Zigbee [267], WirelessHART, ISA100.11a [115].
The main standards and guidelines of good practiced reviewed in this thesis for the security of
CIs (see Sections 3.5 and 4.1) are the IEC/TS 62351 series [134] (comprised of 8 parts), the
NIST SP800-82 [112], the NIST SP800-53 [141], the NISTIR 7628 [110], the ISO/IEC 27000
series [268], the NIST SP800-144 [127], the NERC-CIP [113], he CCS CSC [136] and COBIT 5
[137], the NISCC Guide [133], the ISA 62443-2-1:2009 [138] and the ISA 62443-3-3:2013 [139].
And we also consider additional guidelines and standards such as the NIST SP1108 [269] and
the IEEE2030 [11] on interoperability or the NFV Guides [126] on virtualization of network
functions.
Additionally, it is necessary to consider, that when working with CIs, we need to deal with a
high level of complexity in the resulting designs, since these infrastructures are highly interde-
pendent among them [31]. Therefore, a system designed to connect these infrastructures and
make them interoperable through a common platform infrastructure needs to take this essential
characteristic into account. The resulting interoperability model needs to take this into account
to provide e cient solutions that do not interfere with the communications and service provision
between CIs.
5.2 Background and Technologies for the Design
In this section we tackle the analysis of the main techniques, guidelines and technologies we use
in our architectural model which help us address the problem of interoperability in our complex
scenario, where heterogeneous devices and technologies interact in a cooperative way to perform
the control tasks in the federation of SG infrastructures, as mentioned Section 5.1.
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Access Control Mechanisms
As we discussed in Section 2.4 access control is a preventive mechanism that can help the
infrastructure avoid multiple types of (stealthy) attacks. There are many methods (DAC, MAC,
ABAC, RBAC, etc.) however, the separation of identity from privileges and the improved
dynamic management of the security roles makes RBAC [28], in our opinion, a good candidate
for the management of access control in large critical environments. The the IEC/TS 62351-
8 [28] standard specifies and defines the access control process in power systems. The access
control process is needed enterprise-wide, covering multitude of system’s users, from members
of the sta↵ to external providers, suppliers and other partners/stakeholders. RBAC follows the
principle of least privilege (previously described in Section 3.4), which states that no subject
should be given more rights than necessary for performing that subject’s job [28].
To do this, RBAC helps create an infrastructure based on subjects, roles and rights (i.e., permis-
sions) for the authorization process. This division is done in order to separate the most frequently
changing profiles in the system, from the access control mechanisms itself, i.e., subject names
change more frequently than role names, and role names change more frequently than the rights
of a data model. Therefore, this separated model, together with the fact that RBAC can be
implemented as distributed services, simplify the maintenance of the access control system in a
wide and complex system such as the SG.
Cloud and Fog Infrastructures
According to NIST, cloud computing is defined as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient,
on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks,
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with
minimal management e↵ort or service provider interaction” [270]. Cloud services can be pro-
vided following three di↵erent services models [270], i.e., Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform
as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Additionally, cloud infrastructures
can be managed according to four di↵erent deployment models [270]:
• Private cloud, where the cloud infrastructure is owned, managed and used in exclusive by
a single organization.
• Community cloud or federated cloud, where a community or federation of partner or-
ganizations own, manage and operate the cloud infrastructure, following shared security
requirements and policies, and complying with common requirements and considerations
previously agreed between the members of the federation.
• Public cloud is used when the cloud infrastructure is provided (owned, managed and
operated) by a public cloud provider, which can be a business, academic or government
organization (or a combination of them).
• Hybrid cloud is a composition of two or more of the above-mentioned cloud deployment
models, which work cooperatively by means of common enabling technologies for the porta-
bility of data and applications.
Additional to the cloud computing, another technology interesting to introduce within our secure
interoperability architecture is Fog Computing. As introduced in Section 5.1, the fog is a new
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paradigm based on the convergence of a set of technologies coming from di↵erent areas, e.g.,
cloud computing, sensor networks, peer-to-peer networks, network function virtualization, or
configuration management techniques, which are integrated in order to meet the demands of
device ubiquity, agile network and service management and data privacy that are now surfacing
with the new models and practices of today’s information technologies.
More formally, fog computing is defined as “extension of the cloud computing paradigm (that)
provides computation, storage, and networking services between end devices and traditional cloud
servers” [271]. L. Vaquero and L. Rodero-Merino provide a more extensive definition: Fog com-
puting is a scenario where a huge number of heterogeneous (wireless and sometimes autonomous)
ubiquitous and decentralized devices communicate and potentially cooperate among them and with
the network to perform storage and processing tasks without the intervention of third parties.
These tasks can be for supporting basic network functions or new services and applications that
run in a sandboxed environment. Users leasing part of their devices to host these services get
incentives for doing so [8].
Table 5.1: Cloud vs. fog features, extracted from [8]
Cloud Fog
Latency High Low
Access Fixed and wireless Mainly wireless
Control Centralized Distributed
Service Access Through core At the edge / on handheld device
Availability High Volatile - High Redundancy
Main Content Generator Humans Devices / sensors
Content Generation Central Anywhere
Content Consumption End devices Anywhere
SW Virtual Infrastructure Central servers Edge devices
The fog computing paradigm has emerged in the recent years alongside other so called “edge”
paradigms such asmobile edge computing and “mobile cloud computing” trying to meet the needs
and requirements that the cloud cannot fulfill, e.g., low latency and jitter, context awareness,
mobility support, that are crucial for some applications [271]. Table 5.1 provides a comparison
between some important characteristics of the cloud and how they change in the fog paradigm.
This table is an extraction from the work of L. Vaquero and L. Rodero-Merino [8], and provides
interesting insight about the main di↵erences between paradigms, and the new characteristics
introduced by fog computing in latencies, control location, contents productions and consump-
tions, accesses, and availability.
Software Defined Networking
To implement virtualization techniques using fog computing, it is possible to make use of the
Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm [272]. SDN is a new networking paradigm where
the data plane (i.e., the actual data packets in the network) is decoupled from the control plane,
i.e., the network control decisions; the network intelligence is located in SW-based controllers,
and the physical network devices become simple packet forwarding HW, managed by the con-
trollers via an open interface such as OpenFlow. This paradigm promises to simplify network
management through network programmability, allowing the SW developers to control network
resources as easily as computing and storage resources [272].
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Figure 5.2: Conventional networking vs. SDN
Figure 5.2 illustrates the comparison between the schema of operation of conventional networking
versus the operation of the SDN. In conventional networking, the control plane provides data
to build the forwarding table, and the data plane looks into this forwarding table in order to
make routing decisions. Conversely, in SDN, the switch running the open interface solution,
such as the OpenFlow protocol [273] (there might be others), forwards the packets to the SDN
controller for it to make control decisions, according to the SDN controller data installed as a
forwarding table in the switch. The main di↵erence between conventional networking and SDN
is, therefore, the way in which data is handled and forwarded.
The OpenFlow protocol [273] enables these forwarding operations between switches and con-
trollers, and the programming of the OpenFlow-enabled switches (or routers) tables. Generally,
in the SDN architecture, we have an OpenFlow-enabled switch, generally a physical device (al-
though it is possible to have a virtual switch) working with the SDN paradigm, where its SDN
controller can be deployed in any device capable of supporting its computational and storage
needs. It is possible to talk about a SDN controller, when the controller runs directly on HW,
or about a virtual controller when it runs as a virtualized service in a computer or server.
A concept related to SDN is the Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [126], is a network
architecture concept where virtualization techniques are used to implement virtualized network
functions, in order to create communications services. NFV uses standard virtualization tech-
nologies to transfer di↵erent dedicated network equipment functions onto industry standard high
volume servers, switches and storage, allowing the system administrators to avoid purchasing
costly dedicated networking HW. According to the documentation, NFV is “applicable to any
data plane packet processing and control plane function in fixed and mobile network infrastruc-
ture”, and is “highly complementary to SDN ” [126]. An example of the use of NFV together
with the SDN paradigm would be the usage of a virtual switch in charge of the data plane of
SDN, instead of deploying an SDN-enabled switch, where this virtual switch is a virtualized
service running in a general-purpose computer or server.
In terms of security, the use of the SDN paradigm has its own advantages as well as it introduces
new kinds of threats within the system. As a security strong point, it is important to remark
that SDN enhances the network monitoring and the detection of abnormal behaviors, since the
SDN controller has a global perspective of the network dynamics (it receives tra c from all the
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nodes in the network), additionally, the controller can launch its own response procedures, which
are easily programmed and updated by the system administrators, instead of requiring updates
of the operative system of the physical network device [274]. Works such as [275] illustrate the
use of SDN to build interesting protective solutions.
However, the use of SDN has weaknesses from the point of view of security. Given the nature of
the SDN, where instead of a networking interface, the system is separated into di↵erent planes,
there are more attack entry points within the system, e.g., the SDN switch, the links between
switches, the SDN controller, the links between controllers and switches, etc. Additionally,
the characteristics of the SDN controller makes it especially interesting to compromise and
manipulate by adversaries. This is because this module is designed to provide many open
programmable interfaces to adjust perfectly the networking system to its desired operation.
These available interfaces make the system open at many points to manipulation if not properly
protected [274]. Common cyberattacks such as man-in-the-middle or denial of service attacks
can easily take advantage of the SDN elements in the network.
Therefore, the SDN modules must always be properly protected and monitored in order to
avoid introducing new vulnerabilities to threat the underlying system. Di↵erent measures can
be applied to increase security and prevention in this area, such as the use of secure channels,
e.g., using Transport Layer Security (TLS) for the OpenFlow links between controllers and
switches, the use of network IDSs to monitor also the tra c around the SDN controllers taking
into account the OpenFlow links, monitoring agents to manage DoS attacks, etc.
5.3 Design of the Secure Interoperability Architecture Model
Given the characteristics and requirements gathered in the previous section for the design of our
secure interoperability architecture model, we devote this section to concretize the specific com-
ponents needed for the secure interoperability among CPCSs of the SG. Based on the first drafts
and proposals from the interoperability infrastructure provided in Section 3.5 (see Figure 3.11)
and in Section 5.1 (see Figure 5.1), we propose a design for the secure interoperability of the
CPCSs of di↵erent providers of the SG, which we illustrate in Figure 5.3. As we can observe in
this figure, we propose an interoperability scenario for several SG infrastructures, each of them
comprised of di↵erent subnetworks and remote subsystems. We present a distributed and decen-
tralized environment which makes use of cloud and fog computing technologies and enables the
inclusion of CPS and IoT devices within the infrastructure, contemplating therefore an scenario
where some of the new technologies of the Industry 4.0 are represented (see Section 5.1).
Figure 5.3 presents, therefore, our approach to the solution of secure interoperability for the
CPCSs of the SG. In the figure it is possible to di↵erentiate a central module representing the
cloud infrastructure, which will guide the interoperability between the actors in the platform at
a global level. There are di↵erent smaller clouds or cloudlets that represent the fog computing
infrastructure deployed at the ground level in the architecture, i.e., at each independent sector
of the infrastructures, e.g., substations, remote networks, etc. Within each of the cloudlets,
it is possible to find one or several controllers, which will serve as intelligent access points
(see Figure 3.11 in Section 3.5) to the secure interoperability platform, and perform the main
interoperability tasks in the infrastructure. It is also present in the figure, depicted as brown dots,
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Figure 5.3: Secure interoperability infrastructure for the smart grid
a distributed diagnosis system based on software objects that gather contextual information for
awareness and control tasks. And finally, we represent several types of control networks belonging
to the SG infrastructures, e.g., corporate networks, remote control networks, SG substations,
IoT control networks.
Within each of the controllers, we have depicted in the figure the need to specify their controllers.
This is denoted with the letter A, which corresponds to the modules and services provided by
each controller, as illustrated in Figure 5.4. As we can see in the figure, the functionalities
o↵ered by the controller modules are complex, and will be described in depth in the next
sections. Additionally, the services provided by the cloud, denoted by module B are illustrated
in a separate image, given in Figure 5.5. Moreover, there is another module illustrated within the
platform represented by a green lock that refers to the security and the advanced monitoring
services included within the infrastructure, which will be discussed in depth in the following
sections.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the analysis and description of the main services
and technologies needed for the construction of this secure interoperability architecture model,
and in the next section we present and describe in depth the service modules o↵ered by the
controllers and cloud components of the infrastructure.
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Figure 5.4: Services o↵ered by the controller modules
5.3.1 Access Control Mechanisms
In the scenario of critical infrastructures, the critical systems must be protected at all times in
order to avoid malfunctions and attacks to the system that can threaten its continued and correct
operation (see Chapter 2), given that it is critical that the service provided by the infrastructure
is not interrupted at any moment (see Section 3.1). Therefore it is of vital importance to provide
the infrastructure with access control mechanisms (both cyber and physical measures) to avoid
unauthorized actors to perform threatening actions to the system. In our secure interoperability
platform, a complex and interconnected scenario where many subsystems of the SG interact
with each other in a cooperative way among SG providers, it is of paramount importance to
implement powerful access control mechanisms.
As previously discussed, in our scenario, it is particularly critical that the authorization mecha-
nisms are finely configured and allow its users to rapidly perform their tasks, without granting
access to forbidden segments of the interoperability platform, e.g., unauthorized access to sensi-
tive data, unauthorized access from one infrastructure to another, etc. We therefore use RBAC,
as defined in the IEC/TS 62351-8 [28], to provide access control mechanisms to our infrastruc-
ture, as introduced in Section 5.2. When a subject (user) needs authorization credentials to
perform tasks according to the job description, the system manager assigns this user a role or
set of roles to accomplish this task, following the principle of least privilege, ensuring that the
rights assigned to the role for the user allow him access only to the functions in the system
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Figure 5.5: Services o↵ered by the cloud
needed to do his job.
5.3.2 Cloud Infrastructure
According to the characteristics of the cloud provided in Section 5.2, it is possible to define
the type and features of the cloud infrastructure and the cloud services for the inclusion of
cloud technologies within our secure interoperability infrastructure design model. Reviewing
the requirements for interoperability we identified in Section 3.3, we observe that related to
cloud, there are two main NFRs that need to be fulfilled when deploying cloud services within
the interoperability architecture for CPCSs of the SG: elasticity and measured service. As we can
see, these two requirements are naturally satisfied by the aforementioned essential characteristics
of the cloud [270].
The use of cloud computing in an interoperability architecture for CIs can result of extreme in-
terest, since this cloud infrastructure supports the operation of the control infrastructure, adding
with this operational layer, new means to fulfill the sustainability, dependability and survivabil-
ity requirements of the CCS (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3) by adding redundancy, distribution, load
balancing and virtualization (among other techniques) as described in Section 3.4. The new
infrastructure added by the cloud is external to the already existing HW and networks of the
CI and its control system.
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Cloud computing is a powerful and useful tool for critical systems [264], however, the cloud
becomes even more interesting whenever dealing with a federation of partners which want to
establish a secure interoperability platform for cooperation motives, in which critical information
and control is shared among the di↵erent federated providers. Therefore, there are two di↵erent
possible cloud infrastructures present in our scenario: dedicated cloud and community cloud (see
Section 5.2).
Each SG provider can acquire and manage its own dedicated cloud, either by acquiring the
equipment and creating a privately-maintained cloud infrastructure, or contracting the cloud
services to a public cloud provider. This dedicated cloud can be used as redundancy mechanisms,
to maintain a coherent and actualized backup of the control configurations of the infrastructure,
etc. Each SG provider chooses the configurations and dedicated use of its cloud infrastructure,
without any influence from the outside.
However, in the interoperability scenario depicted in Figure 5.3, it is very interesting to contem-
plate the inclusion of a community-managed cloud infrastructure to support the secure inter-
operability for the di↵erent partners. This cloud infrastructure would be deployed according to
one of the four deployment models mentioned above, according to the needs and characteristics
of the federation of SG providers in need of cloud services. Given that it is a federation of
CIs, it is probable that the preference of the SG partners is to acquire and manage its own
private cloud infrastructure, creating a community-managed cloud infrastructure where one or
several partners participate in the maintenance and management of the system. The location of
this community-managed cloud infrastructure can take diverse configurations according to the
agreements of the federation partners regarding the management of the cloud:
• Single manager : one of the partners of the federation is designated as the cloud manager,
which is in charge of managing the cloud services. In our model for the secure inter-
operability platform, a management role must be created, the CloudMNT following the
standard IEC/TS 62351-8 [28] (this role is not pre-defined by the standard, but can be
created using the private role values of the standard). This role will be in charge of man-
aging the federation cloud whenever it is necessary, and the permissions to the role must
be assigned using the principle of least privilege technique as described in Section 3.4.
• Multiple managers: several partners of the federation are designated as cloud managers,
and are in charge of managing the cloud services. In this scenario, each of the partners
acting as cloud managers should create the management role CloudMNT following the
standard IEC/TS 62351-8 [28], and its permissions assigned using the principle of least
privilege (see Section 3.4). The CloudMNT will be in charge of managing the federated
cloud, regardless of its location, since this responsibility becomes a shared task among the
cloud manager partners, and the existence of di↵erent partners dedicated to the manage-
ment of the infrastructure helps achieve reliability, accountability and service assurance in
the system.
• On the premises: the servers and HW that compose the physical layer of the cloud infras-
tructure are stored on the premises of one or more partners of the federation, which are
in charge of maintaining and managing its operation, and configure them in order for the
services provided by the cloud to be stable, continued and available for each and everyone
of the partners of the federation. This deployment model corresponds to the community
cloud described in [270].
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• Out of the premises: the infrastructure servers of the cloud are located in a location desig-
nated by the federation providers, which are external to their premises. This extraction of
the cloud infrastructure from the location of the di↵erent CIs can suppose an advantage for
the operation of the physical servers, since industrial environments are usually surrounded
by interferences and industrial noise, which might a↵ect the operation of the equipment.
This configuration should not be confused with the deployment scheme denominated public
cloud model [270].
Since this interoperability infrastructure is set in the context of CI’s cooperation and the infor-
mation exchange implies the transference of highly sensitive and critical data, it is most probable
that the federation partners prefer to acquire and maintain a shared private cloud infrastructure.
However, it is possible that some of the less sensitive data generated by the federation can be
exported to an external public cloud contracted by the partners. As stated, the public cloud
[270] is contracted with an external cloud service provider, which is in charge of the management
of the physical layer and the configuration of its servers in order to ensure a quality service for
the partners of the federation. In an scenario where the cloud is private or maintained by the
community, it is not necessary to describe its service model [270], however, in the case of a
public cloud usage, it is possible to model the services required from the cloud as SaaS or PaaS,
depending on the implementation of the services required by the federation partners.
The use of public cloud services would help the interoperability architecture to achieve additional
backup and redundancy mechanisms for the data in a distributed fashion. Nevertheless, this
configuration could be less interesting for the federation of SG providers given the need to
trust a third party to manage their services and data. As described in Figure 5.3, the cloud
infrastructure serves as means of interoperability among the di↵erent subnetworks belonging
to the SG providers of the federation. Additionally, it provides varied security services which
allow the interoperability platform to operate in a secure, well balanced and solid way. In
general terms, the cloud infrastructure provides the secure interoperability platform with the
basic security services described in Section 4.1.
In line with with the use of these basic services, and with the objective of maintaining the
privacy of the operations of each member of the federation, all connections to the cloud must be
encrypted, and the access to the cloud must follow a normalized process of authentication and
authorization through the modules dedicated to this access, i.e., the controllers as illustrated
in Figure 5.4 which will be described in depth in the next sections. Information sharing and
communications among di↵erent providers can be achieved making use of the PRE technique
[132] as described in Section 3.4, a technique that will be discussed for this scenario in the
following sections.
5.3.3 Fog Infrastructure
According to the NF requirements elicited in Chapter 3, our secure interoperability architecture
must comply with the requirements of flexibility, scalability, robustness, and resilience (among
others), which are parent softgoals containing many other related requirements as leafs in the
diagram (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4). Thus, in order to fulfill these requirements, it is possible to
include in the interoperability architecture certain practices or techniques which help satisfice
the requirements, e.g., virtualization, decentralization, distribution, load balancing, redundancy
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Figure 5.6: Main components of the secure interoperability infrastructure
or diversity (among others, see Figure 3.5).
Techniques and practices as aforementioned can be implemented using technologies such as the
ones provided by edge computing (i.e., fog computing and the other similar edge paradigms),
as introduced in Section 5.2. In our architecture, we apply an adaptation of the concept of
fog computing or edge computing, as seen in Figure 5.1, in order to include in our model the
most interesting characteristics of this paradigm together with cloud computing, to achieve
the characteristics required for a secure interoperability platform for the CPCSs of the SG.
Observing Figure 5.3, we see the way in which we combine these two paradigms (i.e., cloud and
fog computing) in order to obtain the best characteristics of each one for the interoperability
scenario.
In our architecture for the secure interoperability of CPCSs for the SG, we observe mainly two
di↵erent types of abstractions: the cloud and the cloudlets (see Figure 5.3). The cloud present in
the infrastructure corresponds to the community-managed cloud infrastructure for the federation
of SG providers discussed in Section 5.3.2. This cloud helps orchestrate, manage and monitor the
internal communications and procedures of the secure interoperability infrastructure between the
di↵erent subnetworks of the federated CIs. It provides global security services, supporting the
robustness, resilience and accountability of the architecture, as well as means to obtain resilient
interoperability and control of the CPCSs, even in the presence of critical events. The specific
services functionalities implemented by the cloud, illustrated in Figure 5.5, will be discussed in
detail in the next sections.
The second abstraction corresponds to the cloudlets present in the architecture, depicted by
the small yellow clouds in Figure 5.3. Each cloudlet contains a subsection or subnetwork of the
SG infrastructure of one of the SG providers, this section can contain: a corporate network of
the infrastructure, one or several remote substations, a remote field control network, etc. (see
Section 4.3). These cloudlets are generally composed of a subnetwork with edge servers and
access points, as depicted in the abstraction presented in Figure 3.11. We denominate the access
points as controllers (as introduced in Section 5.3 and Figure 5.4), and their function is the
advanced control, monitoring and management of the control network in their area of influence,
supported by the edge servers of the cloudlet. Figure 5.6 illustrates these main components
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present in our architecture.
Virtualization
Introducing advanced management and control mechanisms within the edge devices in a critical
infrastructure is not always trivial. These devices are mainly RTUs, industrial sensors and
actuators, and other legacy equipment with restricted capabilities. Due to the computational
and storage constraints these devices present, it is necessary to find an alternative way to
place the advances functionalities of the controllers. We can accomplish that making use of
virtualization techniques, and placing the computationally and storage-costly functions of the
controller within the edge servers of the substation.
These servers are either heavy-duty or powerful-duty CPSs deployed at each substation or
cloudlet, such as general-purpose servers, industrial proxies and gateways (see Section 1.1.2).
Each cloudlet in the secure interoperability architecture can include one or several controllers,
and their main mission is to act as secure access points for the edge devices present in the area
of influence of each controller, providing advanced security and interoperability capabilities, as
well as the basic security services described in Section 4.1. The specific services and components
implemented by the controllers in the architecture (see Figure 5.4) will be described in depth in
the following sections.
5.3.4 Software Defined Networking
SDN, as introduced in Section 5.2, presents many advantages over conventional networking [272],
such as increased scalability, dynamism, and adaptability, easiness for migration operations, con-
figuration automation, quality of service control, and reduced costs for the dedicated networking
HW, since only simple switches are needed instead of costly routers and gateways. The net-
working costs can be further reduced if the system administrators resort also to using the NFV
instead of deploying physical SDN-enabled switches or routers. In our scenario, SDN provides
the possibility to add advanced intelligent and sophisticated network solutions to an environ-
ment where the legacy equipment has very few computational and storage capabilities, but there
exists heavy constraints with respect to the real-time performance of the system. Therefore ad-
vanced interoperability, security and networking capabilities can be added to the CIs without
incurring in the high cost and complicated procedures for replacing current dedicated HW and
networking solutions.
In our secure interoperability architecture, we include the SDN paradigm in our belief that
this inclusion leverages the aforementioned advantages of the SDN, and helps build the secure
interoperability in the complex context of CPCSs, where the constraints and requirements (see
Chapter 3) highly restrict the inclusion of any additional component to the control infrastructure.
Therefore, within each cloudlet (see Section 5.3.3), we include one or several access points for
the subnetwork, in the form of a SDN-enabled switch, whose SDN controller resides in the fog
servers (see the previous section) of the cloudlet. For the remainder of the chapter, we will
refer to this infrastructure composed of the SDN switch and the SDN virtual controller, as a
controller (see Section 5.3 and Figure 5.4).
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The aim of each controller is to serve as an access point in the cloudlet to the secure inter-
operability platform designed for the CPCSs of a federation of providers of the SG, in order
to allow the di↵erent CPSs and other control devices to interact among them, and with other
systems in the infrastructure in a secure and e cient manner. Each controller must provide
the basic security services described in Section 4.1, and additionally they must also provide the
advanced secure interoperability mechanisms which will be described in depth in the following
sections.
5.3.5 Defense in Depth
To build a secure interoperability architecture for the CPCSs of the SG, it is necessary to provide
basic security services (see Section 4.1), however, the correct operation of the interoperability
architecture also relies on the correct operation of the system in the occurrence of threatening
events. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is also necessary to provide this critical scenario with
advanced security services for its protection. In this section we discuss the inclusion of these
security services at the level of controller (see Section 5.3.4) and cloudlet (see Section 5.3.3),
where there exist the main access points to this secure interoperability infrastructure (see Fig-
ure 5.3).
In order to protect the system, the interoperability platform implements the Defense in Depth
methodology. Defense in depth is defined as an “information security strategy integrating people,
technology, and operations capabilities to establish variable barriers across multiple layers and
missions of the organization” [141]. The term defense in depth originally referred to a military
strategy for the prevention of the advance of an attacker by yielding space to buy time. In
computer science, it refers to the placement of protection mechanisms and security policies cre-
ating a multiple-layered schema of defense against attacks. This method is widely recommended
for the protection of critical systems, where the measures try to prevent security breaches, and
allow the organization to early detect them and mitigate them before they inflict any harm to
the CI.
There are several forms to implement defense in depth, however, the main configuration used
in critical environments is the triad: DMZ network, firewall, and antivirus, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.6. Nevertheless, defense in depth can be constructed by integrating two or more of the
following security solutions together: antivirus, authentication mechanisms, DMZs, encryption,
firewalls, IDSs, IDPRSs, accountability mechanisms, physical security, Virtual private networks
(VPNs), or access control mechanisms (this list does not contain all the possible security mech-
anisms implemented in defense in depth).
For our purposes, we choose to implement the security in depth mechanisms including four of
the aforementioned security mechanisms: DMZ network, firewall, IDS and VPN, as depicted
in Figure 5.7. These security mechanisms will help protect the access points to the secure
interoperability platform, therefore any access to a controller in the infrastructure by any edge
device will be conditioned and protected by these security procedures. The selected algorithms
to act as IDS engines vary from one scenario to another, taking into account the characteristics
of the infrastructure and network dynamics, as summarized in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 in Section 4.5.
These tables reflect the suitability of the di↵erent IDS approaches and techniques taking into
account the deployment area of the infrastructure, additionally Table 4.8 illustrates the best
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Figure 5.7: Defense in depth and diagnosis system
techniques according to the CPS capabilities.
Taking into account these studies, it is possible to find the best approaches according to the
di↵erent areas of our interoperability infrastructure, i.e., the IDPRs mechanisms deployed in the
cloud or in fog computing nodes (see Figure 5.3) can be complex and sophisticated, since these
nodes are powerful-duty (mixed knwoledge-based, with powerful detection algorithms). However
those IDSs deployed in field networks where the CPCSs have low computational capabilities,
should be lightweight in order to properly function (signature-based solutions with simple de-
tection algorithms such as rules or decision trees implemented). According to the capabilities
of the nodes hosting them, they can include already existing solutions such as Snort [102], Bro
[152], or other proprietary solutions. The defense in depth is represented by a green lock in
the Figure 5.3, where we can observe it is present at all the di↵erent segments of the secure
interoperability infrastructure.
5.3.6 Diagnosis System
Among the di↵erent services provided within the secure interoperability architecture, we include
the presence of a Diagnosis System (DS), see Figure 5.7. The DS will be in charge of monitoring
the status of the varied systems and networks present in the interoperability platform. This
diagnosis system is based on the IEC/TS 62351-7 standard [142], which describes the use of
the Network and System Management (NSM) and Management Information Base (MIB) Data
Object Models. These objects provide security to the system thanks to the monitoring of the
network status and the di↵erent nodes and systems working within the infrastructure.
NSM objects deployed across the platform are in charge of retrieving useful information about
the health and operation of the infrastructure. This information can be used for intrusion
detection, for protection, and additionally, it provides a detailed knowledge about the context
of each subsystem in the infrastructure, a highly important source of information for control
decisions. According to the IEC/TS 62351-7 standard [142], NSM objects can be present at
many di↵erent components in the secure interoperability platform (see Figures 5.3 and 5.7,
where these objects are depicted by a brown dot).
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The main objectives of the NSM objects within our secure interoperability architecture is the con-
text monitoring and control, applied taking advantage of the available functionalities described
in the IEC/TS 62351-7 standard [142]. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, NSM objects manage and
monitor diverse objects in the system, providing the controllers in each cloudlet, and the cloud
with vital information about the health and operation of the interoperability infrastructure, the
di↵erent CSs and its separate CPCSs.
In our infrastructure, the main devices containing NSM objects are the cloudlet’s edge servers,
which host the controllers among other services, and the medium to powerful-duty devices
present at each cloudlet (see Figure 5.3) e.g., computers, servers, gateways, routers, RTUs,
mobile devices, etc. Some industrial sensors and wireless sensors are powerful enough to host
NSM objects, therefore they will be deployed in those sensor networks with su cient capabili-
ties to manage their operation. However, there are some devices in which it would be di cult
or computationally draining to deploy NSM objects, such as IoT devices, which will not carry
this functionality for our architecture. The information in these sections of the networks would
be gathered by the network’s cluster heads or similar and more computationally powerful de-
vices.
Each controller in the interoperability infrastructure, and the cloud would have a Context Man-
ager (CM) module in charge of gathering, correlating and analyzing the data collected by the
NSM objects. In the case of the controllers, they will work with the data transmitted by the
devices present in their area of influence, the cloud, on the other hand, will gather de data com-
ing from the entire interoperability platform, to generate a global perspective on the operation
and behaviors of the infrastructure as a whole. The detailed operation of the CM modules will
be explained in depth in the next sections.
5.3.7 Delegation Mechanisms
Delegation is the process of handing over credentials between system’s users. There are two
types of delegation: delegation of authentication and delegation of authorization. The first one
refers to the use of an identity by an user, di↵erent to the one it was authenticated in the system
with, given that this operation is permitted (e.g., the sudo command in UNIX). The second one
is the most common way of delegation, and serves to ensure critical tasks in the system do not
get unattended when using security techniques such as the principle of the least privilege (see
Section 3.4). Therefore, using authorization delegation, the permissions to perform a delegated
job are transferred or enabled from a delegator role to a delegatee role. This characteristics is
usually found when making use of the RBAC standard (IEC/TS 62351-8 [28]).
We find delegation mechanisms of vital importance in a critical environment such as the SG’s
control systems, since critical events must be addressed at all times, and if the administrator
or operator authorized to address the problem is not available, the situation could escalate
rapidly and cause extensive harm to the infrastructure. Therefore, the use of delegation mecha-
nisms ensure that there is always an active user in the system capable of addressing the arising
situations in case of necessity, through delegation. To this end, our architecture contains the im-
plementation of mechanisms for authorization delegation within the di↵erent roles in the secure
interoperability infrastructure for the CPCSs of the SG.
In a normal situation, when a member of the sta↵ wants to access the system e.g., a field
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User
Primary Role, e.g., Operator
Secondary Role 1, e.g., SECADM Secondary Role 2, e.g., CloudMNT
Figure 5.8: Primary and secondary roles
operator e↵ectuating control operations with her laptop, she sends an access request to the
controller in the area of influence of the connected laptop. This controller has to verify if the
used client satisfies the minimum security requirements for access, i.e., if the operator has the
adequate credentials to access the system. This step is managed by the authentication services
available within the controller (see Figure 5.4), which will be explained in detail in the following
sections.
Once the authentication is achieved, the authorization module is launched, together with the
Policies Manager (PM) module (see Figure 5.4), the context and status of the target system, its
environment and the situation of the interoperability platform are determined, identifying and
selecting the security policies regulating the access, and the applicable roles and permissions
to the authenticated user. The operation of these modules will be explained in detail in the
following sections. In this step, if the context of the system is critical and the user accessing the
system has the adequate credentials, the delegation mechanisms are launched. This is better
illustrated with an example:
A field operator is e↵ectuating scheduled control operations with her laptop in a SG substation,
while working, one of the electrical transformers in the substation breaks down and stops working,
the backup equipment fails and the remote control mechanisms are not able to activate it, needing
a manual activation of the backup units. This operation is only authorized to be performed by
security administrators of the system (RBAC SecAdm pre-defined roles [28]). The operator is the
member of the sta↵ that is present at the nearer position to the failing equipment, however, in a
normal situation, this maintenance operation is not permitted to her role. The operator has the
RBAC pre-defined role Operator [28] assigned for the regular aspects of her job, additionally, as
secondary roles she has the roles SecAdm and CloudMNT assigned for delegation in case of neces-
sity, as illustrated in Figure 5.8. When this critical situation arises, the interoperability system
is able to identify the critical context of the infrastructure through the information gathered by
the context manager and the NSM objects (see Section 5.3.6), activating priority access to the
operator in situ, and activating automatically the secondary role of SecAdm for her, in order to
procede as soon as possible to the mitigation tasks needed.
Therefore, as mentioned in the example, when a critical situation arises in the interoperability
architecture, thanks to the delegation mechanisms, a member of the sta↵ which primary role
is not allowed to perform certain actions in regular situations, can be authorized to perform
emergency mitigation tasks through the activation of the secondary roles (see Figure 5.8). Due
to the fact that we are designing an interoperability infrastructure for the members of a federation
of SG providers, it is possible that the maintenance of given substations or cloudlets is shared.
In this case, the infrastructure has to take into account the cooperation between federated
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partners and the need to establish inter-organization delegation mechanisms for cooperative
and emergency situations.
To provide mechanisms for the delegation among di↵erent partner infrastructures, we make use
of the proxy re-encryption technique [132]. As described in Section 3.4, the PRE is a type of
public-key encryption which allows a proxy to transform ciphertexts generated with a public key,
into ciphertexts decryptable by another key. Therefore, this technique allows the cooperation
between infrastructures of di↵erent providers, given that each organization generates its own
delegation schema, providing the proxy the re-encryption keys for the trusted partners, e.g.,
infrastructure A provides the re-encryption keys RkA for the controller present in remote control
substation B RCSB(RkAÑRCSB) (see Figure 5.3). The proxy is present in the federated cloud
of the secure interoperability platform (see Figure 5.5), allowing access to the partners from all
subsystems in the infrastructures. Following the previous example for delegation, we can picture
the following scenario:
A field operator from infrastructure A is e↵ectuating scheduled control operations with her laptop
in a SG substation shared by infrastructures A and B. While working, one of the electrical
transformers belonging to the substation B fails without activating the corresponding backup
equipment, which remains o✏ine without possibility of remote activation. There are no field
operators from the infrastructure B nearby, therefore, it is needed that the field operator from
infrastructure A tends to the equipment as soon as possible to activate the backup units. The
operator present at the substation is correctly authenticated in the system with the role SecAdm
from the infrastructure A, however, to do this job, a specific authorization is needed to perform
tasks reserved to security administrators from infrastructure B. To obtain the authorization, a
connection is established to the federation cloud, in order to retrieve the delegated credentials
for the operator, according to the security policies in place, and with high priority given that the
context of the system is critical and immediate actions are needed.
Therefore, thanks to the deployed delegation schema in the secure interoperability architecture, it
is possible to rapidly grant authorizations for mitigation and restoration actions to the di↵erent
members of the federation, allowing to rapidly tend to emergency situations, and therefore
prevent cascading failures and shortages of service in the di↵erent infrastructures belonging
to the federation of providers of the SG. This technique is also useful for data sharing and
cooperation between the di↵erent partners of the federation, where PRE allows translating the
ciphered data from the infrastructure A with the public key PkA into the public key of the
subsystem in need of information belonging to infrastructure B (with the public key PkSB).
Thus, the needed data X is re-ciphered: EPkApXq Ñ EPkSB pXq.
Another interesting scenario for delegation is the management of the federated cloud infras-
tructure (see Section 5.3.2). As previously described, our security interoperability architecture
makes use of a cloud infrastructure shared among the SG partners (see Figure 5.3). This cloud
would be most likely managed by two or more of the partners in the federation, building a
federated cloud with a multiple manager schema, as described in Section 5.3.2. Therefore, the
role CloudMNT will be present in more than one of the partner organizations, and the need arises
to manage and control the permissions and tasks assigned to these roles. In the first place, the
permissions assigned to the CloudMNT role have to be assigned following the principle of least
privilege [28] technique as described in Section 3.4, this would increase the security within the
infrastructure, given that this global role would not be able to perform any tasks related with
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other infrastructure than the cloud.
CloudMNT roles will connect to the federation cloud through the controller in the area of influ-
ence, which establishes a secure connection to the cloud. Usually, CloudMNTs will manage the
infrastructure and access to the needed information and configurations stored and administered
by the partner’s infrastructure the CloudMNT belongs to. However, there are occasions where
further accesses are needed to data belonging to other partner of the federation. Given that for
security and privacy reasons, the information stored in the cloud is ciphered with each organi-
zation’s public key (PkOi), this information is not generally accessible to other members of the
federation.
To allow cooperation, enabling and facilitating the needed data sharing between partners, the
re-encryption mechanisms are used. The proxy in the cloud (see Figure 5.5) will re-cipher
the data encrypted with the public cloud of the organization who owns the data (PkOA), into
the public key of the controller from where the CloudMNT is managing the infrastructure
(PkCntBx ). Since this access to the shared data also follows the principle of the least privilege,
the security and privacy of the partner’s data is maintained, allowing the transference of data
among organizations in a secure way.
Further applications of delegation mechanisms and PRE are the use of these technologies to
enable the processes of auditing. As we mentioned, auditing is vital for implementing account-
ability processes, and helps maintain a set of quality standards highly important for the correct
operation of the system (see Chapter 3). Audits can be classified into internal audits and exter-
nal audits, the first one refers to the process of auditing carried out by personnel belonging to
the federation of SG providers, the later refers to the performance of audits by external auditors
(from the government, from auditing firms, etc.). In order to enable the audits in the system,
the auditors need to access the information stored by the system (among other types of data)
during the processes for accountability (logs, configurations), generated by all the systems in the
secure interoperability platform and gathered by the controllers (see Figure 5.4) and the cloud
(see Figure 5.5).
Therefore, the auditors (either internal or external), need to access the system in order to access
the data. Since this data is protected by the diverse infrastructures belonging to the federation,
it is necessary to create a profile associated to the auditor, and assign it an RBAC role, SecAud
[28], applying the adequate permissions and security accesses. Each of these SecAuds will be
able to audit the infrastructure subject to the audit. However, due to the need to provide the
auditor access to the shared data in the secure interoperability platform, the PRE mechanisms
are put to use in a similar way to the previously mentioned scenario for the management of
the cloud by the CloudMNTs. In this case, the proxy will re-encrypt the data requested by
the auditor from the public key of the infrastructure source of the information (PkOA), to the
public key of the auditor in the system (PkAuditorx), allowing information only to the auditor
to this sensitive data. This way, external audits such as governmental audits for the monitoring
of the correct operation of the CIs and their adherence to the procedures stated by the law can
be performed.
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5.4 Design of the Services Modules for the Cloud and Con-
trollers Components of the Infrastructure
This section is devoted to the description and analysis of the service modules present in the
controller (see Figure 5.4) and cloud (see Figure 5.5) components of the secure interoperability
infrastructure (see Figure 5.3). As we have discussed in previous sections, the main function
of the controller is to serve as access point to the interoperability platform to the actors of the
infrastructure, providing security services among others. The cloud services aim to orchestrate
and guide the interoperability infrastructure behavior at a global level, providing accountability
and redundancy mechanisms to avoid service interruptions and improve the mitigation and
restoration tasks in the federated systems.
Therefore, in this section we describe in depth each of the five di↵erent services modules of the
controllers and cloud components in the platform, and discuss the variations in their function-
alities according to their location, i.e., whether they are present at the controllers or at the
cloud.
5.4.1 Authentication and Access Manager
The first module we address is the Authentication and Access Manager (AAM) service mod-
ule, which is present at both the controller and the cloud level in the secure interoperability
infrastructure (see Figure 5.3). This module is focused on the provision of authentication to the
di↵erent actors of the infrastructure, in order to be able to access their resources. The AAM
is composed of six di↵erent components: the Roles Manager and the Access Control Manager
(ACM) which are implemented both in the controllers and in the cloud, the Identity Manager
and the Authentication Manager that are only present at the controller’s level, the Proxy and
the Delegation Tokens Manager (DTM) which are present only at the cloud’s level.
Identity Manager
The Identity Manager is a service module residing at the controllers level in the secure inter-
operability platform, which is in charge of storing and managing, i.e., creating, modifying and
deleting, the identities of the actors in the system. This service can be implemented in di↵er-
ent ways, from using simple XML databases to more specialized solutions such as Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [276]. Thus, when an actor wants to access the secure inter-
operability platform, it must provide its credentials to the system, and they will be matched with
the information provided by the identity manager on the legitimate users of the system.
This information is available only at the level of cloudlet, and it is not replicated through the
interoperability platform, i.e., the system is expected to authenticate only a reduced number of
actors in the system, and each controller stores the identities of the regular actors in its area
of influence. Inclusion of new actors for this cloudlet is performed by system administrators on
demand. However, since we are contemplating an interoperability infrastructure where varied
actors belonging to di↵erent areas of influence need to be successfully authenticated in the
system in order to perform cooperative tasks, the identity information need to be shared across
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the platform in the event it is needed. This task is enabled by the cloud infrastructure (see
Section 5.3.2), where the access manager module in the cloud (see Figure 5.5) provides support
to the sharing of information among di↵erent controllers using on demand connections between
controllers, through their Access Control Manager module, which we will discuss later.
Authentication Manager
The Authentication Manager module provides the service of storing and managing the authen-
tication credentials in the secure interoperability platform. The system administrators can add,
modify or delete the credentials associated to each actor in the database. This module is present
at the level of controllers, and, as in the case of the identity manager module, it contains the
authentication credentials information for the actors that are regularly present in the area of
influence of each controller. Whenever it is necessary to authenticate a legitimate actor external
to the area of influence of a given controller, it must request the information credentials of this
user to its regular controller in the network (or in case of failure of that controller, to the backup
copy present in the cloud) using the Access Control Manager module as will be discussed in the
following sections.
This module, therefore, manages the authentication and access credentials of the actors in the
interoperability platform. These credentials are usually presented as Access Tokens, as described
in the IEC/TS 62351-8 standard [28], which can be in the form of certificates, and they provide
access rights to certain areas of the system according to the identity of the actor, the security
policies of the system (given by the Policies Manager module which will be described in detail
later on), and the general status of the system. The consideration of the state of the system
requested to be accessed is of high importance in a critical environment, where all actions and
tasks need to be prioritized in order to ensure that high priority or critical tasks are tended to
immediately, leaving these less urgent tasks with a minor degree of priority and therefore carried
out in a later instant of time.
Roles Manager
The Roles Manager service is in charge of managing the roles in the secure interoperability
platform according to the RBAC standard (IEC/TS 62351-8) [28], as described in Section 5.3.1.
This service module is present at each controller in the secure interoperability architecture
and within the cloud AAM. The role manager present at the controller’s level is in charge of
managing the roles of the actors in the system belonging to the area of influence of this given
controller, the same module in the cloud is in charge of the management of the global roles in
the federation infrastructure, as well as maintain a backup copy of the roles configuration at
each of the controllers present in the secure interoperability platform.
This service module is also in charge of the assignment of roles to rights (permissions) according
to the RBAC standard (see Section 5.3.1). This procedure enables the mapping of roles to tasks
performed in the system, and the management at the controller’s level provides the system
with additional flexibility, allowing the system administrators of each subnetwork to manage
the profiles and permissions locally, although always following the system’s security policies and
the established principle of the least privilege (see Section 3.4) and the Dynamic Separation of
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Duties (DSD), which limits the availability of rights to the users by establishing constraints on
the roles they can have activated [28]. Therefore the role manager (either in the controller or
the cloud) enables the system administrators to create, modify and delete any role in the system
and their associated rights and tasks.
Access Control Manager
The Access Control Manager (ACM) service module resides both at the controller’s level in the
secure interoperability infrastructure, and at the cloud’s level. Its main function is to provide
access to the systems in the platform to the actors according to their credentials, assigned roles
and permissions, and taking into account the status of the system and the security policies
present. To perform these functions, this module receives input from di↵erent modules in the
system, within the own AAM it receives information from the identity manager, the roles man-
ager and the authentication manager (described above); from the external modules, the ACM
receives information from the Policies Manager and the Monitoring Manager, which will be
described in detail in the following sections.
Therefore, the ACM, in order to make the decision whether or not to grant access to an actor to
the system, receives the actor’s credentials, which can be mapped to the information present in
the authentication manager in order to determine if it is a legitimate actor of the interoperability
platform or not. Once established the legitimacy of the actor, the system can verify its identity
using the information stored on the identity manager module. The ACM also receives informa-
tion on the tasks and requests the actor needs to perform on the interoperability platform from
the received credentials and verifies the roles and rights necessary to perform them through the
roles manager.
With all this information, together with the analysis on the system status and context provided
by the Policies Manager module, and the identification of any suspicious behavior on the part of
the actor provided by the Monitoring Manager module, the ACM can take the decision whether
or not to authenticate and grant access to the system to the requesting actor. This process is
performed at each controller locally, with the support of the ACM module present in the cloud,
which is capable of providing absent information (i.e., present in other controllers or in the
backup copy) to the local controller in order to perform the authentication in the system.
Delegation Tokens Manager and Proxy
The Delegation Tokens Manager (DTM) and Proxy modules are services present in the cloud’s
AAM (see Figure 5.5). They act in case of colapse or failure of the ground servers of a cloudlet,
which contain the controllers of the cloudlet. The DTM and proxy provide robustness to the
secure interoperability platform, since it allows the actors in the area of influence of the failing
system (cloudlet server, specific controller, etc.) to continue their tasks by redirecting their
control requests to any other responsive controller in the federation they need to access for
service continuity, regardless of the smart grid provider the newly accessed controller belongs
to.
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Therefore, the DTM and proxy modules provide delegation mechanisms to the secure interop-
erability infrastructure, as described in Section 5.3.7. According to the procedure described
in Section 5.3.7, each controller in the federation is in charge of generating and maintaining a
set of delegation tokens which grant delegation authorization to a set of trusted controllers in
the federation belonging to other service providers. Each controller periodically transfers these
delegation tokens to the DTM present in the cloud for storage.
In the event a legitimate actor fails to be authenticated with the controllers in the area of its own
service provider, it would redirect their request to any other responsive controller. This controller
may not have the information needed for authenticate and authorize this new actor, therefore,
it will request the cloud the necessary credentials. The cloud would consult the requested
information through the global roles manager and ACM modules to verify the credentials of
the actor and its assigned roles and permissions, and re-encrypt the requested credentials for
the new controller using the proxy module in the cloud and the previously generated delegation
token present in the DTM. This process always takes into account the information coming from
the Monitoring Manager, the status of the system and the prioritization of actions coming from
the Policies Manager, as described in detail in Section 5.3.7. The new re-encrypted credentials
are sent to the local AAM to grant access to the actor to the network.
5.4.2 Policies Manager
The Policies Manager service module is one of the main components needed for the imple-
mentation of interoperability in our secure interoperability architecture model. This module
is in charge of allowing the di↵erent actors in the system access to the federation’s networks
and resources present in the interoperability platform. This function is a critical one, since
any access to critical resources increments its workload, and in an environment where thou-
sand of nodes coexists in a network, incorrect accesses and workload assignments can result
in system faults causing service interruptions and errors cascading through the interconnected
infrastructures.
Therefore, the policies manager is responsible for managing the access to the di↵erent resources
of the federation, remote or local, granting permissions to perform tasks only to authorized
actors of the system and only in the case that system’s status (context) is compatible with
these actions (see Section 5.3.6 for information on the context). An example of the actuation
of the policies manager module can be observed in the following scenario: An external auditor
is scheduled to audit the cloudlet servers of infrastructure A, however, there has been a critical
error in one of the cloudlets, collapsing the communications network in that area. When the
external auditor (a legitimate actor in the system) requests access to these servers, the policies
manager identifies the critical context in this area of the network and delays the auditor’s access
until the system administrator in charge of maintenance in the a↵ected cloudlet can access the
system to perform restoration and recovery tasks.
As we can see, this module is of vital importance for the correct operation of our secure in-
teroperability platform. The policies manager module resides at each controller in the system
and also in the federation cloud. The policies manager is composed of four di↵erent services
sub-modules: the Context Manager and the Authorization Manager, which are present both in
the controllers and in the cloud, the Protocol Converter which is present at the controller’s level,
176
5.4. Design of the Services Modules
and the Security Policies Manager and Protocol Conversion Manager backup modules that are
present in the cloud. We devote the remainder of this section to the description of each of these
modules.
Context Manager
The Context Manager module, as previously stated, is present at the cloud’s level and within
each controller of the system. This module is in charge of gathering the information collected
by the diagnosis system and NSM objects [142] deployed through the secure interoperability
platform (see Figures 5.3 and 5.7, where these objects are depicted by a brown dot), as previ-
ously described in Section 5.3.6. This module is responsible for the system’s context awareness
mechanisms (see Section 3.3), i.e., the CM modules retrieve contextual information on the status
of the system, filtering and storing it for later consults.
This information is used frequently by the controllers and the cloud in order to take ad-hoc
decision on the authentication and authorization processes, as well as to provide up-to-date
information to the Monitoring Manager module to perform the analysis of the network. Based
on the information provided by the CM, together with the security policies of the federation,
actions and accessed are managed and prioritized in our interoperability platform. Although
the functionality performed by the CM in the controllers and in the cloud is basically the same,
it is necessary to di↵erentiate the type of information that is provided by the NSM objects
to the controllers is of a local perspective of the networks in their area of influence, while the
information gathered by the CM in the cloud receives global information from all sections of the
secure interoperability platform.
Further, it is important to stress the importance of the di↵erent CM modules, since each con-
troller situational awareness is constructed using information which comes in an important part
from the context. The information gathered by the diagnosis system and NSM objects, together
with the monitoring manager and, in a lesser degree, the other managers in the controller and
the cloud allow the system to perceive the system’s dynamics, threats and possible risks and
impacts to its operation.
Authorization Manager
The Authorization Manager module is in charge of providing the legitimate actors in the system
authorization to access the di↵erent resources of the secure interoperability infrastructure. To
this end, this module concentrates the contextual information of the system coming from the CM,
information from the security policies of the system and authentication and access information
coming from the AAM module. The authorization manager module resides both in the cloud
and in the controllers of the system. The authorization process is generally performed at the
controller’s level, however, this is a vital process that needs to be extremely robust in order
to ensure the reliability and survivability of the federation’s infrastructure, therefore the cloud
o↵ers an authorization manager service module completely functional and capable of performing
authorization in the event of critical dynamics occurring in the system.
Therefore, when a legitimate actor authenticated within the system requests access to a given
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resource (local or remote), it sends the authorization manager information regarding the type
of access and the target resource requested. The authorization manager retrieves information
on the roles of the actor from the AAM module, verifying whether this actor has permission
to access the resource and perform the indicated tasks (see Section 5.4.1). Once corroborated
this information, the authorization manager enquires the CM about the context and status of
the target resource and its environment. If the context is not labelled as critical, the policies
manager creates the authorization token according to the RBAC (see IEC/TS 62351-8 [28]), and
sends it to the Protocol Converter service module to proceed to the requested network.
In the event of encountering a critical situation (identified through the CM by the diagnosis
system, see Section 5.3.6), only operations of maintenance and mitigation are allowed in the
a↵ected section of the system. Therefore, only the personnel holding the RBAC roles of SecAdm,
Operator, etc. are authorized to access this section of the network to fix the problem. These
accesses are prioritized by the CM and the authorization manager module.
This authorization process, as we previously stated, is usually performed at the controller’s level,
however, there are two events in which the authorization manager of the cloud is needed. First,
in case of remote accesses between subnetworks, the cloud must verify the state and context of
the target node and environment to determine whether a critical context impedes the access for
non-critical operations. The authorization manager in the cloud would be therefore in charge
of performing these verifications and exclude non-essential tra c in critical cases, allowing only
authorized personnel to perform critical operations.
Additionally, in the event of failure of the local controller, its functionality is transferred to
other controller in the cloudlet or even to other remote controllers by means of delegation (see
Section 5.3.7). In this case, the delegated controller may not have an updated database of
actors for authorization procedures, since they are external to their area of influence. To be
able to perform the authorization process, the local authorization manager module transfers
this operation to the cloud authorization manager, or makes use of the information available in
the databases of the Security Policies Manager and the Protocol Conversion Manager service
modules in the cloud to update its databases and perform the authorization operations.
Protocol Converter
The Protocol Converter module is a complex component that resides within each controller. Its
main functionality is to provide a translation service among the protocols of the heterogeneous
networks in the secure interoperability platform for the CPCSs of a federation of SG providers.
Locally, each controller manages and connects multiple type of objects to the interoperability
infrastructure, as we discuss an Industry 4.0 scenario (see Section 5.1) e.g,. industrial sensors,
personal computers, mobile devices, RFID tags, RTUs, etc. Therefore, each object communi-
cates with its assigned controller using its own protocol, and the need of communications among
them poses the need for the controller to provide a translation and conversion platform for the
communication.
However, it is also necessary to address the need for the same translation and conversion mecha-
nisms when there is a need to access remote resources in other subnetworks of the interoperability
infrastructure, e.g., a security administrator (SecAdm) in the corporate network of the Infras-
tructure A needs to manage a non-responsive industrial sensor in the Remote Control Substation
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B (see Figure 5.3). In this scenario, the administrator connects to the local controller using its
PDA, and this controller is in charge of converting the command messages to the adequate pro-
tocol for the industrial sensor in Substation B. This procedure consists on four main steps or
services (see Figure 5.4): Normalization, Protocol Conversion, Security Policy Conversion and
Packet Reconstruction.
Firstly, the normalization service extracts the useful information of the packet, i.e., inspects the
incoming packet to determine the header and payload information, extracting the source and
destination nodes, the command code and other relevant information in the package, discarding
non-relevant information. Once extracted the functions codes for the commands and the relevant
information from the packet, the protocol conversion module translates the control codes from
the source protocol to the destination protocol. The security policy conversion module is in
charge of transforming the security policy from the source to the destination node according to
the IEC/TS 62351 security standard[134]. This service also participates in the normalization
process since the packet is encrypted when it reaches the controller, in accordance with the
security policy from the source network (e.g., symmetric key) and the resulting packet has to
receive the security policy of the destination network (e.g., certificates) [28].
After determining the security policy conversion and the protocol conversion, the packet recon-
struction service creates a new packet with the translated information provided by the protocol
conversion and security policy conversion modules. This module avoid the need for encapsula-
tion and other costly methods of translation that would require high computational resources
available for the devices participating in the network, due to the wide variety of protocols and
security policies that can be present in the federation of providers of the SG, and specially among
the CCPSs networks present in our secure interoperability infrastructure.
Security Policies Manager and Protocol Conversion Manager
The Security Policies Manager (SPM) and the Protocol Conversion Manager (PCM) service
modules reside only in the federation cloud. The SPM is in charge of storing and maintaining
a set of databases (e.g., XML) containing the security policies implemented by each of the
controllers in the federation. This manager stores the policies as backup copies, which allow
the system managers to update the local controllers’ security policy conversion databases in the
event of malfunctions, system upgrades or in case of delegation procedures.
The PCM module also maintains a set of databases as backup and maintenance modules for
each local protocol converter module. Within each controller, the protocol converter has the
means to translate the tra c among the di↵erent protocols existing in its subnetwork or area of
influence (e.g., Modbus [277], DNP3 [14], Bluetooth [114], WirelessHart [115]), the PCM module
retrieves all this knowledge and saves it as backup in a database. This information is available
for local maintenance and recovery procedures.
5.4.3 Monitoring Manager
The Monitoring Manager service module is in charge of scanning the systems and networks
in the secure interoperability infrastructure in order to detect any anomalies or attacks to the
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system which pose risks for the systems belonging to the platform (see Chapter 4). This module is
present at both the controllers and cloud level, where they perform their tasks either from a local
perspective or a global perspective, respectively. The monitoring manager receives information
for surveillance coming from the NSM objects deployed across the platform (see Section 5.3.6).
This module is composed of three main sub-modules, i.e., theMonitor, the Restoration Manager,
and the Alarm Manager services modules. All three of them are present at both the monitoring
managers at the controllers and at the cloud.
Monitor
In addition to the monitoring infrastructure for the network monitoring and defense described
in Section 5.3.5, each controller contains a Local Monitor (LM) service (see Figure 5.4) in order
to detect any abnormal event in the network, i.e., any anomaly of the system or malicious
attack occurring within the range of its area of influence. These monitors, as previously stated,
gather the information obtained by the NSM objects [142] which make available important
behavior information from all the devices in the system, including connected “things” and legacy
equipment. Within each LM, the IDS performs the detection of anomalous events using the
preferred techniques configured by the system managers (see Section 4.2.1). Additionally, the
LM can implement an IDPRS, which can launch countermeasure actions to prevent or react to
the dangerous events occurring within the subnetwork (see Section 4.3).
On the other hand, the cloud implements a Global Monitor (GM) (see Figure 5.5) which gathers
information from the federation subnetworks, containing alarms and context information from
the NSM objects (as detailed in Section 5.3.6), and performs a global detection service. It also
monitors the behaviors of the federation personnel and performs a semantic detection based on
behavior patterns [189]. Since the global IDPRS runs on the computationally powerful servers
of the cloud, it can perform heavy duty-tasks such as automatically determining and launching
prevention and reaction operations taking into account the risks and costs of these operations.
They also can provide support for automatic or semi-automatic countermeasure and mitigation
activities, as described in Section 4.3.5.
Restoration Manager
The Restoration Manager module is in charge of returning the system to its normal state and
operating configuration [241] [242]. Restoration can be implemented using varied techniques, i.e.,
active replication, passive replication, rollback based on checkpoints, rollback based on message
logging, etc. as described in Section 4.4. This module is available in our architecture at the level
of each controller, to perform local restoration tasks, and also it is available in the cloud, where
the system can perform restoration actions at a global level, managing the recovery operations in
di↵erent controllers and applying di↵erent kinds of restoration techniques. Each infrastructure
manager will decide which restoration mechanisms to implement within each subnetwork.
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Alarm Manager
The Alarm Manager service module’s objective is to alert the system administrators and field
operators of any abnormal event in the system, so they can take care of the events and avoid
escalating problems that can cascade through the infrastructure if the anomalous occurrences are
not mitigated on time. The alarm manager receives the information filtered and contextualized
through the NSM objects deployed across the system, and the monitors in the monitoring
managers. This module is present in each of the controllers, supervising the area of influence
of each controller, and where they are able to send local alerts to the nearby personnel and
connected devices. The alarm manager is also present in the cloud, receiving alerts from the
subnetworks in the secure interoperability infrastructure, and notifying the personnel in charge
of the global supervision. Additionally, the alarm manager in the cloud can provide notifications
of any abnormal or dangerous event detected at a global level by the monitoring manager to the
supervisors of the federated system.
5.4.4 Accountability and Backup
The Accountability and Backup service is in charge of gathering su cient evidence to perform
audits and forensic techniques on the data, and also to store and manage the configurations
of the system devices. This module is located in both the cloud and each of the the separate
controllers in the fog servers in the ground networks of the secure interoperability infrastructure
(see Figure 5.3). As in previously detailed modules, the main functionality of the accountability
and backup services in the controllers in the retrieval and storage of local data from the area
of influence of each controller, while the equivalent module residing in the cloud performs the
same activities at a global level in the whole platform, and also stores backup copies of the
information stored by each controller. Each accountability and backup module belonging to the
controllers contains two modules: Logs and Configurations services, while the cloud, in addition
to these two modules, contains a third one called Controllers.
The Logs module is in charge of gathering and storing the events in the system in the form of logs.
As described in Section 5.3.6, these events include information from the accesses to the system,
state changes, faults, alarms, among others. The logs should contain valuable information
capable of providing insight about the events occurring within the system, e.g., they should
reflect and provide useful data about a system crash in a remote substation, including data
such as the time stamp, type of event, time instant, status, device ID, etc. The methods for
event recording should always follow the standards IEC/TS 62351-8 [28] and IEC/TS 62351-7
[142]. As stated, this module exists in the controllers at each subnetwork, which makes use of
the NSM objects deployed in the network to gather and store the logs in the ground servers of
each cloudlet, and then transfer them to the cloud for backup. As previously described, the logs
service in the cloud focuses on logging useful information at a global level containing information
about the communications and accesses occurring among the di↵erent subnetworks in the secure
interoperability infrastructure.
The Configurations module’s main functionality is to manage and store the configurations of
each device in the system, to perform recovery duties or maintenance operations. At the con-
trollers level, the configurations module consists on a database, e.g., an XML database, which
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stores the configurations applied to each devices in their subnetwork or area of influence. These
configuration’s information is maintained at the ground level, and transferred to the cloud for
backup or when the system manager updates the configurations of the devices. The configu-
rations module in the cloud manages and stores the configurations database of the federation.
This task can be considered as Big Data [278] and should be handled in a way that (i) each
configuration’s file and therefore database is as lightweight as possible, (ii) the general database
is well indexed and organized for search and retrieve operations, and (iii) the cloud servers in
charge of the task are su ciently powerful to handle these operations.
The last module, present only in the cloud, is the Controllers service module, which is in charge
of maintaining and managing a database of configurations and backups of each of the controllers
of the federation. This database contains copies of the virtualized controllers running in the
ground servers of the fog, at the cloudlet level, in order to be able to rapidly restore the cloudlet
functionalities in the event of failures.
In addition to the aforementioned functionalities, the cloud plays an important role allowing
access to the data of the whole federation for accountability reasons. The creation of logs of the
system activities allows internal and external auditors to access and review the processes and
behaviors of the systems in the federation to determine whether the member’s security policies
and performance are adequate and in accordance with the law. And also the logs provide very
important information and insight about the system behavior after system crashes using e.g.,
forensic techniques.
5.4.5 Maintenance Manager
The Maintenance Manager is a service module present only at the controller’s level in the
secure interoperability infrastructure (see Figure 5.4). The aim of this module is to help the
system administrator to manage the services and functionalities o↵ered by the controller to its
subnetwork, improve and update the configurations of the controllers and main network devices
in the cloudlet. This maintenance manager module stores a database of the configurations of the
system, and configuration mechanisms to restore, backup, recover or modify each of the services
operating within the controller. As the controllers are virtualized, the management operations
are performed at the ground servers of the subnetwork, in a context of virtual management and
orchestration [126] that allows the continuous operation of the system without disruption for
maintenance processes.
5.5 Analysis of the Operation of the Secure Interoperability Ar-
chitecture
This interoperability architecture model is designed to enable communications between the ac-
tors of an industrial platform, despite their intrinsic characteristics (protocol, computational
capabilities, location, etc.), in a secure and prioritized manner. Prioritization in this context,
as defined earlier, refers to the transmission of critical communications (data, commands) with-
out interruption or delays, even in the presence of network congestions or broken links. To
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this end the platform needs to ensure that its processes are robust enough to manage critical
situations.
We contemplate the communications within the platform at two di↵erent levels: local com-
munications within the same cloudlet, e.g., between the nodes of the same remote substation
or SCADA center, and global communications where a node in a subnetwork can establish a
successful connection with any other node in the network of the federation, e.g., data sharing
between the servers of two providers in the federation.
5.5.1 Local Communication
Local communications make use of the cloudlet infrastructure, without going to the cloud by
default. These connections are established between the nodes of the same cloudlet, and therefore
our interoperability platform o↵ers the services available at the level of controller (see Figure 5.4).
When a local communication is requested, e.g., a field operator performing maintenance oper-
ations requests access to an RTU in a remote control network (see Figure 5.3), the new device
needs to establish a connection with the controller present in the area of influence.
The successful establishment of a connection with the controller enables the device access to
the interoperability platform, therefore, valid credentials need to be provided and verified by
the new actor. This process is conducted at the AAM service module. Therefore, the new
node entering the network provides a set of credentials which will be validated by the ACM in
coordination with the the identity manager service (see Section 5.4.1). If the platform uses the
RBAC standard [28], the new actor will provide an authentication token in the form of an X.509
type A ID certificate, an X.509 type B attribute certificate, or a class C access token [279].
Once the identity manager has validated the identity of the new device with the credentials
provided, the authentication manager authenticates the new actor in the network. Following
the IEC/TS 62351-8 standard [28], the access control manager retrieves the roles and permissions
for the new actor from the roles manager taking into account the credentials provided and assign
them to it. Therefore, through this first step, a new legitimate device is authenticated in the
interoperability platform, and assigned a set of roles and permissions in the system according
to the RBAC standard.
The authentication process, as stated in Section 5.4.1 receives information from the policies
manager service in order to determine if the system’s operation is normal, or there has happened
a critical event, which would mean that a non-critical connection to the platform is delayed until
the system is restored to normal operation. Additionally, the AAM service also receives input
from the monitoring manager module, which is in charge of detecting any abnormal behavior
or connections to the system (any unusual connections could be rejected by this module before
authentication).
When the authentication is performed in the system, the new node is authorized to perform
diverse actions, according to the roles and permissions assigned to it during the process of au-
thorization. If the new device requests a target node (e.g., an RTU) to perform some actions
by using the same communication protocol, e.g., they both establish a connection using Mod-
bus/TCP, the policies manager module would only extract context information for the context
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manager and authorize the communication if the system’s operation is normal (no critical event
requires non-critical connections to be dropped, see more in Section 5.4.2).
However, if the new device connected to the network uses a communications protocol di↵erent
from the target node, i.e., it is necessary to provide a protocol conversion for the two devices
to communicate, e.g., a WirelessHart PLC wants to connect to a Modbus/TCP RTU. Here the
policies manager’s protocol converter module (see Section 5.4.2) is activated. There are several
ways to implement the protocol converter, however the theoretical operation of the module
when node A wants to communicate to node B in the network is as described in Sections 5.4.2
and 5.4.2. When a packet from node A to node B (it requires conversion of protocol) arrives to
the controller, it is normalized, the protocol and the security policies are converted, and then
the packet is built again. Once reconstructed the packet, taking information from the context
manager in order to determine if the communications can proceed (they are authorized by the
authorization manager), the packet is sent to node B of the network.
All this communication’s tra c is analyzed and monitored by the monitoring manager service,
together with the context manager module. The local monitor determines if the tra c in the
network is legitimate, or there are threatening behaviors in the network (see Section 5.4.3) in
which case, its response system would act to protect the system, and the alarm manager module
would alert the system administrators to fix the situation (see Section 5.4.3). In case the system
would be a↵ected, the restoration manager module would act in order to return the system to
its regular operation (see Section 5.4.3).
Any tra c and events in the network is saved for later analysis, this is performed by the account-
ability and backup module (see Section 5.4.4). Additionally, the maintenance manager service
allows direct intervention within the controller to the system administrators, where its config-
urations database together with the configurations backups of the accountability module helps
the operators to perform maintenance and optimization operations within the controller.
5.5.2 Global Communication
The other type of communication within the secure interoperability infrastructure is the global
communication processes, where two nodes in the federation of provider’s control network es-
tablish a connection to exchange information or commands (see Figure 5.3). To enable these
communications, these nodes make use of their assigned controller’s services (the controller
which authenticates the node within the platform), as well as the services in the cloud (see
Figure 5.5).
In order to establish a communication between local node A and remote node B, A must be
first authenticated in the system, and authorized to perform the desired action using the local
services of its controller, as detailed in the previous section. Once verified the need to estab-
lish a remote connection, the controller redirects the tra c through the cloud, to the remote
network (and assigned controller) where node B is. In simple legitimate communications where
data or commands are transferred, the functions of the cloud are limited to monitoring global
dynamics and providing accountability services for the global connections in the platform (see
Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4). The other services perform periodic updates of configurations to their
databases according to the di↵erent network configurations in the platform.
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When there is the need to provide interoperability services within nodes of remote networks, the
protocol conversion is performed at the local level (at each controller) as described in the previous
section, only if the controllers establishing the connection know the protocols used by both the
source and the destination nodes in the communication. If this configuration is not available at
a given controller, the protocol conversion is performed in the cloud, in a similar manner to the
controller’s process, while the protocol conversion and the security policy conversion services in
the controller are updated with the information provided by the protocol conversion manager
and the security policies manager modules (respectively) at the cloud.
The last case in which the cloud services are needed for remote communication is when a con-
troller belonging to the platform stops working. This can be due to a malfunction, system
anomaly, congestion, maintenance operations, cyberattacks, etc. Since the secure interoperabil-
ity platform needs to be reliable and robust, there are methods at local and global level to avoid
sections of the control network to become isolated. At the local level, each controller is config-
ured to accept connections and authenticate into the platform those nodes that are usually in
their area of influence, plus some of the nodes that usually belong to the neighboring controllers
(they are cached in case there is congestion in the network or the computational e ciency of a
given system is reduced).
However, there are two di↵erent scenarios where a controller needs to authenticate a previously
unknown actor in the network. In the first place when a new legitimate node is added to
the network in the area of influence of the controller. The second case is when a neighboring
controller stops operating (due to malfunctions or maintenance) and the nodes in its area of
influence become isolated and therefore request access to the interoperability platform through
a new controller. The operations to enable the new actors in the (local and global) network are
performed at the cloud by the access manager module (see Section 5.4.1), specifically by the
delegation tokens manager and proxy modules (see Section 5.4.1).
The procedures applied in the case of a controller which stops working and the nodes in its
area of influence need new access to the platform is described in Section 5.3.7, where we see
the delegation process in detail. In the case of arrival of a new node to the network, when the
controller does not have the node’s identity in its database, the AAM module sends a query
to the cloud’s access manager database in order to retrieve the information from the new node
from the platform’s databases. Once downloaded to the local controller, the configuration is
updated and the node becomes a legitimate member of this controller’s network. It is possible
that system administrators add manually the new identity, roles and permissions to the local
controller instead of making them available in the cloud. These local configurations would be
later transferred to the cloud via the maintenance manager and the accountability and backup
services (see Sections 5.4.5 and 5.4.4).
5.5.3 Cases of Example of the Operation of the Platform
This section is devoted to present di↵erent examples of application of the communication pro-
cesses in our secure interoperability infrastructure. In the first place, we present an scenario
where elements from the IoT interact with a SG platform. Secondly, we describe an scenario
where a cyber stealth attack impacts the regular operation of a network segment which belongs
to the interoperability platform, and the procedures taken to palliate the threat.
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The IoT Scenario
This first case of example contemplates the operation of the secure interoperability architecture
when establishing the communication mechanisms between an industrial IoT platform and the
SCADA network of a SG provider. There are several protocols used by the industrial IoT
communications, e.g, OPC Unified Architecture (OPC-UA), guided by the standard IEC 62541
[280]) or Message Queueing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), guided by the standard ISO/IEC
PRF 20922 [281]. In our example this IoT platform uses the MQTT protocol. The SCADA
system of the SG provider uses the industrial protocol DNP3 [14].
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Figure 5.9: The IoT communications scenario
Figure 5.9 illustrates this example. A SCADA server authenticated within the interoperability
platform requests information from the IoT platform which also belongs to the platform. This
request goes through the controller in the area of influence of the server and it identifies the
need of a remote connection to the IoT platform, as well as a conversion of protocol. The local
controller in the area of the SG server does not implement a protocol conversion between the
MQTT and the DNP3 protocols, therefore, it sends the cloud the request to update the local
database of protocol and policy conversion and forwards the first communication packets to the
cloud to handle them.
The cloud performs the protocol and policies conversion for this communication, and estab-
lishes that the context is not critical and the operations are authorized according to the RBAC
properties assigned to the actors involved in the communication. Then the cloud forwards the re-
constructed packets to the controller in the area of the industrial IoT platform, while monitoring
the behavior of the two networks at a global level. Each of the local monitors at the controllers
also monitors the context of their subnetwork and the dynamics in their area in order to detect
any abnormal or threatening events. The controller in the IoT area delivers the packets and
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awaits for the response communications. The process for the response would be symmetrical,
until the configuration is updated in the controllers involved in the communication, and then
the cloud only intervenes in this process as a monitor and logger for the connection.
Cyber Stealth Attack Scenario
In this second case of example, there has been a cyberattack compromising the controller in
the remote control field network of provider A in the federation of SG providers. This attack’s
objective is to extract sensitive information from the controller, through the establishment of
a side-channel timing attack (see Chapter 2). This kind of stealthy attack is highly di cult to
detect for a single IDS perspective, however in this secure interoperability platform, the network
dynamics of the a↵ected node are monitored from their neighboring nodes and the cloud.
Thanks to this, the system is able to detect the attack and determine the possible counter-
measures applicable to palliate the situation. Given that the system’s context is not critical
(established by the context manager at the local and neighboring areas), there are su ciently
robust backup mechanisms deployed in the system, and the risk assessment of the situation in-
dicates that the attack poses a higher threat to the system than its countermeasures, the IPRS
at the global monitor acts by isolating the a↵ected controller.
This means the remote control field network of provider A is disconnected from the interoper-
ability platform, and in order to regain access to the platform, the nodes in this network must
connect to the platform through a neighboring controller. The nodes in this field network then
try to access the controller in charge of the SG network of provider B. Since provider’s A nodes
are not usually in the area of influence of provider’s B controller, it needs to send a petition to
the cloud to download the appropriate information to authenticate and authorize the new actors
in the system. This collaboration is enabled in the system thanks to the delegation procedures
implemented in the architecture (see Section 5.3.7), and it is maintained until the system ad-
ministrators restore the a↵ected controller. Figure 5.10 illustrate this scenario with a sequence
diagram.
5.6 Summary
The contents of this section is focused on proposing a design in the form of an architecture
model, for the secure interoperability of CPCSs of the smart grid. In this scenario we contem-
plate the interactions and cooperations among di↵erent SG providers, which exchange critical
information and share the management and maintenance of some of the infrastructure systems
in common, and most importantly, they share the responsibility for the assistance and care
of the systems in the presence of critical events, for protection, mitigation and response and
restoration actions.
In order to provide this architecture model, we base our design on the wide analysis previously
presented in the Chapters 3, 4 and 2 of this thesis, where we extract the main requirements, rec-
ommendations and techniques for achieving secure interoperability between critical systems and
define a threat model for the platform. Since this scenario contemplates di↵erent and heteroge-
neous technologies, we define our architecture as belonging to the Industry 4.0 paradigm, where
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Figure 5.10: The cyberattack communications scenario
CPCSs, cloud technologies and (industrial) IoT devices coexist and interact in a cooperative
way. In addition to the previously extracted guidelines and recommendations for the design,
we also take into account diverse standards for interoperability and security as mentioned in
Section 5.1.
Thus, we propose an architecture model for secure interoperability of CPCSs, as reflected in
Figure 5.3, which makes use of the following main characteristics and technologies:
• Access control mechanisms, in order to authenticate actors within the system, always in
line with the basic security services identified in Section 4.1. To provide access control, we
make use of the RBAC standard defined in the IEC/TS 62351-8 [28].
• Software defined networking-based solutions, for the inclusion of new sophisticated mech-
anisms at the level of subnetwork, which enable new and flexible routing solutions, inter-
operability procedures, and advanced prevention, awareness and protection solutions (see
Chapter 4).
• Cloud and Fog computing infrastructures, which allow the introduction of virtualized
services, the inclusion of sophisticated routing solutions based on the SDN paradigm,
additional support for interoperability procedures, as well as means for enhancing the
survivability and reliability of a working interoperability infrastructure for the CPCSs of
the SG.
• A defense in depth strategy that implements security procedures at di↵erent levels, ensur-
ing the basic security services are always observed in the platform (see Section 4.1), which
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include the utilization of a sophisticated diagnosis system across the platform, based on
the IEC/TS 62351-7 [142]. This standard is in charge of the specification of the NSM ob-
jects, which are deployed within the infrastructure and retrieve monitoring and contextual
information from the platform in order to supply guide the interoperability procedures.
• The implementation of delegation mechanisms in order to ensure that critical events are
always and rapidly attended in the infrastructure, even when the assigned personnel to
take care of these situations is not available. In order to implement this, we implement
the RBAC model with primary (regular) and secondary roles for emergency, which can
be activated in case of emergency. The use of secondary roles, as well as the delegation
mechanisms with PRE techniques allow di↵erent members of the federated providers of
the SG to take care of critical events arising at any part of the secure interoperability
platform, providing robust protection and mitigation mechanisms for the infrastructure.
Thanks to these mechanisms, we provide an architecture (see Figure 5.3), based on two main
interoperability components residing in the controllers (see Figure 5.4) and in the cloud (see Fig-
ure 5.5), which apply the aforementioned recommendations and technologies. The operation of
this platform is detailed in Section 5.5 where we include two di↵erent cases of use of the platform
for the Industry 4.0 and to illustrate the capabilities of this architecture when facing a cyber
(stealthy) attack (see Chapter 2). Therefore this platform, as described previously, achieves the
complete desired functionality for the secure interoperability of CPCSs, always observing the
requirements for CIs and interoperability of critical systems described in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 6
Experimentation and Validation of
the Architectural Model
This chapter is devoted to the analysis and validation of the secure interoperability architecture
model designed in the previous section, through the performance of various experiments. In
the first sections we establish the scope of the validation of our architecture model provided in
Chapter 5, and design a set of validation cases to test the proposed system through experimen-
tation in di↵erent scenarios. In Section 6.3 we describe the di↵erent modules and features of
the testbed we create for the validation, which is based on a network emulator capable of inte-
grating real communication’s protocols and therefore real network tra c. Section 6.4 provides
the results of the di↵erent experiments performed in the testbed, and details the key modules
implemented for the tests describing the processes followed and the resulting outcomes. In this
section we also provide a performance analysis to better understand the system dynamics and
help determine whether the solutions provided by our architecture model are appropriate for a
critical environment.
6.1 Scope of the Validation
In Chapter 5, we propose a design for a secure interoperability architecture model for the CPCSs
of the SG. Its complete design is illustrated in Figure 5.3, where it is possible to appreciate the
di↵erent components and services present in the infrastructure, according to the previously iden-
tified requirements and recommendations framed within a transitional version of the Industry 4.0
paradigm. In order to test this proposed design we need to perform a series of experiments capa-
ble of determining if the technologies and services included in the architecture model are suitable
for critical constrained scenarios and support the interoperability processes properly.
The secure interoperability architecture model features two main services modules residing in
the controllers of the infrastructure (see Figure 5.4), and in the cloud servers (Figure 5.5), as
described in Section 5.4. As we can observe in the design provided in Chapter 5, the main func-
tionalities for interoperability are concentrated in the controller’s modules of the infrastructure
(see Figure 5.4), being the operations performed in the cloud mainly supporting operations for
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the controllers, backup operations, and heavy-duty computing related to big data and streaming
data analysis.
With these characteristics in mind, we decide to focus our experimentations on the main security
and interoperability functionalities performed by the controllers in the platform. The main
reason behind this decision is the utilization of relatively new technologies at the controller’s level,
such as the inclusion of the SDN paradigm (see Section 5.3.4), which introduces new challenges
and di culties in the implementations of the interoperability functions, and the uncertainty
related to the suitability of the use of SDN for critical scenarios in terms of performance and
reliability. Cloud technologies have been long studied, and the functionalities o↵ered by the
secure interoperability platform at the cloud’s level have been evaluated in other works, such as
delegation mechanisms [282] (see Section 5.3.7), or the IDPRS solutions for the cloud [283] (see
Chapter 4).
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Figure 6.1: Simplified controller
We identify as important services for verification: the protocol converter, the authorization
manager (together with its related services in the AAM module (see Section 5.4)), and the
monitoring manager with its local monitor and the alarm manager, together with the logs
module. These services are illustrated in Figure 6.1, which represents the selected modules
for our simplified controller prototype. Therefore, since the prototype controller provides the
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implementation of the main interoperability methods, it is possible to assess the behavior of
the complete controllers at the secure interoperability infrastructure, by analyzing the operation
and performance of the simplified module.
There are several services that we consider less important to validate, since we believe they
add little value to our analysis of secure interoperability for critical scenarios. For example,
authentication procedures, which are widely available in most information technologies systems
(and they already are widely present in most CIs), have a well known behavior in critical envi-
ronments [284, 285]. Therefore, we believe that adding these services to the testbed would not
be very useful for the interoperability validation purposes, and would make the implementation
and use of the testbed more complicated.
In the context of the advanced security services, it is our aim to provide an overview of the
functionalities o↵ered by the monitoring manager’s IDPRS, however, it is not our purpose to
install a complex and complete IDS solution with its response module, especially designed to
work in a critical setting. This is due to de fact that currently (as explained in Section 4.2),
detection and protection solutions for critical systems are subject of current intense research,
where the scientific community is trying to provide e cient solutions capable of performing
properly in a critical scenario. We, therefore, provide a proof of concept for the validation
cases, but we do not intend to tackle the task of building a complete IDPRS for our simplified
interoperability testbed.
The diagnosis system is a module which would result in a challenging implementation for our
experimentation due to the characteristics of the fully-functional diagnosis system described in
Section 5.3.6. This system requires the deployment of NSM objects within all the components
and devices present in our testbed. However, since our focus for these experiments are centered
on interoperability for a reduced set of use cases, we find that we can include and simulate in
the testbed a reduced version of this module, rather than a fully-fledged diagnosis system based
on the IEC/TS 62351-7 standard [142] as proposed in Chapter 5. If we focus on the use of
NSM objects for the identification of threatening dynamics occurring within the system to feed
information to protection systems, it is possible to find several works which feed data to the IDS
and security systems using this technology [248, 286].
Additionally, we also consider that the implementation of all the backup activities to the cloudlet
servers and the cloud in our testbed experimentation would not result of interest for our tests.
These backup and accountability processes are very well known and are currently employed in
the majority of IT systems [287, 8, 264], therefore we believe they would provide little added
value to the verification of the functionalities of our architectural model.
For our interoperability tests, we need to do experiments using two or more industrial protocols
in order to assess the services that provide the protocol conversion. For our tests we have
chosen two industrial protocols, the Modbus/TCP protocol [265] and the IEC 60870-5-104 or
IEC104 protocol [7]. These protocols have been widely used in the industry for long years, and
they have still a strong presence in today’s industrial networks. These protocols have a cabled
nature, they are standards (Modbus is a de facto standard), and their interesting characteristic
for our testbed is that without any modification to the original protocols, they do not implement
security encoding mechanisms, therefore the messages are transmitted in clear. This provides
our testbed with networks which use real industrial protocols, which messages are open and easy
to understand and manipulate with the analysis tools, without introducing any modifications to
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the protocols in order to do so.
Therefore, given these considerations, it is possible to design and analyze a series of experimen-
tation scenarios, which allow us to test and understand the secure interoperability capabilities
of a simplified version of the controller services modules designed for our secure interoperability
architecture model. By testing the services present in the simplified controller in Figure 6.1,
we believe it is possible to gain su cient insight about the properties and performance of the
proposed architecture model (see Chapter 5), in order to determine if the secure architecture
infrastructure provided is suitable for the interoperability of critical systems.
6.2 Design of the experiment: Scenario and Validation Cases
Therefore, taking into account the considerations provided in Section 6.1, we present a testbed
scenario for three di↵erent validation cases which intend to analyze the performance of the
main interoperability services provided by the controllers and determine their suitability for
their original purpose. Our scenario can be described, therefore, as a platform which enables
the secure interoperability among di↵erent actors belonging to the smart grid (see Figure 6.2),
within this complex and heterogeneous scenario, we choose to study the interactions that can
occur within the environment of a hydroelectric dam belonging to the smart grid, and managed
and exploited by two di↵erent energy providers (A and B), which are partners in the same
federation of energy providers (see Figure 6.3).
Each of the providers has a control and monitoring network deployed in the dam in order to
gather their own supervisory and control data. However, in order to minimize costs, part of the
substation (cloudlet, see Section 5.3) equipment is in a shared regime, especially the cloudlet’s
main servers and hence the network controllers that manage the di↵erent providers’ network
functions. In this scenario, we consider that provider A owns a supervisory and control network
that implements the IEC104 protocol (its characteristics are elaborated in Section 6.3.4) to allow
the communications between the di↵erent CPCSs (industrial sensors, RTUs, personal computers,
remote operations, etc.).
The energy provider B has a network deployed for the control and supervision of the CPCSs of
the dam that uses the Modbus/TCP protocol (for further information see Section 6.3.3). These
providers manage their own equipment separately but in a cooperative way, allowing interactions
between the di↵erent CPCSs in order to gain robustness and security through the redundancy,
replication, diversity and self-awareness techniques (see Section 3.4).
In the validation scenarios we contemplate in this section, the control system owned by provider
A verifies the rate at which the water is being released from the dam in order to produce energy.
Since this procedure is critical for the dam, e.g., too much water release can cause floods in
neighboring areas, too much water contained can cause damage to the dam due to water pres-
sure, the control equipment must make constant verifications that the obtained measures are
correct. In order ensure that the taken measures are correct and prevent anomalies, provider’s
A CPCSs periodically request provider’s B CPCSs verification measurements that allows the
control systems check their correct operation and face errors such as sensor degradation, mal-
functions, water theft or other malicious cyber (stealthy) attacks (see Chapter 2). Additionally,
these inter-provider verifications can be launched as protection and response measures in case
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Figure B-1. Examining the Domains in Detail 
 
The purpose of the domain diagram is to provide a framework for discussing both the existing 
power system and the evolving smart grid. While Chapter 5 shows domain interactions and 
overall scope, the following sections describe the details of the specific domains. Note that the 
domain diagrams, as presented, are not intended to be comprehensive in identifying all actors 
and all paths possible in the smart grid. This achievement will only be possible after additional 
elaboration and consolidation of use cases are achieved by stakeholder activities that are 
ongoing.  
 
It is important to note that the domain diagram (or the conceptual model) of the smart grid is not 
limited to a single domain, single application, or single use case. For example, the use of “smart 
grid” in some discussions has been applied to only distribution automation or in other 
discussions to only advanced metering or demand response. The conceptual model assumes that 
smart grid includes a wide variety of use cases and applications, especially (but not limited to) 
functional priorities and cross-cutting requirements identified by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC). The scope also includes other cross-cutting requirements including data 
management and application integration, as described in the GridWise Architecture Council 
Interoperability Context-Setting Framework.189 
189 See http://www.gridwiseac.org/pdfs/interopframework_v1_1.pdf 
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Figure 6.2: The NIST smart grid model [6]
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Figure 6.3: Testbed scenario for the secure interoperability infrastructure
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of cyber attacks. In the remainder of this section, we describe three main validation cases which
depict di↵erent scenarios for experimentation and assessment of the capabilities of our simplified
controller for interoperability.
6.2.1 Validation Case 1: Protocol Converter
The Policies Manager module present in our controller (see Figure 6.1) is composed of two
main components (see Section 5.4.2 for further information), the Protocol Converter and the
Authorization Manager. This first validation case is focused on the functionalities and modules
implemented by the protocol converter. This validation case is based on the aforementioned
scenario set in the previous section (see Section 6.2). The main actors present are (see Fig-
ure 6.4):
• Provider A: subnetwork of CPCSs communicating in the IEC104 protocol.
• Provider B: subnetwork of CPCSs communicating in the Modbus/TCP protocol.
• Federation equipment: a virtual switch with its corresponding SDN controller.
In this scenario, the CPCSs belonging to the Provider A are taking measurements on the rate that
the water is released from the dam and transmitting it to the control station through a IEC104
client-server communication. In parallel, Provider B CPCSs’ are also monitoring the water
release using its own network of clients and servers which communicates over Modbus/TCP.
In order to make sure that everything is correct and avoid system anomalies, periodically the
IEC104 client opens a connection with the Modbus server (RTU), to request the measurements
taken by the Provider’s B sensor network.
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IEC104 
Client
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Figure 6.4: Converted tra c between nodes that use di↵erent communication protocols
This communication is facilitated in a transparent way by the SDN controller, which receives the
requests from the di↵erent subnetworks and performs the protocol conversion in order to allow
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this inter-protocol communication. Once the IEC104 client verifies that the measurements are
correct, closes this connection with the other provider’s network and continuous to work with its
own control network. These periodic verifications provides the CI with additional security mech-
anisms based on the interoperability and cooperation of di↵erent control infrastructures.
6.2.2 Validation Case 2: Monitoring Manager
The second validation case is devoted to analyze theMonitoring Manager and the Accountability
and Backup modules functionality. These modules are present in the controller designed for our
architecture in Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4, and for our study, we have simplified some of their
functions (see Figure 6.1). We validate these two services in this same scenario since they are
highly interrelated. Therefore, in this section we have two main case studies for validation:
the validation of the Logger module, and the validation of the Local Monitor together with the
Alarm Manager module. The main actors involved in this scenario are (see Figure 6.5):
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Figure 6.5: Disconnection attack
• Provider A: subnetwork of CPCSs communicating in the IEC104 protocol.
• Provider B: subnetwork of CPCSs communicating in the Modbus/TCP protocol.
• Federation equipment: a virtual switch with its corresponding SDN controller.
• Federation equipment: a database of system logs.
• Federation operator: a system operator monitoring a Human Machine Interface (HMI)
where the system alerts are sent.
• Malicious actor performing cyber attacks.
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To validate the logging module, the scenario is set as follows: the CPCSs belonging to the
Provider A are taking measurements on the rate that the water is released from the dam and
transmitting it to the control station through a IEC104 client-server communication. In parallel,
Provider B CPCSs’ are also monitoring the water release using its own network of clients and
servers which communicates over Modbus/TCP. The SDN controller provides logging function-
ality, saving any event in the system with its timestamp and associated criticality level. As
we discussed previously, in our scenario of validations, the logger module is tightly interrelated
with the monitoring manager, therefore we test its operation by launching events which are first
detected and handled by the monitoring manager module and then logged into the system for
accountability.
For the validation of the monitoring manager module, we take aforementioned scenario of com-
munications, and launch various cyber attacks against the system with varying degrees of stealth-
iness (see Chapter 2). Each of the following settings shows the application of a cyber attack
against the testbed and the behavior of the system in the validation case:
Disconnection and Goodput Reduction Attack
The first type of attack we launch is one with a low degree of stealthiness, we perform a dis-
connection attack (see Section 2.3.1) in which the attacker disconnects one of the industrial
sensors belonging to the control network of provider A, causing it to stop transmitting. This is
detected by the IDS module in the controller, which analyzes this behavior, launching protective
measures. The first measure is made through the alarm manager module, which sends an alert
to the system operators monitoring the HMI, in order to re-establish the normal operation of
the system. The second measure is taken by the IPRS module, which launches a petition to the
Modbus server (RTU) in Provider’s B sensor network, to request the measurements of the dam
while the system is not working properly. This attack is illustrated in Figure 6.5.
Active Eavesdropping Attack
The second attack scenario reflects the performance of an active eavesdropping attack (see
Section 2.3.2). It is done by introducing a Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM). In this setting,
the malicious actor impersonates a node of the network using spoofing techniques, and tries to
perform di↵erent control actions in the system to extract information. They are detected by the
IDS module of the monitoring manager, and protective measures are launched to protect the
system. Firstly, as in the previous case, an alarm is sent to the system operators monitoring the
HMI. Secondly, the IPRS module filters non-authorized operations and tra c generated by the
attacker through a whitelisting procedure. The attack is illustrated in Figure 6.6.
Covert channel attack
In the last example, we launch a stealth attack against the testbed by implementing a covert
channel (see Section 2.3.4) between two nodes of the network. In this case, we work with a
scenario where a sophisticated malware has infected several nodes of Provider’s A network (see
Figure 6.7). The objective of this malware, which operates in a similar way to Stuxnet [48], is to
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Figure 6.6: Active eavesdropping attack
stealthily degrade the operation of Provider’s A infrastructure, reducing the availability of the
control infrastructure, in order to cause disruptions and economic loss. This malware targets
the IEC104 servers and clients of Provider’s A control infrastructure.
The infection of these systems has the objective of making the RTUs and PLCs under its influence
to selectively and stealthily turn o↵ the industrial sensors under their control to simulate system
failures, hence reducing the availability of the sensor nodes and producing interruptions in the
supervision and control procedures. To launch such an attack in a stealthy way, an infected
IEC104 RTU gathers information from compromised IEC104 sensors via a covert channel. In
our attack scenario, the compromised RTU uses this covert channel to retrieve the number of
hours each sensor has been working without interruption (uptime), in order to better select
the sensor to turn o↵ so this action goes unnoticed by the system operators. This dynamic is
reflected in Figure 6.7.
Since the malware is gathering unauthorized system information by hiding it within the IEC104
packets, the IDS in the controller’s local monitor detects it and alerts the system operators
in the HMI. The IPRS launches a countermeasure action based on whitelisting which filters
the packets belonging to the covert channel’s communication. This filter allows all legitimate
network packets to continue their route, while it sanitizes the packets which carry the covert
channel’s information by removing the information. This is done until the system administrators
remove the malware from the infected devices.
All the events produced by each attack scenario are also categorized as critical and saved to
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Figure 6.7: Covert channel attack
the logging database. These accountability procedures are useful for the validation of the logger
module.
6.2.3 Validation Case 3: Authorization and Access Manager
The last validation scenario studies the Authorization Manager present in the Policies Manager
(see Section 5.4.2), thus completing the validation study of this module together with Validation
Case 1 in Section 6.2.1; and also analyzes the Authentication and Access Manager module of the
controller (see Section 5.4.1). Figure 6.8 illustrates this combination of functionalities, which
we call Authorization and Access Manager (AuthAM), where the main actors in this scenario
are:
• Provider A: subnetwork of CPCSs communicating in the IEC104 protocol.
• Provider B: subnetwork of CPCSs communicating in the Modbus/TCP protocol.
• Federation equipment: a virtual switch with its corresponding SDN controller.
• Federation equipment: a database of system logs.
• Federation operator: a system operator monitoring an HMI where the system alerts are
sent.
• Federation remote administrator: a system administrator that remotely connects to the
substation to perform analysis and maintenance tasks.
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Figure 6.8: Authorization and access manager in the testbed
To validate this functionality, we set the scenario as in Section 6.2.1, where the CPCSs of the
di↵erent providers communicate among them. However, we introduce a failure in one of the
sensors of Provider A, which makes it to stop transmitting the measurements to the control
station, thus creating a system anomaly. This is rapidly notified to the HMI, and communicated
to the remote administrator to perform the proper analysis and maintenance tasks. This operator
need to establish a connection with the IEC104 server of Provider A in order to retrieve specific
logging information.
In order to manage the petitions to the critical CPCSs, the cloudlet implements an access
control procedure based on the role-based access control standard (see Section 6.3.5 for expanded
information). When an access petition arrives to the controller, it verifies the credentials sent
(by the remote system administrator in this use case) and matches it to its databases, through
the Roles Manager module and the Access Control Manager module (see Section 5.4.1). This
verifications determine if the administrator has de proper credentials to perform the requested
tasks, and depending on the situation, allow or reject the connection and petition to the critical
resource.
6.3 Definition of the Testbed: Modules and Libraries
We devote this section to describe those tools, protocols, developing modules and programming
libraries or relevance used to build our testbed.
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6.3.1 Mininet
For our experimentation, we have decided to implement our testbed usingMininet [288]. Mininet
is a network emulator able to create a network of virtual hosts, switches, controllers and links,
where the switches support OpenFlow protocol [273] in order to provide SDN capabilities (see
Section 5.3.4 for more information). Mininet networks run real code, including standard network
applications and protocols. Due to this characteristic, it is posible to develop a testbed on
Mininet for an OpenFlow controller, switch or host and move to a real system with minimal
changes for real-world testing, performance evaluation and deployment. This means, that it is
possible to move directly into HW a design correctly working within Mininet [288]. Consequently,
the development of a testbed using this network emulator makes it possible to make real-world
validations of network functions and services, thus we consider this tool to be highly interesting
for the construction of our testbed and the validation of our design.
Within Mininet, there is a simple network simulator graphical user interface, Miniedit. It is
possible to use this tool to create and run network simulations from a visual perspective, allowing
us to configure a simple network for the interoperability testbed, with two subnetworks that use
di↵erent communication protocols, a virtual switch (vSwitch) [289] and an SDN controller.
6.3.2 POX OpenFlow Controller
The controller is one of the most important components in our design, since the validation of
our architecture is based on the functions implemented by the controllers in the cloudlets. We
make use of the development platform POX [290] to implement the di↵erent components of our
controller. POX provides a platform to develop Python-based SDN control applications (such
as OpenFlow [273] controllers) supporting the interaction with OpenFlow switches, debugging,
network visualization, etc.
Since POX is Python-based, it is especially interesting to use within Mininet, since this emulator
runs Python-coded applications. Therefore, we find the POX development platform interesting
for our testbed, since it allows the user to rapidly develop and test a versatile SDN controller
prototype. In our testbed, we build the designed functions and capabilities (see Figure 6.1
and Section 5 for more information) within the POX controller we develop for our validation
studies.
OpenFlow Protocol
OpenFlow, as stated in Section 5.3.4, is an open communications protocol that allows program-
ming the flow table of (OpenFlow-enabled) routers and switches [273]. This protocol separates
the control from the forwarding plane, and therefore allows sophisticated tra c management and
network functions. This protocol allows direct access to the forwarding plane of virtual or phys-
ical network devices. OpenFlow is the first standard communications protocol developed to be
used between the control and forwarding layers of the SDN architecture (see Section 5.3.4).
OpenFlow works on top of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), it allows the controller
to remotely administrate a layer 3 switch’s packet forwarding tables, by adding, modifying and
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removing packet matching rules and actions. This characteristic entails that routing decisions
can be made ad hoc by the controller, and translated into rules installed in the switch’s flow
table for a determined period of time. Those packets that do not match the switch’s flow table
are sent to the controller to decide whether to modify the existing flow table rules or to perform
additional actions (e.g., drop the packet, deep packet inspection [291]).
6.3.3 Modbus/TCP Protocol
Modbus is an open serial communication protocol developed by Modicon in 1979 [277], which
has become a de facto standard widely used in the industrial manufacturing environment. It
provides master-slave/client-server communication between intelligent field devices for indus-
trial control applications. Especially, it is often used to connect RTUs with SCADA systems.
The Modbus/TCP protocol [265] is a variant of the Modbus protocol used to enable Modbus
messaging over TCP/IP networks.
Modbus/TCP protocol is also a de facto standard, commonly used to connect PLCs or RTUs to
SCADA systems using Ethernet connections that have to go through gateways or other types of
networks. Advantages of Modbus/TCP are the possibility of implementing concurrent connec-
tions, and the control of each individual transaction enclosed in a TCP/IP connection, which
can be identified, supervised and canceled without requiring specific actions from the Modbus
client or server. Figure 6.9 represents the di↵erent fields of a Modbus/TCP packet.
Figure 6.9: Modbus packet
Pymodbus Library
In order to include the Modbus/TCP protocol within Mininet, we make use of the Pymodbus
library [292]. Pymodbus is a full Modbus protocol implementation written in Python, which
allows easy scripting and stress testing of the developed solutions. This library also permits
the integration of Pymodbus-developed solutions into already existing Modbus solutions. Using
the Pymodbus library, we have developed a Modbus/TCP client and server which communicate
with each other in an asynchronous way, where the client requests values from the server through
the Modbus command read input registers.
6.3.4 IEC 60870-5-104 Transmission Protocol
The IEC 60870-5-101, or IEC101 [266] is a standard protocol for designed for power system mon-
itoring, control and communications for remote control and protection. The IEC101 belongs to
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the set of standards IEC 60870 for telecontrol (SCADA) in electrical engineering and power
system automation applications, where its Part 5 is devoted to the standardization of the com-
munication between systems. IEC101 supports multiple configurations and topologies, balanced
and unbalanced modes of data transfer, priority classification of data, time synchronization and
other characteristics for control of the electric power systems.
The IEC 60870-5-104, or IEC104 [7] is an extension of the IEC101 protocol, enabling communi-
cation between the control station and the remote substations via a standard TCP/IP network.
The IEC104 protocol layers are modified to use standard transport profiles, but the application
layer is based on IEC101, however, not all the functions available in the later are implemented
for the first. The main advantage of IEC104 is the communication via a standard network,
which allows simultaneous data transmission between di↵erent devices and services. Figure 6.10
represents the di↵erent fields of a IEC104 packet.
Figure 6.10: IEC104 packet [7]
One of the main commands used in the IEC104 communications is the “Interrogation Com-
mand”, the Application Service Data Unit (ASDU) Type ID 100 C IC NA 1 where the controlled
station (RTU) will send the the controlling station (SCADA system) information, in order to
synchronize or update the database. In this protocol, the RTU responds to the request with
the corresponding values through the ASDU Type ID 11: M ME NB 1, which provides measured
scaled values.
OpenMUC: j60870 Library Module
In order to introduce the IEC104 protocol [7] in our testbed in Mininet, we make used of
the OpenMUC: j60870 library module [293]. This library is written in Java, and implements
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the IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC104) communication standard. The j60870 can be used to program
IEC104 clients and servers. This library belongs to the OpenMUC software framework, which
helps develop monitoring, logging and control systems, providing the developer with the tools
to implement controlling applications without needing to know the intricacies of the underlying
communication protocol and data logging technologies.
The OpenMUC framework developed by Fraunhofer ISE has been used as a basis in various
smart grid projects. In our testbed, we only make use of the j60870 library module, which can
be utilized separately. Since this library is developed in Java, to include it within Mininet, we
need to develop separate Python modules to launch the di↵erent clients and servers for our
testbed.
6.3.5 IEC/TS 62351-8 - RBAC Standard
In our designed architecture, one of the main components for secure interoperability is the Au-
thentication and Access Manager (see Section 5.4.1). As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, one of
the main standards that support the access control is the IEC/TS 62351-8 [28] which defines
role-based access control for enterprise-wide use in power systems. This widely used stan-
dard is an access control mechanism defined around roles and privileges. RBAC components:
role-permissions, user-role and role-role relationships, make it simple to perform user assign-
ments.
In an organization, a set of roles are created in relation to a set of job functions. Those roles
are assigned a set of permissions. The company’s sta↵ are assigned one or several roles (see
Section 5.4.1). Thus a member of the organization is assigned a role (or a set of roles) which
have assigned a set of permissions to perform certain tasks within the system. The management
of this structure is simple, given that permissions are not assigned directly to users, but to roles,
and the security management is therefore not conducted at an individual level but through
groups of roles.
In order to introduce RBAC into our testbed, we make use of the Simple-RBAC library [294].
This library, written in Phyton, allows us to introduce RBAC sets of roles, resources and per-
missions easily into our testbed.
6.3.6 Other Tools and Resources
In this section we describe other useful tools we have integrated within our testbed in order
to achieve the desired functionalities, i.e., the Scapy tool, and the IEC104 and Modbus/TCP
dissectors which help us extract important information from the testbed network tra c.
Scapy is a packet manipulation program, which allows the developer to forge or decode packets
of a wide number of protocols [295]. Other interesting functionalities of Scapy are the performing
of tasks like scanning, tracerouting, probing, unit tests, attacks, network discovery, and many
other interactive procedures. Scapy is a helpful that we use to decode and dissect the packets
in di↵erent protocols, to build new packets from scratch in the POX controller, and also can be
used to generate malicious attacks to the Mininet network.
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Using the Scapy tool as a programming library, we can perform the dissection of the IEC104
packets in our testbed’s network. With this dissector, it is possible to obtain useful information
from those packets, extracting the encapsulated IEC104 ASDU and reading the function codes
and payload of the protocol. For our purposes, the IEC104 dissector identifies the di↵erent fields
in the IEC104 packet, in particular the Application Protocol Control Information (APCI) fields
in the header (see Figure 6.10 for more information), where the field seq received contains the
IEC104 code for the command type identification.
Additionally, using this same method in order to extract structured information from the Mod-
bus/TCP packets, we can use a Modbus/TCP dissector (e.g., theModbus tra c generator [296])
to manipulate Modbus/TCP packets, e.g., to extract the values obtained from the Modbus
server making use of the command read input registers.
6.4 Experimentation Results
For the validation of our design, we build a testbed scenario using Mininet (see Section 6.3.1). In
order to cover all the validation cases, we define a simple network with 8 hosts, a virtual switch
and a SDN controller. This network represents the di↵erent actors present in a cloudlet or sub-
station in our architecture design (see Section 5). Figure 6.11 illustrates our validation scenario
designed using the Miniedit tool, where the Mininet (Ethernet) connections are represented in
blue, and the OpenFlow (see Section 6.3.2) tra c is represented in red.
Figure 6.11: Mininet testbed scenario illustrating the communications in the network
Since this is a secure interoperability testbed, Figure 6.11 also illustrates the communications
in the di↵erent protocols that coexist in the network. In purple we can see the communications
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using the Modbus/TCP protocol, orange represents the IEC104 communications between the
di↵erent clients and servers in the network, in pink we show the authorization communications
over TCP. The dotted light blue lines represent the UDP notifications, and the green lines
represent the communications through the protocol converter (see Section 6.2.1).
In detail, Figure 6.12 represents the tested scenario where it is possible to identify the Modbus
communication between the Modbus client and server in the testbed and the IEC104 communi-
cation between the IEC104 client and server in the testbed (see Figure 6.11).
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Figure 6.12: Industrial protocols communications within the testbed
6.4.1 Protocol Converter
The first scenario tested is the one corresponding to the protocol converter module, in the first
validation case (see Section 6.2.1). As aforementioned, this module is a fundamental part of the
policies manager module of the SDN controller designed for our architecture, and is designed to
allow the interoperability between di↵erent nodes in the same network, that work with di↵erent
communication protocols, to interact among them and exchange information without concerns
about the translation between protocols and security policies.
In Figure 6.1 we can see the SDN controller, where the main functionalities of the protocol
converter module are illustrated: the normalization of the incoming messages, the security
policy conversion, the proxy IEC104-Modbus/TCP and the packet reconstruction module, as
described in Section 5.4.2. As we can see, the actual protocol conversion is performed through
a Transparent Interoperability Proxy that helps translate IEC104 messages into Modbus/TCP
messages.
A proxy is a computer system or application acting as intermediary in a communication between
two parties, where they send requests to each other in order to gather information or resources
from one another. The proxy is usually configured in a client-server way, where the client
connects to the proxy server requesting a service, the proxy receives the requests and analyzes it
in order to identify the best way to retrieve the information and provide it to the client. Proxies
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Figure 6.13: Transparent interoperability proxy
are used for multiple purposes, e.g., to provide anonymity [297] or to provide protocol conversion
[298], among others.
In our testbed scenario, we are in need of the use of a proxy for the protocol conversion due to the
industrial protocols used, i.e., Modbus/TCP (see Section 6.3.3) and IEC104 (see Section 6.3.4).
These are protocols that use TCP in their transport layer, and are, therefore connection-oriented
[299], which means that the actors establishing the communication need to open a communi-
cation session or a semi-permanent connection before any useful data can be transferred, and
the data is delivered in the same order as it was sent. This characteristic of TCP causes a
problem in a protocol-translation scenario, because the information exchange between the nodes
connected have to follow an adequate order, and in this protocol, the nodes always keep track
of the amount of data received and the amount of data remaining in the connection.
In order to consider these protocol restrictions in our testbed scenario, our transparent inter-
operability proxy (see Figure 6.13) is configured in a way that allows a connection with the
IEC104 client, receives the query, processes it, and launches a Modbus/TCP client to retrieve
the requested data from the Modbus network. In this way, it is possible to maintain proper TCP
connections between the di↵erent nodes in the network through the proxy, without incurring in
TCP protocol violations and NAT errors.
This configuration of the transparent interoperability proxy is similar to the approaches of
Indirect TCP (I-TCP) [300] and the performance-enhancing proxies and split TCP mentioned
in the RFC 3135 [301], where the TCP network is segmented to accomplish di↵erent purposes.
I-TCP was conceived in order to provide connectivity between the wired hosts and the mobile
wireless hosts in a TCP network. Split TCP breaks the TCP end-to-end connection into multiple
connections to overcome and address a mismatch in TCP capabilities between two end systems.
Performance-enhancing proxies are designed to improve the end-to-end performance of some
communications protocols. The basic concept of these solutions consist on terminating the
connection from one end system and originating a separate connection to the other end system.
208
6.4. Experimentation Results
The advantages of implementing this type of solution include: (i) they do not require changes to
TCP at the hosts in the fixed network, (ii) errors can be identified and corrected by the proxy,
thus avoiding them to spread through the network, (iii) the usage of this new configuration only
a↵ects a reduced part of the network, and (iv) the proxy can introduce optimization for the
communications network (e.g., optimized TCP, header compressions, change of protocol) [300].
As disadvantages for this solution we can list: (i) the loss of TCP end-to-end semantics, (ii)
hando↵ overheads, and (iii) the need for the proxy to be trusted.
Figure 6.14: Proxy protocol conversion
In our scenario, we encounter a similar problem, there exist two networks which implement dif-
ferent communication protocols, and it is necessary to establish a successful connection between
the nodes of these networks in order to exchange control information. Since direct translation
is impossible due to the di↵erences between the two industrial protocols (Modbus/TCP and
IEC104) and the aforementioned restrictions of the TCP protocol. Thus we need to deploy a
protocol conversion proxy capable of performing the mentioned segmentation of the communi-
cations in the network in order to allow the communication within our architecture, preferably
in a transparent way (i.e., the nodes of the network are unaware of the proxy converter and
believe they establish a direct connection). Figure 6.14 provides an overview of the protocol
conversion through the transparent interoperability proxy, representing the protocol stack for
both the IEC104 and Modbus/TCP protocols. It is possible to observe that each protocol layer
provides an encapsulation for the network packets, and it is necessary to filter them and to
extract the command codes in the application layer protocol in order to parse the queries and
responses for the communications between nodes of di↵erent protocols.
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Interoperability Proxy Implementation
In our testbed scenario (see the first validation case 6.2.1), the IEC104 client periodically opens
a connection with the Modbus/TCP server in order to verify the correctness of the measure-
ments taken by the IEC104 network sensors. In order to implement that, we have deployed
a transparent interoperability proxy as part of the network, that would reside in the servers
of the cloudlet. This proxy is in charge of translating the communications between the nodes
of one network and the other in a transparent way, i.e., an IEC104 node establishes a connec-
tion to the Modbus/TCP server, without noticing that the communication is passing through a
proxy.
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Figure 6.15: Proxy utilization in the testbed
Figure 6.15 illustrates the scenario, where the IEC104 communications are represented in orange,
and the IEC104 client connects to the proxy in order to request information from the Modbus
server (the Modbus/TCP communications are represented in purple). In this scenario, since the
proxy is transparent, the nodes believe they are establishing a point-to-point communication,
however all the communications go through the proxy (represented in green). The subsequent
operations performed by the controller’s proxy in order to retrieve the requested information
from the Modbus server are completely transparent to the IEC104 client.
Figure 6.11 represents the communications between the nodes in Mininet, where each of the
nodes in the testbed network corresponds to a Mininet host. Due to implementations require-
ments, in Mininet, the proxy node is deployed in a mininet network host, however, in our
design, it could be implemented as a virtualized network function within the cloudlet servers
together with the SDN controller. The transparency functionality of the proxy is implemented
at the SDN controller’s level, since it can modify the flow tables of the switch, it is possible
to install redirection rules depending on the tra c that arrives from one port of the switch to
another.
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Listing 6.1: Log for the interoperability proxy activation
Client connected using TCP/IP. Will listen for a StartDT request. Connection ID: 2
Started data transfer on connection (2) Will listen for incoming commands.
Got interrogation command. Will send scaled measured values.
We test our design of the protocol converter through the proposed implementation of the inter-
operability proxy and perform some experiments to verify the correct operation of the system.
Listing 6.1 shows the system’s log containing the activation of the interoperability proxy when
a request for communication is sent from the IEC104 client to the Modbus server (see Fig-
ures 6.15). Following to that request, it is possible to see in Listing 6.2 the logs corresponding
to the behavior of the protocol converter module: (i) firstly, a connection with the Modbus
Server is established and a request for information is sent to it, (ii) secondly, the response of the
Modbus server (in the experiment, the water level is raising to the 250 mark level) is translated
into the IEC104 protocol and sent to the IEC104 client requesting it, and (iii) finally, the data
values are verified, allowing the system to continue its operation without indicating the presence
of any incident.
Listing 6.2: Log for the protocol converter operation
#The IEC104 client needs to establish a connection with the Modbus server and sends a
request for the information
Verifying information with Modbus server ...
successfully connected
Received ASDU:
Type ID: 100, C_IC_NA_1 , Interrogation command
Cause of transmission: ACTIVATION_CON , test: false , negative con: false
Originator address: 0, Common address: 1
IOA: 0
Qualifier of interrogation: 20
#The proxy translates the request to the Modbus network and returns the information
required
Received ASDU:
Type ID: 11, M_ME_NB_1 , Measured value , scaled value
Cause of transmission: SPONTANEOUS , test: false , negative con: false
Originator address: 0, Common address: 1
IOA: 1
Information Element Set 1:
Scaled value: 250
Quality , overflow: true , blocked: true , substituted: true , not topical: true , invalid:
true
Information Element Set 2:
Scaled value: 250
Quality , overflow: true , blocked: true , substituted: true , not topical: true , invalid:
true
Information Element Set 3:
Scaled value: 250
Quality , overflow: true , blocked: true , substituted: true , not topical: true , invalid:
true
Modbus server value verified , continuing ...
successfully connected
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6.4.2 Monitoring and Accountability Managers
The second validation case contemplates the analysis of the monitoring manager and account-
ability and backup modules of the SDN controller (see Section 6.2.2 for extended information).
As we mentioned, this validation case covers the experimentation on the logger module, together
with the local monitor and the alarm manager modules, as depicted in Figure 6.1.
To test the local monitor capabilities, we have implemented a reduced IDPRS prototype capable
of performing detection and response actions in our scenario. This system contains an IDS using
a signature-based and specifications-based detection engine to detect threatening and anomalous
dynamics happening in the testbed. The signature-based module is composed of detection rules
that can be matched to known threats. The specifications-based detection module contains a
partial implementation of the IEC104 protocol, where the correctness of the protocol packets
(APDUs) can be verified.
We also provide a simplified IPRS module capable of launching varied countermeasure actions
in response to the threats posed to the testbed in each experiment. This IPRS has a static
configuration, i.e., it has a static cost calculation, a static mapping design, it provides burst
response execution in a reactive manner (see Section 4.3.3 for detailed information on IPRS
configurations). This selected configuration illustrates the operation of the response module in
the local monitor of the controller, however, in a fully-fledged environment, dynamic adaptive
solutions would be more interesting to provide more sophisticated and measured responses.
Accountability and Backup Module
Listing 6.3: Logger output for the utilization of the transparent interoperability proxy
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,468 INFO IEC104 M_ME_NB_1
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,610 INFO Modbus/TCP packet
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,618 INFO Proxy not used
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,662 INFO IEC104 packet
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,664 WARNING Transparent proxy: Redirecting Host1 to Host5
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,670 INFO IEC104 packet
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,670 WARNING Transparent proxy: Reply
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,673 INFO IEC104 packet
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,674 WARNING Transparent proxy: Redirecting Host1 to Host5
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,677 INFO IEC104 packet
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,678 WARNING Transparent proxy: Redirecting Host1 to Host5
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,723 INFO IEC104 packet
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,724 WARNING Transparent proxy: Reply
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,731 INFO IEC104 packet
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,735 WARNING Transparent proxy: Reply
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,739 INFO IEC104 packet
2016 -07 -03 23:42:26 ,739 WARNING Transparent proxy: Redirecting Host1 to Host5
2016 -07 -03 23:42:27 ,162 INFO Proxy not used
2016 -07 -03 23:42:27 ,174 INFO Modbus/TCP packet
Firstly, we address the setting of the accountability and backup module for our testbed scenario.
We have implemented this module using a Logger created using the Logging facility for Python
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[302]. This facility helps implement a logging system using a standard library module, allowing
the system to log the custom messages integrated with the messages of third-party modules. It
is possible to customize the level or severity of the events in the system using the classification:
DEBUG, INFO, WARNING, ERROR, and CRITICAL.
We introduce this logging module within our POX controller, allowing it to log any events in the
system. Listing 6.3 shows the output produced by the logger module, when recording the events
of the transparent interoperability proxy (see Section 6.4.1) utilization in the testbed scenario.
Other validation tests for this module are dependent on the critical events occurring within the
testbed, therefore we decide to test it together with the monitoring manager module, where we
launch di↵erent attacks to the system and they must be properly registered for later forensics
and accountability purposes.
Disconnection Attack
As discussed in Section 6.2.2, the first attack launched against the testbed has a low degree of
stealthiness, where the attacker causes a sensor to stop transmitting. This action is detected by
the IDS, and the alarm manager sends an alert to the HMI indicating a critical occurrence in
the control network (see Figure6.5). This alert service is in charge of notifying the operator of
any important events in the system. In the presence of an event (alert of failure, misuse of the
equipment, important actions in the system), the alarm managers should provide the human
operator with useful information about the occurrence. In the literature, some solutions are
proposed in order to filter the amount of information arriving to the operation according to the
importance and criticality of the alerts [151].
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Figure 6.16: Notification of alarms to the HMI in the disconnection attack to the testbed
In this scenario, the operator is alerted of events labeled as CRITICAL in the controller. In
order to implement this, we deploy a UDP Server in a host in our testbed, which will represent
the HMI terminal for the monitoring panel in the control center. As previously described, the
IEC104 client stops transmitting, this is detected by the controller’s IDS and a log is created.
Additionally, a notification is sent to the HMI to inform the operator of the presence of a critical
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alert in the network. Listing 6.4 shows an extract of the system logs, where the controller detects
that a CPCS in the network has stopped transmitting for a certain period of time and alerts
the operator to fix the situation. Figure 6.16 illustrates this scenario.
The implementation of this alarm manager system is based on the UDP server deployed in
the HMI host, and the capability of the POX controller and the Scapy packet manipulation
tool to create UDP packets from the controller itself to create the alert notifications. At the
same time the logger module records a critical log, the alarm manager creates an alert for the
human operator monitoring the HMI. This alarm manager module can be extended to allow
the controller to notify the operators of multiple types of threatening events to the system.
Listing 6.5 shows an implementation for this alert procedure for our testbed, where we can see
the usage of the Scapy tool to create the alert packets for the HMI operators.
Listing 6.4: Logger output for the alert of sensor not responding
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,043 INFO IEC104 M_ME_NB_1
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,044 INFO Proxy not used
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,050 INFO IEC104 packet
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,051 INFO Monitored Node H7: connection OK
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,051 CRITICAL ALERT: Sensor in 10.0.0.7 not responding
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,055 INFO Proxy not used
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,056 INFO Transmitting alert to HMI ...
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,530 INFO Proxy not used
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,542 INFO Modbus/TCP packet
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,544 INFO Proxy not used
2016 -07 -03 23:49:39 ,553 INFO Proxy not used
2016 -07 -03 23:49:40 ,077 INFO Proxy not used
2016 -07 -03 23:49:40 ,087 INFO IEC104 packet
2016 -07 -03 23:49:40 ,090 INFO IEC104 C_IC_NA_1
Once the IDS has detected the attack to the system, and a log is created, the IPRS of the local
monitor is activated in order to palliate the situation. In our scenario, the IPRS countermeasures
the attack by launching the interoperability proxy. This measure uses provider’s B control
network as redundancy and backup mechanism to reinforce the supervision operations for control
purposes.
Listing 6.5: Using Scapy to create the UDP packet for the alert notification
#Scapy creates an UDP packet for the HMI with destination IP =10.0.0.6 , port =10000 , mac
=00:00:00:00:00:06
#message contains the customized alert message sent by the controller to the HMI
a=Ether(dst="00:00:00:00:00:06")/IP(dst="10.0.0.6")/UDP(dport =10000)/message
#The controller sends the packet out of the specified switch port
#In this case the output port where the HMI is , is the port number 6 of the switch
self.send_packet(None , str(a), out_port=6, in_port =0)
Active Eavesdropping Attack
As described in Section 6.2.2, the adversary uses spoofing techniques to create a MITM attack
against a CPCS of provider’s A control network. Using this node, the attacker tries to send
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control commands to the IEC104 network. The MITM attack is implemented using the the
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing technique as indicated in [303]. This attack has a
higher level of stealthiness than the previous one, thus, the IDS has to implement mechanisms
to detect this kind of situation.
In our scenario, we provide the controller’s IDS the ability to detect invalid control requests
through a whitelisting procedure. This, together with the knowledge of the control network
(whitelist of authorized MAC addresses) enables the IDS to identify malicious requests in the
system. Therefore, when the IEC104 client sends its server a forbidden request, it is detected by
the controller’s IDS and a critical log is created. Additionally, a notification is sent to the HMI
to inform the operator of the presence of a critical alert concerning an unauthorized operation
in the network. This is illustrated in Figure 6.6. Thus, when these events are detected and
registered, the IPRS in the controller acts by filtering the tra c coming from this node while
the system operators act in order to fix the situation and eliminate the attacker’s presence in
the network.
We implement this whitelisting function at the controller, where we perform Deep-Packet In-
spection (DPI) [291] in order to extract the IEC104 function code and verify if the requested
operation is allowed. We use the IEC104 dissector together with Scapy (see Section 6.3.6) in
order to manipulate the packet and extract the adequate fields of the IEC104 protocol for verifi-
cation. In our controller, we allow the “Interrogation Command”, ASDU Type ID 100 C IC NA 1
and the response command ASDU Type ID 11: M ME NB 1. However, we filter out the “Clock
Synchronization” command ASDU Type ID 103 C CS NA 1. All these events are recorded in
the logs of the system including its timestamp and the code indicating their criticality, for later
analysis. Listing 6.6 illustrates the logger output for this experiment.
Listing 6.6: Logger output for the alert of non-authorized operation
2016 -07 -03 23:49:30 ,119 INFO IEC104 C_CS_NA_1
2016 -07 -03 23:49:30 ,120 CRITICAL IEC104: Operation not permitted
2016 -07 -03 23:49:30 ,140 INFO Proxy not used
2016 -07 -03 23:49:30 ,142 INFO Transmitting alert to HMI ...
Covert channel attack
This validation case focuses on the establishment of a covert channel between di↵erent nodes of
the IEC104 (provier’s A) network in the testbed (see Section 6.2.3). As shown in Figure 6.7,
the malware infection compromises several IEC104 sensors, as well as an IEC104 gateway. The
covert channel is established between the gateway and each of the infected sensors, in order to
retrieve uptime information from the CPCSs.
There are many ways of implementing covert channels, and many variations depending on the
protocol used (e.g., IP, TCP, Modbus). In our scenario, as proof of concept for this stealth
attack, we have implemented a covert channel propagated by malware, taking advantage of a
field in the IEC104 packet, in order to transmit information to the adversary (see Section 2.3.4
for extended information). For our example, we use the Information Object Address (IOA) fields
in order to transmit the information for the covert channel.
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Figure 6.17: IEC104 ASDU [7]
Listing 6.7: Sample code for the covert channel implementation
// Covert channel implemented using the third byte of the IOA of the first information
object in the ASDU
byte[] IOA = 0x01, 0x00, 0xa3; // third byte is a covert message
int covertMessage = new java.math.BigInteger(IOA).intValue ();
// Decimal value of covert message = 65699
boolean SQ = false;
connection.send(new ASdu(TypeId.M_ME_NB_1 , SQ , CauseOfTransmission.SPONTANEOUS , false ,
false , 0, aSdu.getCommonAddress (),
new InformationObject [] {
new InformationObject( covertMessage, // First IOA (COVERT CHANNEL)
new InformationElement [][] {
{ new IeScaledValue(val), new IeQuality(true , true , true ,
true , true) } }),
new InformationObject (1192960 , // IOA
new InformationElement [][] {
{ new IeScaledValue(val), new IeQuality(true , true , true ,
true , true) } })
}
));
The IOA indicates the object addresses for each information object transmitted within the
IEC104 ASDU packets, as depicted in Figure 6.17. Each IEC104 ASDU can contain from
1 to 127 information objects, where each object has an IOA field. The IOA has a length
of 3 octets, however the third byte is only applied for disambiguation purposes in the case
of transmitting multiple information elements within an information object. According to the
protocol specifications, “In all cases the maximum number of di↵erent object addresses is limited
216
6.4. Experimentation Results
to 65535 (as for two octets). If the information object address is not relevant (not used) in some
ASDUs, it is set to zero” [7].
Therefore, in our testbed scenario, we set the SQ bit to zero, indicating that “Each single element
or a combination of elements is addressed by the information object address. The ASDU may
consist of one or more than one equal information object. The number of objects is binary coded
(number of objects) and defines the number of the information objects.” This indicates that
we implement the IEC104 communication in a way that each information object contains only
an information element. Thus, the third byte of each IOA is never used, and a covert channel
can be set making use of this field. Specifically, we use the third byte of the IOA contained
on the first information object of each ASDU. Listing 6.7 shows an example implementation
of this covert channel, implemented using the OpenMUC: j60870 library module [293] (see
Section 6.3.4).
Type ID: 11, M_ME_NB_1
Number of objects=2SQ=0
SPONTANEOUS0  0 
0x01
0x00
0xa3(COVERT MESSAGE)
0x12
0x34
0x56(COVERT MESSAGE)
0
00
Information object 2
Information object 1
00
Identification of 
Data unit
Variable estructure
qualifier
Header
Control fields
Originator address
ASDU address fields
( 2 bytes )
Object information
Object information
Figure 6.18: IEC104 ASDU containing covert channel
In this example, there are two information objects, each of them containing an information
element with an IOA. The first IOA value would be 010000hex “ 65536dec, and the second
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IOA value is 020000hex “ 131072dec. However, in the first IOA, the malware in our system
introduces the covert channel. In this case, the malware indicates that this specific IEC104
CPCS has been working 163 hours without interruption. Since 163dec “ a3hex, the IOA value
for the first information object is transformed to 0100a3hex “ 65699dec. This is illustrated in
Figure 6.18, where we can see the ASDU packet for this example, including the covert channel
information.
Listing 6.8: Log for the covert channel communication
Received ASDU:
Type ID: 100, C_IC_NA_1 , Interrogation command
Cause of transmission: ACTIVATION_CON , test: false , negative con: false
Originator address: 0, Common address: 1
IOA: 0
Qualifier of interrogation: 20
Received ASDU:
Type ID: 11, M_ME_NB_1 , Measured value , scaled value
Cause of transmission: SPONTANEOUS , test: false , negative con: false
Originator address: 0, Common address: 1
IOA: 65699
Scaled value: 34
Quality , overflow: true , blocked: true , substituted: true , not topical: true , invalid:
true
IOA: 131072
Scaled value: 36
Quality , overflow: true , blocked: true , substituted: true , not topical: true , invalid:
true
Listing 6.8 shows the system logs produced when the communication is established and the
malware transmits the aforementioned covert messages. In the first place the IEC104 client
interrogates the IEC104 server to obtain control information, sending an interrogation command
C IC NA 1 and the response to this query transmits the covert information together with the
legitimate response ASDU which sends the requested measured value M ME NB 1.
In order to detect this type of stealthy attack, the IDS must be extremely tuned to the infras-
tructure’s dynamics to detect those situations. However, this adjustment of the detection system
to especially stealthy situations may cause the IDS to produce a high number of false positives,
and hence a high level of alarms to the operator. This situation makes it necessary to configure
a mixed IDS which uses signtature-based detection together with specifications-based insight of
the system communication protocols (see Section 4.2.1 for further information on detection). In
a real environment, this double detection engine can be improved by adding a third component,
the anomaly-based detection system in order to better detect previously unknown events.
Therefore, the inclusion of knowledge about the systems and the protocol behavior within the
detection engine permits the IDS to detect stealthy attacks such as the covert channel imple-
mented in our testbed with high precision and a low rate of false positives. In our scenario, we
program the IEC104 protocol in a way that we are certain that the third byte of each IOA field is
never used by legitimate communications (see Figure 6.17). Thus, our IDS specification includes
the indication that this byte in the ASDU must be always set to zero in the normal tra c. The
information on this byte of the packet’s ASDU is obtained by performing deep-packet inspection
of the network’s tra c. When a packet containing a value di↵erent from zero in this field is
found, the IDS’s engine consider it suspicious and an alert is sent to the operator in the HMI in
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order to resolve the situation.
While these actions are performed by the IDS and the alarm manager, in case of determining
that the existence of this illegitimate packet format is a threat to the system, the IPRS in
the local monitor takes corrective measures. There are very di↵erent solutions to address this
situation. In our example, since a malicious communication channel has been established via
this field in the IEC104 packet, we configure our IPRS to delete the information in this field by
setting it to zero, while the system operators intervene.
6.4.3 Authorization and Access Manager
In Section 6.2.3 we describe the last scenario of validation, this corresponds to the authorization
manager present in the policies manager, together with the authentication and access manager
module of our simplified controller (see Figure 6.1). As aforementioned, the authorization man-
ager completes the validation of the policies manager module in combination with the tests
performed for the first validation scenario (see Section 6.4.1) as described in Section 6.2.1.
Figure 6.19: Authorization Manager utilization in the testbed
The authentication and access manager module is described in detail in Section 5.4.1, however,
the validation tests will only take into account the roles manager and access control manager
modules, which compose what we refer to as the authorization and access manager module. We
have made the decision to omit the Identity Manager and the Authentication Manager modules
because these solutions are widely used systems present in most IT scenarios, including CIP
scenarios. Thus we consider these modules are already validated in a critical scenario and will
add di culty to the implementation or hide interesting details of our testbed validation.
To set this validation scenario, we introduce several actors in our testbed: (i) an IEC104 client
that suddenly stops transmitting due to a malfunction (hence producing a system anomaly)
and (ii) a remote administrator that tries to fix the situation (see Figure 6.19). The network
is configured in Mininet as in the previous scenarios, with the addition of the new actors. To
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implement the access control mechanisms, we make use of the IEC 62351-8 standard [28], as
described in Section 6.3.5.
Figure 6.20: Role-based connection rejection in the testbed
In this scenario, a failure in one of the IEC104 sensors makes it to stop transmitting the mea-
surements to the IEC104 server. This malfunction is logged to the system and an alert is sent
to the operator monitoring the HMI, as in the previous test case (see Section 6.4.2). After the
alert, a system administrator is notified of the failure and attempts to remotely connect to the
IEC104 server in order to retrieve the logging information for analysis. In order to do so, it
has to provide adequate credentials that allow the access and operation requested to the target
resource.
Two di↵erent situations can emerge from this interaction:
• The administrator is granted the access, given the AuthAM receives adequate credentials
that allow the administrator to retrieve the information, as depicted in Figure 6.19.
• The administrator is unable to provide adequate credentials that allow the retrieval of
information, and hence is denied the access. This is depicted in Figure 6.20, where the
non-authorized operator tries to establish the connection with the server and the access is
denied.
In Listing 6.9 we can observe the logs produced by these two situations in the system. In the
first place, an operator tries to access the IEC104 server providing the credentials: engineer,
view, IECServer, which do not allow access to this resource, thus making the AuthAM to
drop the connection. In a second place, the operator accesses the IEC104 server providing
the credentials: operator, view, IECServer, where this role gives her access to the required
resource and requested information.
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Listing 6.9: Logger output for the authorization and access manager interaction
2016 -07 -05 01:34:38 ,564 DEBUG Socket created
2016 -07 -05 01:34:38 ,564 DEBUG Server running in: (’10.0.0.5 ’, 10000)
2016 -07 -05 01:34:43 ,209 INFO Connection from: (’10.0.0.8 ’, 56972)
2016 -07 -05 01:34:43 ,246 INFO Credentials provided: engineer view IECServer
2016 -07 -05 01:34:43 ,248 ERROR Connection NOT allowed, dropping connexion...
2016 -07 -05 03:12:28 ,054 DEBUG Socket created
2016 -07 -05 03:12:28 ,056 DEBUG Server running in: (’10.0.0.5 ’, 10000)
2016 -07 -05 03:16:24 ,975 INFO Connection from: (’10.0.0.8 ’, 57065)
2016 -07 -05 03:16:25 ,014 INFO Credentials provided: operator view IECServer
2016 -07 -05 03:16:25 ,015 INFO Connection allowed, starting proxy...
2016 -07 -05 03:16:27 ,406 INFO Information received , value for the registry: -5
2016 -07 -05 03:16:27 ,407 INFO Information received , closing connection
Authorization and Access Manager Implementation
The implementation of this module is depicted in Figure 6.21, this service is deployed within a
Mininet host, together with the transparent interoperability proxy, although both services are
part of the intelligence of the SDN controllers and reside in the servers of each cloudlet of our
architecture. The AuthAM is composed of two main modules, the authorization module that
receives the queries to the system and the RBAC credentials, and a client that connects to the
server targeting the requests for information. In our case, it implements an IEC104 client in
charge of retrieving the requested data.
Figure 6.21: Authorization and access manager
When the human operator wants to connect to a node, it sends its credentials to the AuthAM
module, it verifies the roles and permissions through the access control manager and the roles
manager in the controller, and in case they are correct, it launches the IEC104 client to connect
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to the IEC104 server to retrieve the system logs. When the response is returned, the AuthAM
recomposes the response and sends it back to the operator. In case the credentials are not
correct, the AuthAM denies the operator the connection to the server.
6.4.4 Performance Analysis
In this section, we aim to analyze the general performance and characteristics of the prototype
system, as shown by the experimentations made on the testbed in previous sections. In order
to do so, we gather information about the behavior of the system in each of the three main
scenarios of validation (see Section 6.2). Once performed the experiments, we can retrieve the
information and provide statistics and graphics on the behavior and performance of the system
using tools such as the Wireshark network protocol analyzer. An example of such graphics is
illustrated in Figure 6.22, which depicts the tra c of the network and the behavior of the testbed
in the di↵erent validation scenarios described in Section 6.2. As we can see in this image, the
Mininet testbed generates real network tra c in the di↵erent protocols used (illustrated by the
di↵erent colors in the graph), and provides insight about the network utilization when each of
the validation tests are launched in the testbed.
Wireshark IO Graphs: Testbed Trafﬁc
Modbus/TCP Trafﬁc
IEC104 Trafﬁc
UDP Notiﬁcations to HMI
Proxy Activation
Operator - RBAC Auth.
Figure 6.22: Testbed tra c graph
As depicted in Figure 6.22, we can observe in the beginning of the graph the regular tra c
generated by the communications in the IEC104 network of provider B (in red), and the Mod-
bus/TCP network of provider A (in purple). Around 70 seconds into the simulation, we begin
introducing unauthorized operations petitions into the network, which are notified to the HMI
as alerts (depicted in blue in the graph). It is also possible to see the activation of the interoper-
ability proxy (in orange) and the changes in the Modbus/TCP and IEC104 networks to serve the
interoperability petitions, which are reflected by a spike in the graphic. Later in the simulation
it is possible to see (around 175 seconds into the simulation), the tra c generated in the network
corresponding to the authorization procedures in the testbed (depicted in green).
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To analyze the experiments in more detail, we break the analysis down into the three valida-
tion cases mentioned in Section 6.2. As we described, the first validation scenario is devoted
to the experimentation with the protocol converter module of the simplified controller (see Fig-
ure 6.1), where we implement this conversion using a transparent interoperability proxy in order
to provide communications capabilities between the IEC104 and the Modbus/TCP networks
(see Section 6.4.1). Once performed the experiments described in Section 6.4.1, we retrieve data
of the network tra c communications in order to analyze the behavior of our system in the
testbed and analyze the specific tra c related to the transparent interoperability proxy acti-
vation. Figure 6.23 illustrates the behavior of the testbed in the moment of activation of the
transparent interoperability proxy, where the functions of the protocol converter module are
put to test. In the figure, the regular IEC104 is represented in red, the regular Modbus/TCP
is represented in purple, and the tra c generated in the network by the transparent proxy is
illustrated in orange.
Wireshark IO Graphs: Proxy Trafﬁc
Modbus/TCP Trafﬁc
IEC104 Trafﬁc
Proxy Activation
Figure 6.23: Proxy activation tra c graph
As we can see in the figure, there is a high number of injected packets in the network when the
proxy is activated, returning to stable levels afterwards. We can see in the figure the increase
of number of packets and the frequency of emissions in the Modbus/TCP and IEC104 protocols
tra c when the communication of the proxy is established, since given the implementation of
the transparent proxy, the network tra c between the devices and the proxy is augmented. The
system returns to normal when the queries between the IEC104 client and the Modbus/TCP
server have been responded, and the proxy ends the connection.
To better illustrate the operation of the transparent interoperability proxy, Figure 6.24 schema-
tizes the communications flow of the transparent interoperability proxy in the testbed, i.e., the
communications messages between the nodes IP=10.0.0.4 corresponding to the IEC104 client,
and the node IP=10.0.0.1 which corresponds to the Modbus/TCP server (see Figure 6.15 in
Section 6.4.1), passing through the interoperability proxy available in node IP=10.0.0.5. In
the figure it is possible to observe the IEC104 petition to the Modbus server, which is “inter-
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A + B : Interoperability proxy operations
IEC104 Interrogation Command: C_IC_NA_1 (100) Act (6)
IEC104 Interrogation Command: C_IC_NA_1 (100) ActCon (7)
Modbus Query: Read_Input_Registers (4)
Modbus Response: Read_Input_Registers (4)
IEC104 Measured Value: M_ME_NB_1 (11) Spont (3)
Figure 6.24: Flow diagram for the Interoperability proxy
cepted” by the transparent proxy, and converted into a Modbus query (conversion operation A).
Similarly, when the Modbus response is sent to the IEC104 client, the proxy captures the packet
and converts the response into an IEC104 response (conversion operation B). Operations A and
B incur in a time cost, which correspond to the overhead time introduced by the interoperability
proxy for the inter-network communications. In our experiments, given that the interoperability
operations are not considered critical control commands (thus they are not optimized to achieve
hard real-time requirements), the added overhead for the operations A and B (packet processing
and normalization, deep packet inspection, protocol conversion, security policy conversion and
packet reconstruction - see Figure 6.1) takes about 80 ms. These same operations can be highly
optimized and prioritized in order to achieve real-time response times in case it is necessary to
perform inter-network critical control tasks.
In order to further analyze the performance of the testbed network in general terms, we have gen-
erated throughput and Roundtrip Time (RTT) graphs using Wireshark. Figure 6.25 illustrates
the throughput of the transparent interoperability proxy within the testbed, i.e., it indicates the
individual performance of each of the communications packets between the IEC104 client and
the Modbus/TCP server. As we can observe, in our experiments the average throughput for the
proxy-enabled communications is of about 400 bits/s. Figure 6.26, on the other hand, shows the
throughput of a regular connection between an IEC104 client and its server, without the need
of proxy-enabled communications, where the average throughput for these communications is of
about 1500 bits/s. As we mentioned before, given that the inter-network communications are
marked as non-critical for our experimentations, the transparent interoperability proxy internal
operations introduces delays on the network which entails a lower throughput for the inter-
network connections than the throughput available for the nodes of the same network.
It is possible to also analyze and measure the performance of the testbed intra-network and
inter-network communications in terms of the time it takes to send the request commands and
receive the acknowledgements and responses in the network. We can observe this information
in the RTT graphs generated by the Wireshark tool. Figure 6.27 provides an overview of the
average length of time it takes for the request commands in the network to be sent and receive
the corresponding acknowledges and responses. As we can see, in general terms the values in
the graph are low, while there are certain operations that take around 80ms to be completed
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IEC104 Client                 Modbus/TCP Server
Figure 6.25: Throughput graph of the transparent proxy utilization between the IEC104 client
and the Modbus/TCP server
(the higher spikes in the graph), these are the inter-network communications which precise of
the proxy for interoperability between the di↵erent industrial protocols.
Following with our performance analysis, we can determine the e ciency of other services im-
plemented by the controller module, for example, we can assess the performance of the AuthAM
service, which manages the RBAC profiles of the system and controls the access to the resources
of the system. Therefore, with the simulation data obtained from the third validation case (see
Sections 6.2.3 and 6.4.3), we analyze the tra c in the network generated for the authoriza-
tion process, together with the subsequent tra c generated when the access has been provided.
Figure 6.28 illustrates these tra cs, and we can observe in the graphic that the authorization
process for the testbed does not incur in heavy overheads for the system since authorization is
a procedure that takes a few milliseconds and introduces a low number of new packets in the
network. With this information in mind, we believe this process is adequate to be implemented
within a critical system, given its lightweightness.
The last module we would like to consider within this performance analysis is the behavior of
the monitoring manager module (see Sections 6.2.2 and 6.4.2). As we described in Section 5.4.3,
this module is in charge of scanning the systems and networks in the secure interoperability
infrastructure, alerting of any threatening dynamics occurring within the system, and providing
di↵erent countermeasure actions to palliate those threats. Since it is not the aim of this doctoral
thesis to design a new IDPRS for the protection of CPCSs, we produce a local monitor service
module operational for our validation scenario, which serves as a proof of concept.
We design this local monitor as a set of procedures installed directly on the POX controller
(see Section 6.3.2). In our example we do not make use of the NSM objects technology o
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IEC104 Client                 IEC104 Server
Figure 6.26: Throughput graph of the regular connection established between the IEC104 client
and the IEC104 server
retrieve contextual information. Rather, we provide a simple service functionality integrated
within the controller itself, in a way that introduces no overhead within our system. Listing 6.10
illustrates a simple process to control and discard forbidden operations taking using a whitelist
of the IEC104 protocol operations, as we can observe, this is a process which makes use of the
Scapy libraries (see Section 6.3.6) for deep packet inspection and packet manipulation and it is
lightweight enough to introduce little to none overheads within the interoperability system. The
alert manager service is also located at the POX controller, where we also make use of the Scapy
libraries to create notification and alert packets for the operator supervising the security of the
system on the HMI node, Listing 6.11 shows the simple code performing these operations.
With these considerations in mind, we can state that the performance of the monitoring manager
module must be measured according to the IDPRS implemented within it. This process needs to
be su ciently powerful to contemplate all the dynamics of the network in the area of influence
of the controller, but lightweight enough to avoid introducing any significative delays within the
system and the network. Since this processes reside on the SDN controller, i.e., on the cloudlet
servers, it is possible to use moderately sophisticated IDPRS solutions for detection, awareness
and reaction, as described in Chapter 4.
Therefore, given the performance results obtained by the di↵erent experimentations and sim-
ulations carried out in order to validate our secure interoperability platform, we understand
that the data obtained shows satisfactory outcomes for our simplified architectural model, and
therefore promising results for the general architecture proposed in this thesis.
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Listing 6.10: Monitoring manager in the POX controller, example of IEC104 functions whitelist-
ing implementation
#Received packet
pkt = Ether(packet.pack())
# Identification of the IEC104 protocol packets
if pkt.haslayer(TCP) and (pkt.sport == 2404 or pkt.dport == 2404):
logger.info(’IEC104 packet ’)
# Extraction of the TCP packet
pktTCP = pkt.getlayer(TCP)
# Discriminating the IEC104 packets
if pkt.haslayer(Raw):
# Extracting the payload from the TCP packet
pktLoad = pkt.load
# Extracting the second byte of the payload , itentifying the length of the APCI
packet in the IEC104 protocol
lenACPI = pktLoad [1]
# Differentiating IEC104 START packets , which do not contain ASDU (length <=4)
if ord(lenACPI) <= 4:
print("lenACPI: ", ord(lenACPI))
print "START"
else:
#Loading IEC104 Scapy -based packet dissector
pack = iec104prot.APDU(pktLoad)
#Call to Whitelisting functions - IDS functions for Deep -packet - inspection
#[...]
#Example of packet whitelisting by IEC104 ’type identification ’ code:
type_id = pack.apci.information.seq_received
if type_id == 103:
print "type_id: C_CS_NA_1 - Clock synchronization"
logger.info(’IEC104 C_CS_NA_1 ’)
elif type_id == 100:
print "type_id: C_IC_NA_1"
logger.info(’IEC104 C_IC_NA_1 ’)
elif type_id == 11:
print "type_id: M_ME_NB_1"
logger.info(’IEC104 M_ME_NB_1 ’)
else:
print "Other codes"
logger.critical(’IEC104: Operation not permitted ’)
self.to_HMI("ALERT on Operation: " + str(type_id))
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Round Trip Time for the IEC104 and Modbus/TP Trafﬁc 
Figure 6.27: Roundtrip time graph of the tra c in the testbed networks
6.5 Discussion
It is the aim of this chapter to analyze in depth the main characteristics and behaviors of the
secure interoperability architecture model designed in Chapter 5 through a series of experiments.
These tests helps us understand the dynamics and problems that arise at an scenario where
di↵erent CPCSs are interconnected in order to cooperate and communicate among them. To do
so, we have implemented a testbed scenario where a simplified version of our design is put to
test. With this testbed, we pursue the objective of validating through tests and experiments the
functionalities and suitability of our architecture model for a scenario where the CSs of several
critical infrastructures need to interact by means of a secure interoperability platform in order
to perform cooperative tasks in regular and emergency situations.
As we have reviewed in the literature, the diversity and heterogeneity of (remote) networks
present in current industrial systems, such as the energy industry (now turning towards the
smart grid), makes these CIs complex to manage and maintain [1], especially when dealing with
their remote field networks and substations. We, therefore, need to arrive at a solution which
takes into account these considerations and characteristics and provides secure, reliable and
e cient procedures for cooperation.
Our architecture model in Chapter 5 is designed taking into account an extensive capture and
analysis of requirements for this type of interoperability scenario (see Chapter 3), and a detailed
review of security services especially designed for CIP gathered in Chapter 4. Our architecture
(see Figure 5.3) is the final product of this study. In the present chapter, we aim therefore, to
review and determine if the characteristics described in the previous chapters are accomplished
for our design through the implementation in the testbed.
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Wireshark IO Graphs: RBAC Authorization Trafﬁc
IEC104 Trafﬁc
Operator - RBAC Auth.
Figure 6.28: RBAC authorization tra c
Due to the complexity of the design at hand, we need to produce a reduced version of the
interoperability architecture model where several of its main functionalities are tested, leaving
the complete implementation of the prototype as future work of research. In this thesis, we decide
to focus our validation on the review of the secure interoperability of the infrastructure at the
level of cloudlet (see Section 5.3), an entity in which the di↵erent SG infrastructures cooperating
through the interoperability platform can be divided on (i.e., each SG infrastructure can be
subdivided into several cloudlets, which manage their di↵erent functions and networks).
The main interoperability control unit at the cloudlet’s level is the controller, where they serve as
access points (see Section 5.3) to the interoperability infrastructure to the di↵erent systems and
devices participating in the federated infrastructure. For our experiments, we therefore focus on
the functionality provided by the controllers, through the implementation of a simplified version
Listing 6.11: Monitoring manager in the POX controller, example of the alert notification pro-
cedure to the HMI
#This is the process for the controller that creates an UDP datagram to alert the HMI
of the critical alerts
def to_HMI (self , mensaje):
#Using Scapy , the HMI resides in the host with IP :10.0.0.6 , port =10000 , mac
=00:00:00:00:00:06
a=Ether(dst="00:00:00:00:00:06")/IP(dst="10.0.0.6")/UDP(dport =10000)/mensaje
#Sends a packet out of the specified switch port (in our testbed , port =6).
self.send_packet(None , str(a), out_port=6, in_port =0)
#Logging functions for accountability
logger.info(’Transmitting alert to HMI ...’)
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of the controller as described in Section 6.1. In our validation cases, we aim to determine
whether this simplified controller provides the desired interoperability characteristics described
in the previous chapters.
Section 6.4 describes in detail the experiments performed to test each of the main secure interop-
erability functions available at the simplified controller and provides an overview of the perfor-
mance of these services within the testbed. The implementation and development of the service
modules for the simplified controller within the testbed is described in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
In the process of developing the services according to the designed architecture model and the
requirements and recommendations guiding it, we have contemplated di↵erent particularities of
the implementation of services in a real environment.
One of the important characteristics of the testbed we have developed is that it is based on the
real network simulator and emulator Mininet (see Section 6.3.1), therefore it allows us to im-
plement and run the complete industrial communications protocols IEC104 and Modbus/TCP.
The use of the real protocols makes the implementation of the testbed face real-life problems
such as the management of the protocols and services which we would have not been able to
appreciate in the case of using a simple network simulator. What is more, given that Mininet is
a network emulator, the code we have generated for our experimentations and validation cases,
i.e., the di↵erent services and modules for the controller, could be deployed with little changes
within a real production environment, and provide the same functionalities we have observed in
our experimentation. This characteristic strengthens the validation of our architecture model,
since we have been able to develop a simple version of a functional real-life industrial system.
Additionally, through the experience in the process of development, we have found three main
obstacles or considerations that shape our design:
• The implementation of interoperability services between real-life industrial protocols is
constrained by the characteristics and capabilities of these protocols, rather than the ser-
vices provided by the testbed. In architectural designs it is usual to provide solutions
which take into account the protocols’ application layer [304], however, the design concept
can interfere with the internal operation of the communications protocols at other levels in
the protocol stack, e.g., at the transport level. We encountered this kind of obstacle in our
implementation of the testbed when tackling the interoperability procedures of protocol
conversion, given that we are using the actual industrial protocols in our experimenta-
tions. As described in described in Section 6.1, we chose for our testbed the IEC104 and
Modbus/TCP protocols, which are both based on TCP. These protocols are connection
oriented, as described in Section 6.4.1, therefore, immediate protocol conversion can not
be performed as conceptualized in our architecture model. We solve this problem im-
plementing a proxy service for the interoperability between networks of the two di↵erent
protocols, however, this characteristic shapes the implementation of interoperability for
our validation case, and constrains the capabilities and e ciency of the service in this
scenario. Other industrial protocols might bring other advantages or obstacles to light
when implementing interoperability mechanisms between them. Therefore, it is necessary
to take this characteristic into special consideration, since this type of perspective arises
only at the moment of implementation of the conceptual model, and can alter or condition
the actual characteristics of the secure interoperability architecture model.
• Automatic intrusion detection is a major pillar for the security in the Industry 4.0 scenario,
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especially in an era in which cyber attacks against CIs are frequent, and they become more
and more sophisticated and stealthy. Our design (see Chapter 5) includes detection proce-
dures at a local and global level. We believe this double detection perspective will aid the
protection of critical systems against the more complex attack dynamics. In our valida-
tion prototype however, we focus on the local monitor, since we devote our experiments to
validate the controller. At the local level, the IDS module needs to be able to detect both
system anomalies and attacks against the control network. The detection engine for this
local monitor must implement a combination of detection strategies to allow it to detect
stealthy attacks. Our prototype IDS provides insight about the detection capabilities of
a signature-based detection which includes specification-based knowledge. This concept
can be developed further in order to implement a fully-fledged detection system for the
interoperability platform as indicated in its design (see Chapter 5).
• The monitoring manager module needs of a sophisticated IPRS solution capable of provid-
ing semi-to-automatic functionalities regarding reaction and mitigation characteristics, as
described in Section 4.3. The main issue with this recommendation is the lack of current
solutions that are demonstrated to be suitable for critical scenarios (see Section 4.2.4),
providing detection, prevention and reaction mechanisms that take into account the crit-
ical scenario where they are deployed, where any action that is not correctly measured
and perfectly tailored to the environment of application can unleash chains of unforeseen
events that threaten the operation of the separate infrastructure and therefore the integrity
of the whole interoperability platform. Given that this is currently an active open field
of research, we have decided to restrict the experiments on this side of the testbed and
provide only basic functionalities as a proof of concept for our experiments. However, this
is an important module of the architecture model that needs further analysis.
• Both the monitoring manager and the policies manager modules in the controller of our
original design need of the information gathered by the NSM objects deployed across the
entire interoperability platform (see Section 5.3.6). As described in Section 6.1, we dismiss
the implementation of a fully-fledged diagnosis system for our testbed experimentations at
this stage, given the complexity of the target infrastructure. As detailed in Section 5.3.6,
the diagnosis system retrieves data from all the main devices and networks present in the
interoperability platform, and the implementation of these objects or agents is conditioned
by the system where they are deployed. Intensive testing of this advanced diagnosis in-
frastructure must be performed at a large-scale network with real equipment, capable of
simulating the characteristics and dynamics of the environment in the more realistic way
possible. Due to the size and complexity of this test, we leave it as future work, however,
we consider the diagnosis system to be of paramount importance in such an environment
as the secure interoperability platform architecture model proposed in our design.
However, considering the requirements and recommendations for the secure interoperability plat-
form, as compiled in Chapters 3 and 4, and the final design of our architectural model proposed
in Chapter 5, we can observe the results of our experimentations as a whole. Throughout this
chapter, we have focused our e↵orts on developing a functional testbed capable of determining
the behavior and functionalities of our proposed design, and at the same time providing cases of
experimentation for validating our architectural model. Our testbed, which has been developed
with this objective in mind, is based on a network simulator and emulator, where we run the
real industrial protocols creating realistic dynamics (and hence encountering real-life obstacles
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and challenges) capable of accurately simulate the environment and dynamics of a real critical
infrastructure. In our experiments, we have focused on a simplified version of the architecture,
where we perform simulations to determine the behavior and e ciency of several services of the
controller module (see Figure 6.1).
We test these services through three di↵erent validation cases to analyze the operation of the
protocol converter, the monitoring manager and the authorization and access manager modules,
obtaining satisfactory results. The protocol converter module is capable of providing inter-
network transparent interoperability services for the communication among the di↵erent SG
providers regardless of the industrial protocol used, and in an e cient way. The monitoring
manager service is able to detect and palliate the attacks launched against the system, even
in the case of stealthy attacks, and issues alerts to the system administrators when presented
with anomalous situations in a lightweight and fast manner. And the authorization and access
manager is capable of providing authorization services based on RBAC, without introducing sig-
nificative overheads in the interoperability platform. Therefore, taking into account the features
of our design and the experiments, we believe our architecture model for the secure interoper-
ability of the CPCSs of the SG provides the interesting characteristics and functionalities needed
to be deployed in a federated environment where diverse CIs interact, and we are confident that
our design model is suitable for the proposed secure interoperability scenario.
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This final chapter constitutes a brief recapitulation of the work done on this thesis. We first
summarize the motivation and contextual framework that incentive and shape the research
performed throughout this doctoral thesis. We then describe the main contributions of our work,
which come to fruition with the design of a new architectural model for the secure interconnection
and interoperability of critical control systems. Finally we discuss open issues for research and
future lines of work which have been opened with the development of this thesis.
7.1 Motivation and Contextual Framework
As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, in recent years a new paradigm for the industry
has appeared, leading the way to the introduction of new concepts and technologies previously
unseen in the world’s infrastructures. This new industrial paradigm constitutes the conceptual
framework defining our work. We devote this section to review the main characteristics that
motivates the development of this thesis, providing the conceptual frame and starting point for
the research issues addressed in this dissertation:
The arrival of the Industry 4.0 paradigm introduces new research challenges in order to
accommodate the new technologies and conceptualizations within current industrial settings.
Technologies such as the CPSs, the industrial IoT, the cloud, etc. bring new actors and new
capabilities for the industrial systems into scene, which need to be addressed and carefully
considered when developing new applications and systems in the frame of this paradigm.
The incorporation of the Industry 4.0 paradigm to current infrastructures generates a need for
a new generation of control systems capable of taking into account the new technologies
and conceptual needs of this new paradigm, and provides an adequate management and control
of the new actors in the control infrastructures. We have identified for this fourth generation
of control systems three key characteristics, i.e., decentralization, security and interoperability,
which will shape the new models and architectures that arise as proposals for design of CSs in
this new environment.
Therefore, this new architectural framework created based on the appearance of the new in-
dustrial paradigm and the need for CSs capable of addressing the new challenges brought by
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the Industry 4.0, creates an interesting research gap that is the object of the investigation of
our thesis. We aim to provide a new infrastructure model for the fourth generation of control
systems which takes into account the new characteristics of the industrial paradigm, as well as
the identified essential features of the new generation of CSs.
7.2 Contributions
Once established the motivation of this thesis, we review the main contributions provided in
this thesis, according to the needs and challenges provided by this new scenario of research.
These contributions and accomplishments are described in more detail in the following para-
graphs.
Better understanding of advanced threats menacing the operation of critical infrastruc-
tures in the form of cyber stealth attacks against the control infrastructures (CCSs). Apart
from well-known large-scale cyber attacks targeting CIs and their CSs, there is a second type
of less-known and sometimes dismissed cyber attacks, based on common ICT characteristics,
which are capable of causing great damage to critical systems. We provide a review of this type
of advanced threat, analyzing the stages which these stealthy attacks can achieve, and categorize
their impact and possible threatening e↵ects according to the AICAn taxonomy. AICAn pro-
vides abstract indicators of impact and risks to critical systems, based on the security properties
of the CIs. Through this taxonomy we can classify the di↵erent cyber stealth attacks targeting
CIs and assess their level of stealthiness and penetration on the system, hence the dangers and
risks they pose to critical systems. As part of our study we review countermeasures and pre-
vention mechanisms capable of mitigating the risks and threats introduced by the studied cyber
stealth attacks.
Identification of the requirements and characteristics of the architectural model
from the point of view of SW engineering. In order to better understand the needs of
the new architecture for the secure interoperability of the CPCSs of the SG we intend to build,
we believe it is necessary to firstly provide a solid basis of knowledge which gathers the special
constraints and requirements presented by the new scenario. Following the methodologies of
the NFR Framework and the GQM approach, we create a model for our architecture which
gathers its essential characteristics in the form of goals or non-functional requirements. The
analysis of these softgoals opens the door to a better understanding of the needs of the target
architectural model, and hence it provides insight about a possible set of satisficing techniques
capable of addressing these needs and satisfying them. The last step of this analysis constitutes
a concretization of the model via the review of metrics to assess the adequacy of the model to
the context of application of the fourth generation of CSs, where the Industry 4.0 paradigm and
the key components of the CSs have to be met and satisfied. The proposed set of metrics is
based on varied reviewed standards and guidelines for the security and interoperability of critical
systems.
Analysis of the characteristics and suitability of security services and solutions for
the protection of control systems, particularly CPCSs. We particularize the application
of the previously mentioned methodology to identify the characteristics and requirements of the
security services needed for the protection of CCSs. This analysis of requirements, techniques
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and metrics provides insight about the essential characteristics of interoperability and suitability
that protection solutions for critical systems need to implement. The analysis is focused on the
suitability of IDS and IDPRS solutions for a critical context.
Methodological framework and taxonomy for the IDPRS protection solutions for
critical systems. Based on these previously identified characteristics, we review the di↵erent
security services for CIs, from basic security services such as authentication, authorization or
accountability; to advanced security measures, like prevention and detection, awareness and
reaction or restoration mechanisms. To organize this analysis we provide a methodological
framework and taxonomy for IDPRS solutions for critical systems to better understand the dif-
ferent components and processes they can implement, and their suitability for critical scenarios.
The protection these IDPRSs can provide is very varied, and is determined by the modules
they incorporate, and the mitigation and restoration processes they implement. This analysis of
security services is put into context by studying their characteristics when applied to the CPCSs
of the SG.
Design of a new architectural model for the secure interoperability of CPCSs for
the smart grid. Following the key characteristics determined for the fourth generation of
CSs, we propose a new architecture model solution which gathers the previously identified
requirements and features for the secure interoperability of CPCSs in the context of SG. This
architecture provides a decentralized infrastructure which implements secure interoperability at
two di↵erent levels. Firstly the local (subnetwork) level, where the di↵erent CPCSs interact with
the subjacent physical infrastructure and other network actors (e.g., IoT devices), implements
its secure interoperability mechanisms making use of controller modules especially designed for
this purpose. Each subnetwork contains one or many controllers capable of providing their
services to the devices in their environment (area of influence). Interoperability and security
services are provided at a global perspective by the designed cloud module which enables global
connectivity and interaction among the di↵erent networks and subnetworks participating in the
secure infrastructure platform. From a design perspective, the main characteristics devised for
the new generation of CSs, i.e., decentralization, security and interoperability, are fulfilled with
our design.
Development of a testbed and validation scenarios for the proposed secure and
interoperable architecture for the CPCSs of the smart grid. To better understand
the behavior and performance of our proposed design, we compose a testbed scenario for the
validation through experimentation of the characteristics of our architecture. The main security
and interoperability services of the controller module are implemented and tested, through
three validation scenarios of the SG, which contrast the original design with the real-world
implementation contemplating the real industrial protocols and technologies.
7.3 Open Research Issues and Future Work
Throughout the development of this thesis, we have identified some issues and areas in need of
further research. Several of them have been discussed in their corresponding chapters, however
we show them together in this chapter to have a comprehensive view of the future work and
open research lines.
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In the first place, we identify a need for providing advanced automatic and intelligent IDPRS
solutions especially designed for their application in the context of CIP. In the literature it is
possible to find numerous solutions for general-purpose networks and systems, however, their
suitability for critical systems is not certain. Furthermore, there have been research e↵orts to
provide IDS solutions especially conceived for CIP, nonetheless there are few IDPRS solutions
equally conceived, and the characteristics they provide, i.e., their proactivity and response solu-
tions, consist of a few notification features, and minimal response procedures which always need
a human supervisor. Therefore, we believe further research e↵orts need to be placed in this area
in order to create intelligent IDPRS solutions capable of establishing automatic awareness and
reaction processes for CIP.
In the process of providing the analysis of requirements for the secure interoperability of CPCSs,
we have uncovered two main issues which we do not address in our research, i.e., the validation
of the NF requirements, and the validation of the identified set of metrics. As discussed in
Chapter 3, we have performed an iterative process for the definition and refinement of the NFRs
which stops at a still high level of abstraction, hence not providing a concrete definition and
scenario of application for validation. This open issue can be addressed applying a further cycle
of refinement of the requirements in a concrete scenario for validation, and following either a
theoretical approach such as game theory, or through an expert group interview process (e.g.,
Delphi method) to determine the adequacy of the selected NFRs for the problem at hand, and
to have access to feedback about the completeness of the requirement set.
Regarding the validation of the identified metrics, we find this is a similar scenario to the
previous one. In our work, for each of the identified metrics, we provide a high-level definition,
indicating their scope and the requirements they aim to assess, i.e., whether or not the matched
requirements would have been fulfilled in the concrete secure interoperability scenario. As
discussed, it is possible to tackle the validation of the metrics using two methods: through
a formal process of validation, or through an expert group interview process, such as the Delphi
method. This process remains an open issue for research given the complexity of the scenario,
where there exist numerous actors and interdependencies, and where true validation procedures
can only be performed in a real-life concrete critical infrastructure scenario. Therefore, we believe
the validation of the proposed set of metrics can be the object of a research project that includes
a partnership with the industry, where these tests and validations can be accomplished.
In order to better analyze the features and behaviors present in the architectural model for the
secure interoperability of CPCSs provided in this thesis, it is possible to expand the validation
and simulation cases present in Chapter 6. Due to the complexity of the architecture’s design,
the validation scenarios contemplate a reduced version of the model, which focus on the main
services provided by the controller. It is possible however to implement the whole functionality
of the proposed platform, including important components such as the fully-fledged diagnosis
system or the services residing in the cloud, in order to better analyze the performance of the
secure interoperability system.
Additionally, it is possible to include within our architectural model other technologies and
protocols suitable for the Industry 4.0 scenario that are now in the process of research and
development, such as the NFV, which can introduce new redundancy and robustness mechanisms
within the CIs, and might redefine the industrial control systems of the future by allowing the
infrastructures to eliminate their constrained legacy control systems and equipment.
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Las infraestructuras cr´ıticas (IICC) modernas son vastos sistemas altamente complejos, que pre-
cisan del uso de las tecnolog´ıas de la informacio´n para gestionar, controlar y monitorizar el
funcionamiento de estas infraestructuras. Estos sistemas informa´ticos se denominan sistemas de
control (SSC) y, dado su cara´cter imprescindible para el funcionamiento correcto de las IICC,
se consideran sistemas cr´ıticos en s´ı mismos. Las IICC, de manera interrelacionada entre ellas,
conforman una intrincada red que proporciona los servicios indispensables para el buen funcio-
namiento de la sociedad (gestio´n de electricidad, agua, transporte, etc.). Debido a sus funciones
esenciales, la proteccio´n y seguridad de las infraestructuras cr´ıticas, y por tanto, de sus sistemas
de control, se ha convertido en una tarea prioritaria para las diversas instituciones gubernamen-
tales y acade´micas a nivel mundial. La interoperabilidad de las IICC, en especial de sus SSC,
se convierte en una caracter´ıstica clave para que estos sistemas sean capaces de coordinarse y
realizar tareas de control y seguridad de forma cooperativa. Esta nueva funcionalidad se con-
vierte en el escenario actual en algo vital para establecer un estatus de seguridad y robustez
que proporcione estabilidad y herramientas de actuacio´n a estos sistemas cr´ıticos en presencia
de eventos que amenacen su buen funcionamiento. Estos eventos, ya sean fallos internos del
sistema o ciberataques industriales altamente sofisticados, amenazan nuestras infraestructuras
cada d´ıa, es de vital importancia, por tanto, encontrar mecanismos de cooperacio´n y proteccio´n
que ayuden a establecer un funcionamiento seguro de las mismas.
El objetivo de esta tesis se centra, por tanto, en proporcionar herramientas para la interoperabi-
lidad segura de los diferentes SSC, especialmente los sistemas de control ciber-f´ısicos (SCCF), de
forma que se potencie la intercomunicacio´n y coordinacio´n entre ellos para crear un entorno en
el que las diversas infraestructuras puedan realizar tareas de control y seguridad cooperativas.
Los esfuerzos de nuestro trabajo esta´n centrados en crear una base de conocimiento que permi-
ta extraer las caracter´ısticas necesarias para crear una plataforma de interoperabilidad segura
capaz de dar servicio a diversas IICC, creando un entorno de consciencia situacional (del ingle´s
situational awareness) de alto espectro o a´rea (wide-area).
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A.1 Marco de la tesis, objetivos y contribuciones
Para contextualizar nuestra investigacio´n, es importante tener en cuenta el marco industrial y
las tendencias actuales que dan forma al disen˜o y las caracter´ısticas de los sistemas de control
que los manejan. Este contexto industrial en el que se centra esta tesis es la Industria 4.0,
tambie´n llamada cuarta revolucio´n industrial, que se refiere al movimiento que actualmente se
esta´ produciendo para guiar a la industria hacia la adopcio´n de nuevas tecnolog´ıas y paradigmas,
como son los sistemas ciber-f´ısicos (SCF), el internet de los objetos (del ingle´s Internet of Things
- IoT), etc. Como se puede observar en la Figura A.1, las diferentes revoluciones industriales han
estado marcadas por la incorporacio´n de distintas tecnolog´ıas a la industria (la mecanizacio´n,
la cadena de montaje, la automatizacio´n). Esta cuarta revolucio´n industrial se centra en la
aparicio´n de los nuevos componentes y tecnolog´ıas previamente mencionados en este escenario
siguiendo los principios de interconexio´n e interoperabilidad, transparencia de la informacio´n,
decisiones decentralizadas, y asistencia te´cnica [10].
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Revolución Industrial
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Automatización
Computación
SEGUNDA
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Figura A.1: Evolucio´n de la industria y de sus sistemas de control a trave´s de las generaciones,
adaptado de [1] y [2]
Dado que los sistemas de control y monitorizacio´n son tambie´n elementos claves para la operacio´n
de los sistemas industriales (junto con los principios y tecnolog´ıas mencionados), entendemos
que uno de los principales retos para la Industria 4.0 es adaptar los procesos de control utilizados
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tradicionalmente durante la tercera revolucio´n industrial a este nuevo escenario y paradigma.
En la Figura A.1 podemos observar como los sistemas de control han ido evolucionando a lo
largo de los an˜os para acomodarse a las nuevas necesidades. Comprender las caracter´ısticas y
capacidades de estos sistemas de control nos resulta de intere´s para poder extraer los requisitos
que el paradigma de la Industria 4.0 requiere para afrontar los nuevos retos y escenarios que se
presentan.
En nuestro ana´lisis no utilizaremos sistemas de control para una industria gene´rica, si no que
centraremos nuestro estudio en los sistemas de control a cargo de gestionar el smart grid (SG)
[11], el cual se puede considerar como la versio´n inteligente de la industria energe´tica tradicional
cuando se incorpora al paradigma de la Industria 4.0. En especial, y dentro del SG, nos cen-
tramos en sus sistemas de control industrial (SSCI), es decir aquellos SSC que realiza tareas de
gestio´n y regulacio´n del comportamiento de otros dispositivos y sistemas en las infraestructuras
industriales (ejemplos de estos SSCI son los sistemas SCADA (del ingle´s Supervisory Control
And Data Acquisition) o los sistemas DCS (del ingle´s Distributed Control Systems)), y en los
sistemas de control ciber-f´ısicos.
Como podemos ver en la Figura A.1, desde su introduccio´n en los an˜os 60, los sistemas de control
han ido evolucionado a trave´s de tres generaciones: la Monol´ıtica, la Distribu´ıda y la Conectada
en Red [1, 12], hasta el presente en el cual entramos en una nueva generacio´n de sistemas de
control. Dadas las caracter´ısticas de la Industria 4.0, y de los diferentes SSC existentes hasta
la fecha, esta nueva Cuarta Generacio´n de SSC se caracterizara´ por (i) Seguridad intr´ınseca al
disen˜o, (ii) procesos de control descentralizados, e (iii) interoperabilidad garantizada entre los
componentes heteroge´neos que coexisten en este escenario.
Por tanto, en este entorno donde se incluyen tecnolog´ıas tales como el IoT, los SCCF o el
cloud, se necesitan SSC suficientemente flexibles para aprovechar las ventajas que ofrecen (por
ejemplo descentralizacio´n), siempre contemplando la seguridad del sistema desde el punto de
vista del disen˜o. Por este motivo, el disen˜o y especificacio´n de las caracter´ısticas de esta cuarta
generacio´n de SSC es un campo de investigacio´n puntero que presenta numerosos retos a la
hora de crear un modelo arquitectural que tenga en cuenta las consideraciones mencionadas
anteriormente. En esta tesis afrontamos estos retos con el objetivo de proporcionar una solucio´n
a este problema, por tanto, las principales contribuciones de esta tesis se pueden resumir en los
siguientes puntos:
• Revisamos las amenazas de cara´cter ma´s sofisticado que amenazan la operacio´n de los
sistemas cr´ıticos, particularmente enfoca´ndonos en los ciberataques y los ciberataques ca-
muflados (del ingle´s stealth) que amenazan los sistemas de control de infraestructuras
cr´ıticas como el smart grid. Dado que las anomal´ıas y fallos en el sistema se han estudiado
en profundidad en el contexto de las IICC, enfocamos nuestra investigacio´n al ana´lisis y
comprensio´n de este nuevo tipo de ataques que aparece contra los sistemas cr´ıticos, y a las
posibles contramedidas y herramientas para mitigar los efectos de estos ataques.
• Examinamos e identificamos los requisitos especiales que limitan el disen˜o y la operacio´n
de una arquitectura de interoperabilidad segura para los SSC (particularmente los SCCF)
del smart grid. Nos enfocamos en modelar requisitos no funcionales que dan forma a esta
infraestructura, siguiendo la metodolog´ıa NFR para extraer requisitos esenciales, te´cnicas
para la satisfaccio´n de los requisitos y me´tricas para nuestro modelo arquitectural. Reali-
zamos este proceso de extraccio´n de requisitos dos veces, en primer lugar para extraer el
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modelo para la plataforma de interoperabilidad segura, y en segundo lugar para modelar
los sistemas de proteccio´n adecuados a la infraestructura.
• Estudiamos los servicios necesarios para la interoperabilidad segura de los SSC del SG
revisando en profundidad los mecanismos de seguridad, desde los servicios ba´sicos hasta
los procedimientos avanzados capaces de hacer frente a las amenazas sofisticadas contra los
sistemas de control. Nuestro ana´lisis se divide en diferentes a´reas: prevencio´n, consciencia
y reaccio´n, y restauracio´n; las cuales general un modelo de seguridad robusto para la
proteccio´n de los sistemas cr´ıticos.
• Proporcionamos el disen˜o para un modelo arquitectural para la interoperabilidad segura
y la interconexio´n de los SCCF del smart grid. Este escenario contempla la interconec-
tividad de una federacio´n de proveedores de energ´ıa del SG, que interactu´an a trave´s de
la plataforma de interoperabilidad segura para gestionar y controlar sus infraestructuras
de forma cooperativa. La plataforma tiene en cuenta las caracter´ısticas inherentes y los
nuevos servicios y tecnolog´ıas que acompan˜an al movimiento de la Industria 4.0.
• Presentamos una prueba de concepto de nuestro modelo arquitectural, el cual ayuda a
validar el disen˜o propuesto a trave´s de experimentaciones. Creamos un conjunto de casos
de validacio´n que prueban algunas de las funcionalidades principales ofrecidas por la ar-
quitectura disen˜ada para la interoperabilidad segura, proporcionando informacio´n sobre
su rendimiento y capacidades.
A.2 Ataques avanzados a los sistemas de control ciber-f´ısicos
Las IICC, especialmente sus SSC, se han convertido paulatinamente en el objetivo de diferentes y
sofisticados ciberataques en los u´ltimos an˜os. Los sistemas cr´ıticos son especialmente vulnerables
a los ciberataques, y los organismos globales de respuesta de emergencia (CERT - del ingle´s
Computer Emergency Response Teams) ante estas situaciones, confirman la intensificacio´n del
nu´mero de ciberataques maliciosos cuyo objetivo es causar alteraciones en el servicio de las
IICC. Especialmente peligrosos y dan˜inos para las IICC son los ciberataques camuflados, que
son capaces de causar grandes dan˜os a los sistemas cr´ıticos, o generar filtraciones de datos
sensibles sin el conocimiento de los administradores de servicio.
Existen numerosos tipos de ciberataques dirigidos a las infraestructuras cr´ıticas, cuyos objetivos
y caracter´ısticas var´ıan en sofisticacio´n (desde ataques f´ısicos sencillos para estropear ciertos
dispositivos, hasta ataques a gran escala como el gusano Stuxnet [48]). Hay mucha literatura
cient´ıfica e informes de empresas de seguridad dedicados a la revisio´n de los ciberataques camu-
flados a gran escala. Sin embargo, teniendo en cuenta el escenario de nuestra tesis, donde nos
dedicamos al estudio de los nuevos sistemas de control para la Industria 4.0, en nuestro ana´lisis,
identificamos un tipo diferente de ciberataque camuflado que no se ha estudiado previamente en
el contexto de las IICC.
Nos referimos a aquellos ciberataques que emplean me´todos y pra´cticas provinientes de las redes
de TI (tecnolog´ıas de la informacio´n) de cara´cter general, y que en esta nueva generacio´n de SSC,
donde encontramos numerosos SCCF, presentan una amenaza creciente. Estos ataques tienen
como objetivo redes y dispositivos de control que eran previamente inexistente en las IICC, y
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que ahora (si no se encuentran protegidos) introducen nuevas vulnerabilidades en los sistemas
cr´ıticos.
Para entender mejor la naturaleza y alcance de estos ciberataques, desarrollamos una taxonomı´a
para clasificar los ataques, basa´ndonos en las propiedades de seguridad Disponibilidad (A - del
ingle´s Availability), Integridad (I) y Confidencialidad (C), AIC, y extendie´ndola para introducir
indicadores que caractericen los diferentes tipos de anomal´ıas que se producen en las IICC:
Anomal´ıas Infrasestructurales (InfAn), relacionadas con eventos f´ısicos que ocurren a la propia
infraestructura; Anomal´ıas de Control (CAn), correspondientes a la alteracio´n de los sistemas de
control causados por fallos, errores o intrusiones; y Anomal´ıas de Intrusio´n (IntrAn), asociadas
a las acciones maliciosas llevadas a cabo contra la infraestructura o sus sistemas de control y que
pueden causar incidentes imprevistos. Estos indicadores se pueden utilizar de forma compuesta
indicando la aparicio´n de combinaciones de anomal´ıas, la Figura A.2 ilustra nuestra taxonomı´a
AICAn y los tipos de amenazas de seguridad que contempla.
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Figura A.2: Taxonomı´a AICAn
Como vimos previamente, los ciberataques camuflados ocurren en un escenario donde el objetivo
del adversario no es u´nicamente llevar a cabo el ataque, si no hacerlo con el mı´nimo esfuerzo
posible y ocultando su existencia y sus actividades en la medida de lo posible. Por tanto, los
atacantes hacen uso de me´todos o armas con este propo´sito: suplantacio´n, mentiras y sobrecarga.
La suplantacio´n ataca la integridad del sistema (I) introduciendo paquetes cuyo origen declarado
es diferente del origen real (algo que puede realizarse mediante spoofing de direcciones IP o
frecuencias de comunicaciones aplicadas a otros). Los me´todos basados en mentiras tambie´n
amenazan la integridad del sistema (I), permitiendo al atacante propagar informacio´n incorrecta
(por ejemplo tablas de enrutado). Las sobrecargas amenazan la disponibilidad del sistema (A),
como en los ataques de denegacio´n del servicio, donde se inyectan mensajes inva´lidos en la red
para sobrecargarla.
Basa´ndonos en nuestra taxonomı´a AICAn y en la clasificacio´n de me´todos y armas para los
ataques camuflados, realizamos un ana´lisis y clasificacio´n de los ciberataques camuflados que
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encontramos en la literatura (para redes generales) y analizamos su nivel de sofisticacio´n, ca-
muflaje y peligrosidad en el contexto de las IICC. Encontramos cinco categor´ıas principales
dentro de los ciberataques camuflados para los sistemas cr´ıticos segu´n el objetivo del adversario:
(i) ataques de desconexio´n y reduccio´n del rendimiento de la red (disconnection and goodput
reduction) [60], (ii) escuchas o espionaje activo (active eavesdropping) [60], (iii) escaneado y
exploracio´n (scanning and probing) [70], (iv) canales encubiertos y laterales (covert and side
channel exploitation) [71, 72, 73], e (v) inyeccio´n de co´digo (code injection) [73, 74].
La Tabla A.1 resume el ana´lisis realizado sobre los ciberataques camuflados, proporcionando
una visio´n sobre como e´stos amenazan las IICC en relacio´n con lo estudiado en este cap´ıtulo
(Cap´ıtulo 2). En la tabla se puede ver los diferentes ataques divididos en a´reas y categor´ıas de
amenazas, y se puede observar que los ataques esta´n estrechamente relacionados entre s´ı debido a
que los objetivos de los atacantes, independientemente del me´todo, son comunes. En la columna
denominada camuflaje se puede observar el nivel de camuflaje que aplica cada uno de los ataques
estudiados con respecto a las fases de comunicacio´n, ejecucio´n y propagacio´n del ciberataque,
teniendo en cuenta su nivel de riesgo de acuerdo a la taxonomı´a AICAn y considerando el peor
escenario posible, es decir, la ma´xima penetracio´n del ataque en la infraestructura en caso de
ser exitoso.
Por otra parte, en la tabla introducimos tambie´n una serie de contramedidas sugeridas que se
pueden aplicar para prevenir o reaccionar ante estos ciberataques camuflados. Estas contrame-
didas provienen de un estudio de los me´todos de reaccio´n y prevencio´n que se proponen en la
literatura para redes generales, y que en casos de IICC es posible aplicar con ciertas adapta-
ciones para proteger los entornos cr´ıticos. Como podemos observar, las principales acciones que
encontramos en caso de proteccio´n de sistemas cr´ıticos (SCCF y otros SSC) son mecanismos
preventivos, tales como reputacio´n o criptograf´ıa, dirigidas a proteger los elementos de control
ante perturbaciones en las propiedades de seguridad del sistema. Asimismo, la proteccio´n de los
canales de comunicacio´n se puede basar en estas te´cnicas, las cuales protegen contra ataques a la
confidencialidad del sistema. Sin embargo, ante ciberataques camuflados de mayor complejidad,
es necesario introducir otra capa de proteccio´n para el sistema que proporcione mecanismos de
respuesta y recuperacio´n automa´ticos capaces de actuar antes o durante un ataque de este tipo.
Herramientas que son u´tiles en este sentido son los mo´dulos IDS e IPS, capaces de proporcionar
deteccio´n de dina´micas sofisticadas en el sistema y alertar a los administradores de la presencia
de un ataque. Estas herramientas esta´n siendo objeto de gran investigacio´n en la actualidad,
para adaptar su funcionamiento al entorno delicado y vulnerable presente en las IICC.
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A.3 Ana´lisis de requisitos para la interoperabilidad segura de
sistemas de control ciber-f´ısicos
Como hemos visto anteriormente, pra´cticamente todas las infraestructuras cr´ıticas dependen
de los sistemas de supervision y control, de forma que las TI se han convertido en elementos
esenciales para nuestra sociedad, mejorando el rendimiento de las infraestructuras, reduciendo
el coste y mejorando nuestra calidad de vida. Sin embargo, dada la gran penetracio´n de las
nuevas tecnolog´ıas de la informacio´n en las infraestructuras cr´ıticas y la migracio´n de estas al
nuevo paradigma de la Industria 4.0, estos sistemas cr´ıticos cada vez se hacen ma´s complejos e
interdependientes entre ellas. Debido a esto, surgen nuevos y sofisticados ataques a las infraes-
tructuras que tienen como objetivo aprovechar las nuevas vulnerabilidades (como vimos en la
Seccio´n A.2) que se introducen con dichas nuevas tecnolog´ıas.
De esta situacio´n surge la fuerte necesidad de disen˜ar y crear nuevos mecanismos de seguridad
proteccio´n para los sistemas cr´ıticos, en particular para los SSC y los SCCF que gestionan el
funcionamiento de estas infraestructuras, para garantizar su correcto funcionamiento en todo
momento, manteniendo intactas las condiciones operacionales de disponibilidad, integridad, ac-
ceso, vida u´til, gestio´n y fiabilidad. Con el objetivo de abordar este problema desde el punto
de vista de la ingenier´ıa del software, dedicamos el Cap´ıtulo 3 de esta tesis a analizar los re-
quisitos y restricciones que tienen los sistemas cr´ıticos para implementar diferentes soluciones
de interoperabilidad y proteccio´n. Para ello basamos nuestro estudio en los principios de se-
guridad ba´sicos para las infraestructuras de control [21]: operacio´n en tiempo real, fiabilidad,
supervivencia, sostenibilidad y seguridad cr´ıtica (en ingle´s real-time operational performance,
dependability, survivability, sustainability, safety critical).
Partiendo de este ana´lisis, aplicamos dos metodolog´ıas, el Framework NFR [119] y el GQM
[129] para realizar un estudio que nos ayude a determinar las caracter´ısticas y el disen˜o para
la creacio´n de una arquitectura de interoperabilidad descentralizada y segura para los sistemas
de control (especialmente los SCCF) del SG. Nuestro estudio consta de tres fases: el ana´lisis
de los requisitos, la identificacio´n de las te´cnicas de satisfaccio´n y la identificacio´n de me´tricas
representativas. Centramos la primera etapa de nuestro ana´lisis en la identificacio´n de requisitos
no funcionales (aquellos que representan caracter´ısticas de alto nivel e informacio´n del sistema)
de forma iterativa para determinar el conjunto de requisitos que deben tenerse en cuenta a la
hora de crear una plataforma de interoperabilidad segura para los SSC del SG.
La segunda fase de nuestro estudio se centra en determinar los me´todos que hacen posible cum-
plir los requisitos previamente identificados. Para ello, siguiendo la metodolog´ıa NFR, propor-
cionamos una serie de te´cnicas de satisfaccio´n que permiten al sistema cumplir cada uno de los
requisitos identificados en la primera fase del estudio. Dentro de estas te´cnicas encontramos di-
ferentes subconjuntos, por ejemplo: te´cnicas que potencian la proteccio´n de los SSC de las IICC,
te´cnicas para mejorar la robustez estructural y la integridad de la plataforma de interoperabi-
lidad y de sus infraestructuras de comunicaciones, te´cnicas para garantizar la interoperabilidad
en s´ı misma, te´cnicas que permiten la integracio´n de los nodos IoT dentro de la infraestructura,
o te´cnicas relacionadas con la virtualizacio´n de servicios dentro de la plataforma.
Con el objetivo de concretar los resultados del estudio basados en las caracter´ısticas abstrac-
tas obtenidas mediante la metodolog´ıa NFR, utilizamos la aproximacio´n GQM (explicado en
detalle en el Cap´ıtulo 3) para identificar un conjunto de me´tricas que nos ayuden a analizar
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de forma cuantitativa los requisitos extra´ıdos en las dos etapas previas del ana´lisis. Las me´tri-
cas propuestas son clasificadas en los siguientes grandes conjuntos: mantenimiento, fiabilidad y
disponibilidad, rendimiento, seguridad y confiabilidad, respuesta, auditor´ıa, interoperabilidad, vir-
tualizacio´n, monitorizacio´n y restauracio´n, y autorizacio´n y delegacio´n. Cada una de las me´tricas
va asociada a uno o varios de los requisitos obtenidos en la primera fase del estudio. Cada conjun-
to de me´tricas tiene asociado una serie de controles, esta´ndares o gu´ıas de referencia tales como:
el NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [131], el NISTIR 7628
[20], el NIST SP800-82 [112], la gu´ıa NISCC [133], la serie IEC/TS 62351 [134], el NERC-CIP
[113], el ISO/IEC 27002 [135], el IEEE 2030 [11], el NIST SP800-144 [127] o las gu´ıas NFV [126].
Estas gu´ıas son u´tiles para continuar el estudio de las me´tricas, formaliza´ndolas y concreta´ndolas
teniendo en cuenta las caracter´ısticas de los sistemas donde se vayan a aplicar, en un cliclo o
iteracio´n posterior a nuestro estudio.
Un caso particular de la aplicacio´n de nuestra metodolog´ıa de ana´lisis en tres pasos es la apli-
cacio´n de este estudio para determinar si una solucio´n de proteccio´n (modular, por ejemplo un
sistema IDS) es adecuado para su despliegue en un entorno industrial cr´ıtico, perteneciente a la
Industria 4.0, junto con los SSC que lo gestionan. Para determinar esta adecuacio´n, aplicamos
nuestra metodolog´ıa de ana´lisis de requisitos te´cnicas y me´tricas para identificar las caracter´ısti-
cas necesarias para que las soluciones de deteccio´n y proteccio´n para los SSC sean compatibles
con la IC y su entorno cr´ıtico. Realizamos este proceso para un mo´dulo IDS gene´rico, pero ser´ıa
igualmente factible realizar el estudio para cualquier solucio´n modular que se quiera incorporar
en este contexto. Posteriormente, dados un sistema de proteccio´n concreto y una infraestruc-
tura en particular, ser´ıa posible finalizar las iteraciones de refinamiento de requisitos, te´cnicas
y me´tricas para entender en profundidad las caracter´ısticas de este sistema y su adecuacio´n,
cuantificada, a la infraestructura cr´ıtica concreta fruto del ana´lisis.
A.4 Servicios para la interoperabilidad segura de sistemas de
control ciber-f´ısicos
En esta seccio´n estudiamos los diferentes servicios de seguridad que precisa una arquitectu-
ra de interoperabilidad descentralizada para los SCCF que controlan el SG, de acuerdo a los
componentes clave y caracter´ısticas que impone el paradigma de la Industria 4.0 para la nueva
generacio´n de SSc. Estos servicios de seguridad forman parte de las caracter´ısticas clave para la
cuarta generacio´n de SSC, garantizando su correcto funcionamiento, la interoperabilidad de sus
componentes, y evitando que las amenazas que ocurren en el sistema se extiendan a trave´s de
los componentes interrelacionados del sistema en forma de efecto en cascada.
Dividimos los servicios para la interoperabilidad segura de los SCCF (en particular, para los SSC
en general) en cuatro categor´ıas diferentes, como podemos ver en la Figura A.3: los Servicios
de Seguridad Ba´sicos, los servicios de Prevencio´n y Deteccio´n, los servicios de Consciencia y
Reaccio´n, y los servicios de Restauracio´n. Estos mo´dulos, o conjuntos de servicios ayudan a
introducir la interoperabilidad segura para los SCCF en las IICC, en especial en nuestro ana´lisis
particularizamos la seguridad en el smart grid.
El primer mo´dulo se refiere a los servicios ba´sicos de seguridad que deben estar presentes a
cualquier nivel de la infraestructura de interoperabilidad para que e´sta sea segura. Servicios
245
Ape´ndice A. Resumen
Servicios de Seguridad Básicos
Servicios de Seguridad
Prevención y 
Detección
Consciencia 
y Reacción Restauración
Figura A.3: Servicios de seguridad
como la autenticacio´n, la autorizacio´n, y la responsabilidad (en ingle´s accountability) deben
formar parte de la infraestructura de interoperabilidad para los SCCF del SG, y ser utilizados
por todos los actores de la plataforma. Una vez establecida la presencia de estos servicios ubicuos,
se pueden desplegar los servicios de seguridad avanzados (ver la Figura A.3) que mencionamos
previamente.
El primero de estos servicios de seguridad avanzado se centra en la prevencio´n y deteccio´n
temprana de cualquier evento amenazante para los SSC (las IICC en general). Estos servicios
deben estar localizados en diferentes secciones de la infraestructura de control del sistema, y
monitorizar la operacio´n de la infraestructura de interoperabilidad en s´ı misma para detectar
posibles dina´micas peligrosas en los sistemas y lanzar mecanismos de mitigacio´n para evitar fallos
en cascada propaga´ndose por los sistemas cr´ıticos interconectados. En el Cap´ıtulo 4 se describen
en profundidad estos servicios, de entre los cuales destacamos las soluciones IDS. En nuestro
ana´lisis defendemos la necesidad de proporcionar soluciones de monitorizacio´n inteligentes y
automa´ticas, capaces de aprender y adaptarse a las diferentes dina´micas que ocurren en las IICC,
siempre y cuando estas soluciones respeten y cumplan los requisitos y restricciones que presentan
las IICC para desplegar herramientas de proteccio´n (como se vio en el Cap´ıtulo 3).
El segundo mo´dulo de servicios avanzados de seguridad comprende aquellos servicios centrados
en la implementacio´n de estados de consciencia y mecanismos de reaccio´n para la infraestruc-
tura. Estos mecanismos ayudan a establecer y mantener un estado de consciencia del entorno
o contexto (situational awareness) y monitorizar el funcionamiento de la infraestructura (refi-
rie´ndonos a la IC en s´ı misma y a sus SSC), que permiten gestionar ra´pidamente los diferentes
eventos del sistema de forma inteligente, automatizada y proporcionada. Existen diferentes im-
plementaciones posibles para las capacidades que se requieren, sin embargo, en nuestro estudio
defendemos la necesidad de soluciones de reaccio´n proactivas e inteligentes capaces de prevenir
amenazas a la infraestructura desde el minuto cero, para evitar cualquier dan˜o que se pueda
producir a la IC y al delicado funcionamiento de los sistemas cr´ıticos.
El tercer y u´ltimo componente de los servicios de seguridad para la interoperabilidad de los
SCCF del SG corresponde con las herramientas y soluciones para la restauracio´n de los servicios
de la infraestructura. Estos mecanismos son activados y se hacen cargo de recuperar el correcto
funcionamiento del sistema cuando un evento amenazador ha producido un impacto en la in-
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fraestructura (fallos, degradacio´n del rendimiento del sistema o de sus redes de comunicacio´n,
etc.). Existen te´cnicas variadas para implementar medidas de restauracio´n, sin embargo, nor-
malmente implican la introduccio´n de elementos redundantes y de backup en la infraestructura
para realizar las tareas de recuperacio´n. Pese a esto, las medidas de restauracio´n deben estar
presentes a todos los niveles de la arquitectura de un sistema cr´ıtico, dado que cualquier fa-
llo o error en el sistema puede desequilibrar el funcionamiento de la IC y debe ser remediado
inmediatamente.
Una vez descritos los diferentes servicios de seguridad necesarios para una plataforma de inter-
conexio´n e interoperabilidad segura para los SCCF, analizamos estas te´cnicas y mecanismos en
el contexto de las distintas redes de una infraestructura SG. En este escenario, analizamos las
te´cnicas y tecnolog´ıas espec´ıficas aplicables a cada seccio´n de la infraestructura, por ejemplo las
fa´bricas, subestaciones, o las redes de los vecindarios, estudiando en cada caso las caracter´ısti-
cas y requisitos espec´ıficos para estos dominios, y la adecuacio´n de las te´cnicas mencionadas
para cada uno de ellos. Como en secciones anteriores, sostenemos que es necesaria la inclusio´n
de mecanismos de seguridad automa´ticos e inteligentes en estos escenarios, para proporcionar
sistemas de vigilancia y seguridad capaces de conseguir una deteccio´n, prevencio´n y proteccio´n
eficaces para los sistemas cr´ıticos.
A.5 Disen˜o de una plataforma de interoperabilidad segura para
sistemas de control ciber-f´ısicos
El Cap´ıtulo 5 de esta tesis se centra en proponer un disen˜o en forma de modelo arquitectural para
la interoperabilidad segura de los SSC, y en particular los SCCF, del SG. En nuestro escenario,
contemplamos las interacciones y cooperacio´n entre diferentes proveedores de SG que forman una
federacio´n. Dichos proveedores intercambian informacio´n cr´ıtica sobre determinadas funciones de
sus infraestructuras y comparten tareas de gestio´n y mantenimiento de algunas de las partes de
sus infraestructuras que manejan en comu´n. Tambie´n comparten la responsabilidad para asistir
y manejar sus sistemas cr´ıticos cuando ocurren eventos peligrosos dentro de sus respectivas
infraestructuras o en las a´reas comunes, proporcionando me´todos adecuados para la proteccio´n,
mitigacio´n, respuesta y restauracio´n de sus sistemas.
Para crear este modelo arquitectural, basamos nuestro disen˜o en el ana´lisis detallado que se
presenta en los Cap´ıtulos 3, 4 y 2 de la tesis, donde se extraen los principales requisitos, reco-
mendaciones y te´cnicas para conseguir la interoperabilidad segura entre sistemas cr´ıticos y se
define un modelo de amenazas para la plataforma a tener en cuenta. Dado que este escenario
contempla diferentes tecnolog´ıas muy heteroge´neas (como mencionamos previamente coexisten
sistemas anticuados con nuevas tecnolog´ıas como fog computing, sensores inala´mbricos, etc.),
definimos nuestra arquitectura como perteneciente al paradigma de la industria 4.0, donde se
deben tener en cuenta que los SCCF, las tecnolog´ıas del cloud, los dispositivos IoT deben estar
correctamente integrados e interactuar de forma eficiente y cooperativa con la infraestructura
cr´ıtica subyacente.
Por tanto, proponemos un modelo arquitectural para la interoperabilidad segura de los SSC del
SG, tal y como esta´ ilustrado en la Figura A.4. Como podemos observar en la figura, propone-
mos un escenario de interoperabilidad para diferentes infraestructuras de SG (la federacio´n de
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proveedores de energ´ıa), cada una comprendida de diferentes subredes y sistemas remotos. Pre-
sentamos un entorno distribuido y descentralizado que hace uso de tecnolog´ıas cloud y fog para
permitir la inclusio´n de otros sistemas dentro de la infraestructura, como por ejemplo los sen-
sores inala´mbricos y el IoT, contemplando por tanto un escenario donde las nuevas tecnolog´ıas
de la industria 4.0 esta´n representadas.
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Figura A.4: Infraestructura para la interoperabilidad segura del smart grid
La Figura A.4 presenta, por tanto, nuestra aproximacio´n para resolver la interoperabilidad se-
gura de los SCCF del SG, en esta figura se puede diferenciar un mo´dulo central representando
la infraestructura cloud, que sustenta la interoperabilidad entre actores de la plataforma a nivel
global. Existen diferentes clouds ma´s pequen˜os, denominados cloudlets, que representan al a
infraestructura de fog computing, desplegada a nivel ma´s bajo en la arquitectura, es decir, re-
lacionadas con cada sector independiente de las infraestructuras (subestaciones, redes remotas,
etc.). Dentro de cada uno de estos cloudlets, es posible encontrar uno o varios controladores, que
sirven como puntos de acceso inteligentes para los dispositivos de la plataforma, y que permiten
realizar las principales tareas de interoperabilidad para la infraestructura. Finalmente, podemos
observar que en la figura esta´n representadas diversos tipos de redes de redes de control per-
tenecientes a las infraestructuras SG, tales como redes corporativas, redes remotas de control,
subsestaciones SG, o redes de control IoT.
Cada uno de los mo´dulos controladores presentes en la Figura A.4 (denotados por A) proporciona
una serie de servicios a la infraestructura que esta´n descritos a parte en la Figura A.5. Igualmente,
los servicios proporcionados por el cloud (denotados por B) esta´n ilustrados separadamente en
la Figura A.6. Adicionalmente, existe otro mo´dulo ilustrado dentro de la plataforma que esta´
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Figura A.5: Servicios ofrecidos por los mo´dulos controlador
representado por un candado verde, este se refiere a los servicios de seguridad y monitorizacio´n
avanzados incluidos dentro de la infraestructura, que quedan ilustrados en la Figura A.7. Como
podemos ver en estas figuras, nuestro modelo propuesto contiene las siguientes tecnolog´ıas y
caracter´ısticas:
• Mecanismos de control de acceso, para permitir autenticar a los diferentes actores del
sistema, siempre en l´ınea con los servicios de seguridad ba´sicos previamente identificados
(ver Seccio´n A.4). Para proporcionar control de acceso, hacemos uso del esta´ndar RBAC
definido en el documento IEC/TS 62351-8 [28].
• Soluciones de redes definidas por software (del ingle´s Software Defined Networking - SDN),
que permiten la inclusio´n de nuevos y sofisticados mecanismos a nivel de subred, que per-
miten soluciones de enrutado novedosas, al igual que procedimientos de interoperabilidad,
prevencio´n avanzada, consciencia y proteccio´n.
• Infraestructuras cloud y fog, que permiten la introduccio´n de servicios virtualizados, la
inclusio´n de soluciones de enrutado sofisticadas basadas en el paradigma SDN, soporte
adicional para los procesos de interoperabilidad, al igual que medios para mejorar la fia-
bilidad y supervivencia de una infraestructura operativa para los SCCF del SG.
• Una estrategia de defensa en profundidad (ver Figura A.7) que implementa procedimientos
de seguridad a diferentes niveles, garantizando que siempre esta´n presentes los servicios
de seguridad ba´sicos para la plataforma (ver Seccio´n A.4). Esta estrategia incluye la uti-
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Figura A.6: Servicios ofrecidos por el cloud
lizacio´n de un sistema de diagno´stico sofisticado en todo el conjunto de la plataforma,
basado en el esta´ndar IEC/TS 62351-7 [142]. Este esta´ndar describe la especificacio´n de
los objetos NSM, desplegados dentro de la infraestructura de control para recoger infor-
macio´n de monitorizacio´n y del contexto de la plataforma para proporcionar gu´ıas a los
procedimientos de interoperabilidad y seguridad.
• La implementacio´n de mecanismos de delegacio´n para asegurar que los eventos cr´ıticos
se atienden ra´pidamente y en todo momento dentro de la infraestructura, incluso cuan-
do el personal asignado para hacerse cargo de estas situaciones no esta´ disponible. Para
implementar esta caracter´ıstica, hacemos uso del modelo RBAC con roles primarios y se-
cundarios que pueden ser activados en casos de emergencia. El uso de roles secundarios, al
igual que los mecanismos de delegacio´n basados en te´cnicas de proxy re-encryption permite
que diferentes miembros de la federacio´n de proveedores del SG puedan hacerse cargo de
eventos cr´ıticos que ocurren en cualquier parte de la plataforma de interoperabilidad se-
gura, proporcionando de esta forma mecanismos de proteccio´n y mitigacio´n robustos para
la infraestructura.
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A.6 Experimentacio´n y validacio´n del modelo arquitectural pro-
puesto
Una vez disen˜ado el modelo arquitectural para la interoperabilidad segura de SSC en entornos
cr´ıticos, es nuestro objetivo analizar en profundidad las principales caracter´ısticas y compor-
tamientos del modelo descrito a trave´s de una serie de experimentos. Estos experimentos nos
ayudan a entender mejor las dina´micas y los problemas que aparecen en un escenario interco-
nectado y complejo, donde los SCCF interoperan para comunicarse y colaborar entre ellos. Para
ello, creamos un escenario de pruebas (testbed) donde implementamos una versio´n simplificada
de nuestro disen˜o para comprobar su funcionamiento. Con la creacio´n de este testbed, nuestra
intencio´n es validar a trave´s de pruebas y experimentos la funcionalidad y la adecuacio´n de nues-
tro modelo arquitectural al escenario en el cual los SSC de diferentes IICC necesitan interactuar
v´ıa la plataforma de interoperabilidad segura, para realizar tareas de forma cooperativa.
Dada la complexidad del disen˜o de nuestro modelo arquitectural (ver Seccio´n A.5), para nuestros
experimentos creamos una versio´n reducida de la plataforma para la interoperabilidad segura
de SSC, donde probamos algunas de sus funcionalidades principales, dejando la implementacio´n
del prototipo en su totalidad como trabajo futuro. En esta tesis, nos centramos en la validacio´n
de la funcionalidad de interoperabilidad segura de la infraestructura a nivel de cloudlet, que
es la entidad que proporciona interoperabilidad a los diferentes dispositivos conectados a la
plataforma a nivel de subred.
El principal mo´dulo de interoperabilidad a nivel de cloudlet es el controlador, que cumple las
funciones de punto de acceso a la infraestructura de interoperabilidad para los diferentes sistemas
y dispositivos que participan en la infraestructura federada. Para nuestros experimentos, nos
centramos principalmente en la funcionalidad proporcionada por estos controladores, a trave´s de
la implementacio´n de una versio´n simplificada del controlador descrito en la seccio´n anterior. En
nuestros casos de validacio´n intentamos determinar si este controlador simplificado proporciona
las caracter´ısticas de interoperabilidad deseadas para nuestra infraestructura.
Creamos nuestro testbed para las simulaciones y experimentaciones haciendo uso del simulador
y emulador de red Mininet (ver Cap´ıtulo 6), que nos permite incorporar protocolos de comunica-
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cio´n industrial reales dentro del testbed. Hacemos uso de los protocolos IEC104 y Modbus/TCP
en nuestro sistema. Esta posibilidad de incorporar protocolos reales, hace que nuestra implemen-
tacio´n vaya ma´s alla´ de una simple simulacio´n, y nos permite adentrarnos en el funcionamiento
de la interoperabilidad desde un punto de vista realista, haciendo frente a problemas reales de
comunicaciones y a las dificultades que se encontrar´ıan al desplegar el sistema real. Esta carac-
ter´ıstica permite validar en la medida de lo posible nuestro modelo arquitectural, ya que hemos
podido desarrollar una versio´n simple de un sistema industrial real operativo, que puede ser
migrado a un entorno real realizando pocos cambios en la implementacio´n.
Realizamos los experimentos en nuestro testbed con tres casos de validacio´n centrados en anali-
zar la operacio´n del mo´dulo conversor de protocolos, el gestor de monitorizacio´n en conjunto con
el servicio de accountability y el mo´dulo gestor de autorizacio´n y acceso (ver Figura A.5, para
ma´s detalles ver Cap´ıtulo 6). El mo´dulo conversor de protocolos es capaz de proporcionar servi-
cios de interoperabilidad transparente inter-red para los diferentes proveedores de SG presentes
en la federacio´n, de forma eficiente y sin verse afectados por el protocolo industrial utilizado.
El servicio de gestio´n de la monitorizacio´n se encarga de detectar anomal´ıas y ataques al sis-
tema, independientemente del grado de camuflaje (stealthiness) del ataque, y de proporcionar
respuestas adecuadas para paliar las amenazas generadas en el sistema, al igual que notificar
v´ıa alertas a los administradores del sistema para hacerse cargo de estas situaciones anormales.
El mo´dulo de gestor de acceso y autorizacio´n proporciona sus servicios basados en RBAC sin
introducir costes (computacionales o de red) significativos en la plataforma de interoperabilidad.
Por tanto, teniendo en cuenta las caracter´ısticas de nuestro disen˜o, y los experimentos llevados
a cabo, creemos que nuestro modelo arquitectural para la interoperabilidad segura de los SCCF
del SG proporciona caracter´ısticas y funcionalidades interesantes, muy necesarias a la hora de
desplegarse en un entorno federado donde interactu´an diversas IICC. Estamos convencidos de
que este disen˜o es adecuado para el escenario propuesto de interoperabilidad segura.
A.7 Conclusiones y trabajo futuro
Esta tesis doctoral se ha centrado en el ana´lisis y disen˜o de un sistema de interoperabilidad
segura para los SSC de las infraestructuras cr´ıticas. En especial centramos nuestro estudio en
los SCCF de las infraestructuras de SG en un entorno federado donde diversos proveedores de
energ´ıa se comunican y coordinan para llevar a cabo diversas tareas de forma cooperativa. Este
escenario esta´ enmarcado en el nuevo paradigma industrial denominado Industria 4.0, el cual
constituye un marco de trabajo conceptual en el que desarrollamos nuestro trabajo centra´ndonos
en las redes de control industriales y las caracter´ısticas que estas precisan para proporcionar las
funcionalidades de interoperabilidad segura propuestas. Tres caracter´ısticas clave gu´ıan nuestro
disen˜o: la descentralizacio´n, la seguridad y la interoperabilidad. De acuerdo a estas caracter´ısticas,
desarrollamos nuestro trabajo de tesis, durante el cual afrontamos las necesidades y los retos
que plantea el escenario sugerido, y podemos establecer las principales contribuciones de esta
tesis:
• Mejora de la comprensio´n de amenazas avanzadas contra el funcionamiento normal de las
IICC, en forma de ciberataques camuflados contra las infraestructuras de control. Realiza-
mos un extenso ana´lisis y revisio´n de la literatura relacionada, trasladando al entorno de
las IICC ciberataques camuflados contra redes convencionales que pueden tener especial
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impacto y relevancia en redes de control de sistemas cr´ıticos.
• Identificacio´n de los requisitos y caracter´ısticas del modelo arquitectural desde el punto de
vista de la ingenier´ıa del software. Para comprender mejor las necesidades de una nueva
arquitectura para la interoperabilidad segura de los SCCF del SG, debemos proporcionar
en primer lugar una base de conocimiento so´lida que recoja los principales requisitos y
restricciones que se presentan en este nuevo escenario.
• Ana´lisis de las caracter´ısticas y adecuacio´n de servicios de seguridad y soluciones de pro-
teccio´n para SSC, particularmente SCCF. Estudiamos los requisitos, restricciones y carac-
ter´ısticas que deben proporcionar las soluciones de proteccio´n para poder ser desplegados
en entornos cr´ıticos de forma que lleven a cabo su funcionalidad de forma adecuada y sin
causar ningu´n impacto sobre el rendimiento de la infraestructura subyacente.
• Marco de trabajo y taxonomı´a para los sistemas de proteccio´n IDPRS para sistemas cr´ıti-
cos. Teniendo en cuenta los requisitos previamente estudiados, revisamos los diferentes
servicios de seguridad disponibles para las IICC, desde aquellos servicios ba´sicos, hasta los
ma´s avanzados y sofisticados. Estudiando en cada caso sus caracter´ısticas, adecuacio´n y
beneficios aportados a los SSC donde pueden ser desplegados.
• Disen˜o de un nuevo modelo arquitectural para la interoperabilidad segura de los SCCF del
SG. Esta arquitectura propone una infraestructura descentralizada capaz de proporcionar
servicios de interoperabilidad a nivel local (subred - subestacio´n) a trave´s de mo´dulos
controladores, y a nivel global (infraestructura - federacio´n de proveedores) a trave´s de los
servicios de infraestructuras cloud.
• Desarrollo de un testbed y escenarios de validacio´n para el modelo arquitectural propuesto,
que permiten entender mejor el comportamiento y el rendimiento del disen˜o propuesto,
donde se prueban algunos de los principales servicios del mo´dulo controlador de nuestro
disen˜o.
Teniendo en cuenta estas contribuciones, tambie´n cabe destacar aquellos asuntos y a´reas de
intere´s que hemos podido identificar a lo largo del desarrollo de nuestro trabajo, cuyo a´mbito
excede el estudio realizado en esta tesis. En primer lugar, hemos identificado la necesidad de
profundizar en la investigacio´n para conseguir soluciones de proteccio´n IDPRS automa´ticas e
inteligentes especialmente desarrolladas para su aplicacio´n en el contexto de la proteccio´n de las
infraestructuras cr´ıticas. Actualmente existen pocas de estas herramientas, y su funcionalidad
es muy limitada y restringida.
Durante el proceso iterativo de la extraccio´n y ana´lisis de los requisitos para la interoperabilidad
segura de los SSC, hemos tomado la decisio´n de disen˜o de parar nuestro proceso iterativo en un
paso previo a la validacio´n de requisitos y me´tricas, dado que para ello precisamos de un escenario
de aplicacio´n concreto y real donde llevarlo a cabo. Esta u´ltima iteracio´n de especificacio´n queda
como trabajo futuro y sera´ espec´ıfica para cada caso de aplicacio´n, ya que los requisitos y las
me´tricas relevantes a cada tipo de infraestructura cr´ıtica y a cada subsistema espec´ıfico variara´n
de acuerdo a sus caracter´ısticas inherentes.
Para analizar en su totalidad las caracter´ısticas y comportamiento del modelo arquitectural pro-
puesto en esta tesis, es posible ampliar los casos de validacio´n propuestos en el Cap´ıtulo 6 de
validacio´n, extendiendo el prototipo disen˜ado con las dema´s funcionalidades propuestas en el
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Cap´ıtulo 5 de disen˜o. Debida la complejidad del disen˜o original, en esta tesis se proporciona un
prototipo de validacio´n con funcionalidades limitadas a los principales servicios de interopera-
bilidad segura, pero es posible completar el estudio desarrollando el modelo completo.
De forma adicional, es posible incluir en nuestro modelo arquitectural otras tecnolog´ıas y pro-
tocolos diferentes que sean compatibles con el escenario de la Industria 4.0, tales como la tec-
nolog´ıa NFV (del ingle´s Network Functions Virtualization), que permitira´n introducir nuevas
caracter´ısticas que mejoren la redundancia y la robustez de las IICC, y quiza´ puedan redefinir
los sistemas de control del futuro, permitiendo a las infraestructuras eliminar sus sistemas y
equipos ma´s anticuados, sustituye´ndolos por tecnolog´ıas modernas.
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